Opinion
Civil No. 3:17-CV-486
03-21-2017
JOHN WALSH, III, Plaintiff, v. U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, Defendants
(Judge Mannion)
( ) REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
I. Statement of Facts and of the Case
The plaintiff, John Walsh is a frequent, albeit frequently unsuccessful, pro se litigant. Indeed, Walsh is the author of more than 30 quixotic pro se lawsuits filed with this court during the past several years. These lawsuits are often varied in their form, and eccentric in their content, but frequently share a common, frivolous quality. Moreover, often upon scrutiny Walsh's lawsuits are little more than odd polemics reflecting random observations on life by Walsh, polemics which masquerade as litigation.
So it is in the instant case. While the nature of Walsh's legal claim is murky, and the factual background of this lawsuit is somewhat obscure, Walsh's 4-page complaint describes the plaintiff as a "pro se stakeholder, citizen, resident, customer taxpayer," and seeks to sue the U.S. House of Representatives, seeking an order directing Congress "to do the 'Right Thing' thus creating the best Health Care System in the World." (Id., p.3.) Along with this complaint Walsh filed a document we construe as motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis, (Doc. 2.), which we will GRANT. However, upon a screening review of this pro se in forma pauperis complaint, for the reasons set forth below, it is recommended that the complaint be dismissed.
II. Discussion
A. Legal Standards Governing Sufficiency of Civil Complaints
This court has a statutory obligation to conduct a preliminary review of pro se complaints brought by plaintiffs given leave to proceed in forma pauperis. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). Specifically, the court must assess whether a pro se complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, since Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that a complaint should be dismissed for "failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). In addition, when reviewing in forma pauperis complaints, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) specifically enjoins us to "dismiss the complaint at any time if the court determines that . . . the action . . . fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. This statutory text mirrors the language of Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides that a complaint should be dismissed for "failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
With respect to this benchmark standard for legal sufficiency of a complaint, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has aptly noted the evolving standards governing pleading practice in federal court, stating that:
Standards of pleading have been in the forefront of jurisprudence in recent years. Beginning with the Supreme Court's opinion in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) continuing with our opinion in Phillips [v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 230 (3d Cir. 2008)] and culminating recently with the Supreme Court's decision in Ashcroft v. Iqbal -U.S.-, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (2009) pleading standards have seemingly shifted from simple notice pleading to a more heightened form of pleading, requiring a p[arty] to plead more than the possibility of relief to survive a motion to dismiss.Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 209-10 (3d Cir. 2009).
In considering whether a complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, the court must accept as true all allegations in the complaint and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from the complaint are to be construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Jordan v. Fox Rothschild, O'Brien & Frankel, Inc., 20 F.3d 1250, 1261 (3d Cir. 1994). However, a court "need not credit a complaint's bald assertions or legal conclusions when deciding a motion to dismiss." Morse v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997). Additionally a court need not "assume that a ... p[arty] can prove facts that the ... p[arty] has not alleged." Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal. v. California State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 526 (1983). As the Supreme Court held in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), in order to state a valid cause of action a party must provide some factual grounds for relief which "requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of actions will not do." Id. at 555. "Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Id.
In keeping with the principles of Twombly, the Supreme Court has underscored that a trial court must assess whether a complaint states facts upon which relief can be granted when ruling on a motion to dismiss. In Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009), the Supreme Court held that, when considering a motion to dismiss, a court should "begin by identifying pleadings that, because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth." Id. at 679. According to the Supreme Court, "[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice." Id. at 678. Rather, in conducting a review of the adequacy of complaint, the Supreme Court has advised trial courts that they must:
[B]egin by identifying pleadings that because they are no more than conclusions are not entitled to the assumption of truth. While legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations. When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.Id. at 679.
Thus, following Twombly and Iqbal a well-pleaded complaint must contain more than mere legal labels and conclusions. Rather, a complaint must recite factual allegations sufficient to raise the party's claimed right to relief beyond the level of mere speculation. As the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has stated:
[A]fter Iqbal, when presented with a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, district courts should conduct a two-part analysis. First, the factual and legal elements of a claim should be separated. he District Court must accept all of the . . . well-pleaded facts as true, but may disregard any legal conclusions. Second, a district court must then determine whether the facts alleged . . . are sufficient to show that the plaintiff has a "plausible claim for relief." In other words, a complaint must do more than allege the p[arty's] entitlement to relief. A complaint has to "show" such an entitlement with its facts.Fowler, 578 F.3d at 210-11.
