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Walker v. State, Department of Corrections

United States District Court, D. Connecticut
Mar 15, 2006
Prisoner Case No. 3:06CV165 (SRU) (D. Conn. Mar. 15, 2006)

Summary

dismissing action against CMHC under section 1983 because CMHC is not a "person" within the meaning of the statute

Summary of this case from Payton v. Conn. Dep't of Corr.

Opinion

Prisoner Case No. 3:06CV165 (SRU).

March 15, 2006


RULING AND ORDER


The plaintiff, Darnell L. Walker ("Walker"), an inmate currently confined at the Northern Correctional Institution in Somers, Connecticut, brings this civil rights action pro se and in forma pauperis pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915. Walker challenges his medical treatment for rectal bleeding. Although he references two doctors in the description of his claims, he names as defendants only the State of Connecticut, the Department of Corrections, Northern Correctional Institution and Correctional Health Services. For the reasons that follow, the complaint is dismissed without prejudice.

I. Standard of Review

Walker has met the requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) and has been granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis in this action. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), "the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that . . . the action . . . is frivolous or malicious; . . . fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or . . . seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief." 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-(iii). Thus, the dismissal of a complaint by a district court under any of the three enumerated sections in 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) is mandatory rather than discretionary.See Cruz v. Gomez, 202 F.3d 593, 596 (2d Cir. 2000).

"When an in forma pauperis plaintiff raises a cognizable claim, his complaint may not be dismissed sua sponte for frivolousness under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) even if the complaint fails to `flesh out all the required details.'" Livingston v. Adirondack Beverage Co., 141 F.3d 434, 437 (2d Cir. 1998) (quoting Benitez, 907 F.2d at 1295).

An action is "frivolous" when either: (1) "the `factual contentions are clearly baseless,' such as when allegations are the product of delusion or fantasy;" or (2) "the claim is `based on an indisputably meritless legal theory.'" Nance v. Kelly, 912 F.2d 605, 606 (2d Cir. 1990) (per curiam) (quoting Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327, 109 S. Ct. 1827, 1833, 104 L. Ed. 2d 338 (1989)). A claim is based on an "indisputably meritless legal theory" when either the claim lacks an arguable basis in law, Benitez v. Wolff, 907 F.2d 1293, 1295 (2d Cir. 1990) (per curiam), or a dispositive defense clearly exists on the face of the complaint. See Pino v. Ryan, 49 F.3d 51, 53 (2d Cir. 1995).
Livingston, 141 F.3d at 437. The court exercises caution in dismissing a case under section 1915(e) because a claim that the court perceives as likely to be unsuccessful is not necessarily frivolous. See Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 329 (1989).

A district court must also dismiss a complaint if it fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) ("court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that . . . (B) the action or appeal . . . (ii) fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted");Gomez, 202 F.3d at 596 ("Prison Litigation Reform Act . . . which redesignated § 1915(d) as § 1915(e) provided that dismissal for failure to state a claim is mandatory"). In reviewing the complaint, the court "accept[s] as true all factual allegations in the complaint" and draws inferences from those allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Gomez, 202 F.3d at 596 (citing King v. Simpson, 189 F.3d 284, 287 (2d. Cir. 1999)). Dismissal of the complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), is only appropriate if "`it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.'"Id. at 597 (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957)).

In addition, "unless the court can rule out any possibility, however unlikely it might be, that an amended complaint would succeed in stating a claim," the court should permit "a pro se plaintiff who is proceeding in forma pauperis" to file an amended complaint that states a claim upon which relief may be granted. Gomez v. USAA Federal Savings Bank, 171 F.3d 794, 796 (2d Cir. 1999).

II. Discussion

In order to state a claim for relief in a civil right action filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Walker must satisfy a two-part test. First, he must allege facts demonstrating that the defendants are persons who acted under color of state law. Second, he must allege facts demonstrating that he has been deprived of a constitutionally or federally protected right.See Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 930 (1982);Washington v. James, 782 F.2d 1134, 1138 (2d Cir. 1986).

None of the defendants named in this action are "persons" within the meaning of section 1983. Thus, all claims against them must be dismissed as lacking an arguable legal basis.

