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Walker v. Huggins

United States District Court, M.D. Alabama, Northern Division
Apr 11, 2008
CASE NO. 3:07-cv-503-MEF (WO) (M.D. Ala. Apr. 11, 2008)

Opinion

CASE NO. 3:07-cv-503-MEF (WO).

April 11, 2008


MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER


This cause is before the Court on Plaintiff's Motion to Remand (Doc. # 15), filed April 3, 2008. For the reasons discussed below, this Court finds that motion is due to be GRANTED.

Plaintiff Walker filed this cause of action in the Circuit Court of Macon County, Alabama on April 27, 2007. Defendants filed a Notice of Removal in this Court on June 6, 2007. Defendants based their attempt at removal on diversity jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332.

Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. See, e.g., Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994); Burns v. Windsor Ins. Co., 31 F.3d 1092, 1095 (11th Cir. 1994) ; Wymbs v. Republican State Executive Comm., 719 F.2d 1072, 1076 (11th Cir. 1983). As such, federal courts only have the power to hear cases that they have been authorized to hear by the Constitution or the Congress of the United States. See Kokkonen, 511 U.S. at 377. Because federal court jurisdiction is limited, the Eleventh Circuit favors remand of removed cases when federal jurisdiction is not absolutely clear. See Burns, 31 F.3d at 1095.

Removal of a case from state to federal court is proper if the case could have been brought originally in federal court. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). The removing defendant has the burden of establishing that this a court has subject matter jurisdiction over an action. See Diaz v. Sheppard, 85 F.3d 1502, 1505 (11th Cir. 1996) (stating that the party seeking removal to federal court has the burden of establishing federal jurisdiction).

In order for this Court to have jurisdiction under § 1332, two requirements must be met. First, there must be complete diversity of citizenship; that is, each plaintiff's citizenship must be diverse from each defendant's citizenship. See, e.g., Riley v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner Smith Inc., 292 F.3d 1334, 1337 (11th Cir. 2002). The parties do not contest that this requirement is met. Second, the amount in controversy must exceed $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). Plaintiff argues that this requirement is not met.

On the face of the Complaint, Plaintiff claims that "[t]he total amount sought by Plaintiff in this lawsuit, cumulative of all counts in the complaint, is not to exceed $75,000 exclusive of interest and costs." Because Plaintiff specified an amount of damages in the Complaint that are less than the jurisdictional requirement, Defendants have the burden of proving to a "legal certainty" that Plaintiff would actually receive more than the jurisdictional requirement if she prevailed. See Burns v. Windsor Ins. Co., 31 F.3d 1092, 1095 (11th Cir. 1994). This burden is intended to be a "heavy" one. See id.

Not only do Defendants fail to meet this "heavy" burden, the Notice of Removal fails to even mention the amount in controversy requirement. Furthermore, after Plaintiff's Motion to Remand directed this Court's attention to this glaring deficiency, Defendants' response mischaracterizes Plaintiff's motion as an attempt to amend the Complaint to add the limit on damages, when in fact the Complaint as filed contained the restriction. Accordingly, Defendants have failed to meet their burden and this case is due to be remanded.

Moreover, this Court would like to direct counsel for the Defendants' attention to the following passage in their response:

In this case, Plaintiff's Motion to Remand states "The Complaint is crystal clear that the Plaintiff is not seeking the requisite [jurisdictional] amount . . ." and that ". . . the Plaintiff is willing to sign anything the Court wishes to verify that the amount in controversy at the time of the filing of the lawsuit is less than $75,000.

Def. Response to Mot. Remand at 2. Counsel should note that the unedited passage from the Plaintiff's motion reads:

The Complaint is crystal clear that the Plaintiff is not seeking the requisite amount. The Complaint specifically limits the recovery to less than $75,000 on at least three occasions (See Complaint). The Plaintiff has the right to litigate her claims in state court by limiting the amount in controversy. The Plaintiff, as well as her counsel, can think of no clearer way to do so than to simply state that the total amount sought is less than $75,000. Further, the Plaintiff is willing to sign anything that the Court wishes to verify that the amount in controversy at the time of the filing of the lawsuit was less than $75,000.

Pl. Mot. to Remand at 2 (emphasis added).

Defendants' response attempts to justify removal on the ground that Plaintiff only attempted to limit her recovery after removal. However, the manner in which the above quoted passage was edited indicates that defense counsel should have been aware, and may in fact have been aware, that Plaintiff had in fact limited the amount of damages in the Complaint below the jurisdictional requirement. This Court would caution defense counsel that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11(b) requires the signing attorney of any written motion presented to this Court to certify that the legal arguments are nonfrivolous and the factual contentions have evidentiary support. In the future, defense counsel should take more care with the arguments and factual assertions it makes to this Court.

This Court has discretion to award costs and attorney fees incurred as a result of an improvident removal. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). Such an award is appropriate when the defendant had no "objectively reasonable basis for removal." Martin v. Franklin Capital Corp., 546 U.S. 132, 136 (2005). There is no objectively reasonable basis for Defendant's argument that this Court has jurisdiction because Plaintiff attempted to limit damages after removal. In fact, this argument is most decidedly unreasonable, and this Court will award Plaintiff her costs and attorney fees incurred as a result of removal.

For the foregoing reasons, it is hereby ORDERED that:

(1) Plaintiff's Motion to Remand (Doc. # 15) is GRANTED.
(2) Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) all "just costs and any actual expenses, including attorney fees, incurred as a result of the removal" are TAXED to Defendants.
(3) This case is REMANDED to the Circuit Court of Macon County, Alabama.
(4) The Clerk is DIRECTED to take appropriate steps to effect the remand.
(5) Any pending motions not resolved by this Order are left for resolution by the Circuit Court of Macon County, Alabama.

This Court retains jurisdiction for the limited purpose of determining costs if the parties cannot reach agreement, see Fowler v. Safeco Ins. Co. of America, 915 F.2d 616 (11th Cir. 1990); Brooks v. Pre-Paid Legal Servs., Inc., 153 F. Supp. 2d 1299, 1303 (M.D. Ala. 2001) (DeMent, J.).


Summaries of

Walker v. Huggins

United States District Court, M.D. Alabama, Northern Division
Apr 11, 2008
CASE NO. 3:07-cv-503-MEF (WO) (M.D. Ala. Apr. 11, 2008)
Case details for

Walker v. Huggins

Case Details

Full title:DOROTHY WALKER, Plaintiff, v. JOHN HUGGINS, et al., Defendants

Court:United States District Court, M.D. Alabama, Northern Division

Date published: Apr 11, 2008

Citations

CASE NO. 3:07-cv-503-MEF (WO) (M.D. Ala. Apr. 11, 2008)