Opinion
1:22-cv-560 (DNH/TWD)
06-29-2022
ALISHA CLARK WALKER, Plaintiff, v. RICHARD RIVERA, et al., Defendants.
ALISHA CLARK WALKER Plaintiff, pro se.
ALISHA CLARK WALKER Plaintiff, pro se.
ORDER AND REPORT-RECOMMENDATION
THERESE WILEY DANCKS, United States Magistrate Judge.
On May 26, 2022, Alisha Clark Walker (“Plaintiff”), proceeding pro se, filed a Complaint against Judge Richard Rivera, Judge Jill Kehn, Judge Anthony McGinty, Leslie Silva, Douglas Broda, and the Averill Park School District (collectively, “Defendants”). (Dkt. No. 1.) Plaintiff simultaneously moved to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”). (Dkt. No. 2.) Having reviewed Plaintiff's motion to proceed IFP, the undersigned GRANTS the motion for purposes of this review. See id. The undersigned now considers the sufficiency of the allegations set forth in the Complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e). For the reasons discussed below, the undersigned recommends that the Court dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint in its entirety with leave to amend. (Dkt. No. 1.)
The following recitation of facts is drawn from the Complaint, which the Court accepts as true for purposes of initial review. See, e.g., LaTouche v. Rockland County, No. 22-CV-1437 (LTS), 2022 WL 953111, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 29, 2022); Walker v. City of New York, No. 20-CV-5240 (PKC) (LB), 2021 WL 1838277, at *1 n.1 (E.D.N.Y. May 7, 2021).
Invoking this Court's jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and § 1343, Plaintiff purports to advance several causes of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and § 1985. (Dkt. No. 1 at 4.) Plaintiff's allegations arise out of orders and events stemming from New York State Family Court Proceedings in Rensselaer County involving a child custody dispute. See generally id. at 1-3, 9-12. Plaintiff accordingly brings this action against New York State Family Court Judges Richard Rivera, Jill Kehn, and Anthony McGinty, as well as Leslie Silva, a private attorney, Douglas Broda, a Rensselaer County Attorney for the Child (“AFC”), and the Averill Park School District (collectively, “Defendants”). Id. at 2-3.
On June 2, 2022, Plaintiff filed another action in this Court stemming from the same New York State Family Court proceeding. See Case No. 1:22-cv-581, Dkt. No. 1.
In general, Plaintiff claims “the policies, practices, procedures, and standards established and/or maintained by Defendant/s [sic] violate the Right to Free speech, the Right to Assemble under the First Amendment, and the Due Process and Equal Protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution.” Id. at 4; see also id. at 6 (claiming Defendants violated Plaintiff's “rights to her children, due process of law, and First Amendment rights of Freedom of Speech and the Right to Peacefully Assemble”). Stated differently, Plaintiff “contends Defendants' policies, practices, procedures, and standards are gender-based, unconstitutional, have a disparate impact on women, and violate women's [New York State] entitled equal economic, property ownership, and custody rights in contested Judgment of Custody Orders when domestic violence (“DV”) exists.” Id. at 8. Plaintiff accordingly advances six causes of action against Defendants. See id. at 12-31.
