Opinion
Case No. C-2-01-332
December 4, 2002
OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Christine Wallace seeks compensatory and punitive damages from defendants for injuries allegedly sustained when plaintiff was arrested and detained on March 13, 1999. Plaintiff asserts federal claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 contending that defendants violated her Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Plaintiff also asserts state Zaw claims of intentional infliction of emotional distress, interference with her civil rights in violation of O.R.C. § 2921.45, and failure to meaningfully investigate, discipline, supervise or train the individual defendants.
Defendants are: City of Columbus, Chief James Jackson, Officer Donovan Kane, Officer Frank Nichols (in his official capacity only), Franklin County, Ohio, and Franklin County Sheriff James Karnes.
Defendants, the City of Columbus and Franklin County, each separately move the Court for summary judgment. For the following reasons, the Court GRANTS defendants' motion as to all of plaintiffs' federal and state law claims against them.
I. FACTS
On the night of Saturday, March 13, 1999, the plaintiff, Christine Wallace, decided to go for a drive. The plaintiff and her passenger, Terry Carter, had been drinking. Wallace was driving north on 4th Street and at approximately 11:21 pm, when she was pulled over by Officer Kane and Officer Nichols. Officer Kane observed open alcohol containers under the driver's seat of Wallace's car and also an open beer bottle between Carter's legs on the passenger side. Plaintiff was arrested for DUE, speed, no taillights, and resisting arrest. (Wallace Dep. 30-32; see also Division of Police slate # 7805).
Officer Kane and Officer Nichols then transported plaintiff to the Columbus Police Department Headquarters where she was asked to take a breathalyzer test. Plaintiff initially agreed to submit to the test but later she refused to do so. Plaintiff then requested to call her attorney and in response to her request she says Officer Nichols threw a telephone and phone book at her. Plaintiff was unable to reach her attorney. At this time, Officer Nichols apparently said, "All right. Let's go," which prompted plaintiff to stand. According to plaintiff, Officer Nichols said, "Not you" and "Hands up in the Air" and he pushed her and handcuffed her. Plaintiff then alleges that Officer Nichols sprayed her face with mace from point-blank range which caused plaintiff to suffer immediate blindness and have difficulty breathing. Plaintiff claims that Officer Kane was also in the room while she was maced but she admits that it appeared that Officer Kane did not know that Officer Nichols was going to employ mace. (Wallace Dep. 52-53).
While Nichols appears to be the only officer who sprayed mace on plaintiff, the Court only has jurisdiction over Officer Nichols in his official capacity only. Plaintiff was unable to obtain personal service on Officer Nichols, therefore her claims against Officer Nichols in his individual capacity were dismissed.
After she was maced, plaintiff claims that she was left in the interrogation room while Officer Nichols and Officer Kane, as well as other police personnel, laughed among themselves in the hallway. Plaintiff was then transported to the Franklin County Correctional Facility and held until her arraignment on Monday, March 15, 1999. Upon arrival at the Franklin County facility, plaintiff was slated, which included an initial medical and mental health screening by a nurse. The nurse noted that plaintiff had been maced and that she was under the influence of alcohol, but ultimately determined that she should be placed with the general population. (Initial Medical Screening Report). Plaintiff alleges that she repeatedly attempted to obtain medical assistance while being held in jail but did not receive any attention until Sunday afternoon, more than 36 hours after plaintiff was maced. Plaintiff claims that two women merely wiped her face with cotton balls saturated with saline solution. (Wallace Dep. 77).
After arraignment, plaintiff was released from jail and she immediately went to Riverside Hospital Emergency Room for treatment for the chemical burns on her face. Plaintiff then sought treatment from a dermatologist. Plaintiff states that the effects of the chemical burns from the macing continue to date. She claims her face is scarred and although the treatments have diminished the severity of her condition, her face periodically erupts in an acne-like condition. Plaintiff claims that prior to being maced, her facial complexion was unblemished. (Wallace Aff. ¶ 2). In addition to the reoccurring acne problems, plaintiff says she has been severely traumatized by the incident and has experienced nightmares and anxiety attacks and is currently under a doctor's care for trauma. (Wallace Dep. 90, 156-170). Plaintiff seeks compensation for the emotional distress, physical pain, disfigurement and eye injuries which she sustained as a result of the events described above.
II. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c) provides the mechanism for deciding cases on summary judgment. It provides:
The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). The evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See Adickes v. Kress Co., 398 U.S. 144, 158-59 (1970). Summary judgment will not lie if the dispute about a material fact is genuine; "that is, if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). Summary judgment is appropriate, however, if the opposing party fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986); see also Matsushita Elec. Indus Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986).
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals has recognized that Liberty Lobby, Celotex, and Matsushita have effected "a decided change in summary judgment practice," ushering in a "new era" in summary judgments. Street v. J.C. Bradford Co., 886 F.2d 1472, 1476 (6th Cir. 1989). The Street court determined that complex cases and cases involving state of mind issues are not necessarily inappropriate for summary judgment. Id. at 1479. Also, in responding to a summary judgment motion, the nonmoving party "cannot rely on the hope that the trier of fact will disbelieve the movant's denial of a disputed fact, but must `present affirmative evidence in order to defeat a properly supported motion for summary judgment.'" Id. (quoting Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 257). The nonmoving party must adduce more than a scintilla of evidence to overcome the summary judgment motion. Id. It is not sufficient for the nonmoving party to merely "show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Id. (quoting Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586).
Moreover, "[t]he trial court no longer has a duty to search the entire record to establish that it is bereft of a genuine issue of material fact." Id. That is, the "nonmoving party has an affirmative duty to direct the court's attention to those specific portions of the record upon which it seeks to rely to create a genuine issue of material fact." In re Morris, 260 F.3d 654, 665 (6th Cir. 2001).
III. DISCUSSION
Plaintiff asserts that defendants deprived her of her 4th, 5th, 8th and 14th Amendment rights by administering mace on her and denying her medical treatment. Defendants argue that they are entitled to summary judgment on all of plaintiffs federal and state law claims. Plaintiffs claims against each defendant are discussed below.
A Federal Claims
1. City of Columbus and Franklin County
Defendants City and County first argue that they are entitled to summary judgment on plaintiffs' 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims against them, as well as the individually named defendants in their official capacities, because the City and County do not have any unconstitutional policies or customs that are causally linked to plaintiffs claims. To maintain a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, plaintiff's complaint must allege that the defendant, acting under the color of state law, deprived the plaintiff of some right, privilege, or immunity secured by the United States Constitution or by federal law. Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 640 (1980).
Claims against a government officer in his or her official capacity are deemed claims against the government entity. Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165-66 (1985).
In Monnell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978), the Court held that municipalities and other local government units can be sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. A municipality, however, cannot be held liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on a respondeat superior theory. Id. at 691. Thus, municipal liability attaches only when "execution of a government's policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy, inflicts the injury." Id. at 694. The City of Columbus and Franklin County therefore cannot be held liable simply as an employer of the officers in this case but must instead have caused the constitutional violations asserted by plaintiff through the execution of a governmental policy or custom. Id.
Defendants maintain that no underlying constitutional violations occurred in this case thus there cannot be municipal liability. However, if any of plaintiffs claims of constitutional violations survive summary judgment, then defendants argue that there is no evidence of a City or County policy or custom which can be considered to be deliberately indifferent to plaintiff's rights nor is there such a policy or custom that led directly to plaintiffs claimed deprivations. In addition, defendants City and County assert that they are immune from liability as to plaintiffs claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
The Sixth Circuit has stated that to satisfy the Monell requirements and maintain a suit against a local governmental entity, a plaintiff must "identify the policy, connect the policy to the city itself and show that the particular injury was incurred because of the execution of that policy." Coogan v. City of Wixom, 820 F.2d 170, 176 (6th Cir. 1987). Plaintiff argues that the constitutional violations alleged in this case were caused by the following City of Columbus policies: 1) the City's policy of encouraging uses of mace by its police officers by treating uses of mace as non-uses of force for purposes of investigation, record-keeping, and discipline; 2) the Division of Police's chain-of-command policy of investigating and dispensing police officer discipline; and 3) the City's policy that complaints against Columbus Police Officers will be ruled "not sustained" if the accused officer contradicts the complainant's description of the events in question. (Pls' Mem. Opp'n Summ. J. at 10-12).
