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stating that the plaintiff "will have to provide sufficient evidence that the conduct was racially-motivated to survive at summary judgment"
Summary of this case from East-Miller v. Lake County Highway DeptOpinion
1:03-cv-69-LJM-WTL
January 22, 2004
ORDER ON DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS AND/OR MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
This matter comes before the Court on Defendants', Claybridge Homeowners Association, Greg Boyd, Mary Lou Spellmeyer, Kevin Tolliver, Patrick Corydon, Margie Bartley, Elizabeth Van Tassel, Dick Carriger, Teri Gregg, Tina Freeman, Leslie Gould, and Annette Sullivan (collectively the "HOA" or "Defendants"), Motion to Dismiss and/or Motion for Summary Judgment, on the claims of Plaintiff, Deborah Walton ("Walton" or "Plaintiff'). Walton brought this housing discrimination action pursuant to Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968 (the "Fair Housing Act" or "FHA"), 42 U.S.C. § 3601, et seq. Walton, an African-American, asserts that the HOA, through the actions of its individual officers and representatives, discriminated against her on the basis of her race. Defendants now seek dismissal of the complaint and/or summary judgement. For the reasons set forth below, the Court DENIES the motion.
I. BACKGROUND
For purposes of this motion, the Court accepts the following well-pleaded factual allegations from the complaint as true. Walton is an African-American female who purchased a home in Hamilton County, Indiana, on or about January 10, 2000. Comp. ¶ 9. Walton began to have problems with the HOA and its officers and representatives almost immediately after the purchase of her home. Id. ¶ 10.In March 2000, the owner of Victor's Lawn Care contacted Walton and advised her that HOA officials told him to cut her grass, and that the HOA was going to drive her out of the neighborhood because she was a renter. Id. ¶ 11. Walton contacted Defendant Greg Boyd ("Boyd"), then-President of the HOA, and Boyd told her that "she was not supposed to be told that." Id. ¶ 12. During spring or summer 2001, someone left mulch in the street near Walton's home. Id. ¶ 13. A neighbor assumed the mulch belonged to Walton and the called the police to report it. Id. Five other residents had mulch delivered in front of their homes, but the police were not contacted. Id.
During 2001, the HOA placed a speed limit sign directly in front of Walton's yard. Id. ¶ 15. In addition, the HOA, through Patrick Corydon, informed Walton that she had to pay homeowner's association dues even though she was exempt from the dues because her home is not lotted in the association. Id. ¶ 14. The HOA also had Walton's property surveyed without the permission or knowledge of Walton, and included Walton's name in the neighborhood directory against her wishes. Id.
¶ 16. The HOA also criticized Walton in its newsletter. Id. ¶¶ 18, 23. In October 2001, the HOA filed an action in state court against Walton, and the court issued a restraining order against her. Id. ¶ 19.
During summer 2002, Defendant Mary Lou Spellmeyer ("Spellmeyer") shouted at Walton, "There is more than one way to lynch a nigger." Id. ¶ 22. Spellmeyer also chased after a sixteen-year old African-American boy whom Walton had hired to take care of her lawn. Id. From the summer of 2000 until spring 2002, neighbors put dog feces on the rear door-mat of Walton's home, beer bottles/can in her mailbox, and constantly threw trash into her yard. Id. ¶ 24. Surveyors and lawn-care contractors hired by the HOA have threatened to harm Walton. Id. ¶ 25. On June 28, 2002, Walton received a phone call from a male who stated, "if you continue to fight [the legal action pending in state court], you'll be dead before it's over." Id. ¶ 26.
Based at least in part on the allegations above, Walton filed a complaint with the Indiana Civil Rights Commission ("Commission"). Def.'s Ex. 2. On November 23, 2002, the Commission issued a no probable cause finding, and dismissed the complaint. Id. Walton filed a request for reconsideration, and the Commission affirmed the no probable cause finding. Def.'s Ex. 3.
