Opinion
C/A No. 3:19-cv-02558-JMC-JDA
09-24-2019
David Richard Walker, Jr., Plaintiff, v. Robert M. Dudek, David R. Alexander, Bryan P. Stirling, Henry D. McMaster, Robert M. Madsen, Sarah A. Mauldin, Shannon M. O'Cain, Thomas E. Huff, Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
David Richard Walker, Jr., ("Plaintiff"), proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, brought this civil action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff is an inmate in the custody of the South Carolina Department of Corrections and is currently incarcerated at the Lieber Correctional Institution. Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2)(d), D.S.C., the undersigned Magistrate Judge is authorized to review such complaints for relief and submit findings and recommendations to the District Court. Having reviewed the Complaint in accordance with applicable law, the undersigned finds that this action is subject to summary dismissal.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff filed this civil rights action alleging that Defendants violated his rights under the First, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. [Doc. 1 at 6.] Plaintiff's verbose Complaint is difficult to decipher. However, the crux of this action appears to be Plaintiff's contention that Defendants Dudek and Alexander have litigated his criminal appeal in the state court, that he has not consented to their representation in his state court appeal, and that their purported representation on his behalf violates his rights under the Constitution. [Id. at 12.] Plaintiff makes a variety of confusing allegations against Defendants, claiming that they are all "associated with [a] network conspiring to unlawfully convict and imprison [him]" and otherwise harm him. [Id. at 13.] Plaintiff contends that he has endured "governmental abuse" which undercuts the integrity of his criminal appeal in the state court. [Id. at 7.]
Plaintiff contends that, prior to and upon his conviction in the state court, he indicated that he wished to remain pro se in his appeal, and he only wished to receive the assistance of counsel to help him with "Print-Out(s) of Information (from web), Type Hand-written Brief(s) and motion/s relevant within [his] appeal." [Id. at 12.] Petitioner contends, however, that Defendants Dudek and Alexander are appellate attorneys who purport to represent him, without his consent, on matters related to his criminal conviction and appeal in the South Carolina Court of Appeals. [Id. at 9.] Plaintiff contends that these two attorneys have violated his civil rights because he never retained them to represent him and they have violated their ethical duties in their purported representation of Plaintiff. [Id.] Plaintiff contends that he has the right to not accept the appointment of these attorneys to represent him in his appeal and that Defendant Huff, who is a judge on the South Carolina Court of Appeals, violated Plaintiff's rights by refusing to permit Plaintiff to proceed pro se. [Id. at 10.] Plaintiff appears to contend that each of the Defendants participated together in the unlawful litigation of his appeal and the unlawful representation of Defendants Dudek and Alexander, thereby violating Plaintiff's civil rights. [Id. at 11.] Plaintiff makes other similar allegations against the named Defendants.
For his relief, Plaintiff requests that the Court enter a preliminary and permanent injunction, ordering "that Appeal (Appellate No. 2017-000550) [briefs] filed and litigated by Attorneys Robert M. Dudek and David R. Alexander be strike[n], removed, and . . . refused [by] the SC Court [of] Appeals." [Id. at 21.] Plaintiff also seeks compensatory damages and punitive damages. [Id. at 22.] Plaintiff also asks for an order from this Court ordering Defendants Dudek and Alexander to terminate their representation of Plaintiff, ordering the South Carolina Court of Appeals to restart the appeal in that court without the assigned attorneys on the case, and ordering Defendants to relinquish all of Plaintiff's files in their possession. [Id.]
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Plaintiff is a prisoner under the definition in 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(c), and "seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity." 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). Thus, this Court is charged with screening Plaintiff's lawsuit to identify cognizable claims or to dismiss the Amended Complaint if (1) it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or (2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.
Because Plaintiff is a pro se litigant, his pleadings are accorded liberal construction and held to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by attorneys. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam). However, even under this less stringent standard, Plaintiff's Complaint is subject to summary dismissal. The mandated liberal construction afforded to pro se pleadings means that if the court can reasonably read the pleadings to state a valid claim on which Plaintiff could prevail, it should do so, but a district court may not rewrite a petition to include claims that were never presented, Barnett v. Hargett, 174 F.3d 1128, 1133 (10th Cir. 1999), or construct Plaintiff's legal arguments for him, Small v. Endicott, 998 F.2d 411, 417-18 (7th Cir. 1993), or "conjure up questions never squarely presented" to the court, Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985). The requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the court can ignore a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts which set forth a claim cognizable in a federal district court. See Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387, 391 (4th Cir. 1990).
