Opinion
No. CV02 0079123S
April 17, 2003
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE MOTION TO STRIKE (#110)
Presently before the court is the plaintiff's motion to strike, filed on November 21, 2002, and the defendants' objection thereto, filed on December 4, 2002. The plaintiff is Washington Mutual Bank, F. A. (Washington), the purported holder of a note and mortgage on property known as 503 West River Street, Milford, Connecticut (the property). The defendants are Kevin Barry, the current owner of the property, and Principal Residential Mortgage, Inc. (Principal), the holder of a note and mortgage on the property.
The court notes that Alice Griffin is also named as a defendant. Nevertheless, the motion to strike relates solely to the special defenses filed by Barry and Principal. Thus, the court will treat Barry and Principal as "the defendants."
On August 12, 2002, the plaintiff filed the operative, two-count complaint. The complaint alleges the following. On October 8, 1976, William and Alice Griffin (the Griffins) the former owners of the property, issued a promissory note to City Savings Bank of Bridgeport (City Savings) in the amount of $33,000.00, which was secured by a mortgage on the property. Fleet National Bank (Fleet) subsequently acquired rights to the note and mortgage, and on March 23, 2001, erroneously filed a release of mortgage on the Milford Land Records. On September 4, 2001, Alice Griffin transferred the property by warranty deed to Barry. On the same date, Barry issued a promissory note and mortgage on the property to The McCue Mortgage Company, which subsequently assigned the note and mortgage to Principal. The plaintiff has since acquired rights to the note and mortgage on the property issued by the Griffins.
The complaint alleges that William Griffin died on November 27, 1977.
In count one of the complaint, the plaintiff seeks a judgment declaring that the release of mortgage filed by Fleet is null and void. In turn, count two of the plaintiff's complaint seeks to foreclose on the mortgage securing the note.
In response to the plaintiff's complaint, the defendants filed an answer and two special defenses on September 25, 2002. The first special defense alleges promissory estoppel, while the second special defense alleges estoppel by laches.
The plaintiff now moves to strike the defendants' special defenses on the ground that they are not based on factual allegations as required by Practice Book §§ 10-1 and 10-50. The plaintiff has filed a memorandum of law in support of its motion. The defendants responded by filing an objection to the plaintiff's motion to strike and a corresponding memorandum of law.
Practice Book § 10-1 provides in pertinent part: "Each pleading shall contain a plain and concise statement of the material facts on which the pleader relies . . ."
Practice Book § 10-50 provides in relevant part: "No facts may be proved under either a general or special denial except such as show that the plaintiff's statements of fact are untrue. Facts which are consistent with such statements but show, notwithstanding, that the plaintiff has no cause of action, must be specially alleged."
"The purpose of a special defense is to plead facts that are consistent with the allegations of the complaint but demonstrate, nonetheless, that the plaintiff has no cause of action." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Danbury v. Dana Investment Corp., 249 Conn. 1, 17, 730 A.2d 1128 (1999); see also Practice Book § 10-50.
"A party wanting to contest the legal sufficiency of a special defense may do so by filing a motion to strike." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Barasso v. Rear Still Road, LLC, 64 Conn. App. 9, 13, 779 A.2d 198 (2001). "A motion to strike admits all facts well pleaded; it does not admit legal conclusions or the truth or accuracy of opinions stated in the pleadings." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Faulkner v. United Technologies Corp., 240 Conn. 576, 588, 693 A.2d 293 (1997). Consequently, "[a] motion to strike is properly granted if the [challenged pleading] alleges mere conclusions of law that are unsupported by the facts alleged." Novametrix Medical Systems, Inc. v. BOC Group, Inc., 224 Conn. 210, 215, 618 A.2d 25 (1992). In ruling on a motion to strike special defenses, a trial court is obligated "to take the facts to be those alleged in the special defenses and to construe the defenses in the manner most favorable to sustaining their legal sufficiency." Connecticut National Bank v. Douglas, 221 Conn. 530, 536, 606 A.2d 684 (1992). Nevertheless, "[t]he burden of alleging recognizable special defenses . . . rests upon the defendant." Cowart v. Grimaldi, 46 Conn. Sup. 248, 250, 746 A.2d 833, 18 Conn.L.Rptr. 682 (1997).
I
The court begins its analysis with the allegations contained in the defendants' first special defense, which is based on promissory estoppel. The defendants allege that they "detrimentally relied on the Plaintiff's act or promise of filing a valid, properly executed and recorded Release of Mortgage on the Milford Land records and Plaintiff's act or promise should have been reasonably expected to induce action or forbearance of a definite and substantial character on the part of the Defendants, and which did induce such action or forbearance."
The plaintiff argues that the court should strike the defendants' first special defense because the defendants have not alleged sufficient facts. The plaintiff argues that the defendants simply allege conclusions of law without any factual support. This court agrees.
