Opinion
December 7, 1999
Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Robert Lippmann, J.), entered on or about September 17, 1998, which, upon the grant of plaintiffs' motion to reargue, adhered to the court's prior order,inter alia, granting defendants' motion and cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint, unanimously affirmed, without costs.
Stephen C. Glasser, for plaintiffs-appellants.
Steve S. Efron and Sung Hee Koh, for defendants-respondents.
SULLIVAN, J.P., WALLACH, RUBIN, SAXE, FRIEDMAN, JJ.
The motion court's grant of summary judgment dismissing the complaint was proper since there was no evidence that plaintiff's fall was attributable to negligence on the part of defendants. The circumstance that the floor upon which plaintiff slipped was "inherently slippery" by reason of its smoothness is not itself indicative of negligence (Murphy v. Conner, 84 N.Y.2d 969; Duffy v. Universal Maintenance Corp., 227 A.D.2d 238; see also, Mroz v. Ella Corp., 262 A.D.2d 465, 692 N.Y.S.2d 156,). Nor does the additional unremarkable circumstance that the floor became more slippery when it was wet, as it allegedly was at the time of plaintiff's accident, bespeak negligence. Since there is no allegation, much less proof, that defendants caused the water to accumulate on the floor or had notice, actual or constructive, of the water's accumulation and failed to take reasonable measures to remedy the resulting hazard, there are no grounds for the imposition of liability on a negligence theory (see, Gordon v. Am. Museum of Natural History, 67 N.Y.2d 836). Given the fundamental flaw in plaintiff's theory of liability, i.e., that liability for negligence might be premised simply on the circumstance that the subject floor was slippery when wet, plaintiffs' requests for further discovery were properly denied. Additional discovery in these circumstances would have served no useful purpose.
We have reviewed plaintiffs' remaining contentions and find them unavailing.
THIS CONSTITUTES THE DECISION AND ORDER OF SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE DIVISION, FIRST DEPARTMENT.