Opinion
CASE NO. 07-CV-0196 W (POR).
June 19, 2008
ORDER ADOPTING REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION (Doc. No. 24)
On January 29, 2007, Petitioner David Dion Watkins ("Watkins" or "Petitioner"), a state prisoner proceeding pro se, commenced this habeas corpus petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Watkins challenges his San Diego County Superior Court conviction for one count of murder, one count of robbery, one count of willful cruelty to an elder, and one count of burglary. ( Lodgment 2, vol. 3 at 722-26.) On April 4, 2008, United States Magistrate Judge Louisa S. Porter issued a Report and Recommendation ("Report") recommending that the Court deny Watkins's habeas request. (Doc. No. 24.) On April 22, 2008, Watkins timely submitted Objections. (Doc. No. 26.) The Court decides the matter on the papers submitted and without oral argument. See S.D. Cal. Civ. R. 7.1. (d. 1). For the reasons discussed below, the Court ADOPTS the Report, OVERRULES Watkins's Objections, and DENIES the Petition.
I. BACKGROUND
On October 20, 2001, Watkins killed eighty-two-year-old widow Lillie Mae Brown by repeatedly stabbing and strangling her. ( Lodgment 7 at 2.) Police officers responding to Brown's house found it in disarray, though the officers found no sign of forced entry. ( Id.) The officers took fingerprints from a jar, a bathroom counter and toilet, a telephone in the master bedroom, and jewelry boxes in the house. ( Id.) The officers also found a jacket on the dining room floor. ( Id.) The fingerprints and jacket were later identified as belonging to Watkins. ( Id.)
On October 21, 2001, a friend of Watkins informed police that Watkins had attempted to sell her some jewelry the previous evening. ( Id.) Detectives James Hergenroeather ("Hergenroeather") and Michael Ott ("Ott") arrested Watkins on an outstanding misdemeanor warrant and took him to police headquarters for questioning. ( Id.) At the outset of the interview, Watkins informed the detectives that he had consumed beer and smoked crack cocaine shortly before his arrest. ( Id.) Before advising him of his Miranda rights, Hergenroeather asked Watkins whether he had tried to sell some jewelry the night before. ( Id.) Watkins denied having any jewelry in his possession. ( Id.)
Following Watkins's initial denial, Hergenroeather told Watkins that he had to do the "[o]l' Jack Webb thing," and advised Watkins of his Miranda rights. ( Pet. at 27; Petr.'s Ex. D.) Following the advisement, Watkins indicated that he understood his rights and continued to answer the officers' questions. ( Lodgment 7 at 3.) Watkins continued to deny that he knew about or had any of Brown's jewelry, though he admitted to the officers that he was one of the few people that Brown would allow in her home. ( Id.) He stated that he performed yard work for Brown the previous afternoon and that he entered her home at that time. ( Id. at 2-3.) Watkins also claimed that James Lauderdale (a.k.a. "Cigarette Man") gave him some jewelry and clocks to sell, and that he sold those items for crack cocaine. ( Id. at 3.) However, Watkins consistently denied any involvement in Brown's murder. ( Id.)
The Court has renumbered the pages of Watkins' petition sequentially to aid in referring to the proper pages.
After being questioned, Watkins took Hergenroeather and Ott to his girlfriend's apartment, where the detectives recovered clocks, jewelry, and other items belonging to Brown. ( Id.) Upon returning to the police station, the detectives resumed questioning Watkins. ( Id.) At that time, Watkins requested several times to speak to an attorney. ( Id.; Lodgment 5 at 60-62.) The detectives subsequently, albeit not immediately, ceased questioning Watkins. ( Lodgment 7 at 3.)
Several hours after Watkins's initial interrogation, officers tested Watkins's blood for alcohol and drugs. ( Id.) The test results showed that Watkins's blood alcohol level was .11 to .12, and that his system contained cocaine, phencyclidine (PCP), and metabolites. ( Id.)
The trial court granted Watkins's pre-trial motion to suppress his statements made to police before being given the Miranda advisement and those made after asking to speak with an attorney. ( Lodgment 7 at 4.) The court found, however, that after being advised of his rights, Watkins knowingly and intentionally waived those rights until he asked to speak with an attorney. ( Id.) Thus, the statements following the Miranda advisement (but prior to Watkins's request to speak with an attorney) were admissible. ( Id.)
At trial, the prosecutor introduced evidence of the events surrounding Brown's death, including blood evidence found on Watkins's clothing and penile swabs taken from Watkins's person. ( Id. at 4; Report at 7-10.) In his defense, Watkins introduced evidence that he possessed Brown's jewelry in the early afternoon of October 20, 2001, hours before Brown was killed. ( Lodgment 7 at 4.) Watkins also introduced expert testimony that he had an IQ of sixty-nine and suffered from brain impairment (perhaps resulting from long-term drug and alcohol use) that limited control of his "short-range impulses." ( Id.)
A jury convicted Watkins of first-degree murder, first-degree robbery, willful cruelty to an elder, and burglary. ( Lodgment 2, vol. 3 at 722-26.) The jury also found the felony murder special circumstances allegations true. ( Id.)
Watkins appealed his conviction to the California Court of Appeal, which upheld both his conviction and sentence. (See Lodgments 6, 7.) Watkins then filed a Petition for Review in the California Supreme Court, which that court denied. (See Lodgments 8, 9.)
On January 9, 2006, Watkins sought habeas relief in San Diego County Superior Court. (See Lodgment 10.) That court denied the petition in an unpublished written opinion. (See Id.) Watkins next filed a habeas petition in the California Court of Appeal, which the court denied in an unpublished written opinion. (See Lodgment 11.) Finally, Watkins filed a habeas petition in the California Supreme Court, which the court denied. (See Lodgment 12.)
