Opinion
Case No. 8:21-cv-1916-KKM-AAS
2021-11-18
Brian R. WALKER, Plaintiff, v. HOME POINT FINANCIAL CORPORATION, Experian Information Solutions, Inc., and Equifax Information Services, LLC, Defendants.
Jordan Tyler Isringhaus, Aaron M. Swift, Jon Paul Dubbeld, Sean Edward McEleney, Swift, Isringhaus & Dubbeld, P.A., Gordon Tyler Bannon, Law Office of Rick G. Bannon, St. Petersburg, FL, for Plaintiff. Tara Marie Petzoldt, Bradley Arant Boult Cummings LLP, Tampa, FL, for Defendant Home Point Financial Corporation. Maria Helena Ruiz, Kasowitz Benson Torres LLP, Miami, FL, for Defendant Experian Information Solutions, Inc. Kimberly A. Carabotta, Seyfarth Shaw LLP, Atlanta, GA, for Defendant Equifax Information Services, LLC.
Jordan Tyler Isringhaus, Aaron M. Swift, Jon Paul Dubbeld, Sean Edward McEleney, Swift, Isringhaus & Dubbeld, P.A., Gordon Tyler Bannon, Law Office of Rick G. Bannon, St. Petersburg, FL, for Plaintiff.
Tara Marie Petzoldt, Bradley Arant Boult Cummings LLP, Tampa, FL, for Defendant Home Point Financial Corporation.
Maria Helena Ruiz, Kasowitz Benson Torres LLP, Miami, FL, for Defendant Experian Information Solutions, Inc.
Kimberly A. Carabotta, Seyfarth Shaw LLP, Atlanta, GA, for Defendant Equifax Information Services, LLC.
ORDER
Kathryn Kimball Mizelle, United States District Judge
On August 11, 2021, Brian Walker filed this action against Home Point Financial Corporation, Experian Information Solutions, Inc., and Equifax Information Services, LLC. (Doc. 1.) Walker alleges that Defendants violated the Fair Credit Reporting Act. (Id. at 2.) On November 15, 2021, all parties signed a stipulation of dismissal under Rule 41. (Doc. 34.) The stipulation dismisses all of Walker's claims against Equifax with prejudice. (Id. ) It does not purport to dismiss any claims pending against Home Point or Experian.
Ordinarily, a stipulation of dismissal dismisses an entire action, not a single party from an ongoing action. Because the parties in this action have walked the less traveled path, this Court must decide whether a stipulation of dismissal that dismisses all claims against a single party but not all claims against all parties is valid under Rule 41. This Court concludes that it is.
I. LEGAL STANDARD
A plaintiff may voluntarily "dismiss an action without a court order by filing" a "stipulation of dismissal signed by all parties who have appeared." Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(1)(A). When a stipulation is valid, it is self-executing and deprives the court of jurisdiction. See Anago Franchising, Inc. v. Shaz, LLC , 677 F.3d. 1272, 1278 (11th Cir. 2012). Rule 41(a)(1) expressly provides only for dismissal of "an action." Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(1) ; see Black's Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019) (defining "action" as a "civil or criminal judicial proceeding"). Accordingly, a stipulation of dismissal that legitimately dismisses "an action" is self-executing and immediately deprives the court of jurisdiction.
The Eleventh Circuit "has made abundantly clear that a Rule 41(a)(1) voluntary dismissal disposes of the entire action, not just some of the plaintiff's claims." Absolute Activist Value Master Fund Ltd. v. Devine , 998 F.3d 1258, 1265 (11th Cir. 2021). For example, the Eleventh Circuit held that a plaintiff could not voluntarily dismiss one claim of her eight-claim complaint. See Perry v. Schumacher Grp. of La. , 891 F.3d 954, 958 (11th Cir. 2018). The Court reasoned that " Rule 41(a)(1), according to its plain text, permits voluntary dismissal only of entire ‘actions,’ not claims." Id. at 956. And since there "is no mention in the Rule of the option" to dismiss "a particular claim [ ] while leaving a different part of the lawsuit pending," the Court concluded that the attempted dismissal was invalid. Id. at 958 ; accord PTA-FLA, Inc. v. ZTE USA, Inc. , 844 F.3d 1299, 1307 (11th Cir. 2016) (" Rule 41 ‘speaks of voluntary dismissal of an action, not a claim.’ " (quotation omitted)).
