Summary
In Warnick, plaintiff sued in federal court two years after her termination and filed her charge with the EEOC twenty-seven months after her termination.
Summary of this case from Cabrera v. World's Finest Chocolate, Inc.Opinion
NO. 1:03-CV-00578-LJM-VSS
March 12, 2004
ORDER ON CROSS-MOTIONS FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT
This matter comes before the Court on Defendant's, Flex-N-Gate Corporation ("Defendant"), Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, and Plaintiff's, Heather E. Warnick ("Warnick" or "Plaintiff), Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. The Court will also consider Plaintiff's Motion for Sanctions and Plaintiff's Request for a Hearing. Warnick initially filed this lawsuit in state court, alleging violations of the Family Medical Leave Act ("FMLA") and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended by the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978. Defendant removed the suit to this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441 and 28 U.S.C. § 1331. The Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331, 29 U.S.C. § 2601, et seq., and 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq. In the instant cross-motions, both parties seek a ruling in their favor regarding the timeliness of Warnick's Title VII claim. For the reasons stated herein, the Court DENIES Plaintiffs Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and GRANTS Defendant's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. In addition, the Court DENIES Plaintiff's Motion for Sanctions and DENIES Plaintiff's Request for a Hearing.
I. BACKGROUND
In Spring 2001, Warnick was employed as a QS9000 Coordinator in Defendant's Quality Assurance Department. Pl.'s Stmt. of Facts at 2. In late March 2001, Warnick became pregnant. Id. On March 28, 2001, she informed Defendant of her pregnancy and gave notice of her intent to take FMLA leave. Id. Warnick's employment was terminated by Defendant on April 12, 2001. Def.'s Stmt. of Facts at 1.Within days of her termination, Warnick contacted the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") to pursue a charge of discrimination. Id. The EEOC interviewed Warnick over the telephone about her allegations, and then sent her a draft charge of discrimination based on that phone interview. Id. A cover letter, dated April 24, 2001, was also included with the draft EEOC charge. Id. The cover letter provided, in relevant part:
The attached EEOC Form 5, Charge of Discrimination, was drafted as a result of the information you provided. To facilitate proper handling of this action by the Commission you should:
(1) Review the enclosed charge form and make corrections.
(2) Sign and date the charge in the bottom left hand block where I have made an "X." The date of your signature on the charge will not affect the jurisdiction date established in your original written complaint to EEOC.
(3) Return the signed charge to this office in the enclosed postage paid envelope.
Since a charge should be processed within the time limitation imposed by law, I urge you to complete these steps as soon as possible. Please call me at (317) 226-7212 if you have any questions.
Def.'s Ex. 1 (emphasis added).
Warnick reviewed the EEOC draft charge of discrimination and noted that several changes needed to be made. Warnick Aff. ¶ 11. She called the EEOC to make the changes, and was informed by an EEOC staff member that the EEOC would only be able to get her job back. Id. ¶ 12. Warnick did not want her job back, so the EEOC stated that she should talk to a lawyer. Id. ¶ 13. Warnick did, in fact, contact a lawyer in April 2001. Def.'s Stmt. of Facts at 1. However, she did not sign and return to the EEOC the draft charge of discrimination at any point during 2001 or 2002. Id. Warnick did not file an EEOC discrimination charge until July 11, 2003. Id. at 4. On July 17, 2003, the EEOC dismissed the charge as untimely, and notified her of her right to sue in federal court. Id. On April 11, 2003, three months before she filed the EEOC charge, Warnick filed this lawsuit.
In September 2001, Warnick terminated her attorney's representation of her in this suit. Pl.'s Stmt. of Facts at 3. The attorney subsequently sent her a letter that stated, in relevant part:
You should be aware that under Title 7 [sic] of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 you are required to exhaust administrative remedies to the extent of obtaining determination from the EEOC on your discrimination claim prior to bringing suit in Federal Court for the alleged age or sex discrimination.
Def.'s Stmt. of Facts at 2. II. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD
As stated by the Supreme Court, summary judgment is not a disfavored procedural shortcut, but rather is an integral part of the federal rules as a whole, which are designed to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 327 (1986). See also United Ass'n of Black Landscapers v. City of Milwaukee, 916 F.2d 1261, 1267-68 (7th Cir. 1990). Motions for summary judgment are governed by Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides in relevant part:
The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.