On January 29, 2007, Watkins filed this federal habeas corpus petition ("Petition") pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. ( Report at 5;see Doc. No. 1.) Watkins contends that his federal constitutional rights were violated when: (1) the prosecutor committed misconduct by presenting false reports and perjured testimony; (2) his trial and appellate attorneys ineffectively failed to challenge this false and perjured evidence, failed to impeach a detective who sent an allegedly improper letter to the DNA lab, and failed to investigate and present evidence of unidentified blood on Watkins's clothing; (3) the prosecutor improperly excluded African-Americans from his jury; (4) the trial court improperly refused to instruct on the consequences of voluntary intoxication and improperly instructed the jury on the felony murder charge; and (5) the admission of his statements to police violated his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. ( Pet. at 6-9, 12-28.) On July 12, 2007, Respondent filed an answer to the petition. (Doc. No. 22.) On April 4, 2008, Magistrate Judge Porter recommended that the Court deny Watkins's habeas request. ( Report at 2.) On April 22, 2008, Watkins timely submitted objections ("Objections"). ( Objections at 3-4.) The Court addresses these Objections in the Discussion below.
The Court has renumbered the pages of Watkins' objection sequentially to aid in referring to the proper pages.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
The duties of a district court in connection with a magistrate judge's report and recommendation are set forth in Rule 72(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). The district court "must make a de novo determination of those portions of the report . . . to which objection is made," and "may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate." 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C); see also United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 676 (1980); United States v. Remsing, 874 F.2d 614, 617 (9th Cir. 1989).
A federal court may grant a habeas petition if it shows the applicant is in custody "in violation of the Constitution or other laws or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). State interpretation of state laws and rules cannot serve as the basis for a federal habeas petition, as no federal or constitutional question would be implicated. Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 68 (1991). Habeas petitions are governed by the provisions of the 1996 Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act ("AEDPA").
Pursuant to AEDPA, a federal court may grant habeas corpus relief from a state court judgment only if the adjudication was (1) contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, or (2) was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the state court proceedings. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d);Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 7-8 (2002).
A state-court decision is "contrary to clearly established federal law" if it (1) applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in Supreme Court cases, or (2) confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a decision of the Supreme Court and nevertheless arrives at the opposite result.Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405 (2000). A state-court decision is an unreasonable application of the rule "if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from [the Supreme Court's] decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner's case." Id. at 413.
III. DISCUSSION
Having read and considered the underlying Petition, Report, and Objections thereto, the Court concludes that the Report presents a well-reasoned analysis of the issues raised in the Petition. For the following reasons, the Court finds that the Report correctly concluded that Watkins is not entitled to federal habeas relief.
A. CRIMINALIST CORNACCHIA DID NOT TESTIFY INCONSISTENTLY AND THUS P RESENTATION O F H IS TESTIMONY DID N OT C ONSTITUTE PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT
Watkins alleges that the prosecutor violated his due process rights by presenting perjured testimony and false laboratory reports regarding blood evidence on Watkins's clothing and regarding two penile swabs taken from Watkins's person. ( Pet. at 6, 12-13.) Criminalist David Cornacchia ("Cornacchia") testified at a preliminary hearing that he had found one small stain on Watkins's boxer shorts that presumptively tested positive for blood, and that he had not tested penile swabs taken from Watkins's person for blood. ( Id.) Watkins asserts that Cornacchia perjured himself by testifying at trial that he found two stains on the boxer shorts that tested positive for blood, and that he performed a presumptive blood test on the penile swabs and obtained a negative result. ( Id.) The Magistrate Judge concluded that Watkins failed to present any evidence that Cornacchia perjured himself in his testimony regarding this evidence. ( Report at 7-10.) Watkins's Objections do not raise any arguments that Watkins did not previously raise in his Petition. ( Objections at 7-8, 10; Pet. at 6, 8, 12-13.)
Under clearly established Supreme Court law, "[t]he knowing use of perjured testimony by a prosecutor generally requires that the conviction be set aside." Killian v. Poole, 282 F.3d 1204, 1208 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 103 (1976)); see also Napue v. People of the State of Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 269 (1959) ("The same result obtains when the State, although not soliciting false evidence, allows it to go uncorrected when it appears."). However, inconsistencies in a witness's testimony "do not of themselves indicate that the witness committed perjury." Riley v. Wilson, 430 F.2d 1134, 1136 (9th Cir. 1970) (per curiam); see also United States v. Sherlock, 962 F.2d 1349, 1364 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding that prosecutor's presentation of contradictory testimony did not constitute knowing presentation of perjured testimony).
A review of the record supports the California Court of Appeal's conclusion that Cornacchia's testimony regarding both the blood evidence and penile swabs was not inconsistent. On February 15, 2002, Cornacchia testified at a preliminary hearing that he found a small stain on Watkins's boxer shorts, which presumptively tested positive for blood. ( Lodgment 3 at 156.) Cornacchia subsequently testified at trial that he found a second blood-like stain on Watkins's boxer shorts after performing the initial blood test, but before sending the shorts to an outside laboratory for DNA testing. ( Lodgment 1, vol. 4 at 1122-26.) Cornacchia's testimony simply suggests that he overlooked the second stain at the time of the preliminary hearing. Because Cornacchia had not discovered the second stain at the time of the preliminary hearing, he did not testify inconsistently — nor did he perjure himself — by testifying about the second stain at trial. The fact that Cornacchia had the opportunity to examine the evidence more thoroughly between the two proceeding fully explains the alleged discrepancy in his testimony.
Similarly, regarding the penile swabs, Cornacchia testified at the February 15, 2002, preliminary hearing that he conducted a DNA analysis on the swabs and tested for sperm cells, but that he did not perform a presumptive blood test. ( Lodgment 3 at 150-51, 153.) On February 27, 2002, Cornacchia performed a presumptive blood test on the same penile swabs at the prosecution's request. ( Lodgment 1, vol. 5 at 1195.) Cornacchia subsequently testified about the negative test results at trial. ( Id. at 1158-59.) Because he had not performed the presumptive blood test at the time of the preliminary hearing, Cornacchia could not have testified about the results at the hearing and thus did not testify inconsistently at trial.
Watkins also argues that Cornacchia's testimony led the jury to believe that "the penile swabs contained blood and that Mr. Cornacchia's presumptive chemical test was not sensitive enough to detect it." ( Pet. at 8, 15; see also Objections at 10.) However, it was the defense which presented evidence that the swabs tested positive for blood using a more sensitive test. ( Lodgment 1, vol. 10 at 1943-49.)
