Waters v. Ray

Full title: REGINOL L. WATERS v. GAIL RAY, COMMISSIONER, TENNESSEE DEPARTMENT OF…

Court: Court of Appeals of Tennessee, at Nashville

Date published: Jun 25, 2008

No. M2006-01453-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Jun. 25, 2008)

Opinion

No. M2006-01453-COA-R3-CV.

Assigned On Briefs January 9, 2008.

Filed June 25, 2008.

Direct Appeal from the Chancery Court for Davidson County; No. 05-2083-III; Ellen Hobbs Lyle, Chancellor.

Judgment of the Chancery Court Vacated; and Remanded.

Reginol Waters, Pro Se.

Robert E. Cooper, Jr., Attorney General and Reporter, Michael Moore, Solicitor General, Pamela S. Lorch, Senior Counsel, for the appellee, Commissioner of Tennessee Department of Correction.

James I. Pentecost and Jon A. York, Jackson, Tennessee, for the appellee, Glen Tuner.

David R. Farmer, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which Alan E. Highers, P.J., W.S., and Holly M. Kirby, J., joined.

OPINION

DAVID R. FARMER, JUDGE.

Petitioner, an inmate with the Department of Correction, filed a declaratory judgment action alleging Tennessee Code Annotated § 40-25-143 had been unconstitutionally retroactively applied to his inmate trust account to reimburse the State for costs arising from the prosecution of Petitioner. In his complaint, Petitioner named the Warden of the Hardeman County Correctional Facility and the Commissioner of the Tennessee Department of Correction as Defendants. The trial court granted the Warden's motion to dismiss and awarded summary judgment to the Commissioner. Petitioner filed a Rule 59 motion to alter or amend and a premature notice of appeal to this Court. The trial court dismissed Petitioner's Rule 59 motion for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Petitioner appeals. We vacate the order of the trial court dismissing Petitioner's Rule 59 motion for lack of jurisdiction, and remand.

The underlying facts relevant to this appeal are not disputed. Petitioner/Appellant, Reginol Waters (Mr. Waters) is serving a total sentence of fifty-eight years in the custody of the Tennessee Department of Correction ("TDOC") after having been convicted in 2001 of rape, aggravated rape, aggravated robbery, and aggravated burglary. In State v. Waters, No. 2000-C-1267, Mr. Waters was found guilty by a jury on June 21, 2001. A sentencing hearing apparently was held on July 27, 2001, and the Circuit Court for Davidson County entered final judgment on the conviction on August 3, 2001. The judgment became final thirty days after entry by the trial court if no post-trial motion was filed by Mr. Waters, or, if Mr. Waters filed any post-trial motion, upon entry of an order disposing of the motion. See State v. Mixon, 983 S.W.2d 661, 670 (Tenn. 1999). Mr. Waters is housed at the Hardeman County Correctional Facility ("HCCF") under the supervision of Warden Glen Turner.

On August 15, 2001, a fieri facias was issued against Mr. Waters. On February 28, 2002, a bill of costs was issued in State v. Waters, which included costs billed to the State in the amount of $669. On May 15, 2002, a nulla bona was returned on the fieri facias. On March 3, 2004, the Central Trust Fund Administration ("CTFA") advised Mr. Waters in writing that, pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 40-25-143, the Department of Collections was permitted to collect costs paid by the State from the inmate's trust account while the inmate was in the custody of the TDOC. CTFA advised Mr. Waters that, in accordance with the statute, it would automatically deduct fifty percent of all deposits made to Mr. Waters' trust account until the $669 billed to the State was paid in full.

In August 2005, Mr. Waters filed a petition for declaratory judgment against Gail Ray, Commissioner, Tennessee Department of Correction ("the Commissioner") and Glen Turner (Mr. Turner), Warden, HCCF in the Chancery Court for Davidson County. In his petition, Mr. Waters sought a declaration that section 40-25-123 had been unconstitutionally retroactively applied to him where the statute became effective July 1, 2001, and he had been convicted on June 21, 2001. He also sought a declaration that he has a vested right in a finding of indigency made by the trial court in January 2001.