II. STANDARDS A. MOTION TO DISMISS
When ruling on a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), the Court accepts as true all well-pleaded factual allegations in the complaint and the inferences reasonably drawn from them. See Baxter by Baxter v. Vigo County Sch. Corp., 26 F.3d 728, 730 (7th Cir. 1994). Dismissal is appropriate only if it appears beyond doubt that Plaintiff can prove no set of facts consistent with the allegations in the complaint that would entitle it to relief. See Hi-Lite Prods. Co. v. Am. Home Prods. Corp., 11 F.3d 1402, 1405 (7th Cir. 1993). This standard means that if any set of facts, even hypothesized facts, could be proven consistent with the complaint, then the complaint must not be dismissed. See Sanjuan v. Am. Bd. of Psychiatry and Neurology, Inc., 40 F.3d 247, 251 (7th Cir. 1994).
Further, Plaintiff is "not required to plead the particulars of [her] claim[s]," Hammes v. AAMCO Transmissions, Inc., 33 F.3d 774 (7th Cir. 1994), except in cases alleging fraud or mistake where plaintiffs must plead the circumstances constituting such fraud or mistake with particularity. See FED. R. Civ. P. 9(b); Hammes, 33 F.3d at 778. "Particularity" requires plaintiffs to plead the who, what, when, where, and how of the alleged fraud. See Ackerman v. Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. Co., 172 F.3d 467, 469 (7th Cir. 1999); DiLeo v. Ernst Young, 901 F.2d 624, 627 (7th Cir. 1990).
Finally, the Court need not ignore facts set out in the complaint that undermine Plaintiffs claims, see Homeyer v. Stanley Tulchin Assoc., 91 F.3d 959, 961 (7th Cir. 1996) (citing Am. Nurses' Ass'n v. III., 783 F.2d 716, 724 (7th Cir. 1986)), nor is the Court required to accept Plaintiff's legal conclusions. See Reed v. City of Chi., 77 F.3d 1049, 1051 (7th Cir. 1996); Gray v. Dane County, 854 F.2d 179, 182 (7th Cir. 1988).
B. SUMMARY JUDGMENT
As stated by the Supreme Court, summary judgment is not a disfavored procedural shortcut, but rather is an integral part of the federal rules as a whole, which are designed to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 327, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2555 (1986). See also United Ass'n of Black Lands capers v. City of Milwaukee, 916 F.2d 1261, 1267-68 (7th Cir. 1990). Motions for summary judgment are governed by Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides in relevant part:
The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.
Once a party has made a properly-supported motion for summary judgment, the opposing party may not simply rest upon the pleadings but must instead submit evidentiary materials which "set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." FED. R. CIV. P. 56(e). A genuine issue of material fact exists whenever "there is sufficient evidence favoring the nonmoving party for a jury to return a verdict for that party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2511 (1986). The nonmoving party bears the burden of demonstrating that such a genuine issue of material fact exists. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 1355-56 (1986); Oliver v. Oshkosh Truck Corp., 96 F.3d 992, 997 (7th Cir. 1996). It is not the duty of the Court to scour the record in search of evidence to defeat a motion for summary judgment; rather, the nonmoving party bears the responsibility of identifying the evidence upon which she relies. See Bombard v. Fort Wayne Newspapers, Inc., 92 F.3d 560, 562 (7th Cir. 1996). When the moving party has met the standard of Rule 56, summary judgment is mandatory. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-23; Shields Enters., Inc. v. First Chi. Corp., 975 F.2d 1290, 1294 (7th Cir. 1992).