Through the first cause of action, Plaintiff claims Defendants acted in concert to violate her freedom of speech. See id. at 12-16. According to Plaintiff, Defendants violated the First Amendment by supporting and issuing a New York State Family Court order that prevented her from posting on social media about the ongoing custody dispute. See id. Plaintiff also claims Defendants violated the First Amendment by supporting and issuing a New York State Family Court order that prevented her from disseminating documents about the ongoing custody dispute at her children's school district. See id. In her second cause of action, Plaintiff claims Defendants violated her First Amendment right to peacefully assemble by supporting and issuing a New York State Family Court order that prevented her from “disseminating documents or information at any location in the children's school district and/or faculty administration.” Id. at 16-17. By her third cause of action, Plaintiff claims Defendants unconstitutionally deprived her of her right to raise her children by applying discriminatory policies and legal standards. Id. at 19-21. Through her fourth cause of action, Plaintiff claims she has “been discriminated against by the Defendants” because she is “an advocate for sexual abuse [sic] against children (#savethechildren) and women affected by legal abuse by the system and their spouses.” Id. at 22. In her fifth cause of action, Plaintiff claims Judge Rivera, Judge McGinty, Judge Kehn, and AFC Broda “used their positions of power to intentionally inflict harm and pain on me.” Id. at 23. By her sixth cause of action, Plaintiff claims Defendants “routinely engaged in sex bias, often causing [her] to endure worse legal treatment by the abusive husband.” Id. at 26.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
This Court must conduct an initial review of complaints filed in forma pauperis, and “complaints in which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) (governing complaints filed in forma pauperis); 28 U.S.C. § 1915A (governing complaints filed by prisoners against the government). When reviewing these types of complaints, this Court must “identify cognizable claims or dismiss the complaint, or any portion of the complaint, if the complaint . . . is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or . . . seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A; 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see also Allen v. Stringer, No. 20-3953, 2021 WL 4472667, at *1 (2d Cir. Sept. 30, 2021) (applying Section 1915(e)(2)(B)); Carr v. Dvorin, 171 F.3d 115, 116 (2d Cir. 1999) (applying Section 1915A).
Unless otherwise indicated, in quoting cases, all alterations, internal quotation marks, emphases, footnotes, and citations are omitted. See, e.g., Sczepanski v. Saul, 946 F.3d 152, 157 n.4 (2d Cir. 2020).
This Court must exercise caution when determining whether to sua sponte dismiss a pro se complaint on the grounds that it is frivolous. See Thomas v. Scully, 943 F.2d 259, 260 (2d Cir. 1991); Anderson v. Coughlin, 700 F.2d 37, 41 (2d Cir. 1983). “An action is frivolous when either: (1) the factual contentions are clearly baseless such as when the claims are the product of delusion or fantasy; or (2) the claim is based on an indisputably meritless legal theory.” Livingston v. Adirondack Beverage Co., 141 F.3d 434, 437 (2d Cir. 1998). “A claim is based on an indisputably meritless legal theory when either the claim lacks an arguable basis in law, or a dispositive defense clearly exists on the face of the complaint.” Id.
When undertaking this initial review, the Court must construe pro se pleadings with the utmost leniency. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972) (holding that a pro se litigant's complaint is to be held “to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers”); see also Sealed Plaintiff v. Sealed Defendant, 537 F.3d 185, 191 (2d Cir. 2008). To survive dismissal for failure to state a claim, a complaint must contain a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). This short and plain statement of the claim must be “plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). The statement of the claim must do more than present “an unadorned, the-defendant-harmed-me accusation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678. It must “give the defendant fair notice of what the claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555; see also Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2).
In determining whether a complaint states a claim upon which relief may be granted, “the court must accept the material facts alleged in the complaint as true and construe all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor.” Hernandez v. Coughlin, 18 F.3d 133, 136 (2d Cir. 1994) (citation omitted). “[T]he tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id.
III. SUFFICIENCY OF THE COMPLAINT
Plaintiff's Complaint should be dismissed because the claims are frivolous, it fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, and many Defendants are immune. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Moreover, Plaintiff's claims are likely barred by either the Younger abstention or the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.
A. Private Individuals
Plaintiff purports to bring this action against Silva, a private attorney, and Broda, an AFC, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (See Dkt. No. 1 at 3-4.) Plaintiff does not explain or distinguish which of her causes of action are advanced under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and which are advanced under 42 U.S.C. § 1985. See generally id. at 12-31. The undersigned accordingly considers whether any of Plaintiff's causes of action state a claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Silva and Broda. See Sealed Plaintiff, 537 F.3d at 191.