While these opinions make clear that a plaintiff cannot use Rule 41 to dismiss a subset of her claims, they do not specifically address how Rule 41 applies to dismissals of less than all parties. According to a binding Fifth Circuit opinion from 1973, a plaintiff may dismiss the claims against one defendant while the suit against other defendants continues. See Plains Growers By & Through Florists’ Mut. Ins. Co. v. Ickes-Braun Glasshouses, Inc. , 474 F.2d 250, 255 (5th Cir. 1973) ("conclud[ing] that [ Rule 41(a)(1)(i) ] was intended by the rule-makers to permit dismissal against such of the defendants as have not served an answer or motion for summary judgment, despite the fact that the case might remain pending against other defendants"). The Eleventh Circuit alluded to this approach in 2004, saying that Rule 41 "allows a plaintiff to dismiss all of his claims against a particular defendant." Klay v. United Healthgroup, Inc. , 376 F.3d 1092, 1106 (11th Cir. 2004).
The Eleventh Circuit adopted all decisions the Fifth Circuit issued before October 1, 1981. See Bonner v. City of Prichard , 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc).
Since Perry did not overrule either Klay or Plains Growers , all three cases are binding on this Court. See Stevenson v. Equifax Info. Servs., LLC , No. 2:20-CV-330-TFM-N, 2021 WL 1413085, at *1 (S.D. Ala. Apr. 14, 2021) ("Nothing about Perry makes it clear that it is overruling longstanding precedent in Plains Growers and Klay ."). Interpreted together, Klay, Plains Growers , and Perry explain that a Rule 41(a)(1) "action" means "the universe of claims against a particular defendant." Jackson v. Equifax Info. Servs. , LLC, No. CV 119-096, 2020 WL 476698, at *2 (S.D. Ga. Jan. 29, 2020). This definition reconciles Klay and Plains Growers , which allowed dismissal of less than all defendants, with Perry , which found dismissal of less than all claims against any one defendant improper. See Ryan v. Occidental Petrol. Corp. , 577 F.2d 298, 301–02 (5th Cir. 1978) (holding that it was not proper for a plaintiff to dismiss part of his claims against a single defendant). "Put simply, Rule 41 allows a plaintiff to dismiss all of his claims against a particular defendant," but does not "permit plaintiffs to pick and choose, dismissing only particular claims within an action." Klay , 376 F.3d at 1106.
While district courts within the Eleventh Circuit have come to different conclusions on this issue, the majority agree that dismissal of less than all defendants is proper under Rule 41(a)(1). See Rainey-Jones v. Charlie Norwood VA Med. Ctr. , No. CV 119-186, 2020 WL 5370958, at *1 (S.D. Ga. Sept. 8, 2020) (concluding that a stipulation of dismissal was valid to the extent it dismissed all claims against a particular defendant, but invalid to the extent it attempted to dismiss some but not all claims against a defendant); Jackson , 2020 WL 476698, at *2 (concluding that a stipulated dismissal of less than all defendants was proper); A&J Mfg., LLC v. L.A.D. Glob. Enter., Inc. , No. 2:17-CV-50, 2019 WL 125374, at *1 & n.1 (S.D. Ga. Jan. 7, 2019) (finding voluntary dismissal of a single defendant in a multi-defendant suit permissible); Guangzhou Huachao Silver Asset Ltd. Co. v. STSC Enter. Sols. , No. 1:17-CV-1597-RWS, 2018 WL 10128073, at *1 (N.D. Ga. Apr. 20, 2018) (same); Newmont Ghana Gold Ltd. v. Hiller Sys., Inc. , No. 3:11-CV-140, 2011 WL 2648598, at *2 (N.D. Fla. July 6, 2011) (Rodgers, C.J.) (same); see also First Acceptance Ins. Co., Inc. v. Vanderlisa Rosser , No. 2:20-CV-554-TFM-C, 2021 WL 2556151, at *1 (S.D. Ala. June 21, 2021) (considering Plains Growers and Perry and finding that a court "may still dismiss all claims against a single defendant in a multi-defendant action under Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(2) when requested by a plaintiff").