Once a party has made a properly-supported motion for summary judgment, the opposing party may not simply rest upon the pleadings but must instead submit evidentiary materials which "set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." FED. R CIV. P. 56(e). A genuine issue of material fact exists whenever "there is sufficient evidence favoring the nonmoving party for a jury to return a verdict for that party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986). The nonmoving party bears the burden of demonstrating that such a genuine issue of material fact exists. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87 (1986); Oliver v. Oshkosh Truck Corp., 96 F.3d 992, 997 (7th Cir. 1996). It is not the duty of the Court to scour the record in search of evidence to defeat a motion for summary judgment; rather, the nonmoving party bears the responsibility of identifying the evidence upon which she relies. See Bombard v. Fort Wayne Newspapers, Inc., 92 F.3d 560, 562 (7th Cir. 1996). When the moving party has met the standard of Rule 56, summary judgment is mandatory. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-23; Shields Enters., Inc. v. First Chi. Corp., 975 F.2d 1290, 1294 (7th Cir. 1992).
In evaluating a motion for summary judgment, the Court should draw all reasonable inferences from undisputed facts in favor of the nonmoving party and should view the disputed evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See Estate of Cole v. Fromm, 94 F.3d 254, 257 (7th Cir. 1996). The mere existence of a factual dispute, by itself, is not sufficient to bar summary judgment. Only factual disputes that might affect the outcome of the suit in light of the substantive law will preclude summary judgment. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248; JPM Inc. v. John Deere Indus. Equip. Co., 94 F.3d 270, 273 (7th Cir. 1996). Irrelevant or unnecessary facts do not deter summary judgment, even when in dispute. See Clifton v. Schafer, 969 F.2d 278, 281 (7th Cir. 1992). "If the nonmoving party fails to establish the existence of an element essential to [her] case, one on which [she] would bear the burden of proof at trial, summary judgment must be granted to the moving party." Ortiz v. John O. Butler Co., 94 F.3d 1121, 1124 (7th Cir. 1996).
III. DISCUSSION
Defendant asserts that Warnick's Title VII claim is untimely because she failed to file an EEOC charge within 300 days of her termination. In response, Warnick argues that Defendant has waived this defense. In the alternative, Warnick contends that a jury should determine whether or not the limitations period should be equitably tolled. The Court will address each argument in turn.
A. TIMELINESS OF WARNICK'S EEOC CHARGE
It is well-settled that Title VTI plaintiffs must comply with two filing deadlines: first, an EEOC charge must be filed within 180 days (300 days in deferral states like Indiana) of the alleged unlawful employment practice; and, second, a complaint must be filed in court within 90 days of receiving an EEOC right-to-sue letter. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e). Unless a deadline is equitably tolled, failure to comply with either one of the filing deadlines mandates dismissal of the plaintiff's complaint. See, e.g., Peters v. Renaissance Hotel Operating Co., 307 F.3d 535 (7th Cir. 2002) (dismissing retaliation claim where plaintiff filed suit two years after receiving right-to-sue letter on that charge); Fairchild v. Forma Scientific, Inc., 147 F.3d 567 (7th Cir. 1998) (dismissing disability discrimination claim for failure to timely file an EEOC charge). The 300-day period begins to run on the date that the adverse employment decision is made and communicated to the plaintiff. See Cada v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 920 F.2d 446, 450 (7th Cir. 1990).
Plaintiff assumes that she only had 180 days after the April 2001 termination to file an EEOC charge. However, Indiana is a deferral state where plaintiffs have 300 days after the unlawful employment action to file an EEOC charge. See Doe v. R.R. Connelley Sons, Co., 42 F.3d 439, 445 (7th Cir. 1994) ("In a deferral state, such as Indiana, a charge must be filed within 300 days of the occurrence of the act that is the basis of the complaint."). See also Reese v. Ice Cream Specialties, Inc., 347 F.3d 1007, 1009 (7th Cir. 2003).