On December 12, 2005, Mr. Turner filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. In his motion, Mr. Turner asserted that Mr. Waters had alleged no action or inaction on Mr. Turner's part upon which relief could be granted. Mr. Turner further asserted that the relief sought by Mr. Waters was not within Mr. Turner's discretion or control. The trial court granted Mr. Turner's motion to dismiss on May 25, 2006.

In March 2006, the Commissioner filed a motion for summary judgment, statement of undisputed facts, and memorandum of law in support of the motion for summary judgment. In the motion, the Commissioner asserted that a criminal defendant has no "vested right" in indigency. The Commissioner further asserted that Tennessee Code Annotated § 40-25-143 was applied to Mr. Waters' inmate trust account prospectively where it was applied to funds deposited after July 1, 2001, the date the statute became effective. The Commissioner also asserted that the judgment against Mr. Waters was entered on August 3, 2001, subsequent to the date Tennessee Code Annotated § 40-25-143 became effective, and accordingly was not retroactively applied to Mr. Waters. The trial court determined that section 40-25-143 had not been applied retroactively and awarded summary judgment to the Commissioner on May 25, 2006.

On June 26, 2006, Mr. Waters filed a motion to reconsider, alter or amend and vacate/set aside the judgment. Mr. Waters stated his motion was made pursuant to Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure 59 and 60.02. On June 29, 2006, Mr. Waters filed a notice of appeal to this Court and a motion for leave to proceed as a poor person on appeal. The Commissioner opposed Mr. Waters' Rules 59 and 60 motion on the ground that the trial court lost jurisdiction to adjudicate the motion upon the filing of Mr. Waters' notice of appeal. On July 17, 2006, the trial court granted Mr. Waters' petition to proceed as a poor person on appeal. The trial court determined, however, that it was without jurisdiction to hear the motion to alter or amend where Mr. Waters had filed a notice of appeal to this Court.

On August 21, Mr. Waters moved the court to set aside its order dismissing his motion to alter or amend for lack of jurisdiction. Mr. Waters argued that the trial court's order was not final when he filed his notice of appeal to this Court where his motion to alter or amend was pending in the trial court. Mr. Waters further asserted that his notice of appeal was, therefore, prematurely filed. He asserted that, under Rule 4 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure, the trial court retained jurisdiction over his motion to alter and amend despite the premature filing of his notice of appeal. On August 24, 2006, Mr. Waters filed a motion in this Court for leave to remand to the chancery court. By order dated August 30, 2006, this Court determined that the chancery court had erred in determining that it had lost jurisdiction to hear Mr. Waters' motion to alter or amend upon Mr. Waters' filing of a premature notice of appeal to this Court. We vacated the chancery court's order and remanded the matter to the chancery court for consideration of Mr. Waters' Rule 59 motion.

On September 19, 2006, the trial court denied Mr. Waters' August 21 motion to set aside the court's order dismissing his motion to alter or amend for lack of jurisdiction. The trial court's order stated, in whole:

The Court denies the Petitioner's Motion to Alter or Amend, Vacate, Set Aside Order for Lack of Jurisdiction. The motion was filed August 21, 2006. Two months prior, on June 29, 2006, the Petitioner filed a notice of appeal. Jurisdiction of this case is now with the Court of Appeals. This Court denies the Petitioner's motion for lack of jurisdiction of the trial court.

It is so ORDERED.

Thus, despite this Court's order of remand instructing the trial court that it retained jurisdiction to adjudicate Mr. Waters' Rule 59 motion despite the premature filing of Mr. Waters' notice of appeal, the trial court apparently never adjudicated the Rule 59 motion. It merely denied Mr. Waters' motion to set aside its July 17 order dismissing for lack of jurisdiction.

On February 21, 2007, the deputy clerk of the Middle Section of this Court notified the Court that Mr. Waters had failed to comply with Rule 24 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure, which requires the appellant to file a transcript or statement of the evidence within ninety days after the notice of appeal is filed. On February 27, 2007, the Court ordered Mr. Waters to either file with the trial court clerk a transcript of the evidence, a statement of the evidence, or a Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 24(d) notice or else to show cause why the appeal should not be dismissed for failure to comply with Rule 24 within fifteen days. On or about March 13, 2007, Mr. Waters filed a request for a transcript of the evidence in the chancery court and in this Court. In his request, Mr. Waters stated that he had not received "any information" from the chancery court or the court clerk with respect to his Rule 59 motion and that he would have complied with Rule 24 had he received a ruling. The record was transmitted from the trial court in March 2007.