“To prevail on a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege (1) that some person has deprived him of a federal right, and (2) that the person who has deprived him of that right acted under color of state law.” Velez v. Levy, 401 F.3d 75, 84 (2d Cir. 2005). “[P]rivate individuals . . . cannot be sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 absent a plausible allegation that they acted under color of state law.” Basile v. Connolly, 538 Fed.Appx. 5, 7 (2d Cir. 2013). A conclusory allegation that a private individual acted in concert with a state actor does not constitute a plausible allegation that the private individual acted under color of state law. See Ciambriello v. Cnty. of Nassau, 292 F.3d 307, 324 (2d Cir. 2002); see, e.g., Asensio v. DiFiore, No. 18-CV-10933 (RA), 2019 WL 4392743, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 13, 2019) (concluding the plaintiff's “conclusory allegations” of conspiracy were “plainly insufficient to support a finding that [the defendant] has acted under color of state law.”); Bornschein v. Herman, 304 F.Supp.3d 296, 301 (N.D.N.Y. 2018) (same).
Plaintiff's § 1983 claims against Silva and Broda are inadequately pled because she has failed to allege they acted under color of state law. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983; Velez, 401 F.3d at 84. Plaintiff's conclusory allegations that Silva and Broda acted in concert with state actors do not constitute plausible allegations that they acted under color of state law. See Asensio, 2019 WL 4392743, at *8; Bornschein, 304 F.Supp.3d at 301. Moreover, Silva cannot be sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as [i]t is well-settled that attorneys engaged in private practice do not act under color of state law within the meaning of § 1983.” Parent v. New York, 786 F.Supp.2d 516, 538 (N.D.N.Y. 2011), aff'd, 485 Fed.Appx. 500 (2d Cir. 2012); see also Agron v. Douglas W. Dunham, Esq. & Assocs., No. 02 CIV.10071(LAP), 2004 WL 691682, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2004) (“It is well-established that as a matter of law a private attorney is not a state actor.”) (collecting cases). Broda cannot be sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 either-“although appointed by the state, an attorney for the children or law guardian is not a state actor because he or she must exercise independent professional judgment on behalf of the clients they represent.” Parent, 786 F.Supp.2d at 538; see also Milan v. Wertheimer, 808 F.3d 961, 964 (2d Cir. 2015); see, e.g., DeRouseau v. Fam. Ct., Westchester Cnty., No. 21-CV-8716 (LTS), 2022 WL 1747859, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. May 31, 2022) (dismissing the plaintiff's § 1983 claims against “attorneys who were appointed to represent him and his child in the Family Court.”). The undersigned accordingly recommends dismissing all of plaintiff's § 1983 claims against Silva, the private attorney, and Broda, the AFC, on the grounds that they are inadequately pled and frivolous. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see also Livingston, 141 F.3d at 437.
B. Immune Defendants
Judge Rivera, Judge Kehn, and Judge McGinty are all immune from suit. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(iii). Through her various causes of action, Plaintiff complains of rulings these Judges made and orders they issued while performing their duties as New York State Family Court Judges. (See generally Dkt. No. 1 at 6, 11-31.) However, because Plaintiff advanced no allegation suggesting Judge Rivera, Judge Kehn, or Judge McGinty acted outside the scope of their positions or without jurisdiction, the doctrine of judicial immunity applies. See id.; see also Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11 (1991); see also Chris H. v. New York, 740 Fed.Appx. 740, 741 (2d Cir. 2018). This doctrine immunizes the judges from the causes of action Plaintiff asserts under both 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and § 1985. See, e.g., Deem v. DiMella-Deem, 941 F.3d 618, 62021 (2d Cir. 2019) (affirming the dismissal of plaintiff's claims, asserted under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and § 1985, where “Judge Gordon-Oliver was . . . clearly entitled to juridical immunity”); Komatsu v. City of New York, No. 1:20-CV-6510 (LLS), 2020 WL 8641274, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 22, 2020), aff'd, No. 20-3676-CV, 2021 WL 6060603 (2d Cir. Dec. 20, 2021) (“Plaintiffs claims under [42 U.S.C. § 1983, § 1985, and § 1986] against Justice Bannon and Defendant Vaughan, in their individual capacities, are barred under the doctrine of judicial immunity.”); Asensio v. DiFiore, No. 18-CV-10933 (RA), 2019 WL 4392743, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 13, 2019) (concluding claims asserted under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and § 1985 against “Judges DiFiore and Fasanya [we]re barred by the doctrine of judicial immunity”). The undersigned accordingly recommends that the Court dismiss all claims against Judge Rivera, Judge Kehn, and Judge McGinty on the grounds that the judges are immune, and the claims are frivolous. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(i), (iii); see Mills v. Fischer, 645 F.3d 176, 177 (2d Cir. 2011) (“Any claim dismissed on the ground of absolute judicial immunity is “frivolous” for purposes [of the in forma pauperis statute].”).
