Opinion
C. A. 9:23-05126-RMG-MHC
01-29-2024
Kaiwan Shawn Wallace, Petitioner, v. Quandara Grant, Director of the Beaufort County Detention Center, Respondent.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Molly H. Cherry United States Magistrate Judge
Kaiwan Shawn Wallace, a pro se pretrial detainee, seeks habeas corpus relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2) (D.S.C.), pretrial proceedings in this action have been referred to the assigned United States Magistrate Judge.
In the Court's Proper Form Order dated November 29, 2023, Petitioner was given the opportunity to bring his case into proper form by providing the item specified in the Proper Form Order. He was also advised of pleading deficiencies and given an opportunity to file an amended petition. See ECF No. 4. Petitioner has not provided the proper form document and has not filed an amended petition.
I. BACKGROUND
Petitioner, a pretrial detainee at the Beaufort County Detention Center, appears to be challenging a pending state criminal charge. In the caption of his Petition, he lists case number 2021A0710400250. ECF No. 1 at 1. Records from Beaufort County indicate that Petitioner has a pending criminal charge (case number 2021A7104000250) for burglary first degree. He also has a pending charge (case number 2021A0710400247) for use of a vehicle without permission for temporary purpose only, unconnected to other crime, which Petitioner does not appear to challenge in this Petition. See Beaufort County Public Index, https://publicindex.sccourts.org/Beaufort/Pub licIndex/PISearch.aspx [search by the case numbers listed above] (last visited Jan. 23, 2024).
A federal court may take judicial notice of the contents of its own records, as well as those records of other courts. See Aloe Creme Labs., Inc. v. Francine Co., 425 F.2d 1295, 1296 (5th Cir. 1970); Colonial Penn Ins. Co. v. Coil, 887 F.2d 1236, 1239 (4th Cir. 1989) (noting that courts may take judicial notice of other courts' records and proceedings).
Petitioner states that his first ground for relief is “OR/Paid.” He states that his second ground for relief is “[f]or seeking the order to an answer cross claim. A third-party-complaint.” ECF No. 1 at 6 (errors in original). As relief, he requests “[a] stipulation of dismissal signed by all parties.” Id. at 7.
Petitioner asserts that the supporting facts are that he “paid for mortgage foreclose a new car house real estate[.]” ECF No. 1 at 6 (errors in original).
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
A pro se habeas petition is reviewed pursuant to the procedural provisions of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Proceedings in the United States District Court, 28 U.S.C. § 2254; the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) of 1996; and in light of the following precedents: Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25 (1992); Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324-25 (1989); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972); and Todd v. Baskerville, 712 F.2d 70 (4th Cir.1983). The Court is charged with screening Petitioner's lawsuit to determine “[i]f it plainly appears from the petition and any attached exhibits that the petitioner is not entitled to relief in the district court[.]” Rule 4 of Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts.
The Rules Governing Section 2254 are applicable to habeas actions brought under § 2241. See Rule 1(b) Rules Governing § 2254 Cases 28 U.S.C.A. foll. § 2254.
Pro se petitions are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by attorneys, and a court is charged with liberally construing a petition filed by a pro se litigant to allow the development of a potentially meritorious case. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). However, the requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the court can ignore a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts which set forth a claim cognizable in a federal district court. See Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387 (4th Cir. 1990); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 684 (2009) (outlining pleading requirements under Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for “all civil actions”).
III. DISCUSSION
A. Abstention/Failure to State a Claim
Ordinarily, federal habeas corpus relief for a state prisoner is only available postconviction. However, pretrial petitions for habeas corpus may be brought under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, “which applies to persons in custody regardless of whether final judgment has been rendered and regardless of the present status of the case pending against him.” United States v. Tootle, 65 F.3d 381, 383 (4th Cir. 1995) (quoting Dickerson v. Louisiana, 816 F.2d 220, 224 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 956 (1987)). Generally, however, “‘[a]n attempt to dismiss an indictment or otherwise prevent a prosecution'” is not attainable through federal habeas corpus. Dickerson, 816 F.2d at 226 (quoting Brown v. Estelle, 530 F.2d 1280, 1283 (5th Cir. 1976)).
To the extent that Petitioner is attempting to challenge his pending burglary first charge (or another pending criminal charge), his Petition is subject to dismissal on abstention grounds. In Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), the United States Supreme Court held that a federal court should not equitably interfere with state criminal proceedings “except in the most narrow and extraordinary of circumstances.” Gilliam v. Foster, 75 F.3d 881, 903 (4th Cir. 1996). Specifically, the Younger Court noted that courts of equity should not act unless the moving party has no adequate remedy at law and will suffer irreparable injury if denied equitable relief. Younger, 401 U.S. at 43-44. From Younger and its progeny, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has culled the following test to determine when abstention is appropriate: “(1) there are ongoing state judicial proceedings; (2) the proceedings implicate important state interests; and (3) there is an adequate opportunity to raise federal claims in the state proceedings.” Martin Marietta Corp. v. Md. Comm'n on Human Relations, 38 F.3d 1392, 1396 (4th Cir. 1994) (citing Middlesex Cnty. Ethics Comm'n v. Garden State Bar Ass'n, 457 U.S. 423, 432 (1982)).
