Opinion
No. X03 CV05 4006939
February 1, 2006
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS
This case raises important issues concerning the ability of state officials, sued individually for money damages, to gain dismissal of a case by asserting state law immunity defenses in a federal civil rights action. The Court concludes that under the circumstances of this case, state law sovereign immunity and statutory immunity defenses are not available and therefore denies the defendants' motion to dismiss.
Plaintiffs Joseph W. Walsh and Suzanne Walsh, the father and sister of Scott Walsh ("Walsh"), were appointed co-administrators of his estate following his death. The February 7, 2005, complaint in this case alleges that on June 6, 2002, Walsh "hanged himself to death with a bed sheet tied to the top bunk in his cell" while in the custody of the Connecticut Department of Correction ("DOC") at the MacDougall-Walker Correctional Institution ("MacDougall-Walker").
The 259-paragraph complaint is too long to summarize. Its ten counts arc directed against numerous defendants who were in various positions at the time alleged, including John J. Armstrong, the Commissioner of the DOC; Jack Tokarz, Deputy Commissioner; Brian Murphy, warden of MacDougall-Walker; Seneca Patterson, a clinical social worker; and Robert T. Trestman, Jay K. Berkowitz, Renee S. Kohanski, Joseph Coleman and Sue Wargo, identified as psychiatrists, a psychologist and a nurse responsible for treating, monitoring and managing Walsh's care. Two corrections officers, Fred Derota and Timothy Burke, are also named as defendants. Armstrong, Tokarz and Murphy have been referred to as the "supervisory defendants." Colon v. Coughlin, 58 F.3d 865, 873 (2d Cir. 1995). The others have been referred to as the "line defendants."
The First Count, alleging medical malpractice negligence against the State of Connecticut and brought consistent with a limited grant of permission to sue the State of Connecticut issued by the Claims Commissioner on February 4, 2004, is not implicated in the pending motion to dismiss. The Second Count, brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Section 1983, alleges deliberate indifference and a failure to provide constitutionally adequate care against all of the defendants acting in their individual capacities. The Third Count also alleges deliberate indifference and a failure to provide constitutionally adequate care, but this count is directed against the three supervisory defendants acting in their supervisory capacity. The Fourth Count alleges deliberate indifference to safety and failure to protect against all of the individual defendants in their individual capacities, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Section 1983. The Fifth Count makes allegations similar to those in the Fourth Count, but this count is directed against Armstrong, Tokarz and Murphy acting in their individual capacities as supervisors. The Sixth Count is directed against Armstrong, Tokarz and Murphy acting in their individual capacities as supervisors, premised on a failure to properly train and supervise DOC employees. The Seventh Count, brought against all the defendants in their individual capacities, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Section 1983, alleges that Walsh was subjected to cruel and unusual punishment in contravention of the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The Eighth Count, directed to all of the individual defendants in their individual capacities, alleges conspiracy in violation of 42 U.S.C. Section 1985. The Ninth Count alleges intentional infliction of emotional distress against the individual defendants in their individual capacities pursuant to state common law. The Tenth Count, brought, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Section 1983, claims that all of the individual defendants, acting in their individual capacities, violated Walsh's Fourteenth Amendment rights. Plaintiffs seek money damages only.
42 U.S.C. Section 1983 states in relevant part as follows:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
42 U.S.C. Section 1985 states in relevant part as follows:
If two or more persons in any State or Territory conspire . . . for the purpose of depriving, either directly or indirectly, any person . . . of the equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws . . . or cause to be done, any act in furtherance of the object of such conspiracy, whereby another is . . . deprived of having and exercising any right or privilege of a citizen of the United States, the party so injured or deprived may have an action for the recovery of damages occasioned by such injury or deprivation, against any one or more of the conspirators.
Pursuant to Practice Book Section 10-30, the defendants on June 10, 2005, filed a motion to dismiss the Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth and Tenth Counts of the plaintiff's complaint. Defendants argue that all of the claims against them are barred by state common-law sovereign immunity and state statutory immunity. Defendants also contend that the plaintiffs have failed to sufficiently allege facts to establish that they acted maliciously, wantonly, or recklessly, or otherwise in a manner outside the scope of their official duties.
Plaintiffs dispute defendants' arguments, contending that under the supremacy clause of the United State Constitution, defendants may not avail themselves of state sovereign immunity or statutory immunity defenses in a case, like this, alleging violations of the decedent's federal constitutional rights by state employees, acting under color of state law, being sued in their individual or personal capacities. Plaintiffs further contend that, in any event, the claims against defendants are properly pleaded.
The supremacy clause of the United States Constitution, U.S. Const., Art VI, cl. 2, states as follows in relevant part:
This constitution, and the laws of the United States which shall be made in pursuance thereof . . . shall be the supreme law of the land; and the judges in every state shall be bound thereby, any thing in the constitution or laws of any state to the contrary notwithstanding.
