Opinion
No. 14-08-01040-CV
Opinion filed June 3, 2010.
On Appeal from the 133rd District Court, Harris County, Texas, Trial Court Cause No. 2007-39588.
Panel consists of Justices YATES, SEYMORE, and BROWN.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
In this legal-malpractice case, Brenda Watkins appeals from a traditional summary judgment in favor of attorney James C. Plummer on the ground of limitations. Concluding the summary-judgment evidence established that limitations barred Watkins's legal-malpractice claim against Plummer and that Watkins's other claims were not separate from her legal-malpractice claim, we affirm.
I
In March 2001, Watkins employed Plummer to represent her in a products-liability suit against Sulzer Orthopedic, Inc., the manufacturer of an allegedly defective hip implant Watkins received during hip-replacement surgery. Although Watkins did not remember signing a letter or other document consenting to Plummer's referral of the case to another attorney, the record contains her signed consent to such a referral. After reviewing Plummer's medical records, however, the attorney to whom Plummer referred the case declined to take it and so informed Plummer in August 2002.
The factual background is derived from both parties' summary-judgment evidence and other documents of record. As set forth below, we view the summary-judgment evidence in the light most favorable to Watkins, the non-movant. See Trousdale v. Henry, 261 S.W.3d 221, 224 (Tex. App.-Houston 2008, pets. denied).
Late in 2002, Plummer informed Watkins the products-liability case was "over and done" and Watkins needed to get her file. Plummer returned Watkins's file in December 2002. According to Watkins, the file contained only her medical records and no legal papers. The docket sheet in the Sulzer case contains the following notation: "9-19-01 NOTE RECEIPT OF copy of alleged order signed by Judge Kathleen M. O'Malley, U.S. District Ct for Northern District of Ohio, enjoining all state court Sulzer actions. No date on order; order not certified." The next notation on the docket sheet refers to an order dated November 29, 2004, setting the case for trial on June 6, 2005.
In January 2005, Plummer filed a motion to withdraw. In the motion, he stated a copy of the motion had been delivered to Watkins and that she had been advised in writing of her right to object to the motion and advised of the docket-control deadlines. By order signed February 8, 2005, the court denied the motion, stating it had "considered the representations and found no agreements of the parties."
In March 2005, after corresponding with Plummer and Watkins, Sulzer filed a motion to compel Watkins's discovery responses. On April 8, 2005, the court granted the motion and also ordered Watkins to pay $1,000 in attorneys' fees.
By this point Sulzer was known as "Zimmer Austin." For simplicity, we shall continue to refer to the defendant in the products-liability case as Sulzer.
Sulzer sent the correspondence to both Plummer and Watkins because Sulzer understood there were "some questions as to the existence of a present attorney-client relationship" between Plummer and Watkins.
In an internal memorandum dated March 11, Plummer informed a staff member that Watkins was saying the first correspondence she had received from Plummer's office was something from "last week." In the same memorandum Plummer stated he now viewed Watkins's file as "a problem." According to Watkins, in March 2005, Plummer first told her "the case was back on the docket." Watkins also reported,
During my telephone conversation with a woman staff member of Mr. Plummer's office in March of 2005, I was asked whether I wanted Mr. Plummer to continue to represent me in the [Sulzer] Litigation or did I want another attorney to do so. I told her that I wanted Mr. Plummer to continue to represent me. This staff member told me that she would call me back. When she did, she told me that Mr. Plummer had said that he did not want to represent me anymore and to get another attorney. I said "okay[."]
On April 11, 2005, Plummer filed a second motion to withdraw and a motion for continuance.
Sulzer noticed Watkins's deposition for April 13, 2005. According to Watkins, she "knew nothing" about the motion to compel and the court's order for attorney's fees "until right before [her] deposition was taken . . . when [she] received a copy of the April 8, 2005 Order of the Court in the Litigation from an attorney from Sulzer Orthopedics, Inc."
On April 15, 2005, at 8:30 a.m., the court heard and denied Plummer's second motion to withdraw and motion for continuance. Watkins arrived at court one-half an hour late, and claimed that Plummer told her the proceeding was to start at 9:00 a.m. The court informed Watkins of its ruling and also informed her trial was scheduled for June 6, 2005.
On April 19, 2005, the court granted Sulzer's no-evidence motion for summary judgment and ordered Watkins to take nothing on her claims for products liability, breach of implied warranties, 402B misrepresentation, and fraud. The court noted Watkins had not responded to the motion.