Petitioner is currently detained and awaiting trial on a pending state criminal charge or charges, thus satisfying the first prong of the abstention test. See Boyd v. South Carolina, No. 1:11-cv-02981-TMC-SVH, 2012 WL 786341, at *2 (D.S.C. Feb. 10, 2012), report and recommendation adopted, 2012 WL 786356 (D.S.C. Mar. 9, 2012) (noting the first prong of the abstention test is satisfied where the petitioner “is currently awaiting trial in an ongoing state criminal proceeding”). The second criterion has been addressed by the Supreme Court's holding that “the States' interest in administering their criminal justice systems free from federal interference is one of the most powerful of the considerations that should influence a court considering equitable types of relief.” Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 36, 49 (1986). In addressing the third criterion, the Supreme Court has noted that “ordinarily a pending state prosecution provides the accused a fair and sufficient opportunity for vindication of federal constitutional rights.” Kugler v. Helfant, 421 U.S. 117, 124 (1975).
Therefore, this case meets all criteria for abstention under Younger, and federal habeas relief is available under § 2241 only if “special circumstances” justify the provision of federal review. Dickerson, 816 F.2d at 224-226 ; see also Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court, 410 U.S. 484, 489-90 (1973). While “special circumstances” lacks any precise, technical meaning, courts have essentially looked to whether procedures exist which would protect a petitioner's constitutional rights without pre-trial intervention; thus, where a threat to the petitioner's rights may be remedied by an assertion of an appropriate defense in state court, no special circumstance is shown. Moore v. DeYoung, 515 F.2d 437, 449 (3d Cir. 1975); cf. Drayton v. Hayes, 589 F.2d 117, 121 (2d Cir. 1979) (double jeopardy claim entitled to pretrial habeas intervention because the “very constitutional right claimed ... would be violated” if petitioner were forced to go to trial). Further, where the right may be adequately preserved by orderly post-trial relief, special circumstances are likewise nonexistent. Moore, 515 F.2d at 449. In Moore, the court concluded that the federal court should abstain from considering a speedy trial claim at the pretrial stage because the claim could be raised at trial and on direct appeal. Id.; see generally United States v. MacDonald, 435 U.S. 850 (1978); Dickerson, 816 F.2d at 226-227.
In the present action, Petitioner may raise claims related to his pending criminal charge or charges in state court. Petitioner does not allege any extraordinary circumstances to show that pretrial intervention would be appropriate. As Petitioner can pursue his claims in state court both during and after trial, he fails to demonstrate “special circumstances,” or to show that he has no adequate remedy at law and will suffer irreparable injury if denied his requested relief. See Younger, 401 U.S. at 43-44. Petitioner is therefore precluded from federal habeas relief at this time, and his Petition is subject to summary dismissal.
Even if the Petition is not subject to summary dismissal on abstention grounds, it is subject to dismissal for Petitioner's failure to state a cognizable claim for relief under § 2241. Petitioner has not stated any grounds to support a claim that he is being held in violation of the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States. A federal court may review this habeas petition on the grounds that the challenged confinement is in violation of the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States. See 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3); see also 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a).
B. Failure to Bring Case Into Proper Form
Additionally, Petitioner has failed to bring this case into proper form. In the Court's Form Order, Petitioner was given the opportunity to bring his case into proper form by payi five-dollar filing fee for a habeas corpus action or completing and returning a completed and Form AO-240 (application to proceed in forma pauperis). Petitioner was specifically warn his failure to provide the necessary item within the timetable set forth in the Order would s the case to dismissal. See ECF No. 4.
The deadline for Petitioner to get his case into proper form has passed, and Petition not provided the proper form item or contacted the Court in any way about this case. Thus, alternative, it is recommended that this action be dismissed in accordance with Fed. R. Civ. See Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 626 (1962); Ballard v. Carlson, 882 F.2d 93, 95-9 Cir. 1989) (holding that district court's dismissal following an explicit and reasonable w was not an abuse of discretion).
IV. RECOMMENDATION
Accordingly, it is RECOMMENDED that the Petition in this action be DISMI without prejudice and without requiring Respondent to file a return.
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must ‘only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
Post Office Box 835
Charleston, South Carolina 29402
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).