"Section 90 of the Restatement Second states that under the doctrine of promissory estoppel `[a] promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance on the part of the promisee or a third person and which does induce such action or forbearance is binding if injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise.' A fundamental element of promissory estoppel, therefore, is the existence of a clear and definite promise which a promisor could reasonably have expected to induce reliance. Thus, a promisor is not liable to a promisee who has relied on a promise if, judged by an objective standard, he had no reason to expect any reliance at all." D'Ulisse-Cupo v. Board of Directors of Notre Dame High School, 202 Conn. 206, 213, 520 A.2d 217 (1987).
The first special defense does not allege sufficient facts to support a special defense of promissory estoppel. The defendants do not provide any facts which demonstrate that the defendants detrimentally relied on the release of mortgage filed by the plaintiff, nor do the defendants allege facts demonstrating that such reliance was reasonable. Instead, the defendants simply assert a legal conclusion — namely that the defendants detrimentally relied on the release of mortgage filed by the plaintiff and that such reliance was reasonable. These allegations are not enough.
The defendants, however, contend that the allegations make it clear that the defendants are referring to the release of mortgage filed by Fleet and the subsequent mortgage agreement between the defendants mentioned in the plaintiff's complaint. Thus, the defendants argue, when the court combines the allegations in the complaint with the allegations in the first special defense, the defendants have pleaded sufficient facts to support a special defense of promissory estoppel. The defendants' argument, however, fails.
"The fact that in a special defense one must plead facts which are consistent with the allegations of the complaint does not relieve the defendants of the duty of providing the plaintiff with a plain and concise statement of the material facts on which they rely. It does not enable the defendants to incorporate the factual claims of the plaintiff without stating them . . . Thus, [where] no information is provided as to what actions or lack thereof the defendants rely on, a motion to strike is properly granted." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) First Nationwide Mortgage Corp. v. Murphy, Superior Court, judicial district of New London, Docket No. 550981 (November 19, 1999, Martin, J.). The defendants, therefore, may not look to the allegations of the complaint without realleging them in their special defense.
The court notes that even if it were to consider the allegations in the plaintiff's complaint, the allegations are insufficient to support the special defense of promissory estoppel. The only release of mortgage alleged in the complaint is a release filed by Fleet, not the plaintiff. Thus, the complaint does not provide any additional factual allegations that would support a special defense of promissory estoppel.
II
The court now turns to the defendants' second special defense of estoppel by laches, which alleges: "[T]he defendant's alleged change of position for the worse was induced by or resulted from the conduct, misrepresentation or silence taken together with lapse of time of the Plaintiff caused the Defendant's prejudice."
The plaintiff argues that the defendants' second special defense does not allege sufficient facts to support the special defense of estoppel by laches. The plaintiff maintains that the defendants have simply alleged a mere legal conclusion, which is not supported by factual allegations. Specifically, the plaintiff argues that the defendants do not allege any facts that demonstrate conduct, misrepresentation, or silence on the part of the plaintiff, which resulted in prejudice to the defendants. This court agrees.
"Laches occurs when neglect or omission to assert a right taken in conjunction with lapse of time and other circumstances, causes prejudice to an adverse party so as to operate as a bar to relief in equity . . . Laches consists of two elements. First, there must have been a delay that was inexcusable, and, second, that delay must have prejudiced the defendant . . . The mere lapse of time does not constitute laches." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Traggis v. Shawmut Bank Connecticut, N. A., 72 Conn. App. 251, 262, 805 A.2d 105 (2002).
In this case, the allegations are not sufficient to support the defendants' special defense of estoppel by laches. The defendants simply allege that they were prejudiced by the defendants' misconduct, misrepresentations, or silence together with the lapse of time. The defendants, however, do not allege facts which explain the misconduct, misrepresentation, or silence that is referred to in the special defense. Furthermore, the defendants do not include allegations that explain how the lapse of time has prejudiced the defendants.
The defendants, however, contend that the allegations in the special defense are obviously referring to the allegations in the complaint. The defendants maintain that it is obvious that the defendants are alleging that the lapse of time between the release of mortgage filed by Fleet and the initiation of this action has prejudiced the defendants in that they have entered into a mortgage agreement not knowing there was a possible mortgage still encumbering the property and that they are now required to defend against the present action.
Despite the defendants' arguments, our courts have consistently held: "[O]ur rules of practice require fact pleading." Emerick v. Kuhn, 52 Conn. App. 724, 749 n. 18, 737 A.2d 456, cert. denied, 249 Conn. 929, 738 A.2d 653, cert. denied sub nom. Emerick v. United Technologies Corp., 528 U.S. 1005, 120 S.Ct. 500, 145 L.Ed.2d 386 (1999). Furthermore, as explained earlier, the defendants may not "incorporate the factual claims of the plaintiff without stating them . . . Thus, [where] no information is provided as to what actions or lack thereof the defendants rely on, a motion to strike is properly granted." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) First Nationwide Mortgage Corp. v. Murphy, supra, Superior Court, Docket No. 550981. This court will not look to the allegations in the complaint to clarify the allegations made in the defendants' special defense of estoppel by laches.
The plaintiff's motion to strike the defendants' first and second special defense is granted, and the defendants' objection thereto is overruled.
The Court
By Curran, J.