On May 24, 2005, the court granted Sulzer's no-evidence motion for summary judgment on Watkins's negligence claim. The court stated the judgment finally disposed of all parties and claims and was appealable. By letter dated June 13, 2005, Plummer purportedly sent Watkins the May 24 judgment, informed Watkins it was a final judgment, and advised her that, if she wished to appeal, she had to do so within thirty days of the date it was entered. Watkins denies receiving the letter. Her last day to file a notice of appeal was June 23, 2005. She did not do so.
On July 6, 2007, Watkins filed her original petition in the present case, alleging legal malpractice. She subsequently filed amended petitions alleging common-law fraud and breach of fiduciary duty in addition to the legal-malpractice claim.
Plummer answered, entering a general denial and raising, among other matters, the defense of limitations. He also moved for traditional summary judgment on the ground of limitations. Plummer alleged that, because a two-year statute of limitations applied to all Watkins's claims, her claims expired on June 23, 2007. Plummer's summary-judgment evidence consisted solely of the docket sheet from the Sulzer litigation and the Sulzer court's final judgment dated May 24, 2005.
Watkins responded, asserting the discovery rule and fraudulent concealment. She alleged she had no actual notice or knowledge of the May 24 order until July 6, 2005, and that all of her claims accrued on that date. She further alleged her claims for breach of fiduciary duty and fraud were separate from her claim for legal malpractice and were subject to the four-year limitations period. In support of her response, she attached a fourteen-page affidavit and accompanying documents from the Sulzer litigation.
Plummer objected to the form and substance of Watkins's affidavit. He objected to twenty-eight statements prefaced by "I contend" as expressing "matters of opinion, contentions, speculation, allegations, or assertions," and not constituting "direct, unequivocal statements of fact." He objected to statements prefaced by "my present attorney advised [or told or explained to] me," as constituting hearsay. He objected on the ground of the best-evidence rule to statements in which Watkins interpreted, commented on, or explained the accompanying documents. He also objected to Watkins's statement that she assumed the June 6 trial had been postponed as being speculation, and lacking "specificity as to date or time of the alleged assumption." Finally, he objected "to those portions of Watkins'[s] Affidavit in which she makes factual assertions without any underlying foundation."
Watkins replied. She observed, in part, that Plummer did "not even attempt to address that [Watkins] pled the discovery rule by her Response which required [Plummer] to negate that exception to limitations."
Without ruling on Plummer's objections, the trial court granted summary judgment in his favor. Watkins filed a motion for new trial, which was overruled by operation of law.
II
Watkins raises two issues. Both concern the propriety of the court's grant of summary judgment in Plummer's favor. We review the trial court's grant of summary judgment de novo. Joe v. Two Thirty Nine Joint Venture, 145 S.W.3d 150, 156-57 (Tex. 2004); Rodarte v. Investeco Group, L.L.C., 299 S.W.3d 400, 407 (Tex. App.-Houston [14 Dist.] 2009, no pet.). In a traditional summary judgment, the movant bears the burden to show there is no genuine issue of material fact and he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(c); Nixon v. Mr. Prop. Mgmt. Co., 690 S.W.2d 546, 548 (Tex. 1985); Rodarte, 299 S.W.3d at 407. Thus, when a defendant moves for traditional summary judgment, he must conclusively negate at least one essential element of each of the plaintiff's causes of action or conclusively establish each element of an affirmative defense. Sci. Spectrum, Inc. v. Martinez, 941 S.W.2d 910, 911 (Tex. 1997); Rodarte, 299 S.W.3d at 407-08.
In reviewing a motion for summary judgment, we examine the entire record. Sudan v. Sudan, 199 S.W.3d 291, 292 (Tex. 2006) (per curiam) (citing City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 823 (Tex. 2005)). We take as true all evidence favorable to the non-movant, and we indulge every reasonable inference and resolve any doubts in the non-movant's favor. Joe, 145 S.W.3d at 157; Rodarte, 299 S.W.3d at 408. We review a summary judgment for evidence that would enable reasonable and fair-minded jurors to differ in their conclusions. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Spates, 186 S.W.3d 566, 568 (Tex. 2006) (per curiam) (citing City of Keller, 168 S.W.3d at 822, 823); Rodarte, 299 S.W.3d at 408.
