Summary
noting that the NYSHRL and NYCHRL apply the federal standards, with the only difference being that the NYCHRL provides for punitive damages
Summary of this case from Quarless v. Bronx-Lebanon Hospital CenterOpinion
November 18, 1997
Appeal from the Supreme Court, New York County (Diane Lebedeff, J.).
Plaintiff's allegations that the individual defendant made both physical and verbal sexual advances toward her that were unwelcome and repelled, that she was told her job evaluation was tied to her willingness to accept the advances and that she was forced to resign because the corporate defendant did not provide a vehicle of redress State a viable cause of action for both hostile environment and quid pro quo sexual harassment under the Human Rights Law (Executive Law § 296 [a]), which follows Federal standards under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. for sex discrimination claims (Olszewski v. Bloomberg L.P., 1997 U.S. Dist LEXIS 9654, *15, n 3 [S.D.N.Y., July 7, 1997, Patterson, J.]; see, Carrero v. New York City Hous. Auth., 890 F.2d 569, 578; Bridges v. Eastman Kodak Co., 822 F. Supp. 1020, 1027-1028). These same allegations, accepted as true, also show discriminatory conduct within the limitations period sufficiently similar to the alleged conduct without the limitations period to justify the conclusion that both were part of a single discriminatory practice, and that plaintiff's claim is therefore timely in its entirety under the continuing violation doctrine (see, McKenney v. New York City Off-Track Betting Corp., 903 F. Supp. 619, 622, citing Cornwell v. Robinson, 23 F.3d 694).
Plaintiffs' factual allegations, which are incorporated by reference in her claim for punitive damages under the New York City Human Rights Law (Administrative Code § 8-502), are ad equate to state a claim therefor, and, accordingly, we reinstate such claim. The State and City Human Rights Laws apply the same Federal standards for determining quid pro quo and hostile environment sexual harassment claims, and differ only in that the City law allows for the recovery of punitive damages (see, Bracker v. Cohen, 204 A.D.2d 115). Moreover, defendants expressly waived the issue of plaintiff's failure to plead compliance with the City law's requirement that notice be filed with the Office of the Corporation Counsel and the City Commission on Human Rights prior to commencement of the action (Administrative Code § 8-502 [c]). We note, however, that plaintiff, if she has not already done so, should serve such notice on both entities within 30 days or risk future dismissal of her cause of action for punitive damages (see, Kim v. Dial Serv. Intl., 1997 U.S. Dist LEXIS 66, *19-22 [S.D.N.Y., Aug. 11, 1997, Cote, J.]).
Finally, the motion court should have dismissed International Covenant House as a party, defendant Covenant House having submitted sufficient proof that such an entity does not and never has existed, and that Covenant House has never been a "d/b/a" for another entity, and we modify accordingly.
Concur — Milonas, J. P., Wallach, Williams, Tom and Mazzarelli, JJ.