Opinion
No. 37095.
December 24, 1964.
[1] Water Districts — Dissolution — Validity — Justiciable Issue. An action which raises the issue of whether the dissolution procedures for water districts authorized by RCW 57.04.100 impair the obligations of the contracts made by the water district being dissolved, is premature and should be dismissed, where a petition for the dissolution of a water district has been filed but there has been no vote on the issue, since if the vote is against dissolution there would be nothing before the court.
[2] Appeal and Error — Costs on Appeal — Prevailing Party. An appellant who prevailed in that the judgment he appealed from was set aside, was not permitted to recover his costs for the appeal, where the reason for setting aside the judgment was that the action was commenced prematurely, and the appellant had been the plaintiff in the trial court and, thus, responsible for the bringing of the premature action.
See Ann. 96 A.L.R. 1428; Am. Jur. 2d, Appeal § 1011.
Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court for King County, No. 594355, Henry Clay Agnew, J., entered April 2, 1963. Reversed.
Action for a declaratory judgment and injunctive relief. Plaintiffs appeal from a judgment in favor of the defendants.
Wright, Booth, Beresford Anderson and Emerson B. Thatcher, for appellants.
Marvin E. Beckman and Cartano, Botzer Chapman, for respondents.
The Attorney General, Morton M. Tytler and Charles B. Roe, Jr., Assistants (appearing under authority of RCW 7.24.110).
[1] As in Minish v. Hanson (1964), 64 Wn.2d 113, 390 P.2d 704, the issue sought to be raised is whether the dissolution procedures for water districts, as authorized by RCW 57.04.100, impair the obligations of the contracts made by the water district being dissolved. There has been a petition for the dissolution of the plaintiff-appellant water district filed, but no vote on that issue. The vote may be against dissolution, in which event there would be nothing before the court.
The action is premature. The judgment of the superior court appealed from must be set aside, and an order of dismissal entered. As in Minish, we do not reach the question of whether the dissolution procedures would constitute an impairment of contract rights and we express no opinion thereon.
[2] While appellants prevail, in that the judgment appealed from is set aside, they are responsible for the bringing of the premature action and will not be permitted to recover costs on this appeal.