The California Court of Appeal's decision denying Watkins's habeas petition is the last reasoned state court decision on this issue. (See Lodgment 11.) The court held that Watkins failed to present evidence that Cornacchia testified inconsistently and thus failed to state a prima facie claim for relief. ( Id. at 3-4.) This Court is not called to decide whether it agrees with the state court's decision or whether it would have reached the same conclusion; rather, the Court inquires only whether the state court's decision was objectively unreasonable. Yarborough v. Gentry, 540 U.S. 1, 5 (2003). Based on the record, the Court finds Petitioner has failed to show that the state court's determination was objectively unreasonable. Accordingly, the Court ADOPTS the Report, OVERRULES Petitioner's objections and DENIES Petitioner's prosecutorial misconduct claim.
B. WATKINS F AILS T O D EMONSTRATE T HAT C OUNSEL'S A LLEGEDLY DEFICIENT PERFORMANCE PREJUDICED HIS DEFENSE
Watkins asserts that both his trial and appellate counsel were ineffective (1) for failing to challenge Cornacchia's testimony and the test results on the boxer shorts and penile swabs; (2) for failing to investigate an allegedly improper letter sent by Detective James Tomsovic ("Tomsovic") to the DNA lab; (3) for failing to cross-examine Tomsovic regarding the letter; and (4) for failing to investigate and present evidence of unidentified blood found on Watkins's shoes. ( Pet. at 7, 9, 14, 16-20.) After reviewing the record, the Magistrate Judge concluded that Watkins was not entitled to relief as to these claims, because he failed to demonstrate how counsel's allegedly deficient performance prejudiced his defense. ( Report at 11-15.) Watkins's Objections to the Report with respect to these claims consist of a verbatim recitation of his original Petition. ( Objections at 9, 11-15.) Accordingly, the Court addresses the claims as raised in the original Petition.
Watkins raises the same claims with respect to his appellate counsel that he raises with respect to his trial counsel. ( Pet. at 7, 9, 14, 16-20; see also Objections at 9, 11-15.) Because "the proper standard for evaluating [a] claim that appellate counsel was ineffective . . . is that enunciated in" Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1974) (establishing the standard for evaluating ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claims), the following analysis applies to both trial and appellate counsel.Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259, 285 (2000).
To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, a habeas petitioner must first show "that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the `counsel' guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment." Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1974). A reviewing court must give significant deference to the strategic decisions of counsel. Id. at 689-90. Second, the petitioner must show that counsel's deficient performance prejudiced his defense by depriving him "of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable." Id. In order to satisfy this second prong, the petitioner must demonstrate "that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different."Id. at 694. This inquiry must be considered in light of the strength of the prosecution's case. Luna v. Cambra, 306 F.3d 954, 966 (9th Cir. 2002), amended, 311 F.3d 928 (9th Cir. 2002).
As discussed above, there were no discrepancies between Cornacchia's testimony about the blood evidence and penile swabs at the preliminary hearing and his testimony about those items at trial. Thus, counsel had no opportunity to impeach Cornacchia's credibility by pointing out any inconsistent or potentially perjured testimony, and counsel did not — could not — err by failing to do so.
Cornacchia's testimony established that blood consistent with Brown's DNA profile was present on one stain on the front of Watkins's boxer shorts. ( Lodgment 1, vol. 4 at 1141-42.) Even assuming that counsel performed deficiently under the first prong of Strickland, Watkins does not indicate how trial counsel's failure to cross-examine Cornacchia regarding the second stain prejudiced his defense.
Similarly, the record indicates that Cornacchia had not tested the penile swabs for blood prior to the preliminary hearing, but that he did test the swabs prior to trial at the prosecution's request. ( Lodgment 3 at 156; Lodgment 1, vol. 4 at 1122-26.) Watkins fails to indicate how the results of the trial and appellate proceedings would have been different had counsel pointed out that Cornacchia did not test the swabs prior to the preliminary hearing but had done so by the time of trial.
Watkins also claims that counsel's decision not to introduce evidence of a letter sent by Detective Tomsovic to the crime lab prejudiced his defense. Specifically, Watkins argues that this information, viewed in light of Cornacchia's allegedly perjured testimony, would have led the jury to believe that the crime lab fabricated evidence. ( Pet. at 17-18.) However, Watkins provides no supporting evidence to establish that the proceedings' results would have been different had counsel introduced the letter into evidence. On the other hand, the prosecution introduced significant evidence tying Watkins to the crime, including his fingerprints and jacket found at the scene and Brown's blood on Watkins's boxer shorts. For counsel's failure to introduce the letter to prejudice Watkins's defense, the jury would have had to believe that the crime lab fabricated all of this evidence in response to Tomsovic's letter. The Court finds it highly unlikely that the bias allegedly exposed by the letter would have led the jury to disbelieve all of the scientific evidence supporting the conclusion reached at trial.
Detective Tomsovic's letter indicated: "We need to find traces of Brown (i.e., blood, etc.) [on Watkins's] clothing, or traces of Watkins (i.e., semen, hair, skin, etc.) on or in Brown as a first priority." ( Lodgment 1, vol. 1 at 7.)
Finally, Watkins argues that he was prejudiced by trial counsel's decision to move to exclude evidence of unidentified female blood found on Watkins's shoes. ( Lodgment 1, vol. 2 at 333-34.) However, Watkins fails to indicate how counsel performed deficiently under the "highly deferential" standard of review afforded to counsel's decisions. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. As the California Court of Appeal correctly pointed out, this unidentified blood evidence could have led the jury to rationally believe that Watkins had committed additional violent crimes. ( Lodgment 11 at 3.) Accordingly, trial counsel made a perfectly reasonable decision to seek to exclude this evidence. Regardless of whether counsel's decision was reasonable, Watkins fails to indicate how — but for counsel's decision to exclude this evidence — his trial or appeal would have resulted in acquittal or reversal. As Respondent points out, even if the unidentified blood led the jury to believe that a third person had committed the actual murder, Watkins could still have been convicted of first-degree special circumstances felony murder on an aiding and abetting theory. See Cal. Penal Code § 31 (holding individuals who aid or abet the commission of an offense liable as principals); see also People v. Prettyman, 926 P.2d 1013, 1018 (Cal. 1996) ("Under California law, a person who aids and abets the commission of a crime is a `principal' in the crime, and thus shares the guilt of the actual perpetrator.").