There is no textual reason to distinguish the permissible scope of dismissals under Rule 41(a)(1) and 41(a)(2). See Plains Growers , 474 F.2d at 254 (finding "little merit in an argument that" the "word ‘action’ mean[s] ‘all’ in 41(a)(1) and mean[s] less than ‘all’ in 41(a)(2)"); cf. Anago Franchising , 677 F.3d at 1278 (noting that the "Rules make no distinction" between stipulations and dismissals that would require treating one as self-executing and not the other).
The minority position reasons that, under Perry , any attempted dismissal that leaves part of the case pending is improper. See, e.g. , West v. Zacharzewski , No. 2:18-CV-14155, 2019 WL 3426321, at *1 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 18, 2019) (Rosenberg, J.). This approach is not without appeal. See Corley v. Long-Lewis, Inc. , 965 F.3d 1222, 1236 (11th Cir. 2020) (Pryor, C.J., concurring) ("The rule contemplates the voluntary dismissal of ‘an action,’ ... which, we have explained, refers to ‘the whole case’ instead of particular claims" (citation omitted)). However, it requires assuming that Perry silently overruled Plains Growers and Klay. Yet, "[b]efore a lower court makes the assumption of a tacit overruling, it will want to exhaust all possibilities of reconciling the two decisions." Bryan A. Garner, The Law of Judicial Precedent § 36, at 300–02 (2016) ("If at all possible the opinions should be harmonized."); see Corley , 965 F.3d at 1231 (explaining that, to the extent Eleventh Circuit cases cannot be harmonized, the earlier precedent governs (citing CSX Transp., Inc. v. Gen. Mills , 846 F.3d 1333, 1340 (11th Cir. 2017) ).
Admittedly, the majority's definition of "action" is not intuitive or immediately apparent from the text of Rule 41. But see Charles A. Wright & Arthur A. Miller, Fed. Prac. & Proc. § 2362 (4th ed. 2021) (describing this as "the sounder view" supported by "the weight of judicial authority"); Nat'l City Golf Fin. v. Scott , 899 F.3d 412, 415 n.3 (5th Cir. 2018) (continuing to apply Plains Growers to find that, in "a multi-defendant suit, the plaintiff may single out a party for dismissal"). That said, the undersigned agrees that it is the best way of reconciling the opinions that bind this Court.
II. ANALYSIS
Having determined that "an action" under Rule 41 refers to all a plaintiff's claims against any one defendant, applying that definition here is simple. Walker filed a "stipulation of dismissal" that is "signed by all parties who have appeared," Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(ii), and it seeks to dismiss the "universe of claims against a particular defendant." Jackson , 2020 WL 476698, at *2 ; (Doc. 34). The stipulation specifies that "all individual claims of Plaintiff in this action against Equifax are dismissed with prejudice." (Id. ) Accordingly, Walker has complied with Rule 41(a), voluntarily dismissing "an action." This dismissal is self-executing. See Anago Franchising , 677 F.3d. at 1278. Equifax is due to be terminated from this action.
Accordingly, the Clerk is directed to TERMINATE Equifax Information Services, LLC, as a defendant to this action.
ORDERED in Tampa, Florida, on November 18, 2021.