In evaluating a motion for summary judgment, the Court should draw all reasonable inferences from undisputed facts in favor of the nonmoving party and should view the disputed evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See Estate of Cole v. Fromm, 94 F.3d 254, 257 (7th Cir. 1996). The mere existence of a factual dispute, by itself, is not sufficient to bar summary judgment. Only factual disputes that might affect the outcome of the suit in light of the substantive law will preclude summary judgment. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248; JPM Inc. v. John Deere Indus. Equip. Co., 94 F.3d 270, 273 (7th Cir. 1996). Irrelevant or unnecessary facts do not deter summary judgment, even when in dispute. See Clifton v. Schafer, 969 F.2d 278, 281 (7th Cir. 1992). "If the nonmoving party fails to establish the existence of an element essential to [her] case, one on which [she] would bear the burden of proof at trial, summary judgment must be granted to the moving party." Ortiz v. John O. Butler Co., 94 F.3d 1121, 1124 (7th Cir. 1996).
III. DISCUSSION
The HOA seeks dismissal of Walton's housing discrimination claim. First, the HOA argues that Walton has failed to state a housing discrimination claim under the Fair Housing Act. Second, the HOA asserts that the Court should abstain from exercising jurisdiction over this dispute under the Colorado River abstention doctrine and/or the Burford abstention doctrine. Third, the HOA contends that the collateral estoppel doctrine bars Walton from litigating this issue. Each argument will be addressed in turn.
A. FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM UNDER THE FHA
The purpose of the FHA is to end racially segregated housing and provide for fair housing throughout the nation. See South Suburban Housing Cntr. v. Bd. of Realtors, 935 F.2d 868, 882 (7th Cir. 1991); 42 U.S.C. § 3601. To achieve those goals, the FHA allows aggrieved persons to bring civil actions based on "discriminatory housing practices." 42 U.S.C. § 3613. 42 U.S.C. § 3602(f) defines "discriminatory housing practices" as actions that are unlawful under 42 U.S.C. § 3604, 3605, 3606 or 3617. Section 3604 covers discrimination associated with the sale or rental of housing; section 3605 addresses discrimination related to "residential-real estate related transactions" (appraising, lending, constructing, repairing); and section 3606 prohibits discrimination in the provision of residential brokerage services. All three sections cover discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, handicap, familial status, or national origin. The allegations in Walton's complaint do not fit the parameters of any of those sections (3604, 3605, or 3606). Walton does not contest this point in her response.
Instead, Walton asserts that she has stated a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 3631 (a) for intimidation or interference with a resident's right to occupy a dwelling. However, 42 U.S.C. § 3631 is a criminal statute for willful interference with housing rights, and private individuals like Walton do not have the power to prosecute others for alleged violations of federal criminal statutes. See United States v. Hayward, 6 F.3d 1241 (7th Cir. 1993) (affirming conviction of defendant for, inter alia, interference with housing rights under 42 U.S.C. § 3631 in action brought by United States). Thus, Walton's reliance on 42 U.S.C. § 3631 is misplaced.
The FHA does provide a civil remedy for interference or intimidation associated with the exercise of housing rights. 42 U.S.C. § 3617 provides:
It shall be unlawful to coerce, intimidate, threaten, or interfere with any person in the exercise or enjoyment of, or on account of his having exercised or enjoyed, or on account of his having aided or encouraged any other person in the exercise or enjoyment of, any right granted or protected by section 3603, 3604, 3605, or 3606 of this title.
Id. Because § 3617 refers to rights granted in §§ 3603-3606, courts have questioned whether § 3617 can be violated in the absence of a violation of §§ 3603-3606. The Seventh Circuit has expressly declined to decide this question. See Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d 1283, 1288 n. 5 (7th Cir. 1977). Judge Aspen subsequently answered the question in the affirmative, holding "that § 3617 may be violated absent a violation of § 3603, 3604, 3605, or 3606." Stackhouse v. DeSitter, 620 F. Supp. 208, 210 (N.D. Ill. 1985) (reasoning that § 3617 would be superfluous if it were read to as dependent on a violation of §§ 3603-3606). Most courts have followed Judge Aspen's lead. See Ohana v. 180 Prospect Place Realty Corp., 996 F. Supp. 238 (E.D. N.Y. 1998); Michigan Prot. Advocacy Serv. v. Babin, 799 F. Supp. 695 (E.D. Mich. 1992), aff'd, 18 F.3d 337 (6th Cir. 1994); Stirgus v. Benoit, 720 F. Supp. 119 (N.D. Ill. 1989); Seaphus v. Lilly, 691 F. Supp. 127 (N.D. Ill. 1988). See also Bryant v. Polston, 2000 WL 1670938 (S.D. Ind. Nov. 2, 2000) (Tinder, J.); Cass v. Am. Properties, Inc., 1995 WL 132166 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 27, 1995); Waheed v. Kalafut, 1988 WL 9092 (N.D. Ill. Feb, 2, 1988).
