Opinion
C/A No. 5:20-01661-SAL-KDW
08-05-2020
Jordan Wall, Plaintiff, v. South Carolina Department of Corrections, Aaron Joyner, and Kenneth Sharp, Defendants.
Report and Recommendation
This case, filed by the Plaintiff pro se, was originally filed in the South Carolina Court of Commons Pleas in Lee County. The case number in state court was 2020-CP-31-00114. Defendants filed a Notice of Removal in this court on April 28, 2020, alleging that the state court Complaint contained federal claims that could have been filed in this court. ECF No. 1. This case is before the court for consideration of the propriety of the Notice of Removal and Plaintiff's Motion for Remand. ECF No. 15. Additionally, the following non-dispositive motions are currently pending: Defendants' Motion for a more definite statement, ECF No. 8; Plaintiff's Motion for production of Documents, ECF No. 13; and Plaintiff's Motion to Appoint Counsel, ECF No. 22. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), and District of South Carolina Local Civil Rule 73.02(B) (2)(e), the undersigned is authorized to review all pretrial matters in this pro se case and to submit findings and recommendations to the district judge.
In Plaintiff's Motion to Remand, he contends that no federal claims are intended under the state court Complaint, and that he pleaded only state-based claims. See ECF No. 15. Specifically, Plaintiff maintains he is making a claim for gross negligence pursuant to section 15-78-60(25) of the South Carolina Code. See id. Further, he represents that he only referenced a South Carolina constitutional provision, Art. 12 § 2, "and the only reason why this particular reference was made is to establish a duty of care that is owed to the plaintiff." Id. Additionally, Plaintiff represents that he not alleging a violation of the federal Constitution provisions or federal laws. Id. Plaintiff indicates that he made a scrivener's error in his prayer for relief which he wishes to correct. Id. Finally, Plaintiff maintains that his claims are state-law claims that should be heard by a state court, and he asks that this court remove the case back to the appropriate state court. Id. at 2.
Defendants filed a memorandum in opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Remand, ECF No. 18, and argue that their removal of this case to federal court was entirely appropriate because Plaintiff alleges that Defendants violated his civil and constitutional rights in his Complaint. Defendants specifically cite to Plaintiff's prayer for relief in making their argument to the court. See id. Defendants argue that Plaintiff's Complaint should not be remanded to state court because the federal court had original jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). See id. at 2-3.
The removing party bears the burden of establishing federal jurisdiction. See Strawn v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 530 F.3d 293, 297-98 (4th Cir. 2008). A defendant may remove a case only if the claim could have been brought in federal court on the basis of federal question jurisdiction or diversity jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b); Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987), and a certain amount is in controversy under 28 U.S.C. § 1332 or if there is so-called "federal question" jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. As the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals has explained, "courts should resolve all doubts about the propriety of removal in favor of retained state court jurisdiction." Hartley v. CSX Transp., Inc., 187 F.3d 422, 425 (4th Cir. 1999) (internal quotation and citation omitted). In light of the foregoing authority, Defendants bear a heavy burden of proving that this case falls within the court's removal jurisdiction. The Supreme Court has commanded that when considering removal jurisdiction, federal courts must "scrupulously confine their own jurisdiction to the precise limits which the statute has defined." Shamrock Oil & Gas Corp. v. Sheets, 313 U.S. 100, 109 (1941) (internal quotation and citations omitted).
Applicable case law and statutory law, including 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c), provides that subject-matter jurisdiction cannot be conferred by estoppel, waiver, or consent. See Buchner v. FDIC, 981 F.2d 816, 818 (5th Cir. 1993) ( "Although parties may waive their rights to remove a case or to contest the removal procedure, they may neither confer subject matter jurisdiction on the district court nor strip it of such jurisdiction by agreement or waiver."). As a result, a federal district court should remand the case to state court if the face of the initial pleadings makes it clear the court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) ("If at any time before final judgment it appears that the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the case shall be remanded."); see Ellenburg v. Spartan Motor Chassis, Inc., 519 F.3d 192, 196 (4th Cir. 2008) (noting the court's remand order for lack of subject-matter-jurisdiction can be entered at any time).
The court has reviewed Plaintiff's state court Complaint and notes it does include minimal allegations including terminology often associated with prison-related federal constitutional-violations claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ("willfully, recklessly, wantonly" and "denial of access to material property"). Additionally, Defendants are correct that Plaintiff references his constitutional rights throughout his Complaint and once refers to a violation of his rights "under the Constitution and laws of the United States." See ECF No. 1-1. However, Plaintiff specifically references the South Carolina Constitution throughout his Complaint and cites to sections 15-53-90, 15-77-100, and 15-78-60 of the South Carolina Code when establishing jurisdiction in the Complaint. See ECF No. 1-1. Moreover, as Plaintiff notes in his Motion to Remand, he inadvertently referenced the United States Constitution once in his prayer for Relief, and he wishes to correct said reference. Furthermore, Plaintiff is the master of his complaint, and removal jurisdiction is to be strictly limited. Pinney v. Nokia, Inc., 402 F.3d 430, 442 (4th Cir. 2005); see also Negron-Fuentes v. UPS Supply Chain Solutions, 532 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 2008); Addison v. Charleston Cnty. Pub. Defenders, 4:11-2936-CMC-JDA, 2011 WL 6937608, *2 (D.S.C. Dec. 08, 2011).
Plaintiff's attempts to limit his state-court claims to those arising under state law, and his specific claim that only state claims are intended, combined with his one-time passing reference to "United States Constitutional Rights," ECF No. 1-1, convince the court that it is without federal subject matter jurisdiction over this case. In reaching this conclusion, the court notes the similarities between the contents of the first article of the South Carolina Constitution entitled "Declaration of Rights" and the "Bill of Rights" to the United States Constitution.
Recommendation
For the foregoing reasons, it is recommended that Plaintiff's Motion to Remand, ECF No. 15, be granted and this matter be remanded to the Court of Common Pleas for Lee County without prejudice to Defendants' rights to file responses to any of Plaintiff's filings in the state court. Based on this recommendation, the other outstanding motions in this matter are denied as moot. See ECF Nos. 8, 13, 22. As this is a recommendation, the Office of the Clerk of Court shall not immediately certify this Order to the Court of Common Pleas for Lee County. If both parties in this case fail to file written objections to this Report and Recommendation within 14 days after this document is filed, or, if either party files written objections to this Report and Recommendation within 14 days after this document is filed, the Office of the Clerk of Court, at the end of the 14-day period, shall forward the case file and any objections to a United States District Judge for a final disposition.
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED. August 5, 2020
Florence, South Carolina
/s/
Kaymani D. West
United States Magistrate Judge