The parties submitted detailed memoranda of law in support of their positions. Oral argument was held on November 21, 2005. Following oral argument, the Court ordered the parties to submit supplemental briefs addressing the following issues: (1.) Should defendants be prohibited from asserting that the claims against them are barred by state law sovereign immunity and/or statutory immunity? Please cite authority in support of your argument. (2.) What arguments do their parties put forth with respect to the Ninth Count of the complaint? (3.) In connection with the defendants' Motion to Dismiss dated June 9, 2005, do the parties make different arguments with respect to the "supervisory defendants" as opposed to the "line defendants"? If so, should the Court's legal analysis differ as to these two groups of defendants?
Having evaluated the full record, the Court denies the motion to dismiss in all respects, for the reasons stated.
State Sovereign Immunity
A motion to dismiss is the proper procedural vehicle for challenging the court's subject matter jurisdiction; Miller v. Egan, 265 Conn. 301, 828 A.2d 549 (2003). If the court concludes it lacks jurisdiction over the subject matter, the case must be dismissed. Practice Book Sections 10-31, 10-33. The doctrines of sovereign immunity and statutory immunity both implicate subject matter jurisdiction. Martin v. Brady, 261 Conn. 372, 376, 802 A.2d 814 (2002).
Defendants argue that pursuant to the analysis set out in Spring v. Constantino, 168 Conn. 563, 568, 362 A.2d 871 (1975), the Court should look beneath the pleadings and conclude that while plaintiffs purport to sue defendants in their individual capacities, defendants are in actuality being sued in their capacities as state employees discharging their statutory duties. In Spring, our Supreme Court set out a four-part test to determine whether an action was "in effect, one against the state [which] cannot be maintained without its consent." Under the Spring test, defendants argue, they are immune from suit pursuant to a line of cases including Horton v. Meskill, 172 Conn. 615, 623-24, 376 A.2d 359 (1977), Fetterman v. University of Connecticut, 192 Conn. 539, 473 A.2d 1176 (1984), Pamela B. v. Ment, 244 Conn. 296, 328, 709 A.2d 1089 (1998), and Shay v. Rossi, 253 Conn. 134, 165, 749 A.2d 1147 (2000). These cases stand for the propositions, among others, that ". . . the state is immune from suit unless it consents to be sued by the appropriate legislation waiving sovereign immunity in certain prescribed cases," Martinez v. Department of Public Safety, 258 Conn. 680, 683, 784 A.2d 347 (2001), rev'd on other grounds, 263 Conn. 74, 818 A.2d 758 (2003); and that "[b]ecause the state can only act through its officers and agents, a suit against a state officer concerning a matter in which the officer represents the state is, in effect, against the state." Miller v. Egan, 265 Conn. 313. Our State Supreme Court has made it clear, defendants argue, that in cases against state employees, Section 1983 claims do not deprive the state of the ability to raise a defense of state sovereign immunity. In support of this argument, they rely upon cases including Krozser v. New Haven, 212 Conn. 415, 562 A.2d 1080 (1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1036 (1990), and Fetterman v. University of Connecticut, supra, 192 Conn. 552-53.
Two Superior Court judges, in cases alleging violations of 42 U.S.C. Section 1983, have rejected arguments similar to those put forth by the defendants in this case. In Wiseman v. Armstrong, Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford, Docket No. CV-02-0821661S (February 27, 2003) ( 34 Conn. L. Rptr. 428), Judge Wagner denied a defense motion to dismiss, citing the requirements of Spring v. Constantino, 168 Conn. 563, 568, 362 A.2d 871 (1975), and noting that the defendants were being sued in their individual capacities. In that case, counsel for the plaintiff asserts, it was conceded by Attorney O'Neill that the complaint would not be subject to any immunity defense if brought in federal court. In Sullins v. Myers, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven at New Haven, Docket No. CV-04-4001215S (June 6, 2005), Judge Corradino concluded that the states cannot shield agents "proven to have engaged in Section 1983 wrongdoing" from being liable by asserting state law sovereign immunity. He further concluded that "a state law sovereign immunity defense raised in a Section 1983 action brought in a state court cannot be resorted to if such a defense would not be available if the action were to have been brought in federal court." 2005 Ct.Super. At 9669. Defendants are appealing both of these decisions. In Johnson v. O'Connor, Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford, Docket No. CV-03-0826567 (June 2, 2004), Judge Stengel reached a different conclusion.
The four factors set out in Spring v. Constantino are: (1) whether a state official has been sued; (2) whether the suit concerns some matter in which that official represents the state; (3) whether the state is the real party against whom relief is sought; and (4) whether the judgment, though nominally against the official, will operate to control the activities of the state or subject it to liability.