The California Court of Appeal's decision denying this claim is the last reasoned state court decision on this issue. ( Lodgment 11 at 2-3.) The court held that Watkins failed to establish how counsel's allegedly ineffective assistance prejudiced his defense. This Court is not called to decide whether it agrees with the state court's decision or whether it would have reached the same conclusion; rather, the Court inquires only whether the state court's decision was objectively unreasonable. Yarborough, 540 U.S. at 5. Because Watkins fails to demonstrate how counsel's allegedly ineffective assistance prejudiced his defense, the Court finds that the California Court of Appeal's denial of this claim was neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of, clearly established Supreme Court law. Williams, 529 U.S. at 412-13. Accordingly, the Court ADOPTS the Report, OVERRULES Watkins's Objections, and DENIES Watkins's ineffective assistance of counsel claim. C. THE TOTALITY OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE PEREMPTORY EXCUSES OF AFRICAN-AMERICAN JURORS DOES NOT ESTABLISH A PRIMA FACIE CASE OF RACIAL DISCRIMINATION
Watkins contends that the prosecutor excluded African-American jurors from the jury on the basis of race in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. ( Pet. at 21-22.) The Magistrate Judge reviewed the voir dire transcripts and concluded that, although Watkins satisfied the first two elements of a prima facie case, the totality of the circumstances did not give rise to an inference of racial discrimination. ( Report at 19.) Watkins's Objections regarding this claim consist of a photocopy of the corresponding pages from his original Petition, with only minor editorial changes. (See Objections at 16-17; Pet. at 21-22.)
The Equal Protection Clause forbids the exercise of peremptory challenges based on race. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 89 (1986). Establishing a Batson violation requires a three-step inquiry. Id. at 96-98. First, the defendant must establish a prima facie case of racial discrimination. Id. at 96-98. "Once the defendant makes a prima facie showing, the burden shifts to the State to come forward with a neutral explanation for challenging black jurors." Id. at 97. The trial court must then decide whether to accept or reject the state's proffered justification. Id. at 98.
The opponent of a peremptory strike establishes a prima facie case of racial discrimination — and shifts the burden of explaining the strike to the prosecution — by making three showings: (1) the defendant is a member of a "cognizable racial group;" (2) the State used its peremptory strikes to exclude members of the defendant's racial group from the jury; and (3) the totality of the circumstances give rise to an inference of impermissible discrimination. Id. If the defendant fails to establish a prima facie case of discrimination, the inquiry ends.J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127, 145-46 (1994) (citing Batson, 476 U.S. at 97). A review on habeas of the trial court's determination as to whether the defendant established a prima facie case of racial discrimination is entitled to a presumption of correctness. Tolbert v. Paige, 182 F.3d 677, 685 (9th Cir. 1999).
Here, Watkins's Batson claim falls short. When the prosecutor excused the only two African-American potential jurors, defense counsel made a Batson motion, arguing that the excused jurors belonged to a cognizable racial group, that Watkins was a member of that racial group, and that the circumstances raised an inference of discrimination. ( Lodgment 4, vol. 4 at 907.) Upon reviewing the potential jurors' questionnaires, however, the trial judge concluded that the totality of the circumstances failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination. ( Lodgment 1, vol. 3 at 557-58.) After reviewing the voir dire transcripts, this Court must defer to the trial court's analysis.Tolbert, 182 F.3d at 685. Although both excused jurors were members of a cognizable racial group to which Watkins also belonged, the circumstances do not give rise to an inference of racial discrimination. The first excused juror seemed confused by the court's voir dire questioning and gave little meaningful indication of his views on the death penalty. ( Lodgment 1, vol. 1 at 242-45.) The prosecutor could have determined that he was unable to sufficiently gauge this juror's position on the death penalty and his ability to objectively assess the prosecution's case.
The second excused juror stated during voir dire that he did not wish to serve on the jury, and he objected to the random jury summons process. ( Lodgment 4, vol. 4 at 667-68.) He also expressed some negative feelings about law enforcement. ( Id. at 688-89, 693.) The prosecutor could have concluded from this juror's voir dire responses that the juror would be more favorable to the defense. Accordingly, the circumstances surrounding the peremptory excuses of these jurors support the conclusion that the prosecutor excused these jurors on legitimate, non-discriminatory grounds.
The California Court of Appeal's decision denying this claim is the last reasoned state court decision on this issue. ( Lodgment 11 at 4.) The court held that Watkins failed to allege facts "showing the prosecution engaged in discriminatory conduct in the jury selection process." ( Id.) This Court is not called to decide whether it agrees with the state court's decision or whether it would have reached the same conclusion; rather, the Court inquires only whether the state court's decision was objectively unreasonable. Yarborough, 540 U.S. at 5. The totality of the circumstances surrounding the peremptory excuses of the two African-American potential jurors supports the trial court's conclusion that the prosecutor excused the potential jurors based on their voir dire responses, rather than their race. In light of the deferential standard of review afforded to the trial court's factual determination of Batson issues, the Court cannot conclude that the California Court of Appeal's denial of this claim was contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established Supreme Court law. Williams, 529 U.S. at 412-13. Accordingly, the Court ADOPTS the Report, OVERRULES Watkins's Objections, and DENIES Watkins's Batson claim.
D. THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED AT TRIAL DID NOT WARRANT A JURY INSTRUCTION ON INTOXICATION, AND THE INSTRUCTION ON SPECIAL CIRCUMSTANCES FELONY MURDER, WHILE INCOMPLETE, DID NOT VIOLATE DUE PROCESS
Watkins asserts that the trial court violated his Fourteenth Amendment right to due process by failing to instruct the jury on voluntary intoxication and involuntary manslaughter, and by erroneously failing to include the second paragraph of CALJIC No. 8.81.17. ( Pet. at 23-25.) After reviewing the record, the Magistrate Judge concluded that there was insufficient evidence of intoxication to warrant a voluntary intoxication instruction, and the evidence presented did not support an involuntary manslaughter instruction. ( Report at 22-24.) Additionally, the Magistrate Judge concluded that the jury instructions on special circumstances felony murder, while incomplete, adequately described the requisite elements of the offense. ( Id. at 25-27.) In his Objections, Watkins asserts that sufficient circumstantial evidence existed to warrant voluntary intoxication and involuntary manslaughter instructions. ( Objections at 18-29.) Regarding CALJIC No. 8.81.17, Watkins argues that the trial court's failure to include the instruction's second paragraph violated due process. ( Objections at 30.)