The first defendant is the State of Connecticut. A state is not a person within the meaning of section 1983. See Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 67 (1989). Thus, all claims against the State of Connecticut are dismissed.

The second defendant is the Connecticut Department of Correction, a state agency. It is well-settled that a state agency is not a person within the meaning of section 1983. See Fisher v. Cahill, 474 F.2d 991, 992 (3d Cir. 1973) (state prison department cannot be sued under section 1983 because it does not fit the definition of "person" under section 1983); Santos v. Department of Correction, No. 3:04cv1562 (JCH)(HBF), 2005 WL 2123543, at *3 (D. Conn. Aug. 29, 2005) (holding that Connecticut Department of Correction is not a person under section 1983); Santiago v. New York State Dep't of Correctional Servs., 725 F. Supp. 780, 783-84 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (holding that state and state agencies are not persons under section 1983), rev'd on other grounds, 945 F.2d 25 (2d Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1094 (1992). Thus, all claims against the Department of Correction must be dismissed.

Walker also names Northern Correctional Institution as a defendant. Like the Department of Correction, a state correctional facility is not a person within the meaning of section 1983. See Lovell v. Cayuga Correctional Facility, No. 02-CV-6640L, 2004 WL 2202624, at *5 (W.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 2004);see also Whitley v. Westchester County, No. 97 CIV. 0420(SS), 1997 WL 659100 at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 22, 1997) ("A prison facility, such as the Westchester County Correctional Facility or Jail, is not a person within the meaning of § 1983."). All claims against Northern Correctional Institution must be dismissed.

The final defendant is Correctional Health Services. The court assumes that Walker intends to name the University of Connecticut Health Center Correctional Managed Unit, the division of the Health Center that provides medical care to Connecticut inmates. This unit is part of the University of Connecticut Health Center. Like other state agencies, the University of Connecticut Health Center is not a person within the meaning of section 1983. See Stewart v. John Dempsey Hospital, No. 3:03cv1703(WWE), 2004 WL 78145, at *2 (D. Conn. Jan. 9, 2004) (holding that John Dempsey Hospital University of Connecticut Health Center is not a person within the meaning of section 1983); Cassells v. University Hosp. at Stony Brook, 1987 WL 3717, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 12, 1987) (holding that section 1983 claims against state university and university hospital fail because neither entity is a person within the meaning of section 1983). Thus, this defendant is not a person within the meaning of section 1983.

The court can discern no possible amendment that would preserve any claims against these defendants. Accordingly, the complaint lacks an arguable legal basis and must be dismissed. See Neitzke, 480 U.S. at 325.

III. Conclusion

The complaint is DISMISSED without prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) and (ii). Walker may file an amended complaint if he can identify appropriate defendants. Any amended complaint shall be filed within twenty (20) days from the date of this order. If no complaint is timely filed, the clerk shall close the file.

Walker submitted a stool sample with the complaint. Walker is hereby on notice that the court will not accept such submissions in the future. Should Walker attempt to file any excrement or other bodily secretion, the item will be destroyed and sanctions will be imposed.

SO ORDERED.


Summaries of

Walker v. State, Department of Corrections

United States District Court, D. Connecticut
Mar 15, 2006
Prisoner Case No. 3:06CV165 (SRU) (D. Conn. Mar. 15, 2006)

dismissing action against CMHC under section 1983 because CMHC is not a "person" within the meaning of the statute

Summary of this case from Payton v. Conn. Dep't of Corr.

dismissing action against CMHC under Section 1983 because CMHC is not a "person" within the meaning of the statute

Summary of this case from Slaughter v. Univ. of Conn.

dismissing action against CMHC under section 1983 because CMHC is not a "person" within the meaning of the statute

Summary of this case from Angileri v. Wu
Case details for

Walker v. State, Department of Corrections

Case Details

Full title:DARNELL L. WALKER v. STATE OF CONNECTICUT DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS…

Court:United States District Court, D. Connecticut

Date published: Mar 15, 2006

Citations

Prisoner Case No. 3:06CV165 (SRU) (D. Conn. Mar. 15, 2006)

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