This Court agrees with the relatively well-settled authority listed above and holds that a § 3617 claim is not dependent on proving a violation of §§ 3603-3606. The plain text of § 3617 covers different types of discriminatory behavior not covered by §§ 3603-3606: intimidation of those who already have exercised their §§ 3603-3606 rights, or intimidation of those who aid others in the exercise of their §§ 3603-3606 rights. Sections 3603-3606 prohibit discrimination associated with, inter alia, the purchase or rental of a property, applications for loans or appraisals, or the provision of brokerage services. The reference to §§ 3603-3606 in the text of § 3617 simply indicates that the intimidation or coercion must have a nexus to the plaintiff's exercise of housing rights protected by §§ 3603-3606.
The Court notes that there may be instances where the same conduct violates both 42 U.S.C. § 3617 and one of the substantive provisions of §§ 3603, 3604, 3605, or 3606. For example, the first provision of § 3617 prohibits intimidation or coercion with any person in the exercise or enjoyment of any right granted by §§ 3603-3606, and conduct that violates that provision may also violate §§ 3604, 3605, or 3606. However, in the instant case, Walton may have an intimidation or interference claim under § 3617, but she does not allege any conduct that would violate the provisions of §§ 3603-3606.
Although the Seventh Circuit has not considered the elements of a prima facie case in a 42 U.S.C. § 3617 case like this one, it has defined the necessary elements in suits brought under other FHA provisions. For example, in Hamilton v. Svatik, 779 F.2d 383 (7th Cir. 1985), a discriminatory refusal to rent action under 42 U.S.C. § 3604, the court stated:
Under section 3604 a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case by showing that 1) she belongs to a minority; 2) the defendant was aware of it; 3) the plaintiff was ready and able to accept defendant's offer to rent; and 4) the defendant refused to deal with her. The burden then shifts to the defendant to show that he acted without any discriminatory intent. The defendant's evidence of a good reason for refusing to deal with the plaintiff must be devoid of circumstances from which it can be inferred that there was a real though subtle purpose of discrimination.Id. (citations and internal quotations omitted). In Phillips v. Hunter Trails Community Ass'n, 685 F.2d 184 (7th Cir. 1982), the court described the elements of an FHA prima facie case in the context of a refusal to sell a home:
To make out their prima facie case under the Fair Housing Act, [plaintiffs] had only to show that they were black, that they applied for and were qualified to buy the . . . house, that they were rejected, and that the . . . house remained on the market.Id. at 189.
Considering the analysis of those cases and the text of 42 U.S.C. § 7; 3617, the Court concludes that Walton must establish that: (1) Defendants coerced, intimidated, threatened or interfered with her (a) in the exercise of rights protected by sections 3603, 3604, 3605, or 3606, (b) on account of having exercised rights protected by 3603, 3604, 3605, or 3606, or (c) on account of having aided or encouraged another person to exercise housing rights; (2) Defendants' conduct was racially-motived; and (3) the conduct rose to the level of coercion, intimidation or interference that § 3617 was designed to address.
Although 42 U.S.C. § 3617 does not specifically list the FHA-protected classes, it refers back to § 3603-3606, which prohibit discrimination or preferences in housing on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, handicap, familial status, or national origin.