In order for an erroneous jury instruction to support reversal on collateral review, the allegedly defective instruction must have "so infected the entire trial that the resulting conviction violates due process." Henderson v. Kibbe, 431 U.S. 145, 154 (1977) (quoting Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U.S. 141, 147 (1973)). "The fact that the instruction was allegedly incorrect under state law is not a basis for habeas relief." Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 71-72 (1991). Moreover, the instruction must be viewed in the context of the instruction and the trial record as a whole. Id. at 72 (citing Cupp, 414 U.S. at 147).
1. Voluntary Intoxication And Involuntary Manslaughter
In considering an alleged failure to instruct on a defense theory, the Ninth Circuit has held that" [f] ailure to instruct on the defense theory of the case is reversible error if the theory is legally sound and evidence in the case makes it applicable." Clark v. Brown, 450 F.3d 898, 904-05 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Beardslee v. Woodford, 358 F.3d 560, 577 (9th Cir. 2004)). However, "due process requires that a lesser included offense be given only when the evidence warrants such an instruction." Hopper v. Evans, 456 U.S. 605, 611 (1982) (emphasis in original).
a. Voluntary Intoxication
Voluntary intoxication does not act as an excuse to homicide.People v. Boyer, 133 P.3d 581, 662 (Cal. 2006). "Evidence of voluntary intoxication is admissible solely on the issue of whether or not the defendant actually formed a required specific intent, or, when charged with murder, whether the defendant premeditated, deliberated, or harbored express malice aforethought." Cal. Penal Code § 22(b). California law requires that a trial court give a jury instruction on voluntary intoxication "only when there is substantial evidence of the defendant's voluntary intoxication and the intoxication affected the defendant's actual formation of specific intent." People v. Williams, 941 P.2d 757, 777 (Cal. 1997) (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Watkins contends that the testimony of Dr. Alan Abrams ("Dr. Abrams") constitutes sufficient evidence to warrant a jury instruction on voluntary intoxication and involuntary manslaughter. ( Objections at 18-29.) However, Dr. Abrams testified that, although cocaine metabolites and PCP were found in Watkins's urine sample taken at the time of his interrogation, he could not say with certainty whether Watkins was intoxicated at the time of Brown's murder. ( Lodgment 1, vol. 10 at 2028-33.) From the narcotics levels present in Watkins's urine, Dr. Abrams could only conclude that Watkins ingested "a fair amount of cocaine within 24 hours, 48 hours, [or] 72 hours." ( Id. at 2031.) Furthermore, Sylvia Castro and Latesha Johnson, who saw Watkins on the evening of the murder, testified that Watkins did not appear intoxicated. ( Lodgment 1, vol. 4 at 743; Lodgment 1, vol. 5 at 967.)
Watkins attempts to explain away Castro's and Johnson's testimony by offering the testimony of Sarita Santana, the mother of Watkins's child, who testified that Watkins "always had a calm demeanor," even when he used cocaine. ( Lodgment 1, vol. 5 at 1301-02.) However, this testimony simply is not dispositive with respect to whether Watkins was intoxicated at the time of Brown's murder. Because no evidence exists suggesting that Watkins was under the influence of alcohol or narcotics when he killed Brown, the trial court correctly denied Watkins's request to instruct the jury on the effect of voluntary intoxication on specific intent. Even assuming Watkins was intoxicated at the time of the murder, he fails to produce any evidence demonstrating that his intoxication negated the specific intent necessary for first-degree murder. See Williams, 941 P.2d at 777 ("A defendant is entitled to [a voluntary intoxication] instruction only when there is substantial evidence of the defendant's voluntary intoxication and the intoxication affected the defendant's actual formation of specific intent." (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks ommitted)).
Watkins objects to the Magistrate Judge's Report concluding that insufficient evidence existed to support a jury instruction on voluntary intoxication. ( Objections at 18-29.) Watkins relies primarily on the fact that voluntary intoxication "was essentially his only defense." ( Id. at 19.) However, Watkins fails to direct the Court to any substantial evidence in the record warranting such an instruction. In the absence of sufficient evidence to support the giving of the instruction, the trial court did not err by declining to do so. Hopper, 456 U.S. at 611; Williams, 941 P.2d at 777.
b. Involuntary Manslaughter
Involuntary manslaughter is defined as "the unlawful killing of a human being without malice . . . in the commission of an unlawful act, not amounting to a felony; or in the commission of a lawful act which might produce death, in an unlawful manner, or without due caution and circumspection." Cal. Penal Code § 192(b). Consistent with Hopper, California law requires a lesser included offense instruction only where substantial evidence exists to support the theory mandating that instruction.People v. Breverman, 960 P.2d 1094, 1106 (Cal. 1998). In the context of voluntary intoxication, a jury instruction on involuntary manslaughter is proper where evidence of the defendant's intoxication negates malice aforethought. People v. Halvorsen, 165 P.3d 537 (Cal. 2007).
As discussed above, no evidence exists to support the conclusion that Watkins was intoxicated at the time of Brown's murder. Thus, no evidence exists to suggest that Watkins could not form the malice aforethought necessary for first-degree murder. Moreover, Brown's death did not occur during "the commission of an unlawful act, not amounting to a felony; or in the commission of a lawful act which might produce death . . . without due caution and circumspection." Cal. Penal Code § 192(b). The information charged Watkins with burglary and robbery, both felonies. ( Lodgment 2, vol. 1 at 14-17.) Accordingly, the California Court of Appeal's denial of this claim was neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of, clearly established Supreme Court law. Williams, 529 U.S. at 412-13.