Plaintiff has alleged three City policies that she claims are the cause of her injuries, yet the City of Columbus can only be found liable for a § 1983 claim where it policies are "the moving force behind the constitutional violation." Monell, 436 U.S. at 694. There must be a nexus between the alleged deprivation and the municipality's action. Board of County Comm'rs of Bryan County v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 403-04 (1997). Plaintiff has merely made assertions regarding the aforementioned City of Columbus policies but has failed to offer any evidence as to the existence of these policies, nor how they have caused her any harm. Plaintiff seems to be arguing that the City of Columbus' policies discussed above led to the use of excessive force by its officers. However, even it' one of the officers is found to have used excessive force against plaintiff, the City cannot be held liable for that use of excessive force by one of its officers in the absence of some policy or custom which resulted in the excessive use of force. Plaintiff fails to offer any proof that her injuries were the result of an unconstitutional policy or custom of the City of Columbus. Therefore defendant City's motion for summary judgment is granted as to plaintiffs § 1983 claims.
The Court will next address plaintiffs claims against Franklin County and Franklin County Sheriff, James Karnes. Plaintiff asserts that she was denied medical care by defendant County giving rise to a violation of her Fourteenth Amendment due process rights. In addition, plaintiff argues that a supervisory official can be held personally liable when he/she was grossly negligent in managing subordinates who caused the violation. Williams v. Smith, 781 F.2d 319, 324 (2d Cir. 1986). However, as discussed above, liability may not be imposed against a local governmental entity for respondeat superior or vicarious liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Monell, 436 U.S. at 694.
Plaintiff relies on Westlake v. Lucas, 537 F.2d 857 (6th Cir. 1976), in support of her claim that the denial of medical care can give rise to a violation of Fourteenth Amendment due process. In Westlake, the District Court's order dismissing the case upon defendants' motion to dismiss was reversed and remanded allowing appellant the opportunity to prove the truth of his allegations that he sustained injuries as a result of deprivation of medical attention. Id. at 861. While the Westlake Court acknowledges that fundamental fairness and due process mandate that medical care be provided to people who are incarcerated and may be suffering from serious illness or injury, the court recognizes that "not every request for medical attention must be heeded." Id. at 860.
Plaintiff briefly asserts that defendant denied her medical care and in turn violated her Fourteenth Amendment due process rights, but fails to provide any evidentiary support for her assertions. Allegations of denial of medical treatment based on a delay in treatment are to be gauged by examining the effect of the delay in treatment, which is to say that an "inmate who complains that delay in medical treatment rose to a constitutional violation must place verifying medical evidence in the record to establish the detrimental effect of the delay in medical treatment to succeed." Napier v. Madison County, 238 F.3d 739 (6th Cir. 2001). Plaintiff has provided the Court with pictures and her dermatologist's report, but has failed to establish with any other medical evidence how the delay in medical treatment rose to a constitutional violation. Therefore, defendants Franklin County and Sheriff Karnes are entitled to summary judgment on plaintiffs claims against them.
Finally, plaintiff asserts that defendants City and County failed to meaningfully investigate, discipline, supervise or train individual defendants and should therefore be held liable. "There are limited circumstances in which an allegation of `failure to train' can be the basis for liability under § 1983." City of Canton. Ohio v. Hauls, 489 U.S. 378, 387 (1989). To succeed on a failure to train claim, the plaintiffs must establish that the City or County acted with "deliberate indifference" to the rights of persons with whom the police came into contact. Id. at 388-389. Plaintiffs have not offered any specific evidence to prove the City acted with "deliberate indifference" to their rights and the evidence in the record does not support such an inference. It also appears from plaintiff's memorandum in Opposition to defendants' motion for summary judgment that she has abandoned this assertion. Therefore, defendants' motion for summary judgment as to the plaintiffs' claim that the City and County failed to adequately train the individual defendants is granted.