In practice, consideration of the legal sufficiency of a complaint entails a three-step analysis: "First, the court must 'tak[e] note of the elements a p[arty] must plead to state a claim.' Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1947. Second, the court should identify allegations that, 'because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth.' Id. at 1950. Finally, 'where there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement for relief.' Id." Santiago v. Warminster Tp., 629 F.3d 121, 130 (3d Cir. 2010).
In addition to these pleading rules, a civil complaint must comply with the requirements of Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure which defines what a complaint should say and provides that:
(a) A pleading that states a claim for relief must contain (1) a short and plain statement of the grounds for the court's jurisdiction, unless the court already has jurisdiction and the claim needs no new jurisdictional support; (2) a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief; and (3) a demand for the relief sought, which may include relief in the alternative or different types of relief.
Thus, a well-pleaded complaint must contain more than mere legal labels and conclusions. Rather, a pro se plaintiff's complaint must recite factual allegations which are sufficient to raise the plaintiff's claimed right to relief beyond the level of mere speculation, set forth in a "short and plain" statement of a cause of action.
Judged against these legal benchmarks, for the reasons set forth below Walsh's latest complaint is fatally flawed and should be dismissed.
B. The Plaintiff's Complaint Fails to State a Claim Upon Which Relief Can be Granted
In this case, our review of this complaint reveals that this pleading fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted for several reasons.
First, the complaint violates the basic rule of pleading which requires that "a district court . . . determine whether the facts alleged in the complaint are sufficient to show that the plaintiff has a 'plausible claim for relief.' In other words, a complaint must do more than allege the plaintiff's entitlement to relief. A complaint has to 'show' such an entitlement with its facts." Fowler, 578 F.3d at 210-11. In addition, dismissal of this complaint is also warranted because the complaint fails to comply with Rule 8's basic injunction that: "A pleading that states a claim for relief must contain . . . a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Moreover, it is also well-settled that: "[t]he Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require that a complaint contain 'a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,' Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), and that each averment be 'concise, and direct,' Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(e)(1)." Scibelli v. Lebanon County, 219 F. App'x 221, 222 (3d Cir. 2007). Thus, when a complaint is "illegible or incomprehensible", id., or when a complaint "is also largely unintelligible," Stephanatos v. Cohen, 236 F. App'x 785, 787 (3d Cir. 2007), an order dismissing a complaint under Rule 8 is clearly appropriate. See, e.g., Mincy v. Klem, 303 F. App'x 106 (3d Cir. 2008); Rhett v. New Jersey State Superior Court, 260 F. App'x 513 (3d Cir. 2008); Stephanatos v. Cohen, supra; Scibelli v. Lebanon County, supra; Bennett-Nelson v. La. Bd. of Regents, 431 F.3d 448, 450 n.1 (5th Cir. 2005). Furthermore, dismissal under Rule 8 is proper when a complaint "left the defendants having to guess what of the many things discussed constituted [a cause of action];" Binsack v. Lackawanna County Prison, 438 F. App'x 158 (3d Cir. 2011), or when the complaint is so "rambling and unclear" as to defy response. Tillio v. Spiess, No. 11-1276, 2011 WL 3346787 (Aug. 4, 2011).
Here, Walsh's pleadings fail to satisfy these basic minimal pleading standards. Indeed, these pleadings set forth no well-pleaded, or intelligible, factual narrative thread giving rise to civil liability by the United States House of Representatives. In as case such as this where these pleadings would leave "the defendants having to guess what of the many things discussed constituted [a cause of action]," Binsack v. Lackawanna County Prison, 438 F. App'x 158 (3d Cir. 2011), dismissal of this complaint is fully warranted.