In the instant case, Defendant notified Warnick of the adverse employment action, the termination of her employment, on April 12, 2001. Thus, the 300-day period during which she had to file an EEOC charge began to run on April 12, 2001, and she had until mid-February 2002 to file a charge. Warnick did not come close to filing a timely EEOC charge. In fact, Warnick did not file an EEOC charge until July 11, 2003, which was three months after she filed her federal complaint, about twenty seven months after her termination, and about seventeen months after the 300-day limitations period expired. On July 17, 2003, the EEOC dismissed the charge as untimely, and informed her of her right to sue in federal court. Unless an equitable doctrine applies, Warnick's Title VII claim is subject to dismissal for failure to timely file an EEOC charge. See Fairchild, 147 F.3d at 574.
B. WAIVER
Warnick argues that Defendant waived the untimely EEOC charge defense by not filing a motion to dismiss the Title VII claim prior to Warnick's receipt of the a right-to-sue letter on July 17, 2003. See Perkins v. Silverstein, 939 F.2d 463, 471 (7th Cir. 1989) (plaintiff's receipt of the right-to-sue letter after complaint had been filed but before it had been dismissed effectively cured deficiency in the original complaint). See Worth v. Tyer, 276 F.3d 249, 259 (7th Cir. 2001) (same). In other words, Warnick argues that she cured the deficiency in her complaint by filing the late EEOC charge and receiving the right-to-sue letter prior to dismissal of the complaint for lack of a right-to-sue letter. In response, Defendant maintains that Perkins and Worth are distinguishable because the plaintiffs in those cases filed an EEOC charge before filing a complaint, and then simply "jumped the gun" by tiling a federal complaint before the EEOC issued a right-to-sue letter.
The Court agrees with Defendant and concludes that Perkins and Worth are distinguishable from the instant case. Although it is not entirely clear from the text of Perkins or Worth or their respective district court opinions whether the plaintiff filed an EEOC charge prior to filing the complaint, a subsequent Seventh Circuit case bolsters Defendant's position:
In Perkins, the plaintiff had filed a charge of discrimination and, before a right-to-sue letter issued on that charge, brought suit. This court held that, although facially deficient and subject to dismissal prior to the issuance of the right-to-sue letter, once the letter issued, that defect was cured.Peters, 307 F.3d at 551 (emphasis added). Thus, from the Peters court's description of Perkins, it appears that the plaintiff in Perkins had, in fact, filed an EEOC charge prior to filing a complaint. That would be a meaningful distinction because a pre-complaint EEOC charge would at least put the defendant on notice and allow the EEOC to begin an investigation and possible conciliation. Even if Perkins were not distinguishable, it is difficult for Warnick to argue that Defendant waived the timeliness defense when Defendant asserted it in its answer and filed a Motion for Sanctions on the grounds that Warnick's Title VII claim is frivolous due to lack of a timely EEOC charge.
In addition, Warnick's broad reading of Perkins and Worth — which essentially would allow plaintiffs to skip the EEOC administrative process and then benefit from a quick right-to-sue letter issued due to the EEOC's dismissal of an untimely charge — clashes with the vast weight of Seventh Circuit authority on the issue. Absent some compelling justification for the delay, the Seventh Circuit consistently dismisses Title VII claims for failure to file an EEOC charge within the applicable 300-day or 180-day period. See Hentosh v. Herman M. Finch Univ. of Health Sciences/The Chicago Medical School, 167 F.3d 1170, 1174-76 (7th Cir. 1999) (dismissing sexual harassment claim for failure to file charge with EEOC within 300 days of discriminatory conduct); Fairchild, 147 F.3d at 574-76 (7th Cir. 1998) (dismissing disability discrimination claim for failure to timely file an EEOC charge); Speer v. Rand McNally Co., 123 F.3d 658, 662-64 (7th Cir. 1997) (dismissing harassment and retaliation claims where EEOC charge was not filed within 300 days of conduct); Doe, 42 F.3d at 445 (7th Cir. 1994) (dismissing harassment claim as untimely because EEOC charge was not filed within 300 days of the conduct at issue); Lorance v. AT T Technologies, 827 F.2d 163, 166-67 (7th Cir. 1987) (dismissing Title VII claims for failure to file EEOC charges within 300 days of allegedly discriminatory acts); Nazaire v. Tram World Airlines, Inc., 807 F.2d 1372, 1379 (7th Cir. 1986), abrogated on other grounds (dismissing a Title VTI claim as time-barred due to failure to file EEOC charge within 300 days of the challenged action); Martinez v. United Auto., Aerospace Agric. Implement Workers, 112 F.2d 348, 350 (7th Cir. 1985) ("[I]f you do not file a timely charge with the EEOC, you cannot bring a suit under Title VII."). It should be noted that most of the plaintiffs in the above-cited cases and other similar cases, like Warnick, had a right-to-sue letter from the EEOC, issued subsequent to an untimely EEOC charge.