2. Individual Defendants
Plaintiff also asserts § 1983 claims against the individual Columbus police officers Kane and Nichols, as well as Police Chief James Jackson. Plaintiff alleges that her constitutional rights were violated when defendant Officer Nichols used excessive force when he maced her, and defendant Officer Kane was deliberately indifferent to plaintiff's suffering as a result of the macing. Plaintiff additionally asserts that defendant Chief James Jackson is personally liable under § 1983 as a supervisory official because he allowed for the continuance of the policy of treating uses of mace as "non-uses" of force. In a suit for damages against a police officer under § 1983. a plaintiff must show that an officer's actions are unconstitutional and that the officer should have known that he was violating plaintiff's rights. Stealer v. City of Florence, 126 F.3d 856, 866 (6th Cir. 1997).
Defendants argue that they did not violate plaintiffs constitutional rights when acting in their official capacities and/or are entitled to qualified immunity on all claims. Defendants additionally assert that they did not violated plaintiffs rights when acting in their individual capacities. Each individual defendant's conduct will be analyzed below.
Defendant Chief James Jackson
The suit against Chief James Jackson in his official capacity is the equivalent of the suit against the City of Columbus and therefore defendant Chief Jackson is entitled to summary judgment as to plaintiffs claims again him in his official capacity. Chief Jackson was not named in this suit because he was involved in the events in question. He was merely named because he is the Chief of Police for the City of Columbus. Just like the City of Columbus, Chief Jackson cannot be held liable under a theory of respondeat superior. Additionally, Chief Jackson would be entitled to qualified immunity. Under the doctrine of qualified immunity, government officials performing discretionary functions are immune from suit unless the plaintiff shows the official violated "clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Conn v. Gabbert, 526 U.S. 286, 290 (1999) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). "The central purpose of affording public officials qualified immunity from suit is to protect them `from undue interference with their duties and from potentially disabling threats of liability.'" Elder v. Holloway, 510 U.S. 510, 514 (1994) (quoting Harlow, 457 U.S. at 806)). Plaintiff has failed to show that a reasonable official in Chief Jackson's position would have known that classifying the use of mace as a non-use of force violated a clearly established constitutional right.
Plaintiff also maintains that defendant Chief James Jackson, as a supervisory official for the City of Columbus, should be held personally liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for creating custom or policy fostering civil rights violations or allowing such customs or policies to continue. (Pls' Mem. Opp'n Summ. J. at 13-14). Plaintiff failed to provide evidence as to how (he City of Columbus policies have caused her injuries and in turn has failed to establish that Chief James Jackson has created such policies. Therefore, Chief James Jackson is entitled to summary judgment as to plaintiffs claims against him in his personal and official capacities.
Defendant Officer Nichols
Plaintiffs claims against Officer Nichols are based on his actions in his official capacity only. Plaintiff could not maintain claims against Officer Nichols in his individual capacity because she failed to obtain personal service on Officer Nichols. Defendants assert that because the City is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, Officer Nichols in his official capacity is also entitled to summary judgment. "An official capacity claim filed against a public employee is equivalent to a lawsuit directed against the public entity which that agent represents." Turner v. Scott, 119 F.3d 425 (6th Cir. 1997). Despite plaintiffs allegations that Officer Nichols is the one who actually sprayed the mace on her, she has failed to maintain any claims against him. Plaintiff did not respond to defendants' arguments in her Memorandum in Opposition, and in fact, does not address any claims against defendant Nichols at all. Therefore, Officer Nichols is entitled to summary judgment based on the same analysis applied with regard to the claims against the City of Columbus.
Defendant Officer Kane
Plaintiff alleges that defendant Officer Kane was on duty with defendant Officer Nichols and was acting under the color of state law during the incidents in question. Plaintiff further asserts that while defendant Kane had plaintiff in custody, he was "deliberately indifferent" to her suffering in violation of her constitutional rights. Where prison [or jail] officials are so deliberately indifferent to the serious medical needs of prisoners as to unnecessarily and wantonly inflict pain, they impose cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Napier v. Madison County, Ky., 238 F.3d 739, 742 (6th Cir. 2001). Similarly, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects pretrial detainees from such mistreatment. Plaintiff must satisfy both the objective and subjective components of the "deliberate indifference" standard to survive summary judgment on this claim. Id.