After receiving extensions of time from this Court, Mr. Waters filed his brief in this Court on August 7, 2007. The Commissioner and Mr. Turner filed their briefs on September 6 and September 21, respectively. The matter was assigned on briefs to the Western Section of this Court in January 2008. We now vacate the trial court's September 2006 order denying Mr. Waters' motion to set aside its July 2006 order denying his Rule 59 motion for lack of jurisdiction. This matter is remanded for further proceedings, including adjudication of Mr. Waters' pending Rule 59 motion to alter or amend.

Issues Presented

The issues as presented by Mr. Waters, as we perceive them, are

(1) Whether the trial court erred by dismissing his claim against Mr. Turner for failure to state a claim.

(2) Whether the trial court erred in awarding summary judgment to the Commissioner because Tennessee Code Annotated § 40-25-143 was unconstitutionally retroactively applied and because Mr. Waters has a vested interest in the trial court's finding of indigency.

In light of this Court's order of August 30, 2006, vacating the trial court's order dismissing Mr. Waters' Rule 59 motion for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and remanding the matter to the trial court for adjudication of the motion, however, we perceive the issue to be whether the trial court erred in dismissing Mr. Waters' Rule 59 motion for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

Standard of Review

The question of whether a court has subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law which we review de novo, with no presumption of correctness afforded to the determination of the trial court. Tenn. Envtl. Council v. Water Quality Control Bd., 250 S.W.3d 44, 55 (Tenn.Ct.App. 2007).

Analysis

It is well-settled that a court has no authority to adjudicate a case or controversy over which it does not have subject matter jurisdiction. E.g., Benson v. Herbst, 240 S.W.3d 235, 239 (Tenn.Ct.App. 2007) (citations omitted). A court's subject matter jurisdiction is derived, either explicitly or by necessary implication, from the Tennessee Constitution or from legislative acts. Id. (citing Meighan v. U.S. Sprint Commc'ns Co., 924 S.W.2d 632, 639 (Tenn. 1996)). Parties cannot confer subject matter jurisdiction on either a trial or an appellate court by appearance, plea, consent, silence, or waiver. Id. (citing State ex rel. Dep't of Soc. Servs. v. Wright, 736 S.W.2d 84, 85 n. 2 (Tenn. 1987); Team Design v. Gottlieb, 104 S.W.3d 512, 527 (Tenn.Ct.App. 2002)).

Despite our August 2006 order vacating the trial court's order dismissing Mr. Waters' Rule 59 motion for lack of jurisdiction and remanding the matter to the trial court for adjudication of the motion, the trial court's September 2006 order merely reiterated its earlier order dismissing on the basis of lack of jurisdiction. As we noted in our August 2006 order, although the filing of a timely notice of appeal generally deprives the trial court of subject matter jurisdiction and vests jurisdiction in the appellate court, there are several exceptions to this principle. Under the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure effective July 1, 2005, the trial court retains jurisdiction over a Rule 59 motion until the court either grants or denies the motion. Tenn. R. App. P. 4(e); Trundle v. Park, 210 S.W.3d 575, 580 (Tenn.Ct.App. 2006). A notice of appeal filed prior to the trial court's ruling on motions specified in Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure 4(b) and 4(c), which includes a motion filed under Rule 59.04 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure, "shall be deemed premature and shall be treated as filed after the entry of the order disposing of the motion and on the day thereof." Tenn. R. App. P. 4(e). Thus, Mr. Waters filed a premature notice of appeal where he filed the notice after filing a Rule 59 motion to alter or amend but before the trial court had adjudicated that motion. Accordingly, the trial court retained jurisdiction over Mr. Waters' timely-filed Rule 59 motion. Because Mr. Waters has filed his notice of appeal, jurisdiction will vest in this Court when the trial court enters a final order adjudicating the motion on its merits.

Holding

In light of the foregoing, the order of the trial court dismissing Mr. Waters' Rule 59 motion to alter or amend for lack of jurisdiction is vacated. This matter is remanded to the trial court with instructions to comply with this Court's order of August 30, 2006, and dispose of the motion on its merits. Costs of this appeal are taxed to the Appellee, Commissioner of the Tennessee Department of Correction.