Allowing plaintiffs in Warnick's circumstances to proceed with Title VTI claims in federal court would render the Title VII administrative exhaustion requirements meaningless. As the Seventh Circuit recently explained:
The purpose of administrative remedies in Title VTI cases is to place the employer on notice of an impending suit that he canny to head off by negotiating with the complainant, utilizing the conciliation services offered by the EEOC.Horton v. Jackson County Bd. of Comm'rs, 343 F.3d 897, 899 (7th Cir. 2003). The EEOC does not begin an investigation or give notice to defendants until a complainant actually files a charge. Without the first step of an EEOC charge, the parties have no opportunity to utilize the EEOC conciliation services. See Horton, 343 F.3d at 899-900 (noting the success of the EEOC in the conciliation process).
In sum, the instant case is distinguishable from Perkins and Worth because Warnick did not even file an EEOC charge before she filed her complaint in federal court. In addition, Warnick's broad reading of Perkins and Worth clashes with other Seventh Circuit precedent. Moreover, allowing plaintiffs in Warnick's circumstances to proceed with suit in federal court makes the EEOC administrative process meaningless. Accordingly, the Court concludes that Defendant did not waive the timeliness argument and that Warnick did not effectively cure her Title VII claim with her untimely EEOC charge.
C. EQUITABLE TOLLING
Warnick also asserts that equitable tolling saves her claim. In the alternative, Warnick argues that the tolling issue should be determined by a jury. The Seventh Circuit has stated that "[e]quitable tolling applies when a plaintiff, despite the exercise of due diligence and through no fault of his own, cannot determine information essential to bringing a complaint." Soigner v. Am. Bd. of Plastic Surgery, 92 F.3d 547, 533-34 (7th Cir. 1996) ( citing Thelen v. Marc's Big Boy Corp., 64 F.3d 264, 268 (7th Cir. 1995)). Distinguishing equitable tolling from fraudulent concealment and the discovery rule, the Seventh Circuit has explained:
[Equitable tolling] differs from [equitable estoppel] in that it does not assume a wrongful
— or any — effort by the defendant to prevent the plaintiff from suing. It differs from the [discovery rule] in that the plaintiff is assumed to know that he has been injured, so that the statute of limitations has begun to run; but he cannot obtain information necessary to decide whether the injury is due to wrongdoing and, if so, wrongdoing by the defendant.Cada v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 920 F.2d 446, 451 (7th Cir. 1990). The Supreme Court has advised lower courts that equitable doctrines such as equitable tolling "are to be applied sparingly." Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 113, 122 S.Ct. 2061, 2072 (2002).
Equitable tolling does not fit the circumstances of this case. A Plaintiff who invokes the equitable tolling doctrine must argue that s/he was unable to obtain enough information to conclude that s/he had a discrimination claim. See, e.g., Thelen, 64 F.3d at 268. In the instant case, it is undisputed that Warnick contacted the EEOC within two weeks (at the latest) of her termination because she felt that Defendant had discriminated against her on the basis of her sex and disability. Def.'s Ex. 1 (draft EEOC charge). Due to Warnick's immediate suspicion that discrimination was afoot, it is difficult for her to subsequently argue that the filing period should be tolled for more than a year because she could not determine information essential to bringing an EEOC charge. Warnick simply has not offered any evidence that she lacked information about her potential claim.
