Opinion
No. 1-754 / 00-0749.
Filed July 3, 2002.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, MICHAEL HUPPERT, Judge.
The plaintiffs appeal from the district court's ruling dismissing their petition for injunctive relief pursuant to Iowa Code section 314.7 (1997) concerning the defendant's decision to only replace a bridge without replacing entrance and exit interstate ramps for a road providing access to their properties. AFFIRMED.
Robert W. Goodwin of Goodwin Law Office, P.C., Ames, and David L. Brown of Hansen, McClintock Riley, Des Moines, for appellants.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, David A. Ferree, Special Assistant Attorney General, and Mark Hunacek, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.
Heard by SACKETT, C.J., and ZIMMER and VAITHESWARAN, JJ.
Terrance Ward, individually and on behalf of others similarly situated, Thomas Bell, individually and on behalf of others similarly situated, and River Oaks Land Company, L.L.C. (collectively "plaintiffs") appeal from the district court's ruling dismissing their petition for injunctive relief concerning the decision of the Iowa Department of Transportation to only replace a bridge without replacing entrance and exit interstate ramps for a road providing access to their properties. The plaintiffs contend the district court erred in ruling that a judicial review action pursuant to Iowa Code chapter 17A was the exclusive means for challenging the Department's decision and in failing to order the Department to replace the on and off ramps eliminated as part of the highway project in question. We affirm.
I. BACKGROUND FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS.
The plaintiffs are property owners and a development company. Their only means of access to their property is Maffitt Lake Road in Polk County. Maffitt Lake Road connects to an interchange of Interstate 35 and Army Post Road. Maffitt Lake Road is accessed via Interstate 35 by an on and off ramp and from Army Post Road via a bridge over Interstate 35. The bridge has been hit and temporarily closed to traffic on at least two occasions.
As part of a highway improvement project, the Department decided to build a relocated bridge, but not to provide access ramps to Interstate 35 for Maffitt Lake Road. The plaintiffs and others objected to this plan. The Department claims the decision was based on safety concerns and that the project would still provide the property owners in the affected area with reasonable access. The property owners claim the project would limit their access and that they would have no access if the bridge was temporarily closed due to an accident. The Department's commission approved the design and construction of the road with the new bridge only.
The plaintiffs then commenced an action for injunctive relief against the Department pursuant to Iowa Code section 314.7 (1997). The Department filed a motion to dismiss, claiming that the plaintiffs' complaint could not be heard in a petition in equity seeking injunctive relief. It contended the exclusive means of challenging agency action is through a petition for judicial review under chapter 17A. The trial court overruled the motion. The Department filed a second motion to dismiss, alleging mootness. The trial court also overruled this motion.
A hearing on the plaintiffs' petition ensued. At the close of the plaintiffs' case, the Department moved for either a dismissal or a directed verdict on three grounds, one of which was that section 314.7 does not, given the Iowa Administrative Procedure Act, provide for an independent cause of action for injunctive relief directly. The court took the Department's motion under advisement. The Department renewed its motion at the close of all the evidence.
The district court granted the Department's motion to dismiss. It determined that the decision regarding the highway improvement fell within the Department's statutory mandate for the design and construction of state highways, and that since section 314.7 did not refer to chapter 17A by name, judicial review pursuant to that chapter provided the exclusive means for challenging the decision. The court noted that plaintiffs declined the court's invitation to treat their petition as a judicial review action. Accordingly, the court concluded that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction to consider the action and dismissed it. The plaintiffs appeal.
II. SCOPE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW.
Our review is for the correction of errors at law. IES Utils. Inc. v. Iowa Dep't of Revenue, 5 45 N.W.2d 536, 538 (Iowa 1996). A motion to dismiss is sustainable only when it appears to a certainty the pleader has failed to state a claim upon which any relief may be granted under any state of facts provable under the allegations. Curtis v. Bd. of Supervisors, 270 N.W.2d 447, 448 (Iowa 1978). A motion to dismiss waives any ambiguity or uncertainty in the petition. Salsbury Labs. v. Iowa Dep't of Envtl. Quality, 276 N.W.2d 830, 833 (Iowa 1979). For purposes of testing the sufficiency of the petition, it is construed in the light most favorable to the pleader and its allegations are accepted as true. Id. The motion cannot aid itself with factual allegations not part of the petition. Id. Nor can the movant rely on facts supplied by an evidentiary hearing. Id. Accordingly, the proper record for our review is limited to the plaintiffs' averments in the petition for injunction. IES Utils., 545 N.W.2d at 538.
III. MERITS.
The plaintiffs contend the district court erred in ruling that a judicial review action pursuant to chapter 17A was the exclusive means for challenging the Department's decision. They maintain that when an agency acts in derogation of its statutory authority, the aggrieved party is entitled to go directly to district court to seek an injunction of the acts that are in derogation of that authority. They also argue the court erred in not ordering the Department to replace the ramps to allegedly maintain for them reasonable access to their properties as required by section 314.7.