C. Failure to State a Claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and § 1985
Construing Plaintiff's Complaint liberally, Sealed Plaintiff, 537 F.3d at 191, the undersigned concludes Plaintiff has failed to state a claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and § 1985. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). First, Plaintiff has not provided “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that [she] is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). As explained above, to prevail on a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Plaintiff must allege (1) that someone deprived her of a federal right, and (2) that the person who deprived her of that right acted under color of state law. Velez, 401 F.3d at 84. Plaintiff advanced the general claim that Defendants violated her First and Fourteenth Amendment rights through the use of unconstitutional “policies, practices, procedures, and standards.” (Dkt. No. 1 at 4.) Yet, Plaintiff failed to support this general claim with sufficient factual allegations to give rise to the reasonable inference that Defendants' conduct amounted to an actual violation of her First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Furthermore, Plaintiff failed to advance non-conclusory factual allegations in support of her third, fourth, fifth, and sixth causes of action clarifying who did what, when they did it, how that action or inaction caused her injury, and what right or rights it violated. (Dkt. No. 1 at 19-31.) These causes of action fail to give Defendants “fair notice of what the claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555; see also Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). Because Plaintiff failed to plausibly allege that one of the Defendants violated one or more of her federal rights, the undersigned recommends that the Court dismiss every cause of action Plaintiff asserts under § 1983 for failure to state a claim. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii); see, e.g., Perez v. Colon, No. 9:19-CV-0722 (BKS), 2019 WL 5102612, at *6 (N.D.N.Y. Oct. 11, 2019) (“In the absence of factual allegations sufficient to plausibly suggest that the defendant was personally involved in conduct that violated Plaintiff's constitutional rights, the complaint fails to state a cognizable claim against him/her.”); Hamilton v. New York State Dep't of Corr. & Cmty. Supervision, No. 9:18-CV-1312 (MAD), 2019 WL 2352981, at *7 (N.D.N.Y. June 4, 2019) (same); Ying Li v. City of New York, 246 F.Supp.3d 578, 598 (E.D.N.Y. 2017) (“Pleadings that do not differentiate which defendant was involved in the unlawful conduct are insufficient to state a claim.”) (collecting cases).
Plaintiff does not explain or distinguish which of her six causes of action are advanced under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and which are advanced under 42 U.S.C. § 1985. (See generally Dkt. No. 1 at 12-31.) The undersigned accordingly considers whether any of Plaintiff's six causes of action state a claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 or § 1985. See Sealed Plaintiff, 537 F.3d at 191.