With regard to the first element, Walton's complaint falls within the ambit of the second alternative (intimidation or interference on account of having exercised housing rights) because she alleges that the HOA officials discriminated against her on account of having exercised housing rights. Walton exercised a housing right protected by § 3604 when she purchased a home, and she alleges that the HOA discriminated against her after the purchase. See Stackhouse, 620 F. Supp. at 211 ("[T]he second phrase [of § 3617] prohibits coercive acts taken against persons who already have exercised their rights to fair housing.").
The central question revolves around the third element: whether Walton's allegations, taken as true, paint a situation that is sufficiently coercive, intimidating, or threatening such that she has stated a claim under § 3617. Neither the statute nor the case law attempts to define the minimum level of coercion, intimidation, or interference necessary to violate the statute. Most of the cases interpreting and applying § 3617 involve egregious facts. Illustrative cases involve firebombing, cross-burning, and other similarly overt acts of intimidation. See Whisby-Myers v. Kiekenapp, — F. Supp.2d — 2003 WL 22844404 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 1, 2003) (detonation of explosive device simulator combined with racial epithets stated § 3617 claim); Stackhouse, 620 F. Supp. at 211 (firebombing of car sufficient to state § 3617 claim); Byrd v. Brandeberg, 922 F. Supp. 60, 64-65 (N.D. Ohio 1996) (granting summary judgment to plaintiffs in case involving Molotov cocktails); Johnson v. Smith, 810 F. Supp. 235, 238-39 (N.D. Ill. 1992) (allegations that defendants participated in cross-burning on plaintiff's property sufficient to state § 3617 claim); Seaphus v. Lilly, 691 F. Supp. 127, 139 (N.D. Ill. 1988) (allegations of physical assault and attempted arson of plaintiff's home stated § 3617 claim).
However, nothing in the statute indicates that § 3617 claims are limited to extraordinarily violent and discriminatory acts like cross-burning. Rather, the plain language of § 3617 and the purpose of the FHA evidence that the provision was intended to cover a broad range of discriminatory conduct associated with the exercise of housing rights. See Michigan Prot. and Advocacy Serv., Inc. v. Babin, 18 F.3d 337, 347 (6th Cir. 1994) ("Section 3617 is not limited to those who used some sort of potent force or duress, but extends to other actors who are in a position directly to disrupt the exercise or enjoyment of a protected right and exercise their powers with a discriminatory animus."). The plain language of the statute prohibits interference with the enjoyment of housing rights. 42 U.S.C. § 3617 ("It shall be unlawful to coerce, intimidate, threaten, or interfere with any person . . . on account of having exercised or enjoyed [housing rights].") (emphasis added). Although Congress did not intend for any interference with housing rights to give rise to a federal lawsuit, see United States v. Weisz, 914 F. Supp. 1050, 1054 (S.D. N.Y. 1996) (reasoning that a plaintiff must allege conduct that implicates the concerns expressed by Congress in the FHA to state a claim under § 3617, and that otherwise the FHA would federalize ordinary disputes between neighbors), the addition of the word interference to the words coercion, intimidation, and threats indicates that Congress sought to reach a relatively broad range of conduct. Indeed, the purpose of the FHA was to promote "open, integrated residential housing patterns and to prevent the increase of segregation, in ghettos, of racial groups whose lack of opportunities the Act was designed to combat," Otero v. New York City Hous. Auth., 484 F.2d 1122, 1134 (2d Cir. 1973), and Congress chose "broad and inclusive" language to realize that goal. See Trafficante v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 209, 93 S.Ct. 364, 367 (1972).