The objective component requires an inmate [or pretrial detainee] to show that the alleged deprivation is "sufficiently serious." As the Supreme Court explained in Farmer, "the inmate [or pretrial detainee] must show that he is incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm." Specifically, a pretrial detainee "who complains that delay in medical treatment rose to a constitutional violation must place verifying medical evidence in the record to establish the detrimental effect of the delay in medical treatment to succeed." Napier, 238 F.3d at 742. Plaintiff has failed to provide sufficient medical records to satisfy the objective component. Plaintiff has submitted her dermatologist's report to establish that she was treated for her skin condition after her arrest. However, there are no medical records or statements by treating physicians that the hours she was kept in custody before receiving any medical attention had any discernable "detrimental effect" on her skin condition. Hence, plaintiff has failed to present evidence that the delay in treatment caused her skin condition. As a result, plaintiff is unable to satisfy the objective component as a matter of law.
To satisfy the subjective component, an inmate must show that prison officials had "a sufficiently culpable state of mind." Napier, 238 F.3d at 742 (citing and quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994)). Plaintiff must therefore present sufficient evidence that defendants knew or should have known that her symptoms and injuries were so severe to require immediate medical attention. Defendants are laypersons, not physicians, so we must determine if "a layperson would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor's attention" under the circumstances presented in this case. Vaughn v. City of Lebanon, 18 Fed. Appx. 252, *273, 2001 WL 966279, *18 (6th Cir. (Tenn.)) (quofing Hill v. Dekalb Reg'l Youth Detention Ctr., 40 F.3d 1176, 1187 (11th Cir. 1994). The 6th Circuit acknowledged in Vaughn that almost all persons suffer an adverse reaction to pepper spray or mace, complicating this analysis. "Pepper spray is designed to cause intense pain, a burning sensation that causes mucus to come out of the nose, an involuntary closing of the eyes, a gagging reflex, and a temporary paralysis of the larynx." Vaughn, at *18 (quoting Headwaters Forest Defense v. County of Humboldt, 240 F.3d 1185, 1200 (9th Cir. 2001).
After plaintiff was sprayed with mace, she was immediately blinded and encountered great difficulty in breathing, however these are the intended reactions to the spray. (Wallace Dep. 51). The medical evidence submitted by plaintiff suggests she had an allergic reaction to the mace or an extraordinary effect. However, there is nothing in the record to establish that any of the defendants knew or should have known of her alleged unusual sensitivity. Without knowledge of plaintiffs idiosyncratic reaction to the spray, "mere use" of the spray or failure to seek immediate medical treatment was not a Due Process violation. Id. (quoting Young v. City of Mount Ranier, 238 F.3d 567, 576 (4th Cir. 2001). While plaintiff alleges she repeatedly attempted to obtain medical assistance, she did not attempt to do so while she was in the presence of Officer Kane. He is therefore entitled to summary judgment on plaintiffs claims against him.
Plaintiff also asserts in her complaint that defendant Kane violated her constitutional right not to be subjected to excessive force. Defendant Kane, however, argues that he did not violate plaintiffs constitutional rights because he did not use any force on plaintiff and therefore he is entitled to qualified immunity. The Court must apply a two-step test to determine whether qualified immunity protects a government official. Conn, 526 US. at 290; Buchanan v. City of Bolivar, 99 F.3d 1352, 1358 (6th Cir. 1996). The first step is to determine whether a violation of a clearly established constitutional right has occurred. Conn, at 290; Dickerson v. McClellan, 101 F.3d 1151, 1157 (6th Cir. 1996). If a constitutional violation is found, the second step is to determine whether an objectively reasonable public official in the circumstances would have recognized that his conduct violated a constitutional right that was clearly established at the time of the alleged police misconduct. Conn, at 290; Dickerson, at 1158; Buchanan, at 1358.