Furthermore, Walsh's complaint, which effectively asks a federal court to enter an order directing some legislative course of action, runs afoul of a settled legal tenet, the immunity conferred upon legislators by the Speech and Debate Clause of the United States Constitution. It is well-settled that: "Legislative immunity has long been a fixture of our constitutional system. 'The privilege of legislators to be free from arrest or civil process for what they do or say in legislative proceedings has taproots in the Parliamentary struggles of the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries.' Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 372, 71 S.Ct. 783, 95 L.Ed. 1019 (1951). This legislative 'freedom of speech' is enshrined in the Constitution, see U.S. Const. art. I, § 6 ('[F]or any speech or debate in either House, [Senators and Representatives] shall not be questioned in any other place.')[.]" Freedom from Religion Found., Inc. v. Saccone, 894 F. Supp. 2d 573, 582 (M.D. Pa. 2012). This immunity applies to a wide array of legislative functions. Indeed, "Courts have routinely considered many actions taken by legislators that go beyond voting for legislation to be 'legislative acts.' See, e.g. Eastland, 421 U.S. at 507, 95 S.Ct. 1813 (issuing subpoenas and seizing property and records for committee hearings falls within sphere of legislative acts); In re Grand Jury Subpoenas, 571 F.3d 1200 (D.C.Cir.2009) (statements made by a congressman to the House Ethics Committee regarding private funding for a trip shielded from subpoena by a grand jury); Ray v. Proxmire, 581 F.2d 998, 1000 (D.C.Cir.1978) (senator immune from liability for allegedly libelous statement made in letter submitted to Senate Ethics Committee); McSurely v. McClellan, 553 F.2d 1277, 1286-87 (D.C.Cir.1976) (legislative fact-finding is protected by the Speech or Debate Clause)." Freedom from Religion Found., Inc. v. Saccone, 894 F. Supp. 2d 573, 583 (M.D. Pa. 2012). Accordingly, these legislative functions are all cloaked in the protections of the Speech and Debate Clause and cannot form the basis of a federal civil lawsuit. Therefore, this lawsuit, which seeks by judicial fiat to direct a legislative outcome, violates the constitutional separation of powers embodied in the Speech and Debate clause.
We recognize that in civil rights cases pro se plaintiffs often should be afforded an opportunity to amend a complaint before the complaint is dismissed in its entirety, see Fletcher-Hardee Corp. v. Pote Concrete Contractors, 482 F.3d 247, 253 (3d Cir. 2007), unless it is clear that granting further leave to amend would be futile, or result in undue delay. Alston v. Parker, 363 F.3d 229, 235 (3d Cir. 2004). In this case, taken together, the structural flaws in this complaint are beyond any form of repair. Therefore, granting leave to amend would, in our view, be futile. Accordingly, this complaint should be dismissed without any further leave to amend.
Finally, we note that Walsh has over the past several years filed dozens of increasingly bizarre and frivolous complaints with this court. This pattern of frivolous filings has continued unabated despite numerous admonitions from this court and, sadly, Walsh's pattern of frivolous filings has over time declined in coherence and rationality. This court is not powerless to address this blizzard of erratic, frivolous and vexatious filings. Quite the contrary, we have an affirmative responsibility to ensure that the courts do not become encumbered with repeated, random, meritless matters filed litigants who are unable or unwilling to comply with the requirements prescribed by the law. In such instances, provided that the litigant is given prior notice and an opportunity to be heard, it is well settled that the court possesses the inherent authority to limit a frivolous filer's opportunities to burden the legal system with meritless filings, by requiring a frivolous filer to obtain the prior approval of the court before lodging any new complaints relating to the same subject matter of past frivolous litigation. See e.g., Chipps v. U.S.D.C. for the M.D. of Pa., 882 F.2d 72, 73 (3d Cir. 1989); Gagliardi v. McWilliams, 834 F.2d 81 (3d Cir. 1987); In re Oliver, 682 F.2d 443 (3d Cir. 1982). In this case, the steady decline in the rationality of Walsh's filings suggests that the court should consider providing Walsh with notice that his future filing opportunities may be limited and an opportunity to be heard on this issue.