Though drawing a line in a case like this is difficult, courts are not unfamiliar with difficult questions of line drawing in discrimination cases. In sexual harassment cases, for example, courts must determine whether or not a plaintiff has alleged conduct that is severe or pervasive enough to create a hostile work environment. See Bakersville v. Culligan Int'l Co., 50 F.3d 428, 430 (7th Cir. 1995). As the Seventh Circuit has observed, this is not an easy line to draw. See id. "On the one side lie sexual assaults; other physical contact, whether amorous or hostile, for which there is no consent express or implied; uninvited sexual solicitations; intimidating words or acts; obscene language or gestures; pornographic pictures . . . On the other side lies the occasional vulgar banter, tinged with sexual innuendo, of coarse or boorish workers." Id.
Some of those same considerations are also relevant in the § 3617 context. On one side lie cross-burning, fire-bombing and other similarly overt discriminatory acts designed to intimidate, coerce, or interfere with housing rights. On the other side lie unfortunate skirmishes between neighbors, tinged with discriminatory overtones or occasional discriminatory comments. Nothing in the text of the FHA or the case law interpreting it indicates that Congress intended to federalize the latter type of dispute. See, e.g., Sporn v. Ocean Colony Condo. Ass'n, 173 F. Supp.2d 244, 252 (D. N.J. 2001) (ruling in favor of defendants because "shunning" of handicapped neighbors is not enough to support a § 3617 claim); Weisz, 914 F. Supp. at 1054 (finding for defendants where conduct alleged was "nothing more than a series of skirmishes in an unfortunate war between neighbors."). The more difficult cases lie in the middle, and factors such as the frequency and severity of the conduct are relevant when determining how to assess a case, just as they are in a sexual harassment case.
Other courts have analogized to the Title VII standards when addressing an FHA claim. See Dicenso v. Cisneros, 96 F.3d 1004, 1008 (7th Cir. 1996) (recognizing a hostile housing environment cause of action under the FHA, and beginning analysis with the familiar Title VII standard); Gourlay v. Forest Lake Estates Civic Ass'n of Port Richey, Inc., 276 F. Supp.2d 1222, (M.D. Fl. 2003) (case subsequently settled) (analogizing to sexual harassment standard in context of a § 3617 claim.).
In the Court's view, based on the frequent and sometimes severe nature of the conduct alleged in the complaint, Walton may be able to prove a set of facts that would establish a violation of § 3617 despite the absencsse of egregious facts like cross-burning. According to her complaint, dog feces were placed on the rear door-mat of her home, beer bottles were placed in her mailbox, and trash was constantly thrown in her yard. Surveyors and lawn care contractors hired by the HOA threatened to harm Walton. While the state court action was pending, Walton received a phone call from a male who stated, "if you continue to fight [the legal action], you'll be dead before it's over." Spellmeyer, an HOA official, shouted at Walton, "There is more than one way to lynch a nigger." This comment, coupled with the allegation that Spellmeyer chased after a sixteen-year old African-American boy that Walton had hired to take care of her lawn, suggests that above-cited conduct may have been motivated by discriminatory animus.
The HOA cites three Seventh Circuit cases in support of its argument that the Court should dismiss for failure to state a claim under § 3617 of the FHA. See Looper Maint. Serv., Inc. v. City of Indianapolis, 197 F.3d 908 (7th Cir. 1999); Krueger v. Cuomo, 115 F.3d 487 (7th Cir. 1997); Selmon v. Portsmouth Drive Condo. Ass `n, 89 F.3d 406 (7th Cir. 1996). None of the cases is on point. Looper was a case involving disputes over minority bidding on construction contracts, and the Seventh Circuit concluded that the plaintiff's allegations did not fall within the parameters of the FHA. See Looper, 197 F.3d at 912. Krueger dealt with sexual harassment in the FHA context; and Selmon involved the Colorado River abstention doctrine. See Krueger, 115 F.3d at 491; Selmon, 89 F.3d at 408.