Second, to state a conspiracy claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3), a plaintiff must allege: “(1) a conspiracy; (2) for the purpose of depriving, either directly or indirectly, any person or class of persons of the equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws; (3) an act in furtherance of the conspiracy; (4) whereby a person is either injured in his person or property or deprived of any right or privilege of a citizen of the United States.” Cine SK8, Inc. v. Town of Henrietta, 507 F.3d 778, 791 (2d Cir. 2007); see also DeRouseau, 2022 WL 1747859, at *3. Further, the “conspiracy must also be motivated by some racial or perhaps otherwise class-based, invidious discriminatory animus behind the conspirators' action.” Cine SK8, Inc., 507 F.3d at 791. “Complaints containing only conclusory, vague, or general allegations that the defendants have engaged in a conspiracy to deprive the plaintiff of his constitutional rights are properly dismissed; diffuse and expansive allegations are insufficient, unless amplified by specific instances of misconduct.” DeRouseau, 2022 WL 1747859, at *3; see, e.g., Webb v. Goord, 340 F.3d 105, 110-11 (2d Cir. 2003) (“The plaintiffs have not alleged, except in the most conclusory fashion, that any such meeting of the minds occurred among any or all of the defendants. Their conspiracy allegation must therefore fail.”); Morpurgo v. Inc. Vill. of Sag Harbor, 697 F.Supp.2d 309, 340 (E.D.N.Y. 2010), aff'd, 417 Fed.Appx. 96 (2d Cir. 2011) (concluding the § 1985 conspiracy claim failed because “Plaintiff has provided only conclusory, vague and unsupported allegations . . . as a basis for asking the Court to find the existence of a conspiracy.”). Moreover, a § 1985 conspiracy claim fails as a matter of law where there is no underlying constitutional violation. See, e.g., Oliver v. Penny, No. 21-111, 2022 WL 2165814, at *3 (2d Cir. June 16, 2022) (concluding plaintiff's § 1985 conspiracy claim “failed because she did not plausibly allege an underlying constitutional violation”); Tirse v. Gilbo, No. 6:15-CV-0987 (GTS) (ATB), 2016 WL 4046780, at *18 (N.D.N.Y. July 27, 2016) (“Because the Court has found that Plaintiff has failed to allege facts plausibly suggesting a conspiracy and/or an underlying constitutional violation, Plaintiff's § 1985 claim is likewise dismissed.”).
Here, Plaintiff failed to advance any factual allegations suggesting Defendants targeted and discriminated against her on the basis of sex. (See generally Dkt. No. 1; see, e.g., Doe v. Fenchel, 837 Fed.Appx. 67, 68 (2d Cir. 2021) (concluding plaintiff failed to plead any facts in support of the “conclusory allegations” that defendants “targeted him and discriminated against him based on his race, color, gender, sex, veteran status, disability status, and so forth.”).) Although Plaintiff alleges Defendants discriminated against her and “routinely engag[ed] in sex bias,” she fails to advance any factual allegations to support this conclusory statement. (See Dkt. No. 1 at 22, 26.) “Such naked assertions devoid of further factual enhancement are insufficient to give rise to a plausible entitlement to relief.” Doe, 837 Fed.Appx. at 68.
Plaintiff also failed to adequately allege the Defendants agreed (i.e., had a meeting of the minds) to engage in unlawful conduct against her. (See generally Dkt. No. 1 at 4, 13.) Plaintiff advanced the general allegation that Defendants acted in concert during the custody dispute before the New York State Family Court, but made no factual allegations indicating Defendants agreed to engage in unlawful conduct against her. See id. As explained above, the Complaint lacks sufficient factual allegations to give rise to the reasonable inference that Defendants violated Plaintiff's First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. The general allegation that Defendants acted in concert, without more, does not give rise to the inference that Defendants agreed to engage in unlawful conduct against Plaintiff. See, e.g., Webb, 340 F.3d at 110-11; Alston v. Sebelius, No. 13-CV-4537 (SJF) (ARL), 2014 WL 4374644, at *18 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 2, 2014); Morpurgo, 697 F.Supp.2d at 340.