2. Special Circumstances Felony Murder
Watkins contends that the erroneous omission of the second paragraph of CALJIC No. 8.81.17 deprived him of due process because the resulting instruction did not require the jury to find that he committed the murder to carry out or advance the burglary and robbery. ( Objections at 30.) The court instructed the jury on the elements of first-degree felony murder. ( Lodgment 2, vol. 3 at 662.) If the jury concluded that Watkins committed first-degree felony murder, the instructions required the jury to find that the murder was committed during the commission of a robbery or burglary to find the special circumstance allegation true. ( Id. at 665-68.) The jury was instructed that "[t]o prove the robbery special circumstance, the People must prove that the defendant committed the robbery for a purpose other than merely to facilitate or conceal the murder." ( Id. at 669.) An identical instruction was given substituting the word "burglary" for "robbery." ( Id. at 670.)
A felony murder special circumstance exists where "[t] he murder was committed while the defendant was engaged in . . . the commission of, attempted commission of, or the immediate flight after committing, or attempting to commit" a variety of enumerated felonies, including robbery or residential burglary. Cal. Penal Code § 190.2(a)(17)(A), (G). Under California law, a felony murder special circumstance "may be alleged when the murder occurs during the commission of the felony, [but] not when the felony occurs during the commission of a murder." People v. Mendoza, 6 P.3d 150, 182 (Cal. 2000). Thus, the prosecution must demonstrate that the defendant had the "independent purpose" to commit the underlying felony, not merely that the commission of the felony was incidental to the commission of the murder. Id.
The omitted paragraph of CALJIC No. 8.81.17 requires a finding that "[t]he murder was committed in order to carry out or advance the commission of the crime," and states that "the special circumstance is not established if the [crime] was merely incidental to the commission of the murder." CALJIC No. 8.81.17. The California Supreme Court has held that "there is nothing magical about the phrase `to carry out or advance' the felony" in CALJIC No. 8.81.17. People v. Horning, 102 P.3d 228, 253 (Cal. 2004). This requirement may be conveyed using "independent purpose" language. Id. at 253 n. 8 (citing Mendoza, 6 P.3d at 182; People v. Bonin, 765 P.2d 460, 485 (Cal. 1989)).
The jury instructions in Watkins's case required the jury to find that Watkins "committed the robbery for a purpose other than merely to facilitate or conceal the murder," and that he "had a purpose to commit the felony of robbery [or burglary] independent of the murder." ( Lodgment 2, vol. 3 at 669-70.) Accordingly, when read as a whole per Estelle, 502 U.S. at 72, the instructions adequately convey the requirement of CALJIC No. 8.81.17 that the underlying felony must be independent of — and not "merely incidental" to — the murder.
The California Court of Appeal's decision denying this claim on direct appeal is the last reasoned state court decision on this issue. ( Lodgment 7 at 11-16.) The court held that insufficient evidence existed to warrant intoxication-related instructions. ( Id. at 11-14.) The court also held that the jury instructions adequately conveyed special-circumstances-felony-murder's independent purpose requirement by requiring the jury to find that the purpose to commit the underlying felony was independent of the purpose to commit the murder. ( Id. at 14-16.) This Court is not called to decide whether it agrees with the state court's decision or whether it would have reached the same conclusion; rather, the Court inquires only whether the state court's decision was objectively unreasonable. Yarborough, 540 U.S. at 5. Based on the record, the Court finds Petitioner has failed to show that the state court's determination was objectively unreasonable. Accordingly, the Court OVERRULES Petitioner's Objections, ADOPTS the Report, and DENIES Petitioner's due process claim. E. WATKINS KNOWINGLY AND VOLUNTARILY WAIVED HIS MIRANDA RIGHTS, AND HIS POST-MIRANDA STATEMENTS WERE NOT TAINTED BY COERCION
Watkins's final two claims concern the interrogation following his arrest. First, Watkins claims that he did not knowingly and voluntarily waive his Miranda rights. ( Pet. at 25-26.) Second, Watkins claims that the trial court should have suppressed his post-Miranda statements as involuntary. ( Id. at 26-28.) Respondent contends that Watkins failed to exhaust these claims, because he did not present them to the California Supreme Court in his direct appeal or to any state court in a habeas corpus petition. ( Resp't's Mem. at 27.) Alternatively, Respondent contends that the Court of Appeal's denial of these claims was neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of, clearly established Supreme Court law. ( Id. at 27-32.)
The Magistrate Judge ordered Respondent to file a motion to dismiss any claims which the Court could address without reaching the merits. ( Order Reopening Case and Setting Briefing Schedule at 2.) Contrary to the Magistrate Judge's order, Respondent did not file a motion to dismiss Watkins's Miranda claims as unexhausted. Accordingly, the Court will address the merits of Watkins's Miranda claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2), which provides that "[a]n application for writ of habeas corpus may be denied on the merits, notwithstanding the failure of the applicant to exhaust the remedies available in the courts of the State." See also Cassett v. Stewart, 406 F.3d 614, 623 (9th Cir. 2004) ("[A] federal court may deny an unexhausted claim on the merits where `it is perfectly clear that the applicant does not raise even a colorable federal claim.'" (quoting Granberry v. Greer, 481 U.S. 129, 135 (1987))).
1. Knowing And Voluntary Miranda Waiver
Watkins argues that he did not knowingly and voluntarily waive his Miranda rights because Detective Hergenroeather questioned him briefly before giving him a Miranda advisement and trivialized the advisement by referring to it as the "[o]l' Jack Webb thing." ( Pet. at 25-26; Petr.'s Ex. C.) The trial court suppressed all of Watkins's statements prior to receiving theMiranda advisement. ( Lodgment 1, vol. 1 at 268-75.) The court also suppressed all of Watkins's statements following his request to speak with counsel. ( Id.) Watkins argues that the pre-advisement questioning and the statement trivializing the advisement rendered any subsequent Miranda waiver invalid. ( Pet. at 25-26; Petr.'s Ex. C.)