Walton's other allegations, while less serious (calling the police due to mulch in street, placing the speed limit sign in Walton's yard, making Walton pay HOA dues although she was exempt, and criticizing Walton in a newsletter), could also indicate that the HOA officials sought to drive her out of the neighborhood through intimidation and frequent interference with her housing rights. Of course, Walton will have to provide sufficient evidence that the conduct was racially-motivated to survive at summary judgment or win at trial. However, taking all of Walton's allegations as true at this stage, Walton has enough to survive a motion to dismiss. While Walton does not allege that any physically violent behavior occurred, Walton was threatened with physical violence, including a death threat, and subjected to apparently frequent episodes of inference with her housing rights. In addition, Walton has set forth allegations which suggest that the conduct was racially-motivated. Accordingly, the Court DENIES Defendant's Motion to Dismiss for failure to state a claim.
B. ABSTENTION
The HOA also asserts that the Court should abstain from exercising jurisdiction over this dispute. In Colorado River Water Conservation District v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 96 S.Ct. 1236(1976), the Supreme Court described three sets of circumstances where abstention may be appropriate:
(a) abstention is appropriate in cases presenting a federal constitutional issue which might be mooted or presented in a different posture by a state court determination of pertinent state law . . .
(b) Abstention is also appropriate where there have been presented difficult questions of state law bearing on policy problems of substantial public import whose importance transcends the result in the case then at bar . . .
(c) Finally, abstention is appropriate where, absent bad faith, harassment, or a patently invalid state statute, federal jurisdiction has been invoked for the purpose of restraining state criminal proceedings . . .Id. at 815-16 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). According to the HOA, the second category of abstention applies in the instant case. The Court disagrees.
The instant case is a one-count housing discrimination case brought under the Fair Housing Act, a federal statute. While every case is important, this case simply does not require the Court to decide difficult questions of state law whose import transcends the result in the case at bar. The Colorado River Court used the Burford case as an illustration of circumstances fitting the second category of abstention:
[In Burford], the Court held that a suit seeking review of the reasonableness under Texas state law of a state commission's permit to drill oil wells should have been dismissed by the District Court. The reasonableness of the permit in that case was not of transcendent importance, but review of reasonableness by the federal courts in that and future cases, where the State had established its own elaborate review system for dealing with the geological complexities of oil and gas fields, would have had an impermissibly disruptive effect on state policy for the management of those fields.Colorado River, 424 U.S. at 815. The instant case lacks the "exceptional circumstances" of cases like Burford and its progeny, and does not raise any state issues of transcendent importance. See id. at 813. The State of Indiana has a strong policy against discrimination, but discrimination is an area where state and federal courts frequently have concurrent jurisdiction, and the HOA's generalized arguments about discrimination do not convince the Court that this case involves as issue of transcendent importance such that abstention is appropriate.
In its abstention arguments, the HOA also attaches importance to the Indiana Civil Rights Commission's finding of no probable cause with regard to Walton's discrimination complaint. However, the abstention doctrine contemplates an ongoing, concurrent state proceeding where "substantially the same parties are contemporaneously litigating substantially the same issues . . ." Caminiti latarola, Ltd. v. Behnke Warehousing, Inc., 962 F.2d 698, 700 (7th Cir. 1992). See also AXA Corporate Solutions v. Underwriters Reinsurance Corp., 347 F.3d 272, 278 (7th Cir. 2003). The Commission's no probable cause finding resulted in dismissal of Walton's complaint and, consequently, it cannot be considered contemporaneous litigation of the same issues. Moreover, as noted by Walton, "the mere potential for conflict in the results of [federal and state] adjudications, does not, without more, warrant staying exercise of federal jurisdiction." Colorado River, 424 U.S. at 816. Accordingly, the Court DENIES the HOA's motion to the extent it requests the Court to abstain from deciding the instant case.
C. COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL
The HOA also maintains that the collateral estoppel doctrine bars Walton from litigating her housing discrimination claim, and it seeks summary judgment based on the argument. In support of this position, the HOA relies on the Indiana Civil Rights Commission's finding of no probable cause. In response, Walton asserts that collateral estoppel is inapplicable because the matter was never actually litigated before the Commission. The Court agrees with Walton.