Finally, Plaintiff failed to allege facts plausibly suggesting an underlying constitutional violation. (See generally Dkt. No. 1 at 12-31; see, e.g., Tirse, 2016 WL 4046780, at *18 (dismissing a § 1985 conspiracy claim because “Plaintiff has failed to allege facts plausibly suggesting . . . an underlying constitutional violation”.).) Plaintiff alleged in conclusory fashion that Defendants violated her First and Fourteenth Amendment rights, but her Complaint lacks factual allegations to support this claim. (See generally Dkt. No. 1 at 4, 6, 12-31.) Those conclusory allegations fail to plausibly allege a constitutional violation. See id.; see also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Plaintiff has accordingly failed to state a claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3). See, e.g., Oliver, 2022 WL 2165814, at *3; Tirse, 2016 WL 4046780, at *18; Alston, 2014 WL 4374644, at *18. The undersigned therefore recommends that the Court dismiss every cause of action Plaintiff asserts under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) for failure to state a claim. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).
The undersigned notes that, nested within Plaintiff's third cause of action, she purports to assert a “civil rights action brought pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.” (Dkt. No. 1 at 20.) That claim fails, however, because Plaintiff did not allege she is or was an employee of one of the Defendants, and she did not allege any employment discrimination. See, e.g., Amato v. McGinty, No. 1:21-CV-00860 (GLS) (TWD), 2022 WL 226798, at *8 (N.D.N.Y. Jan. 26, 2022) (dismissing plaintiff's Title VII claim as frivolous because she did not “allege employment discrimination or that she is or was an employee of Judge McGinty”) (collecting cases).
D. Jurisdiction
Although the nature of Plaintiff's Complaint makes it difficult to precisely determine which doctrines apply, her claims are likely barred by Younger abstention and/or the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. (See Dkt. No. 1; see, e.g., Amato v. McGinty, No. 1:21-CV-00860 (GLS) (TWD), 2022 WL 226798, at *10-11 (N.D.N.Y. Jan. 26, 2022) (concluding plaintiff's claims, which stemmed from an underlying New York State Family Court custody dispute, were likely barred by Younger abstention and the Rooker-Feldman doctrine).)
First, in the event the underlying family court proceedings are pending, such claims are likely barred by the Younger abstention doctrine. See generally Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971); see, e.g., Amato, 2022 WL 226798, at *11. In Sprint Communications, Inc. v. Jacobs, 571 U.S. 69 (2013), the Supreme Court clarified that the Younger abstention doctrine is limited to three exceptional circumstances, including: (1) state criminal prosecutions; (2) civil enforcement, or “quasi-criminal,” proceedings; and (3) “civil proceedings involving certain orders that are uniquely in furtherance of the state courts' ability to perform their judicial functions.” Id. at 72-73; see also id. (“This Court has extended Younger abstention to particular state civil proceedings that are akin to criminal prosecutions . . . or that implicate a State's interest in enforcing the orders and judgments of its courts”).
Here, Plaintiff seeks declaratory and injunctive relief from a child custody dispute before New York State Family Court. (Dkt. No. 1 at 1-2, 32.) “[I]t is well-settled that a custody dispute raises important state interests.” Stumpf v. Maywalt, No. 21-CV-06248 EAW, 2022 WL 2062613, at *3 (W.D.N.Y. June 6, 2022) (collecting cases); see also Graham v. N.Y. Ctr. for Interpersonal Dev., No. 15-CV-00459 (PKC), 2015 WL 1120120, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 12, 2015). Accordingly, to the extent the custody dispute is continuing in New York State Family Court, this Court should abstain from interfering with that process. See, e.g., Stumpf, 2022 WL 2062613, at *3 (applying Younger abstention in an action stemming from an ongoing child custody dispute); Walker v. Fam. Ct. Judge Catherine Cholakis, No. 1:19-CV-1288 (LEK) (CFH), 2020 WL 3503158, at *4 (N.D.N.Y. June 29, 2020) (applying Younger abstention in an action seeking declaratory relief over a child custody dispute); Graham, 2015 WL 1120120, at *3 (applying Younger abstention in an action seeking injunctive relief over a child custody dispute); Rhee-Karn v. Burnett, No. 13 CIV. 6132 (JPO), 2014 WL 4494126, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 12, 2014) (applying Younger abstention in an action seeking declaratory and injunctive relief over a child custody dispute).