The Department filed a motion to dismiss the plaintiffs' petition for an injunction, alleging lack of district court subject matter jurisdiction over the case. The district court also relied on subject matter jurisdiction in granting the Department's motion to dismiss. Even though the Department and the court phrased this issue in terms of lack of "subject matter jurisdiction," the present case concerns whether the district court has "jurisdiction" or "authority" to entertain the plaintiffs' action seeking injunctive relief based on the particular procedural status of this case, not whether the court has subject matter jurisdiction to entertain actions seeking injunctive relief in general. See IES Utils., 545 N.W.2d at 538. We must determine, then, whether the district court had jurisdiction or authority to hear the plaintiffs' action for an injunction.
Section 17A.19 provides as follows:
Except as expressly provided otherwise by another statute referring to this chapter by name, the judicial review provisions of this chapter shall be the exclusive means by which a person or party who is aggrieved or adversely affected by agency action may seek judicial review of such agency action. However, nothing in this chapter shall abridge or deny to any person or party who is aggrieved or adversely affected by any agency action the right to seek relief from such action in the courts. (Emphasis added.)
The plaintiffs contend that, despite section 17A.19, section 314.7 and caselaw interpreting that section allow their action for injunctive relief against the Department. Section 314.7 provides as follows:
Officers, employees, and contractors in charge of improvement or maintenance work on any highway shall not cut down or injure any tree growing by the wayside which does not materially obstruct the highway, or tile drains, or interfere with the improvement or maintenance of the road, and which stands in front of any city lot, farmyard orchard or feed lot, or any ground reserved for any public use. Nor shall they destroy or injure reasonable ingress or egress to any property, or turn the natural drainage of the surface water to the injury of adjoining owners. It shall be their duty to use strict diligence in draining the surface water from the public road in its natural channel. To this end they may enter upon the adjoining lands for the purpose of removing from such natural channel obstructions that impede the flow of such water. (Emphasis added.)
The parties agree that the Department is an agency. The plaintiffs agree that the action at issue is "other agency action." Section 314.7 does not refer to chapter 17A by name, which indicates that chapter 17A was meant to be the exclusive means by which a person aggrieved by actions of the Department under section 314.7 could seek judicial review of that action. However, we must consider whether the action challenged was the very decision which the agency's mandate directed it to make. Genetzky v. Iowa State Univ., 480 N.W.2d 858, 861 (Iowa 1992); see Jew v. Univ. of Iowa, 398 N.W.2d 861, 864-65 (Iowa 1987).
Interstate roads are part of the primary road system. 1998 Iowa Acts ch. 1075, § 1 (codified at Iowa Code § 306.3(4), (6) (1999)). Jurisdiction of the primary road system is vested exclusively in the Department. Iowa Code § 306.4(1) (1997). This includes the power to determine the location and design of highways in that system. Curtis, 270 N.W.2d at 449. The Department had jurisdiction and control over the design of the interstate at issue, including regulating, restricting, or prohibiting access to best serve the traffic for which the interstate was intended. Iowa Code § 306A.4. We conclude the Department acted within its statutory mandate in designing the on and off ramps for Interstate 35 in the present case. Thus, we conclude that seeking judicial review of the Department's decision was the only means for the plaintiffs to seek review of the agency action.
The plaintiffs contend Rosendahl Levy v. Iowa State Highway Commission, 171 N.W.2d 530 (Iowa 1969) is determinative of whether they could seek an injunction in the district court. We disagree. In Rosendahl, the district court awarded injunctive relief to the plaintiffs, who had alleged the defendant Iowa State Highway Commission acted in violation of section 314.7. Rosendahl, 171 N.W.2d at 536. We note that this case was decided prior to implementation of the Iowa Administrative Procedure Act, chapter 17A. The general purpose of chapter 17A was the creation of a uniform, minimum procedural code for all state agencies. Salsbury, 276 N.W.2d at 835. Before 1975, judicial review of agency action in Iowa was a hodgepodge of specific review provisions in the enabling acts of various agencies and common-law writs. Id. The Administrative Procedure Act provided one form of judicial review and made it an appellate process. Id. Our supreme court has stated,
Certiorari, declaratory judgment, injunction, and other common-law writs are original actions with varying standards of inquiry and review. Little simplification would be achieved if the provisions of section 17A.19 could be discarded at will in favor of certiorari, declaratory judgment, or injunction.Id. We determine that Rosendahl does not support the plaintiffs' position.
We conclude the trial court did not have jurisdiction or authority to entertain the plaintiffs' petition seeking injunctive relief. We have considered all arguments raised by the plaintiffs regarding the trial court's jurisdiction and authority, and we find them to be without merit. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's ruling dismissing plaintiffs' petition. Our resolution of this issue renders it unnecessary for us to consider the plaintiffs' argument that the trial court erred in not ordering the Department to replace the ramps.
IV. CONCLUSION.
We affirm the trial court's ruling dismissing the plaintiffs' petition seeking injunctive relief.
AFFIRMED.