Summary
denying bifurcation because duplication of witnesses, documents, and facts results in a more costly proceeding and would not be conducive to judicial economy
Summary of this case from Moyer v. Am. Zurich Ins. Co.Opinion
C.A. No. 04C-03-311.
Submitted: December 21, 2006.
Decided: March 22, 2007.
Upon Defendant's Motion to Bifurcate — DENIED.
Norman H. Brooks, Jr., Esq., Marks, O'Neill, O'Brien Courtney, Wilmington, DE.
W. Christopher Componovo Esq., Wilmington, DE
Dear Counsel:
Before the Court is the motion of Defendant, Keystone Insurance Group ("K eystone), to bifurcate the liability and damages portions of this matter. Because bifurcation of the liability and damages issues is not conducive to the expedition of the trial in this matter, nor will it advance the economy of the Court, Keystone's motion is DENIED.
FACTS/PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On December 6, 1999, Plaintiff, Nora Wallace, was involved in an automobile accident with Thelma Behr. At the time of the accident, Wallace was operating her vehicle on Boxwood Road, Wilmington, Delaware. Wallace crossed the westbound lane of Boxwood Road from a parking lot, and was attempting to turn left onto the eastbound lane of Boxwood Road. At the same time, Behr, who turned right onto westbound Boxwood Road from Maryland Avenue, struck Wallace's vehicle in the rear driver's side door. Wallace alleges that Behr caused the accident, because, inter alia, Behr failed to yield the right of way in violation of 21 Del. C. § 4131.
Behr's liability carrier tendered the $15,000 policy limits to plaintiffs. On March 26, 2004, plaintiffs initiated the present lawsuit against Keystone to pursue claims under their underinsurance ("UIM") policy. Wallace asserted claims for her personal injuries, and her husband, Edwin S. Wallace, made a claim for loss of a consortium. Arbitration was held in this matter on March 16, 2005. The arbitrator awarded plaintiffs $100,000, less 25% for Nora Wallace's comparative negligence and amount recovered from the tortfeasor, Behr, for a net total of $60,000. On March 31, 2005, Keystone file d a timely dem and for trial de novo.
Trial in this matter was scheduled to commence on Septem ber 18, 200 6. Prior to trial, however, plaintiffs moved for a continuance because Nora Wallace was scheduled to undergo surgery. Plaintiffs requested a new trial date that was approximately one year from the surgery, so Wallace's treating physician could opine about her permanent injuries. On September 7, 2006, the Court granted plaintiffs' motion, and rescheduled the trial to begin on Dece mber 1 7, 2007 . Keystone then brought the present motion for bifu rcation. Keystone petitions the Court to bifurcate the liability and damage portions of the case, and proceed with the liability portion of the case before the December 2007 trial date.
DISCUSSION
Under Superior Court Civil Rule 42(b), the Court has the discretion to bifurcate a matter to "avoid prejudice, or when separate trials will be conducive to expedition and econo my." Courts have held that negligence actions should not be routinely bifurcated. The decision to divide a negligence action into separate trials of liability and damages "should be carefully considered and sparingly granted." A motion for bifurcation will be denied if doing so will cause duplication of witnesses, documents and facts, because "[s]uch a result requires double expense and would not be conducive to the expedition of the trial and economy."Bifurcation may be appropriate, however, in certain situations, such as in multi-party litigation in which plaintiffs have a common issue of liability, but different damages. Similarly, separate trials may be ordered if the damages issue is complex and will require numerous experts, or when "the issues are sufficiently distinct and separable that the separation will not cause confusion and uncertainty."
Randolph, 338 A.2d at 137 ( citing Weinste in, Routine Bifurcatio n of Jury N egligenc e Trials: An Exam ple of the Questionable Use of Rule Making Power, 14 Vand. L. Rev. 831, 840 (1961)). See also In Re Asbestos Litigation, 1987 WL 1 0277, *1 (Del.Super.).
Id. ( citing Bvoci k v. The F irestone T ir e a Rubber Co., 277 F. Supp. 201 (D.C. W is. 1967)).
In Re Asbestos Litigation, 1987 WL 1 0277, at *2 (citation omitted).
In this case, Keystone argues that bifurcation of the liability and damage portions of the case is necessary, because the case has languished for seven years. Keystone claims that both parties will be nefit by putting testimony on the record "sooner rather than later," noting that plaintiffs' liability witnesses include an elderly eyewitness. Moreover, Keystone claims that the damages evidence will be voluminous, because there will be testimony related not only to Nora Wallace's accident-related injuries, but also to an alleged pre-existing condition.
Keystone also indicates that liability is a significant issue, noting that the arbitrator determined plaintiff s were 50% neglige nt. This claim, however, is overstated. The arbitrator itemized the awards for Nora Wallace's personal injuries and Edwin Wallace's consortium claim and reduced each by 25%, the amount that the arbitrator determined to be Nora Wallace's comparative negligence. The arbitrator's award should not be construed to indicate that Nora Wallace's comparative negligence was 50%.
Plaintiffs refute Keystone's claim that the testimony of the elderly eyewitness must be put on the record as soon as possible, noting that her testimony has been preserved in a deposition. Plaintiffs also argue that the damages portion of the case is not as complex or voluminous as Keystone claims. Plaintiffs estimate that both parties will present a total of five witnesses during the damages phase of the case. In addition to plaintiffs' testimony, plaintiffs intend to present the testimon y of one exp ert witness, an d Keystone will present the testimony of two medical experts.
Trial in this matter is presently scheduled to begin on December 17, 2007. Bifurcation of the liability and damages portions of the case at this point would not be conducive to the expedition of the trial and economy of the Court. This matter appears to be a routine negligence matter with straightforward issues of liability and damages. The Court does not find any special circu msta nces that would warrant bifurcation. Therefore, Keystone's motion for bifurcation is DENIED.
CONCLUSION
For the aforementioned reasons, the Motion to Bifurcate of Defendant, Keystone Insurance Group, DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.