Warnick seeks support from case law stating that EEOC error or misleading statements by the EEOC may toll the statute of limitations. See Schnellbaecher v. Baskin Clothing Co., 887 F.2d 124, 129 (7th Cir. 1989). According to Warnick, it was misleading for the EEOC to inform her that it could only get her job back for her, and advise her that she should contact a lawyer. The Court fails to see how that statement was misleading. As stated by the Seventh Circuit, "the advice to get a lawyer could hardly be intended to cause [plaintiff] to forgo filing his administrative charge." Thelen, 64 F.3d at 268. Moreover, even if some part of the EEOC statement was misleading, it would not justify tolling the filing period for seventeen months. See id. (noting that plaintiff must file EEOC charge within reasonable time of when she obtains enough information to suspect discrimination).
Plaintiff's reliance on tolling cases from other jurisdictions is misplaced. In Browning v. AT T Paradyne, 120 F.3d 222, 226 (11th Cir. 1997), for example, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that the limitations period was tolled for the eighteen days that the plaintiff's complaint was untimely because the EEOC told the plaintiff's lawyer that the old, pre-Civil Rights Act statute of limitations applied to his case. See id. The EEOC employee was unaware that Congress had recently changed the applicable limitations period in the 1991 Amendments to the Civil Rights Act. See id. The court emphasized that its holding was a narrow one:
On this unique, specific set of facts, we hold, and our holding is a very narrow one, that the statute of limitations was tolled for the 18 days that [plaintiff's] complaint was untimely.Id. In contrast to Browning, the instant case does not involve any incorrect or misleading EEOC statements. In fact, Plaintiff does not allege that the EEOC employee made any comments about the statute of limitations or the merits of the case. Instead, Plaintiff was advised of the relief that the EEOC could potentially secure for her, and informed that she should consult with a lawyer. In addition, rather than being misinformed about the applicable deadline, the April 2001 EEOC cover letter warned Plaintiff to sign, date, and return the draft EEOC charge "as soon as possible." Moreover, her former attorney reminded her of Title VII's administrative exhaustion requirements in a September 2001 letter. At bottom, the facts do not indicate that Warnick was unable to gather information essential to filing her EEOC charge or bringing suit.
Bush v. Quebecor Printing (USA) Corp., 130 F. Supp.2d 301 (D. Mass. 2001) is also distinguishable from the instant case. In Bush, the plaintiff filed a charge with the EEOC, and the EEOC sent the plaintiff a letter informing him that it would not proceed further with its investigation of his charge. See id. at 302. However, the EEOC letter did not inform the plaintiff that he had a right to sue the defendant in federal court, or how long he had to file a complaint in federal court. See id. The Bush court concluded that the EEOC's failure to notify the plaintiff of his right to sue and the 90-day limitations period during which he could file a complaint justified tolling the limitations period. See id. at 307. In the present case, on the other hand, Plaintiff did not file an EEOC charge until July 2003. When she did file the charge in 2003, the EEOC dismissed the charge, informed her that she had the right to sue in federal court, and warned her of the 90-day filing period. With regard to the draft EEOC charge sent to Plaintiff in April 2001, the EEOC did not inform her of her right to sue in federal court because she did not have the right to sue Defendant at that point. In addition, the EEOC cover letter urged Plaintiff to sign, date, and mail the draft EEOC charge "as soon as possible" to comply with the applicable limitations period for the filing of an EEOC charge.
Finally, the Court respectfully disagrees with Warnick's assertion that the tolling issue should be decided by the jury. As noted by Defendant, courts frequently resolve statute of limitations issues and related tolling issues in the summary judgment context. See, e.g., Brademas v. Indiana Housing Finance Authority, 354 F.3d 681 (7th Cir. 2004). In the instant case, Warnick has not identified any outcome determinative fact issues. In addition, taking reasonable inferences in Warnick's favor, it is clear for the reasons stated above that tolling is not appropriate in this case. Accordingly, the Court DENIES Plaintiffs Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, and GRANTS Defendant's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated herein, the Court DENIES Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and GRANTS Defendant's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. In addition, the Court DENIES Plaintiff's Motion for Sanctions and DENIES Plaintiff's Request for a Hearing. Plaintiff's FMLA claim is the only remaining claim in this case.
IT IS SO ORDERED.