Plaintiffs offer two responses. First, they argue that the defense of state sovereign immunity is not at all available in a count brought against individual defendants acting in their personal capacities pursuant to Section 1983. To permit the defense to be raised in a case brought against individual defendants, they claim, would be to undermine the Supremacy Clause and the primacy of federal law. Second, they argue that in any event, the four-part test of Spring v. Constantino — which was decided in the context of state, not federal, common-law torts seeking to vindicate state constitutional rights — is inapplicable to this case, which seeks the vindication of federal rights under Section 1983. Plaintiffs contend as well that the four-part test of Spring v. Constantino, in the context of this case, has only limited viability in light of the language used by Justice Borden in Miller v. Egan. In Miller, a case alleging violations of Section 1983, Justice Borden stated: "If the plaintiffs' complaint reasonably may be construed to bring claims against the defendants in their individual capacities, then sovereign immunity would not bar these claims." (Emphasis added.) Miller v. Egan, supra, 265 Conn. 307.
The Court fundamentally agrees with both of plaintiffs' arguments and with the thrust of Judge Corradino's analysis in his decision in Sullins v. Myers and concludes that under the circumstances of this case, the motion to dismiss based on state law sovereign immunity should be denied. As Judge Corradino stated in that case: "The nature of a claim for relief against state officials under Section 1983 arises in the context of the fact that two sovereign, one federal and one state, exist having laws operating in the same territory. One of these sovereigns had operating something called the Supremacy Clause operating in its favor." Sullins v. Myers, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven at New Haven, Docket No. CV 04 4001215S (June 6, 2005). The United States Supreme Court has made it clear that litigants may seek to impose personal liability upon government officials for actions they take in their personal capacity under color of state law in contravention of Section 1983. Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21 (1991); Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159 (1985).
The determination of the extent to which immunity provides a defense in a Section 1983 action is entirely a question of federal law. Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 314 (1975). State immunities may generally not be used in Section 1983 litigation, even when the case has been brought in state court. Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356, 383 (1990); ("if we were to uphold the immunity claim in this case, every State would have the opportunity to extend the mantle of sovereign immunity to `persons' who would otherwise be subject to Section 1983 liability. States would then be free to nullify for their own people the legislative decisions that Congress had made on behalf of all the People."); Dean v. Byerley, 354 F.3d 540, 555 (6th Cir. 2004) (". . . the Supreme Court has held that state-law immunities are irrelevant in Section 1983 actions.") To permit the defendants to assert state sovereign immunity to prevent a trial in a case against individual defendants in an action brought pursuant to Section 1983 would undermine the Supremacy Clause and undercut federal law. Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277, 284 n. 8 (1980) ("Conduct by persons acting under color of state law which is wrongful under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 . . . cannot be immunized by state law. A construction of the federal statute which permitted a state immunity defense to have controlling effect would transmute a basic guarantee into an illusory promise . . .") See also Judge Arterton's statement in CT Page 2277 Longmoore v. Nilsen, 285 F.Sup.2d 132, 143 (Conn. 2003), that "Plaintiffs sue the State Police Defendants only in their individual capacities and therefore the State Police Defendants as a matter of law cannot be protected by the common law doctrine of sovereign immunity." The four-part test of Spring v. Constantino is of limited utility because that case was not based on alleged violations of federal law. Nor do the decisions in Krozser or Fetterman mandate a contrary result. Krozser indeed includes general language to the effect that Section 1983 does not abrogate the common-law doctrine of sovereign immunity. But in Krozser, claims were not asserted against individual employees purporting to act in their individual capacities. Moreover, the principal issue in Krozser was whether the trial court had the authority to waive sovereign immunity. The Court held it did not. While Fetterman is susceptible to differing interpretations, the Court concludes that in that case it was not explicitly held that state sovereign immunity could be asserted as a defense in a Section 1983 action seeking money damages brought against individual defendants alleged to have engaged in serious violations of a defendant's constitutional rights under Section 1983. In Fetterman, moreover, there was no claim that the defendants being individually sued had acted in excess of their statutory authority or pursuant to an unconstitutional enactment. In the instant case, the gravamen of the claim is that the individual defendants violated the decedent's federal constitutional rights in a variety of egregious ways.
