Opinion
CASE NO. 20-3117-SAC
09-03-2020
VINCENT LEE WALKER, Plaintiff, v. STATE OF KANSAS, et. al, Defendants.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER AND ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE
Plaintiff Vincent Lee Walker is hereby required to show good cause, in writing, to the Honorable Sam A. Crow, United States District Judge, why this action should not be dismissed due to the deficiencies in Plaintiff's Complaint that are discussed herein.
I. Nature of the Matter before the Court
Plaintiff brings this pro se civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Court granted Plaintiff leave to proceed in forma pauperis. (Doc. 5.) Plaintiff is housed at the Douglas County Jail in Lawrence, Kansas ("DCJ").
Plaintiff alleges in his Complaint (Doc. 1) that he was sentenced to serve six months in custody and six months of probation. Plaintiff alleges that after serving seven months in custody he was released on probation. Plaintiff alleges that a probation violation was issued almost a month after he was supposed to be released from probation. Plaintiff is now in jail for the probation violation which resulted in several new charges. Plaintiff alleges that his probation officer mistakenly issued a probation violation after his probation was completed.
Plaintiff names as defendants: the State of Kansas; Jeremy Bryant, probation officer; snf Paula B. Martin, retired judge. Plaintiff seeks monetary damages.
II. Statutory Screening of Prisoner Complaints
The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a governmental entity or an officer or an employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if a plaintiff has raised claims that are legally frivolous or malicious, that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1)-(2).
"To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and must show that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law." West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988) (citations omitted); Northington v. Jackson, 973 F.2d 1518, 1523 (10th Cir. 1992). A court liberally construes a pro se complaint and applies "less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers." Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). In addition, the court accepts all well-pleaded allegations in the complaint as true. Anderson v. Blake, 469 F.3d 910, 913 (10th Cir. 2006). On the other hand, "when the allegations in a complaint, however true, could not raise a claim of entitlement to relief," dismissal is appropriate. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 558 (2007).
A pro se litigant's "conclusory allegations without supporting factual averments are insufficient to state a claim upon which relief can be based." Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991). "[A] plaintiff's obligation to provide the 'grounds' of his 'entitlement to relief' requires "more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citations omitted). The complaint's "factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level" and "to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Id. at 555, 570.
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals has explained "that, to state a claim in federal court, a complaint must explain what each defendant did to [the pro se plaintiff]; when the defendant did it; how the defendant's action harmed [the plaintiff]; and, what specific legal right the plaintiff believes the defendant violated." Nasious v. Two Unknown B.I.C.E. Agents, 492 F.3d 1158, 1163 (10th Cir. 2007). The court "will not supply additional factual allegations to round out a plaintiff's complaint or construct a legal theory on a plaintiff's behalf." Whitney v. New Mexico, 113 F.3d 1170, 1173-74 (10th Cir. 1997) (citation omitted).
The Tenth Circuit has pointed out that the Supreme Court's decisions in Twombly and Erickson gave rise to a new standard of review for § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) dismissals. See Kay v. Bemis, 500 F.3d 1214, 1218 (10th Cir. 2007) (citations omitted); see also Smith v. United States, 561 F.3d 1090, 1098 (10th Cir. 2009). As a result, courts "look to the specific allegations in the complaint to determine whether they plausibly support a legal claim for relief." Kay, 500 F.3d at 1218 (citation omitted). Under this new standard, "a plaintiff must 'nudge his claims across the line from conceivable to plausible.'" Smith, 561 F.3d at 1098 (citation omitted). "Plausible" in this context does not mean "likely to be true," but rather refers "to the scope of the allegations in a complaint: if they are so general that they encompass a wide swath of conduct, much of it innocent," then the plaintiff has not "nudged [his] claims across the line from conceivable to plausible." Robbins v. Oklahoma, 519 F.3d 1242, 1247 (10th Cir. 2008) (citing Twombly, 127 S. Ct. at 1974).