DISCUSSION
Plaintiff filed this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which "'is not itself a source of substantive rights,' but merely provides 'a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.'" Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994) (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n.3 (1979)). A civil action under § 1983 "creates a private right of action to vindicate violations of 'rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws' of the United States." Rehberg v. Paulk, 566 U.S. 356, 361 (2012). To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).
Although the Court must liberally construe the pro se Complaint and Plaintiff is not required to plead facts sufficient to prove his case as an evidentiary matter in his pleadings, the Complaint "must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)); see also Francis v. Giacomelli, 588 F.3d 186, 193 (4th Cir. 2009) (explaining that a plaintiff may proceed into the litigation process only when his complaint is justified by both law and fact); cf. Skinner v. Switzer, 562 U.S. 521, 530 (2011) (holding that plaintiff need not pin his claim for relief to precise legal theory). "A claim has 'facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.'" Owens v. Baltimore City State's Attorneys Office, 767 F.3d 379, 388 (4th Cir. 2014).
A complaint must contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). As noted, although the court must liberally construe the pro se complaint, a plaintiff must do more than make conclusory statements to state a claim for relief. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677; Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Rather, the complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim that is plausible on its face, and the reviewing court need only accept as true the complaint's factual allegations, not its legal conclusions. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79; see also Adams v. Rice, 40 F.3d 72, 74-75 (4th Cir. 1994) (explaining that, although the court must liberally construe the pro se complaint, a plaintiff must do more than make mere conclusory statements to state a claim); White v. White, 886 F.2d 721, 723-74 (4th Cir.1989) (dismissing complaint dismissed because it "failed to contain any factual allegations tending to support his bare assertion"). While Plaintiff is not required to plead facts sufficient to prove his case as an evidentiary matter in the complaint, he must allege facts that support a claim for relief. Bass v. DuPont, 324 F.3d 761, 765 (4th Cir. 2003).
Here, Plaintiff's Complaint is subject to summary dismissal because each of the Defendants are entitled to dismissal and because he has failed to state a claim for relief. The Court will address each issue below.
Defendants are entitled to dismissal
Defendants are entitled to summary dismissal as Plaintiff's bare allegations against them fail to state a claim for relief and because Defendants are not persons under § 1983 or are entitled to immunity.
Defendants Dudek , Alexander , Madsen , Mauldin , and O'Cain
Plaintiff sues Defendants Dudek, Alexander, Madsen, Mauldin, and O'Cain. Each of these Defendants are attorneys, who in some capacity represent or have represented Plaintiff. Defendants Dudek and Alexander are attorneys with the South Carolina Commission of Indigent Defense and purportedly represent Plaintiff in his state court appeal. [Doc. 1 at 3-4, 9.] Defendants Madsen, Mauldin, and O'Cain are attorneys with the Lexington County Public Defender's Office, who assisted Plaintiff as standby counsel in his underlying criminal action. [Id. at 4-5, 11.]
Plaintiff's claims against these Defendants fail because they are not state actors for purposes of § 1983. As noted, in order to state a § 1983 claim, Plaintiff must allege that he was deprived of a constitutional right by a person acting under the color of state law. Dowe v. Total Action Against Poverty in Roanoke Valley, 145 F.3d 653, 658 (4th Cir. 1998). In Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312 (1981), the Supreme Court addressed the issue of "whether a public defender acts under color of state law when providing representation to an indigent client" and held that "a public defender does not act under color of state law when performing a lawyer's traditional functions as counsel to a defendant in a criminal proceeding." Id. at 317, 325; see also Hall v. Quillen, 631 F.2d 1154, 1156 (4th Cir. 1980) (concluding a court-appointed attorney was entitled to dismissal of the plaintiff's § 1983 claim against him for want of state action); Stroman v. S.C. Office of Appellate Def., 447 F. Supp. 2d 515, 518 (D.S.C. 2005) (finding a public appellate attorney was not acting under state law and was entitled to dismissal); Johnson v. Harris, 483 F. Supp. 710, 712 (D.Md. 1980) ("[C]ourt-appointed counsel in the normal situation do not act 'under color of' state law, for purposes of liability under § 1983, in undertaking representation of indigent defendants in criminal cases."). Simply put, these Defendants are entitled to be dismissed for lack of state action. See Curry v. South Carolina, 518 F. Supp. 2d 661, 667 (D.S.C. 2007) (explaining public defenders are not state actors under § 1983 and thus entitled to dismissal). Plaintiff has not made any allegations to plausibly show that these Defendants exceeded the "traditional functions as counsel." Polk Cty., 454 U.S. at 325; see also Trexler v. Giese, No. 3:09-cv-144-CMC-PJG, 2010 WL 104599, at *3 (D.S.C. Jan. 7, 2010) (finding attorney was entitled to summary dismissal in § 1983 action where attorney's representation in the state criminal case fell "squarely within the parameters of his legal representation" although the plaintiff was unhappy with the manner in which the attorney represented her). To the extent Petitioner is attempting to assert a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel, he has failed to allege a cognizable claim for relief. See Martin v. Burton, No. 0:12-cv-01088-RBH, 2012 WL 2502711, at *2 (D.S.C. June 28, 2012), aff'd, 485 F. App'x 634 (4th Cir. 2012). Accordingly, Defendants Dudek, Alexander, Madsen, Mauldin, and O'Cain are entitled to summary dismissal.