A
In issue one, Watkins argues, "The trial court erred in finding that Plummer, as summary[-]judgment movant, had met his burden of conclusively establishing his affirmative defense of limitations and had negated the discovery rule pled by Watkins in Plaintiff's Third Amended Original Petition in granting final summary judgment in favor of Plummer." A defendant moving for summary judgment on the ground of limitations must conclusively establish the elements of its affirmative defense. KPMG Peat Marwick v. Harrison County Hous. Fin. Corp., 988 S.W.2d 746, 748 (Tex. 1999). To satisfy his burden, the defendant must (1) establish conclusively when the claims in question accrued; and (2) negate the discovery rule if it applies and has been pleaded or otherwise raised, by proving as a matter of law that there is no genuine issue of material fact about when the claimant discovered, or in the exercise of reasonable diligence should have discovered, the nature of her injury. Id.
In his summary-judgment motion, Plummer contended Watkins's action accrued on June 23, 2005, the date Watkins "exhausted" any appeals by virtue of not having filed a notice of appeal. See Hughes v. Mahaney Higgins, 821 S.W.2d 154, 157 (Tex. 1991) ("[W]hen an attorney commits malpractice in the prosecution or defense of a claim that results in litigation, the statute of limitations on the malpractice claim against the attorney is tolled until all appeals on the underlying claim are exhausted."). In support, he offered the final judgment dated May 24, 2005, and the Sulzer court's docket sheet. It is undisputed that a two-year limitation period applies to legal-malpractice claims. See Tex. Civ. Prac. Rem. Code Ann. § 16.003(a) (Vernon Supp. 2009); Apex Towing Co. v. Tolin, 41 S.W.3d 118, 120 (Tex. 2001). Thus, under Plummer's theory and evidence, limitations expired on June 23, 2007, and Watkins's claim for legal malpractice, filed July 6, 2007, was time-barred.
"Accrual" refers to the date when a limitations period begins to run. Seureau v. ExxonMobil Corp., 274 S.W.3d 206, 226 (Tex. App.-Houston [14 Dist.] 2008, no pet.). The date an action accrues is a question of law. See Moreno v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 787 S.W.2d 348, 351 (Tex. 1990).
Watkins, however, pleaded the discovery rule. The discovery rule applies to legal-malpractice cases. See Willis v. Maverick, 760 S.W.2d 642, 645-46 (Tex. 1988). Identifying July 6, 2005, as the date her current attorney advised her of the May 24 final judgment, Watkins alleged she did not discover nor should have discovered Plummer's conduct until that date. Plummer's summary-judgment evidence was not responsive to, and did not negate, the discovery rule.
In her affidavit in response Plummer's summary-judgment motion, Watkins averred: "On July 6, 2005, my present attorney advised me that the Court had signed an Order on May 24, 2005, which had disposed of my final claim against Seltzer Orthopedics, Inc." Plummer objected to statements prefaced by "my present attorney advised [or told or explained to] me," as constituting hearsay. Plummer did not obtain a ruling on his objections to Watkins's affidavit. Even if one assumes a hearsay objection may be raised on appeal absent a ruling from the trial court (and we do not so assume), the quoted statement does not constitute hearsay because it was not offered for the truth of what Watkins's attorney had told her. See Tex. R. Evid. 801(d).
Plummer's response to Watkins's response to the summary-judgment motion consisted solely of Plummer's objections to Watkins's affidavit.
In determining whether a fact issue exists regarding when limitations began to run, however, we may consider Watkins's summary-judgment evidence. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(c) (providing summary judgment to be rendered if "(i) the deposition transcripts, interrogatory answers, and other discovery responses referenced or set forth in the motion or response, and (ii) the pleadings, admissions, affidavits, stipulations of the parties, and authenticated or certified public records" show no genuine issue regarding any material fact and moving party is entitled to judgment as matter of law on issues expressly set out in motion, answer, or any other response); White v. Tackett, 173 S.W.3d 149, 156 n. 29 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2005, no pet.) (stating trial court required to consider all summary-judgment evidence including movant's deposition which non-movant filed with her response); see also Trousdale v. Henry, 261 S.W.3d 221, 235-37(Tex. App.-Houston 2008, pets. denied) (considering non-movant's as well as movant's evidence in concluding no fact question existed regarding when legal-malpractice causes of action accrued); Rea v. Coffer, 879 S.W.2d 224, 228 (Tex. App.-Houston 1994, no writ) (looking to codefendant's summary-judgment evidence negating discovery rule although movant's evidence failed to negate rule).