Second, in the event the relevant underlying state court proceedings are concluded, such claims are likely barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. See Phifer v. City of New York, 289 F.3d 49, 57 (2d Cir. 2002) (“There is no question that Rooker-Feldman bars Phifer's challenges to the family court's decisions regarding custody, neglect, and visitation.”); Fernandez v. Turetsky, No. 1 2-CV-4092 (SLT) (MDG), 2014 WL 5823116, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 7, 2014), aff'd, 645 Fed.Appx. 103 (2d Cir. 2016) (“Courts have repeatedly invoked the [Rooker-Feldman] doctrine in cases, like the one currently before the Court, in which plaintiffs challenge family court decrees setting child support arrears.”) (collecting cases). “The Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars federal district courts from hearing cases that in effect are appeals from state court judgments, because the Supreme Court is the only federal court with jurisdiction over such cases.” Dorce v. City of New York, 2 F.4th 82, 101 (2d Cir. 2021); see also Sykes v. Mel S. Harris & Assocs. LLC, 780 F.3d 70, 94 (2d Cir. 2015). The Rooker-Feldman doctrine applies where the federal court plaintiff: (1) lost in state court, (2) complains of injuries caused by the state court judgment, (3) invites the district court to review and reject the state court judgment, and (4) commenced the district court proceedings after the state court judgment was rendered. Dorce, 2 F.4th 82, 101; Sykes, 780 F.3d at 94.
Here, it appears Plaintiff “lost” in New York State Family Court, complains of injuries caused by that court's judgments, and asks this Court to invalidate those judgments on the grounds that they violated her due process rights. (See Dkt. No. 1 at 32 (requesting an “injunction barring Defendants from continuing their illegal acts,” a “permanent restraining order,” and a declaration that “the Defendants' actions were illegal and violative of Plaintiff's right to due process of the law and to equal protection of the laws”).) Thus, as currently drafted, Plaintiff's Complaint is likely barred under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. See, e.g., Phifer, 289 F.3d at 57; Stumpf, 2022 WL 2062613, at *4 n.4; Amato, 2022 WL 226798, at *10; Fernandez, 2014 WL 5823116, at *4.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the undersigned recommends that the Court dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint with leave to amend. (Dkt. No. 1.)
ACCORDINGLY, it is hereby
ORDERED that Plaintiff's IFP Application (Dkt. No. 2) is GRANTED solely for purposes of initial review; and it is further
ORDERED that the Clerk provide Plaintiff with a copy of this Order and ReportRecommendation, along with copies of the unpublished decisions cited herein in accordance with Lebron v. Sanders, 557 F.3d 76 (2d Cir. 2009) (per curiam); and it is further
RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff's Complaint (Dkt. No. 1) be DISMISSED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), the parties have fourteen days within which to file written objections to the foregoing report. Such objections shall be filed with the Clerk of the Court. FAILURE TO OBJECT TO THIS REPORT WITHIN FOURTEEN DAYS WILL PRECLUDE APPELLATE REVIEW . Roldan v. Racette, 984 F.2d 85 (2d Cir. 1993) (citing Small v. Sec'y of Health and Human Servs., 892 F.2d 15 (2d Cir. 1989)); 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) (Supp. 2013); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72, 6(a).
If you are proceeding pro se and are served with this Order and Report-Recommendation by mail, three additional days will be added to the fourteen-day period, meaning that you have seventeen days from the date the Order and Report-Recommendation was mailed to you to serve and file objections. Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(d). If the last day of that prescribed period falls on a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday, then the deadline is extended until the end of the next day that is not a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday. Fed. R. Civ. 6(a)(1)(C).