Opinion
February 16, 1984.
Unemployment compensation — Wilful misconduct — Personal motives of employer.
1. The personal motives of an employer are not relevant in an unemployment compensation proceeding when the acts committed by the employes resulting in discharge admittedly constituted wilful misconduct and were not protected by any labor statute. [321]
Submitted on briefs May 12, 1983, to Judges BLATT, MacPHAIL and BARBIERI, sitting as a panel of three.
Appeals, Nos. 25 C.D. 1982 and 26 C.D. 1982, from the Orders of the Unemployment Compensation Board of Review in cases of In re: Claim of Leroy Wallace, Jr., No. B-201744, and Claim of James Carter, No. B-201745.
Applications to the Office of Employment Security for unemployment compensation benefits. Benefits awarded. Employer appealed. Referee denied benefits. Applicants appealed to the Unemployment Compensation Board of Review. Denials affirmed. Applicants filed requests for reconsideration. Requests denied. Applicants appealed to the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania. Held: Affirmed.
Harold I. Goodman, for petitioners.
James K. Bradley, Associate Counsel, with him Richard L. Cole, Jr., Chief Counsel, for respondent.
The present case involves the consolidated appeals of two claimants, Leroy Wallace, Jr., and James Carter, who appeal from orders of the Unemployment Compensation Board of Review (Board), denying them benefits for willful misconduct under Section 402(e) of the Unemployment Compensation Law (Law). We affirm.
Act of December 5, 1936, Second Ex. Sess., P.L. (1937) 2897, as amended, 43 P. S. § 802(e).
The claimants, Leroy Wallace, Jr., and James Carter, were employed by Transamerican Office Furniture as a truck driver and a truck driver helper respectively, until July 21, 1981, when, after confronting their supervisor about salary and job security, they were discharged for directing abusive and profane language at their supervisor. Prior to this incident, both claimants had violated rules and regulations of the employer. Specifically, Mr. Wallace had been cited for being tardy, for consuming alcohol on the job, and for leaving his work prior to departure time. Similarly, Mr. Carter had walked off his job on two occasions without first receiving permission to do so. Each of the claimants had received either warnings or suspensions for some but not all of their violations.
Both claimants applied for unemployment benefits, which were granted by the Office of Employment Security (OES). The employer then appealed these decisions, and a referee, after conducting a consolidated hearing on September 15, 1981, reversed the OES, finding that the claimants had been dismissed for willful misconduct. At the September 15th hearing, the referee refused to allow the claimants to introduce testimony regarding charges they filed with the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) in which they alleged that their employer had discharged them in violation of the National Labor Relations Act (Act). The NLRB subsequently issued a complaint against the employer on September 16, 1981, based upon the claimants' allegations. The claimants appealed to the Board, which on December 3, 1981, affirmed the referee's decisions. The appeal is now to this Court.
The claimants do not contend in their appeal to this Court that their conduct did not constitute willful misconduct, but rather argue that their cases should be remanded to the Board so that the Board can reconsider its decisions in light of their employer's union bias, as evidenced by the claimants' charges and the action taken by the NLRB. Essentially, the claimants are asking this Court what effect, if any, should their employer's personal motives have where the complained of conduct admittedly constitutes willful misconduct. We believe that this argument was raised and rejected by this Court in Placid v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 58 Pa. Commw. 250, 427 A.2d 748 (1981), where the petitioner in that case contended, in light of admitted misconduct, that his employer's personal motives were the real cause of his discharge. In dismissing the petitioner's argument in Placid, this Court held that where conduct is sufficient in itself to warrant discharge, a denial of benefits would be upheld irrespective of any "personal motives" on the part of the employer.
We also note that the claimant's reliance upon Frei v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 5 Pa. Commw. 190, 289 A.2d 769 (1972), is misplaced. In Frei, the issue was whether employees who refused to cross a picket line could be discharged for willful misconduct, in light of their existing employment contract, and a NLRB ruling that their conduct did not warrant discharge. What distinguishes Frei, is that the complained of conduct in the present case, as in Placid, is clearly conduct which is not protected by any labor Act.
Accordingly, the orders of the Board denying benefits to the claimants are hereby affirmed.
ORDER IN 25 C.D. 1982
Now, this 16th day of February, 1984, the order of the Unemployment Compensation Board of Review at Decision No. B-201744, dated December 3, 1981, is affirmed.
ORDER IN 26 C.D. 1982
Now, this 16th day of February, 1984, the order of the Unemployment Compensation Board of Review at Decision No. B-201745, dated December 3, 1981, is affirmed.