First the Court must evaluate the alleged constitutional violation of excessive force. In determining the "reasonableness" of the officer's use of force, courts must perform a "careful balancing of the `nature and intrusion on the individual's Fourth Amendment interests' against the countervailing governmental interests at stake." Id. (quoting Tennessee v. Gamer, 471 U.S. 1, 8 (1985)). "Reasonableness," in an excessive force case, is based on an objective standard, and thus, one must consider "whether the officers' actions are `objectively reasonable' in light of the facts and circumstances confronting them, without regard to their underlying intent or motivation." Graham, at 397. One must also consider the fact that police officers are often forced to make split-second decisions in situations that are often tense, uncertain, and quickly evolving. Id., at 397.
The officers' reasonableness must be judged "from the perspective of a reasonabie officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight." Id. at 396. The facts and circumstances of each case must be measured, paying careful attention to the following factors: (1) the severity of the crime at issue; (2) whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of officers or others; and (3) whether the suspect is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade by flight. Id.
As an additional matter, the qualified immunity inquiry has a further dimension:
The concern of the immunity inquiry is to acknowledge that reasonable mistakes can be made as to the legal constraints on particular police conduct. It is sometimes difficult for an officer to determine how the relevant legal doctrine, here excessive force, will apply to the factual situation the officer confronts. An officer might correctly perceive all of the relevant facts but have a mistaken understanding as to whether a particular amount of force is legal in those circumstances. If the officer's mistakes as to what the law requires is reasonable, however, the officer is entitled to the immunity defense.Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 205 (2001). Further, the Court held that "[i]f an officer reasonably, but mistakenly, believed that a suspect was likely to fight back, for instance, the officer would be justified in using more force than in fact was needed." Id.
In the case at bar, Officer Kane was present when Officer Nichols sprayed the mace on plaintiff. It is undisputed that Kane did not participate in any way in the use of mace. In fact, it is essentially undisputed that Kane did not use any force against plaintiff. Significantly, plaintiff admitted in her deposition that it did not appear to her that Officer Kane knew that Officer Nichols was going to employ the mace. (Wallace Dep. 52-53). Plaintiff has therefore failed to meet her burden in establishing a § 1983 claim of excessive force against defendant Officer Kane.
A final constitutional violation that must be evaluated is whether defendant Kane had a duty to intervene when defendant Nichols was administering the mace on plaintiff. A non-supervisory law enforcement officer present at a scene where other officers are violating a person's civil rights may have a duty to intervene. Bruner v. Dunaway, 684 F.2d 422, 426 (6th Cir. 1982) ("plaintiff was entitled to have his case against defendants submitted to the jury upon his having offered testimony that he was beaten by unknown officers in their presence"). However, there was no constitutional right of plaintiffs being violated for which defendant Kane had a duty to intervene and protect. Furthermore, the action by defendant Nichols of spraying the mace was brief and not continuous like the beatings in Bruner that defendant could have intervened and prevented. Therefore, plaintiff has failed to establish that defendant Kane violated her constitutional rights and he is entitled to qualified immunity.
B. State Law Claims
The Court has granted defendants' motion for summary judgment on all of plaintiff's federal claims. The Court therefore declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiffs state law claims. It is well settled that a District Court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims once it has dismissed all claims over which it possessed original jurisdiction. Saglioccolo v. Eagle Ins. Co., 112 F.3d 226, 233 (6th Cir. 1997). Indeed, the Sixth Circuit has recognized that if all federal claims are dismissed before trial, remaining state claims generally should be dismissed. Id.; Taylor v. First of Am. Bank-Wayne, 973 F.2d 1284, 1287 (6th Cir. 1992). Therefore, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) and (d), the Court will dismiss plaintiff's state law claims against all defendants without prejudice.
IV. CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, defendants' motion for summary judgment is hereby GRANTED. The Clerk shall enter a final judgment in this case in favor of defendants and against plaintiff, dismissing plaintiff's federal claims with prejudice and dismissing her state law claims without prejudice.
The Clerk shall remove Doc. 16 and Doc. 17 from the Court's pending motions list. The Clerk shall remove this case from the Court's pending cases list.