Clearly established Supreme Court law prohibits the prosecution from using statements made by the defendant during custodial interrogation unless the defendant is advised of his right to remain silent and his right to the presence of counsel. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966). The defendant may waive these rights, but any waiver must be voluntary, knowing, and intelligent. Id. The Supreme Court enunciated the standard by which courts must judge the validity of any waiver in Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 421 (1986):
First, the relinquishment of the right must have been voluntary in the sense that it was the product of a free and deliberate choice rather than intimidation, coercion, or deception. Second, the waiver must have been made with a full awareness of both the nature of the right being abandoned and the consequences of the decision to abandon it. Only if the "totality of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation" reveal both an uncoerced choice and the requisite level of comprehension may a court properly conclude that the Miranda rights have been waived.
(quoting Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 725 (1979)).
In Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 300 (1985), Sheriff's officers investigating a residential burglary received information implicating Elstad, the burglary victims' eighteen-year-old neighbor. When officers arrived at Elstad's residence with an arrest warrant, one officer sat down with Elstad in the living room and asked Elstad if he knew why the officers wanted to speak with him and whether he knew the victims. Id. at 301. Elstad responded that he knew the victims and added that he had heard that the victims' house had recently been burglarized. Id. The officer indicated that he suspected that Elstad had participated in the burglary, and Elstad responded he was there. Id.
The officers then transported Elstad to the Sheriff's headquarters and advised him of his Miranda rights. Id. Elstad subsequently gave a full statement in which he admitted to being involved in the burglary. Id. At trial, Elstad argued that his post-Miranda-advisement statement should be suppressed because the pre-advisement questioning "let the cat out of the bag," tainting any subsequent statements. Id. at 302. The Supreme Court refused to adopt a categorical rule invalidating any waiver following unwarned questioning; rather, the Court stated that the relevant inquiry with respect to any post-advisement statement focused "solely on whether it [was] knowingly and voluntarily made." Id. at 309. The Court noted that "[n]either the environment nor the manner" of the officer's initial questioning of Elstad was coercive. Id. at 315. The Court concluded "that a suspect who has once responded to unwarned yet uncoercive questioning is not thereby disabled from waiving his rights and confessing after he has been given the requisite Miranda warnings." Id. at 318.
In Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 604 (2004), the respondent's twelve-year-old son Jonathan died in his sleep, presumably as a result of complications associated with the boy's cerebral palsy. Fearing charges of neglect, Seibert and her other sons planned to conceal the circumstances surrounding Jonathan's death by burning the mobile home in which the family lived. Id. In order to make it appear that the family had not left Jonathan alone, Seibert and her sons planned to leave a mentally-ill teenager behind in the mobile home. Id. Seibert's son Darian set the fire, which killed the teenager. Id.
Five days later, police arrested Seibert at a hospital where Darian was being treated for burns he received starting the fire.Id. The officer who arrested Siebert, acting on specific instructions, did not give Seibert a Miranda advisement. Id. After Seibert arrived at the police station, an officer questioned her for thirty to forty minutes, eventually obtaining a confession. Id. at 604-05. After conducting the initial interrogation, the officer gave Seibert a cigarette break. Id. When Seibert returned, the officer advised her of her Miranda rights, obtained a signed waiver, and questioned her again, this time obtaining a tape-recorded confession. Id. At trial, Seibert moved to suppress both her pre-advisement and post-advisement statements. Id. The arresting officer testified that he consciously withheld the Miranda advisement. Id. at 605-06. The Supreme Court held that "when Miranda warnings are inserted in the midst of coordinated and continuing interrogation, they are likely to mislead and `depriv[e] a defendant of knowledge essential to his ability to understand the nature of his rights and the consequences of abandoning them.'"Id. at 613-14 (quoting Moran, 475 U.S. at 424); see also United States v. Williams, 435 F.3d 1148, 1157 (9th Cir. 2006) ("[A] trial court must suppress postwarning confessions obtained during a deliberate two-step interrogation where the midstream Miranda warning — in light of the objective facts and circumstances — did not effectively apprise the suspect of his rights.") (emphasis added).
Considering the totality of the circumstances, the Court concludes that Watkins's interrogation falls more closely on the continuum to Elstad than it does to Siebert. The environment in which Watkins's initial pre-advisement interrogation took place — a police station — was not as innocuous as the suspect's living room in Elstad. However, Detective Hergenroeather's questioning resembled that which took place in Elstad. Hergenroeather began the interview by asking Watkins several general background questions. ( Lodgment 5 at 2-4.) Hergenroeather then told Watkins that he wanted to talk to Watkins about a warrant, and about Watkins's whereabouts on the evening of October 20, 2001. ( Id. at 4.) Hergenroeather also asked Watkins about jewelry, "because other people [said] that maybe [Watkins] could've had some jewelry." ( Id.) After Watkins denied having any jewelry, Hergenroeather told Watkins that he had "to do the ol' Jack Web[b] thing" and advised Watkins of his Miranda rights. ( Id. at 5.)
While this type of interrogation is decidedly more investigative than that at issue in Elstad, it certainly does not rise to the level of "coercive" questioning, which would disable Watkins from waiving his rights. At no point before the Miranda advisement did Detective Hergenroeather directly question Watkins regarding his involvement in the murder, and Hergenroeather's questioning did not prompt any incriminating statements. (See Lodgment 5 at 2-5.) Nor did Hergenroeather deliberately insert the Miranda warning "in the midst of coordinated and continuing interrogation." Seibert, 542 U.S. at 613; Williams, 435 F.3d at 1157. Accordingly, the Court cannot conclude that the California Court of Appeal's finding that neither the "Jack Webb" comment nor the pre-advisement questioning tainted the post-advisement statement was contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established Supreme Court law. Williams, 529 U.S. at 412-13.
2. Implied Miranda Waiver
Watkins also argues that his failure to give an express Miranda waiver rendered any purported waiver invalid. ( Pet. at 25-26; Petr.'s Ex. C.) Specifically, Watkins contends that "it is troubling that an individual with brain damage, with an I.Q. of 69, with a blood-alcohol level of .2, not to mention with cocaine and [PCP] in his system," could be found to have impliedly waived his Miranda rights. ( Pet. at 26.) After viewing the videotape and considering Watkins's interrogation transcript, the trial court concluded that there was "nothing in Watkins's demeanor or conduct [to suggest] that he was so incapacitated or incompetent as to be unable to knowingly and intelligently waive his rights." ( Lodgment 7 at 8.)