III. DISCUSSION
1. Heck Bar
Before Plaintiff may proceed in a federal civil action for monetary damages based upon an invalid conviction or sentence, he must show that his conviction or sentence has been overturned, reversed, or otherwise called into question. Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). If Plaintiff has been convicted and a judgment on Plaintiff's claim in this case would necessarily imply the invalidity of that conviction, the claim may be barred by Heck. In Heck v. Humphrey, the United States Supreme Court held that when a state prisoner seeks damages in a § 1983 action, the district court must consider the following:
whether a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence; if it would, the complaint must be dismissed unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has already been invalidated.Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 487 (1994). In Heck, the Supreme Court held that a § 1983 damages claim that necessarily implicates the validity of the plaintiff's conviction or sentence is not cognizable unless and until the conviction or sentence is overturned, either on appeal, in a collateral proceeding, or by executive order. Id. at 486-87. Plaintiff has not alleged that the conviction or sentence has been invalidated.
2. Immunities
a. State of Kansas
The State of Kansas and its agencies are absolutely immune from suits for money damages under the Eleventh Amendment. The Eleventh Amendment presents a jurisdictional bar to suits against a state and "arms of the state" unless the state waives its immunity. Peterson v. Martinez, 707 F.3d 1197, 1205 (10th Cir. 2013) (quoting Wagoner Cnty. Rural Water Dist. No. 2 v. Grand River Dam Auth., 577 F.3d 1255, 1258 (10th Cir. 2009)). Because Plaintiff has neither made a specific claim against the State of Kansas nor shown any waiver of immunity from suit, he must show cause why this defendant should not be dismissed from this action.
b. Judge
Plaintiff names a state court judge as a defendant. State court judges are entitled to personal immunity. "Personal immunities . . . are immunities derived from common law which attach to certain governmental officials in order that they not be inhibited from 'proper performance of their duties.'" Russ v. Uppah, 972 F.2d 300, 302-03 (10th Cir. 1992) (citing Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 223, 225 (1988)).
Plaintiff's claims against the state court judge should be dismissed on the basis of judicial immunity. A state judge is absolutely immune from § 1983 liability except when the judge acts "in the clear absence of all jurisdiction." Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356-57 (1978) (articulating broad immunity rule that a "judge will not be deprived of immunity because the action he took was in error, was done maliciously, or was in excess of his authority . . . ."); Hunt v. Bennett, 17 F.3d 1263, 1266 (10th Cir. 1994). Only actions taken outside a judge's judicial capacity will deprive the judge of judicial immunity. Stump, 435 U.S. at 356-57. Plaintiff alleges no facts whatsoever to suggest that the defendant judge acted outside of her judicial capacity. Plaintiff's claims against the state court judge are subject to dismissal.
c. Court Services Officer
Plaintiff names his probation officer as a defendant. When the challenged activities of a probation officer are intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process, they are entitled to absolute immunity. Tripati v. U.S.I.N.S., 784 F.2d 345, 348 (10th Cir. 1986) (finding that probation officers who assist in the decision whether to order pretrial release and in the selection of an appropriate sentence are an important part of the judicial process and entitled to immunity). When preparing a presentence report "it is evident . . . that the probation service is an arm of the court. It is not an investigative arm for the prosecution. A presentence report is prepared exclusively at the discretion of and for the benefit of the court." Id. (citing United States v. Dingle, 546 F.2d 1378, 1380-81 (10th Cir. 1976)). Plaintiff has not alleged that Defendant Bryant was acting other than as an arm of the court. Plaintiff is directed to show cause why his claims against Defendant Parker should not be dismissed.
IV. Response Required
Plaintiff is required to show good cause why his Complaint should not be dismissed for the reasons stated herein. Failure to respond may result in dismissal of this action without further notice for failure to state a claim.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED THAT Plaintiff is granted until September 30, 2020, in which to show good cause, in writing, to the Honorable Sam A. Crow, United States District Judge, why Plaintiff's Complaint should not be dismissed for the reasons stated herein.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated September 3, 2020, in Topeka, Kansas.
s/ Sam A. Crow
Sam A. Crow
U.S. Senior District Judge