Even if the state sovereign immunity defense were available, the Court concludes that it would not require dismissal of the challenged counts in this case given the nature of the allegations in the complaint. The Court shares plaintiffs' view that Justice Borden's above-quoted statement in Miller v. Egan calls into question the continuing vitality of the four-part test of Spring v. Constantino. Having reviewed the complaint, the Court concludes that it may "reasonably be construed" to bring claims against the defendants in their individual capacities. In fact, it does so explicitly and repeatedly. See, e.g., paragraph 222 of the Second Count, alleging that all of the defendants knowingly disregarded an excessive risk to Walsh's health and safety; and paragraph 249 of the Eighth Count, alleging conspiracy against the defendants in depriving Walsh of adequate psychiatric and medical care, safety, protection from self-harm, and constitutionally adequate conditions of confinement. In light of these allegations, which the Court must construe in a manner most favorable to the pleader, Ganim v. Smith Wesson Corp., CT Page 2278 258 Conn. 313, 326, 780 A.2d 98 (2001), the Court declines to construe the complaint as defendants suggest.
Statutory Immunity
Defendants argue that plaintiffs' claims are barred by state statutory immunity pursuant to Connecticut General Statutes Section 4-165, which states in relevant part that "No state officer or employee shall be personally liable for damages or injury, not wanton, reckless or malicious, caused in the discharge of his duties or within the scope of his employment." Relying on Martin v. Brady, supra, 261 Conn. 372, defendants also contend that plaintiffs have failed to sufficiently alleges facts so as to cause defendants' conduct to fall within the statutory exception for "wanton, reckless or malicious" conduct.
The Court agrees with the plaintiffs' argument that the defense of state statutory immunity is not available to the defendants in this case, principally for the reasons stated above in the discussion of state sovereign immunity. To permit the defense of state statutory immunity to be asserted in this case would undermine the supremacy of federal law. Martinez v. California, supra, 444 U.S. 277; Howlett v. Rose, supra, 496 U.S. 356, 375-76. (If a state court holds that governmental entities subject to Section 1983 liability enjoy an immunity over and above those already provided in Section 1983, that holding "directly violates federal law."); Schnabel v. Tyler, 230 Conn. 735, 742-43, 646 A.2d 152 (1994) (court is "bound by federal precedent, and may not expand or contract the contours of the immunity available to government officials" in the context of a Section 1983 claim).
Even if a sovereign immunity defense were allowable, there is a simple, practical reason that a statutory immunity defense should not be available in a case such as this. If it were available, as plaintiffs' counsel argues, any state legislature could continuously, by statute, confer more extensive statutory immunities on state actors, thereby frustrating the thrust of the federal civil rights laws. Howlett v. Rose, supra, 496 U.S. 383. Given the historical importance, and the continuing importance, of these laws in vindicating the rights of citizens, it is apparent that such a practice cannot be countenanced.
Ninth Count CT Page 2279
The Ninth Count is analytically distinct from the other counts being challenged, alleging that all of the defendants, in their individual capacities, intentionally inflicted emotional distress on Scott Walsh, or that the defendants knew or should have known that their actions were likely to cause Walsh emotional distress. This count, alleging an intentional tort, is based on state common law, not federal law. Plaintiffs concede that because this count alleges a violation of state common law, defendants are not prohibited from asserting state sovereign or statutory immunity. In response, plaintiffs argue that, given the nature of the allegations, the motion to dismiss this count must fail. The Court agrees. Consistent with the above discussion of the other challenged counts, the Court concludes that because the Ninth Count "reasonably may be construed to bring claims against the defendants in their individual capacities, sovereign immunity would not bar these claims." Miller v. Egan, supra, 265 Conn. 307. The Court further concludes that this count, which incorporates the allegations of the previous counts, alleges conduct that is "wanton, reckless or malicious" as defined in Martin, bringing the alleged conduct within the exception contained in Section 4-165b. Martin v. Brady, supra, 261 Conn. 372. Therefore, the motion to dismiss the Ninth Count is denied.Conclusion
It bears stressing that this ruling, in which the Court is required to treat the allegations of the complaint as true, in no way deprives the defendants of the opportunity to fully and vigorously defend themselves. Defendants may aggressively avail themselves of factual defenses, and legal defenses — including immunity defenses — available under federal law if, as can be expected, they choose to do so. Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976); Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982); DiMartino v. Richens, 263 Conn. 639, 675, 822 A.2d 205 (2003). Additionally, under General Statutes Section 5-141d, state employees such as the defendants may be entitled to have the costs of defense, and any judgment against them, paid by the state.
But under the circumstances of this case as pleaded, the Court concludes that the defendants' assertion of state sovereign immunity and statutory immunity defenses does not require dismissal of the challenged counts, and that in a case such as this, defendants may not avail themselves of these defenses to gain dismissal of the challenged counts, but must rely instead on defenses which have evolved in the context of federal law and jurisprudence. In the alternative, the Court believes that even if the immunity defenses being asserted are available, the complaint sufficiently pleads the claims alleged to bring the challenged counts within applicable exceptions to the asserted immunity.
Because the Court has jurisdiction over the subject matter of this case, defendants' motion to dismiss is denied.