When the discovery rule applies, the cause of action accrues when the plaintiff knows, or through the exercise of reasonable care and diligence should have discovered, the nature of her injury and the likelihood it was caused by the wrongful acts of another. Seureau v. ExxonMobil Corp., 274 S.W.3d 206, 228 (Tex. App.-Houston 2008, no pet.); see Childs v. Haussecker, 974 S.W.2d 31, 40 (Tex. 1998). Thus, accrual is not delayed until the plaintiff learns of actual causes and possible cures for his injuries. Seureau, 274 S.W.3d at 228 (citing PPG Indus., Inc. v. JMB/Houston Ctrs. Partners Ltd. P'ship, 146 S.W.3d 79, 93 (Tex. 2004)). Instead, a plaintiff who invokes the discovery rule still must have sought information about her injuries and their likely cause once apprised of facts that would prompt a reasonably diligent person to make an inquiry that would lead to discovery of the cause of action. Id.
In the present case, Watkins's affidavit and attached exhibits set forth the following events as occurring during litigation of the products-liability case:
• in December 2002, Plummer told Watkins her case was "over and done," and returned at least some of her file to her;
• in March 2005, Watkins first learned from Plummer that "the case was back on the docket";
• in March 2005, a member of Plummer's staff told Watkins that Plummer did not want to represent Watkins anymore and she should find new counsel, to which Watkins responded, "OK";
• on April 13, 2005, Watkins first learned of the $1,000 discovery sanction against her when, five days after the hearing on the motion to compel, opposing counsel told her;
• after Watkins told Plummer she wanted to object to his second motion to withdraw, Plummer told her the hearing on the motion would be held April 15, 2005, at 9:00 a.m., but when Watkins arrived, the court informed her the hearing had been held at 8:30;
• the court informed Watkins trial was scheduled for June 6, 2005;
• Watkins denied receiving a letter from Plummer, dated June 13, 2005, in which Plummer enclosed the judgment dated May 24, 2005, and informed Walker the judgment was final; and
• Watkins did not learn about the disposition of the case until July 6, 2005.
Even viewing Watkins's summary-judgment evidence in the light most favorable to her, we conclude events reflected by this evidence would have prompted a reasonably diligent client to make inquiry that would have led, at least by June 23, 2005, to discovery of her cause of action for legal malpractice. At a minimum, first learning of the discovery sanction from opposing counsel; purportedly being given the wrong time for a hearing on counsel's motion to withdraw, which she opposed; and knowing the date of trial, but not learning of the outcome from her attorney shortly thereafter, would have led a reasonable person to question counsel's conduct. Cf. Trousdale, 261 S.W.3d at 235-37 (holding, albeit on more extensive summary-judgment proof, that events would have prompted reasonable person to investigate further and ultimately to discover her claims had been dismissed).
In sum, because no fact issue exists regarding when Watkins's legal-malpractice causes of action accrued and limitations began to run, the trial court did not err in granting summary judgment in favor of Plummer on Watkins's legal-malpractice claims. See id. at 237. Accordingly, we overrule Watkins's first issue.
B
In issue two, Watkins argues the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to Plummer on the breach-of-fiduciary-duty and fraud claims. A four-year limitations period applies to suits for breach of fiduciary duty and fraud. See Tex. Civ. Prac. Rem. Code Ann. § 16.004(a)(4), (5) (Vernon 2002).
Plummer does not argue Watkins brought her breach-of-fiduciary-duty and fraud claims outside the four-year period. Instead, he argues that these claims were no more than restatements of her legal-malpractice claims and thus were governed by the two-year limitations period. See Goffney v. Rabson, 56 S.W.3d 186, 190 (Tex. App.-Houston 2001, pet. denied) (stating Texas law does not permit plaintiff to fracture legal-malpractice claims into additional causes of action).
Whether a complaint against a lawyer is actionable in negligence or another legal theory is a question of law. Duerr v. Brown, 262 S.W.3d 63, 70 (Tex. App.-Houston 2008, no pet.). In determining whether a complaint is a claim for negligence or something else, a court is not bound by the labels the parties give their claims. Murphy v. Gruber, 241 S.W.3d 689, 697 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2007, pet. denied) (citing State Bar of Tex. v. Heard, 603 S.W.2d 829, 833 (Tex. 1980)). Instead, we look to the real substance of the claims and may be informed by the remedy the plaintiff seeks. See Beck v. Law Offices of Edwin J. (Ted) Terry, Jr., P.C., 284 S.W.3d 416, 428 (Tex. App.-Austin 2009, no pet.).
