Opinion
Case No. 2:19-cv-1929-RMG-MGB
07-23-2019
Maurice D. Washington, Petitioner, v. Al Cannon, Respondent.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Maurice Washington, a pro se state pretrial detainee, seeks habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. (Dkt. No. 1). This matter is before the Court for initial screening. Under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2)(c) (D.S.C.), the undersigned is authorized to review the petition and submit a recommendation to the District Judge. For the following reasons, the undersigned recommends summarily dismissing under Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
BACKGROUND
Washington is in jail on four criminal charges. (See Dkt. No. 1 at 1.) He contends his custody is unconstitutional under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 73 (1963), and Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981), and more generally under the First through Fourteenth Amendments. (Id.) He also claims he is being held in violation of Rule 5 of the South Carolina Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rules 702 and 703 of the South Carolina Rules of Evidence, and State v. Cole, 403 S.E.2d 117 (S.C. 1991). (Id.) He demands to be released from custody and to have all charges dismissed. (Dkt. No. 1 at 1.)
STANDARD OF REVIEW
This is a preliminary review of Washington's § 2241 petition. See Rule 4, Rules Governing § 2254 Cases (requiring district courts to screen habeas petitions); see also Rule 1(b), Rules Governing § 2254 Cases (allowing district courts to apply the rules to other § 2241 petitions). The narrow question before the Court is whether it "plainly appears" that Washington is not entitled to any relief in this Court. Rule 4, Rules Governing § 2254 Cases. If so, the petition must be dismissed; if not, the warden must respond. Id. Because Washington is representing himself, the undersigned has reviewed the petition liberally. See, e.g., Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007).
DISCUSSION
As Washington makes clear in his petition, his goal is dismissal of his pending criminal prosecution in South Carolina state court. However, criminal defendants generally cannot use federal habeas "to dismiss an indictment or otherwise prevent a prosecution." Dickerson v. Louisiana, 816 F.2d 220, 226 (5th Cir. 1987) (citation and quotation marks omitted). That prohibition comes from our "national policy forbidding federal courts to stay or enjoin pending state court proceedings except under special circumstances." Younger, 401 U.S. at 41. Under Younger, a federal court must refrain from exercising its jurisdiction over a § 2241 challenge to pending state charges if
(1) there is an ongoing state judicial proceeding that began prior to substantial progress in the federal habeas proceeding;Robinson v. Thomas, 855 F.3d 278, 285 (4th Cir. 2017) (citing Middlesex City Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass'n, 457 U.S. 423, 432 (1982)).
(2) that proceeding implicates important, substantial, or vital state interests; and
(3) there is an adequate opportunity to raise constitutional challenges within the framework of the state judicial process.
Because Washington was already in jail on four charges when he filed his petition, the first criterion is easily met. So is the second. See Nivens v. Gilchrist, 319 F.3d 151, 154 (4th Cir. 2003) (finding state had a "very important, substantial, and vital interest in preventing violations of its criminal laws"); see also Cooper v. Oklahoma, 517 U.S. 348, 367 (1996) (noting "the State's interest in the efficient operation of its criminal justice system" is an "important state interest[]"). As for the third, "ordinarily a pending state prosecution provides the accused a fair and sufficient opportunity for vindication of federal constitutional rights." Kugler v. Helfant, 421 U.S. 117, 124 (1975). Nothing in Washington's petition suggests his pending case departs from that ordinary situation. Rather, he can assert his claims before, during, and—if need be—after trial.
"A federal court may disregard Younger's mandate to abstain from interfering with ongoing state proceedings only where extraordinary circumstances exist that present the possibility of irreparable harm." Robinson, 855 F.3d at 286 (citations and quotation marks omitted). Seeing none here, the undersigned finds that Younger's mandate applies. Thus, this Court should abstain from exercising its jurisdiction.
Washington contends Younger does not apply here because of the grounds for habeas relief he has raised. (Dkt. No. 1 at 1.) He does not further explain that position; the undersigned liberally construes it as a challenge to the third Younger element. In other words, Washington appears to be arguing he cannot assert one or more of his constitutional challenges in South Carolina's state court system. The undersigned has not been able to find a ground that South Carolina courts structurally exclude from consideration. To the contrary, those courts routinely entertain constitutional challenges, including issues arising under the three Supreme Court cases Washington cites in his petition. See, e.g., State v. Johnson, 776 S.E.2d 367 (S.C. 2015) (Edwards); State v. Simpson, 823 S.E.2d 229 (S.C. Ct. App. 2019) (Brady); State v. Hill, 822 S.E.2d 344 (S.C. Ct. App. 2018) (Miranda).
Washington also alleges his custody violates South Carolina law. Section 2241 does not allow federal courts to grant habeas for state-law violations. E.g., Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764, 780 (1990); see also Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 68 (1991) ("In conducting habeas review, a federal court is limited to deciding whether a conviction violated the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States."). Consequently, even if Younger did not require total abstention, the claims of state-law violations would be subject to summary dismissal.
CONCLUSION
The undersigned recommends dismissing the petition without prejudice and without requiring a return to be filed.
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED. July 23, 2019
Charleston, South Carolina
/s/_________
MARY GORDON BAKER
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
The parties' attention is directed to the important notice on the next page.
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. "[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must 'only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'" Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
Post Office Box 835
Charleston, South Carolina 29402
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).