Clearly established Supreme Court law holds that a suspect's express Miranda waiver "is not inevitably either necessary or sufficient to establish waiver." North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 373 (1979). Instead, the question is "whether the defendant in fact knowingly and voluntarily waived" his Miranda rights. Id. "[I]n at least some cases waiver can be inferred from the actions and words of the person interrogated." Id.; see also United States v. Rodriguez-Preciado, 399 F.3d 1118, 1127 (9th Cir. 2005) ("Waivers of Miranda rights need not be explicit; a suspect may impliedly waive the rights by answering an officer's questions after receiving Miranda warnings." (citing Terrovona v. Kincheloe, 912 F.2d 1176, 1179-80 (9th Cir. 1990))). "[T]he question of waiver must be determined on `the particular facts and circumstances surrounding [the] case, including the background, experience, and conduct of the accused.'" Butler, 441 U.S. at 374-75 (quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938)).
The circumstances of Watkins's interrogation support the state court's finding that Watkins implicitly waived his Miranda rights. After receiving his Miranda advisement, Watkins explicitly stated that he understood his rights. ( Lodgment 5 at 5.) Watkins then continued to respond to Detective Hergenroeather's questions. (See Id. at 5-60.) Watkins requested to speak with an attorney near the end of the interrogation, lending further support to the conclusion that he understood the nature of — and had previously waived — his Miranda rights. ( Id. at 60); see Terrovona, 912 F.2d at 1180 (holding that suspect's demonstrated ability to assert constitutional right to an attorney militated in favor of finding of knowing and voluntary waiver).
After independently reviewing the record, the California Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's finding that Watkins implicitly waived his Miranda rights by continuing to respond to Detective Hergenroeather's questions following the advisement. ( Lodgment 7 at 8-9.) This Court finds nothing in the record to undermine the state court's conclusion that Watkins knowingly and voluntarily waived his rights by continuing to respond to post-advisement questions. Accordingly, the California Court of Appeal's denial of this claim was neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of, clearly established Supreme Court law. Williams, 529 U.S. at 412-413.
Watkins also argues that his intoxication during the interview should render his Miranda waiver invalid. ( Pet. at 25-26.) However, the ingestion of alcohol or drugs does not automatically render a waiver invalid. Nelson v. McCarthy, 637 F.2d 1291, 1295 (1980). Upon reviewing the videotape and considering the transcript of the interrogation, both the trial court and the appellate court concluded that Watkins's intoxication was not so gross as to render him unable to understand his Miranda rights. ( Lodgment 1, vol. 1 at 272; Lodgment 7 at 8-9.) The trial court's determination that Watkins's voluntarily waived his Miranda rights carries a presumption of correctness under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). Nelson, 637 F.2d at 1295-96. Watkins's claim is deficient in this regard, because it fails to direct the Court to any clear and convincing evidence to contradict the trial court's determination. Id.
3. Admission Of Watkins's Post-Advisement Statements
Watkins also argues that the trial court should have suppressed his post-advisement statements as involuntary. ( Pet. at 26-27.) Specifically, he contends that, even if "the initial Miranda violation did not render the Mirandized portion of the interrogation inadmissible as a matter of law, that portion was nevertheless inadmissible, inasmuch as [Watkins's] statements there were involuntarily given." ( Petr.'s Ex. D at 59 n. 13.)
The Fifth Amendment forbids the use of an involuntary confession against a defendant. Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 385-86 (1964). However, "coercive police activity is a necessary predicate to the finding that a confession is not `voluntary.'"Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 167 (1986). "[W]hether the confession was obtained by coercion or improper inducement can be determined only by an examination of all of the attendant circumstances." Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 513 (1963). Specifically, a court must consider "whether `the government obtained the statement by physical or psychological coercion or by improper inducement so that the suspect's will was overborne.'" Beaty v. Stewart, 303 F.3d 975, 992 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting United States v. Guerrero, 847 F.2d 1363 (9th Cir. 1988)); see also Hutto v. Ross, 429 U.S. 28, 30 (1976) (per curiam) ("The test is whether the confession was `extracted by any sort of threats or violence, [or] obtained by any direct or implied promises, however slight, [or] by the exertion of any improper influence.'" (citing Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 542-43 (1897) (alterations in original))).
Although Detectives Hergenroeather and Ott told Watkins during the interrogation that it would be "alright" and "fine" if he admitted to having jewelry, the detectives never explicitly or implicitly promised Watkins any leniency in exchange for his statement. ( Lodgment 5 at 16, 36.) Nor did the detectives use any threats of violence or undue influence in extracting Watkins's statement. (See id.) The detectives conducted the relatively short interrogation in a relaxed manner and did not deprive Watkins of food, water, or access to a restroom. (See id. at 14 ¶ 19-20 (" [John Hergenroeather]: Want some water? [David Watkins]: Yeah."); id. at 52 ¶ 7-10.) In short, Detectives Hergenroeather and Ott did not engage in any "coercive police activity" that would render Watkins's statement involuntary.
The California Court of Appeal's decision denying this claim on direct appeal is the last reasoned state court decision on this issue. ( Lodgment 7 at 11-16.) The appellate court held that Watkins's implied Miranda waiver was knowing and voluntary, and that Watkins's statements following the Miranda advisement were given voluntarily. ( Lodgment 7 at 7-10.) This Court is not called to decide whether it agrees with the state court's decision or whether it would have reached the same conclusion; rather, the Court inquires only whether the state court's decision was objectively unreasonable. Yarborough, 540 U.S. at 5. Based on the record, the Court finds Petitioner has failed to show that the state court's determination was objectively unreasonable. Accordingly, the Court OVERRULES Petitioner's Objections, ADOPTS the Report, and DENIES Petitioner's Miranda claim.
IV. CONCLUSION AND ORDER
In light of the foregoing, the Court ADOPTS the reasoning and findings contained in the Report and OVERRULES Watkins's Objections. For the reasons stated in the Report, which is incorporated herein by reference, the Court DENIES Watkins's § 2254 writ of habeas corpus. The Clerk of the Court shall close the district court file.