Collateral estoppel, also referred to as issue preclusion, is a common law doctrine that serves the "dual purpose of protecting litigants from the burden of relitigating an identical issue with the same party or his privy and of promoting judicial economy by preventing needless litigation." Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 326, 99 S.Ct. 645, 649 (1979) (citation omitted). Collateral estoppel will only apply if: "(1) the issue sought to be precluded is the same as that involved in the prior action; (2) the issue was actually litigated; (3) the determination of the issue was essential to the final judgment; and (4) the party against whom estoppel is invoked was fully represented in the prior action." Havoco of Am., Ltd. v. Freeman, Atkins Coleman, Ltd., 58 F.3d 303, 307 (7th Cir. 1995) (citations omitted). Because collateral estoppel is an affirmative defense, the HOA, the defendant in this action, has the burden of establishing each of these elements.
In the instant case, the prior action was a housing discrimination complaint that Walton filed with the Indiana Civil Rights Commission. The Commission issued a "no probable cause" finding, which resulted in dismissal of Walton's complaint. Def.'s Ex. 2. However, this finding does not support invocation of collateral estoppel because the complaint was not "actually litigated" in any meaningful sense. No administrative hearing was held prior to the dismissal, nor was any discovery taken. 9101.A.C. 1-3-5 (no hearing held unless Commission issues a probable cause finding); 910 I.A.C. 1-4-1 (complaintant may take discovery only after finding of probable cause is made). As noted by the Seventh Circuit, "when a federal court has serious doubts about the fairness, quality, or extensiveness of the earlier state proceedings, it will not apply collateral estoppel." Kunzelman v. Thompson, 799 F.2d 1172, 1176(7th Cir. 1986) (emphasis added) (citing Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 164 n. 11, 99 S.Ct. 970, 979 n. 11 (1979) and Lumen Const., Inc. v. Brant Const. Co., 780 F.2d 691, 697 (7th Cir. 1985)).
910 I.A.C. 1-1.5-8 ("Finding of no probable cause" means a written finding issued by . . .[Commission] that probable cause does not exist to believe that an unlawful discriminatory practice occurred."); 910 I.A.C. 1-3-2(I) (finding of no probable cause results in dismissal of complaint with prejudice).
Although neither the parties nor the Court has identified case law on the preclusive effect of a no probable cause determination by the Indiana Civil Rights Commission, one Indiana Court of Appeals has concluded that a no probable cause finding is not an affirmative, appealable action of the Commission. See Hill v. Indiana Civil Rights Comm'n, 665 N.E.2d 1 (Ind.Ct.App. 1996) (affirmative actions by Commission may be appealed to the Indiana Courts of Appeal). The Hill court noted that complaintant was not deprived of relief because she could still file a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim in federal court. See id. Like the complaintant in Hill, Walton can file a federal lawsuit despite a no probable cause finding by the Commission.
The Commission's finding of no probable cause is akin to an Equal Employment Opportunity Commission's ("EEOC") lack of reasonable cause determination in the Title VII context. When a discrimination charge is filed with the EEOC, the agency conducts an investigation into the allegations of the charge, and then makes a determination as to whether there is reason to believe the charge is true. See e.g., E.E.O.C. v. Shell Oil Co., 466 U.S. 54, 61-62, 104 S.Ct. 1621, 1627 (1984). If the EEOC concludes that reasonable cause is lacking, it dismisses the charge and issues a right to sue letter. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1). In other words, an EEOC no reasonable cause determination does not bar a plaintiff from filing a subsequent lawsuit. Similarly, an lndiana Civil Rights Commission no probable cause finding does not bar a plaintiff from filing a subsequent federal lawsuit. The Court DENIES the HOA's motion to the extent it seeks to bar this suit under the collateral estoppel doctrine.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated herein, the Court DENIES Defendant's Motion to Dismiss and/or Motion for Summary Judgment in its entirety.