If the essence of a client's complaint is that the attorney did not exercise the degree of care, skill, or diligence that attorneys of ordinary skill and knowledge commonly possess, the client should pursue her complaint as a negligence claim, rather than some other claim. Deutsch v. Hoover, Bax Slovacek, L.L.P., 97 S.W.3d 179, 189 (Tex. App.-Houston 2002, no pet.). If, however, the client's complaint is more appropriately classified as another claim — for example, fraud or breach of fiduciary duty — the client can assert a claim other than negligence. Id. As we explained in Duerr:
A legal[-]malpractice claim focuses on whether an attorney represented a client with the requisite level of skill, while a breach[-]of[-]fiduciary[-]duty claim encompasses whether an attorney obtained an improper benefit from the representation. Breach of fiduciary duty involves conduct including failure to disclose conflicts of interest; a failure to deliver funds belonging to the client; placing personal interests ahead of a client's interests; misuse of client confidences; taking advantage of the client's trust; engaging in self-dealing; and making material misrepresentations.
This court, however, has "never held that self-dealing, deception, and misrepresentation must all be present in order for a breach[-]of[-]fiduciary[-]duty claim to stand." Trousdale, 261 S.W.3d at 228. Instead, we stated, "[T]he allegations in support of a breach[-]of[-]fiduciary[-]duty claim must simply go beyond the mere negligence allegations in a malpractice action." Id.
Watkins's pleadings, response to the summary-judgment motion, and affidavit contain allegations Plummer (1) misrepresented that the litigation concluded in 2002 when it had only been abated, and in doing so put his interest in a contingency fee above Watkin's interest in obtaining new counsel; (2) "lied" in (a) telling the court he would be filing a response to the first no-evidence motion for summary judgment (b) describing his own skills and stating he was referring the case to another law firm, (c) stating, in the motion to withdraw, that he had informed Watkins of the litigation deadlines and her right to object to the motion, and (d) telling her the time of the April 15 hearing; (3) "fake[d]" letters indicating he had returned her files to her and informed her of the May 24 judgment; (4) fraudulently concealed from her the discovery dispute and the second summary-judgment motion; and (5) "was in clear conflict of interest by having [her] take the blame for discovery disputes when it was his fault alone."
Even when viewed in the light most favorable to Watkins, at least four aspects of Watkins's pleadings and summary-judgment proof lead us to conclude she has raised only a claim of legal malpractice. First, although Watkins's allegations contain generic language used in Duerr to describe breach of fiduciary duty, the specific conduct Watkins cites concerns Plummer's care, skill, and diligence in communicating with her and handling the case. See Beck, 284 S.W.3d at 428 (stating court looks to substance of claims rather than labels). Second, the statements in Watkins's affidavit characterizing Plummer as lying, fraudulently concealing information, and attributing self-interest as the motive for his behavior are conclusory. See Walls Reg'l Hosp. v. Bomar, 9 S.W.3d 805, 807 (Tex. 1999) (per curiam) (concluding affiants' characterizations of physician's conduct and motives were conclusory and failed to raise fact issue). Third, the only "benefits" Watkins alleges Plummer sought were the possible receipt of a contingency fee and having Watkins "take the blame for the discovery disputes." See Duerr, 262 S.W.3d at 71 ("A legal[-]malpractice claim focuses on whether an attorney represented a client with the requisite level of skill, while a breach[-]of[-]fiduciary[-]duty claim encompasses whether an attorney obtained an improper benefit from the representation."). Finally, Watkins has not requested fee forfeiture, a remedy available for breach of fiduciary duty. See Burrow v. Arce, 997 S.W.2d 229, 246 (Tex. 1999) (indicating fee forfeiture is available remedy for breach of fiduciary duty and listing factors to be considered); Beck, 284 S.W.3d at 428 (stating, in considering whether claim is for negligence or something else, court may consider relief sought).
For the preceding reasons, we conclude Watkins's claims sound only in negligence. Accordingly, we overrule Walker's second issue.
* * *
Having overruled Watkins's two issues, we affirm the trial court's judgment.