A partial list of these frivolous filings includes the following civil actions filed within the past year: 3:15-cv-1103,Walsh v. Walsh et al filed 06/05/15 closed 08/13/15; 3:15-cv-02012-ARC Walsh v. Walsh et al filed 10/16/15 closed 11/12/15; 3:15-cv-02122-RDM Walsh v. Summers et al filed 11/05/15 closed 02/11/16; 3:15-cv-02313-MEM Walsh v. Corbett filed 12/02/15 closed 12/02/15; 3:15-mc-00452-RDM Walsh v. Verrilli filed 10/05/15 closed 07/26/16; 3:16-cv-00503-RDM Walsh v. DeNaples et al filed 03/24/16 closed 05/17/16; 3:16-cv-00834-ARC Walsh v. Greater Scranton Young Mens Christian Association et al filed 05/10/16 closed 05/20/16; 3:16-cv-00872-RPC Walsh v. Rite Aid et al filed 05/13/16 closed 07/20/16; 3:16-cv-00950-ARC Walsh v. Munley filed 05/20/16 closed 06/21/16; 3:16-cv-00998-RPC Walsh v. Bambera, et al filed 05/26/16 closed 06/17/16; 3:16-cv-01234-NQA Walsh v. Conaboy et al filed 06/22/16 closed 07/12/16; 3:16-cv-01429-EMK Walsh v. Conaboy et al filed 07/13/16 closed 07/25/16; 3:16-cv-01430-EMK Walsh v Wilding, et al filed 07/11/16 closed 08/02/16; 3:16-cv-01440-EMK Walsh v. Pascal et al filed 07/13/16 closed 07/25/16; 3:16-cv-01460-EMK Walsh v. Alejandro filed 07/18/16 closed 07/27/16; 3:16-cv-01462-EMK Walsh v. Stark, 3:16-cv-01112-ARC Walsh v. Cardonick et al filed 06/10/16 closed 07/08/16; 3:16-cv-01223-EMK Walsh v. Deleeum filed 06/21/16 closed 07/20/16; 3:16-cv-01269-NQA Walsh v. Mariani et al filed 06/23/16 closed 07/12/16; 3:16-cv-01422-EMK Walsh v. Saporito et al filed 07/08/16 closed 08/09/16; 3:16-cv-01445-EMK Walsh v. McKee et al filed 07/13/16 closed 07/25/16; 3:16-cv-01452-EMK Walsh v. The Lynett Family filed 07/14/16 closed 07/27/16; 3:16-cv-01472-EMK Walsh v. Harhut et al filed 07/19/16 closed 07/22/16; 3:16-cv-01494-EMK Walsh v. Barrasse et al filed 07/20/16 closed 07/28/16; 3:16-cv-01495-EMK Walsh v. American Water et al filed 07/21/16 closed 07/29/16; 3:16-cv-01498-EMK Walsh v. Fuentes et al filed 07/21/16 closed 07/29/16; 3:16-cv-01560-SHR Walsh v. Brazil et al filed 07/27/16 closed 08/01/16.
If the district court wishes to follow this course these show cause proceedings could be referred to the undersigned for the preparation of a Report and Recommendation. See In re Allen, 248 F. App'x 874, 876 (10th Cir. 2007).
III. Recommendation
Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, the plaintiff is GRANTED leave to proceed in forma pauperis, (Doc. 2.), and IT IS RECOMMENDED that the plaintiff's complaint be dismissed. IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that the district court consider causing a show cause order to be issued placing Walsh on notice that the court is considering limiting this frivolous filer's opportunities to burden the legal system with meritless filings by requiring Walsh to obtain the prior approval of the court before lodging any new complaints relating to the same subject matter of past frivolous litigation, and giving Walsh an opportunity to be heard on this proposed course of action.
The Parties are further placed on notice that pursuant to Local Rule 72.3:
Any party may object to a magistrate judge's proposed findings, recommendations or report addressing a motion or matter described in 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(B) or making a recommendation for the disposition of a prisoner case or a habeas corpus petition within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy thereof. Such party shall file with the clerk of court, and serve on the magistrate judge and all parties, written objections which shall specifically identify the portions of the proposed findings, recommendations or report to which objection is made and the basis for such objections. The briefing requirements set forth in Local Rule 72.2 shall apply. A judge shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made and may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge. The judge, however, need conduct a new hearing only in his or her discretion or where
required by law, and may consider the record developed before the magistrate judge, making his or her own determination on the basis of that record. The judge may also receive further evidence, recall witnesses or recommit the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions.
Submitted this 21st day of March, 2017.
S/Martin C . Carlson
Martin C. Carlson
United States Magistrate Judge