Defendant Huff
Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Thomas E. Huff is a judge on the South Carolina Court of Appeals. [Doc. 1 at 5.] Plaintiff contends that Judge Huff violated his rights because he permitted Defendants Dudek and Alexander to represent him, even though Judge Huff was obligated to order those Defendants "to immediately terminate their litigation/s and filing/s" on behalf of Plaintiff in the South Carolina Court of Appeals. [Id. at 10.]
Judge Huff has absolute judicial immunity from this civil action and should be dismissed from this case. It is well-settled that judges have absolute immunity from a claim for damages arising out of their judicial actions unless they acted in the complete absence of all jurisdiction. See Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9 (1991); Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 351-64 (1978); see also Chu v. Griffith, 771 F.2d 79, 81 (4th Cir. 1985) (explaining that if a challenged judicial act was unauthorized by law, the judge still has immunity from a suit seeking damages). Whether an act is judicial or non-judicial relates to the nature of the act, such as whether it is a function normally performed by a judge and whether the parties dealt with the judge in his judicial capacity. Mireles, 502 U.S. at 12. Immunity applies even when the judge's acts were in error, malicious, or in excess of his authority. Id. at 12-13. Immunity presents a threshold question. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 475 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). Absolute immunity is "an immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability." Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985).
Here, Plaintiff seems to allege that Judge Huff improperly appointed Defendants Dudek and Alexander to represent Plaintiff in his state court appeal and/or refused to terminate their appointment as Plaintiff's attorneys. These allegations relate to a judicial action. Thus, because the alleged misconduct of Judge Huff arose out of his judicial actions, judicial immunity squarely applies and should bar this lawsuit against him.
Defendants McMaster and Stirling
Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Stirling, as the executive director for the South Carolina Department of Corrections ("SCDC"), is obligated to correct any unlawful, uncivil, or unethical issue that pertains to an inmate in SCDC. [Doc. 1 at 10.] As such, according to Plaintiff, Defendant Stirling violated his rights because he failed to prevent the unlawful representation of Defendants Dudek and Alexander. [Id. at 10, 16.] Similarly, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant McMaster, as Governor of South Carolina, is obligated to ensure the integrity of the Government of South Carolina and should have prevented Defendants Dudek and Alexander from unlawfully representing Plaintiff in his appeal. [Id. at 17-18.]
Plaintiff's claims fail against these two Defendants. In his Complaint, Plaintiff makes no direct allegations against Defendants McMaster and Stirling about their personal involvement. Instead, Plaintiff makes only general, vague allegations about these Defendants' obligations over SCDC and the Government of South Carolina. "However, such general allegations, absent any specific facts of personal involvement in the events giving rise to this case, are insufficient to state a cognizable § 1983 claim." Tracey v. Nelson, No. 1:12-cv-1614-JMC-SVH, 2012 WL 4583107, at *2 (D.S.C. Aug. 31, 2012) (dismissing claims against the Governor of South Carolina and Director of SCDC), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2012 WL 4588205 (D.S.C. Oct. 1, 2012).
Further, construing Plaintiff's claims against these Defendants as one for supervisory liability, the undersigned notes that the doctrine of respondeat superior is not applicable in § 1983 actions. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676 ("Because vicarious liability is inapplicable to . . . § 1983 suits, a plaintiff must plead that each Government-official defendant, through the official's own individual actions, has violated the Constitution."); Carter v. Morris, 164 F.3d 215, 221 (4th Cir. 1999). To hold a supervisory official liable for constitutional injuries inflicted by their subordinates, certain criteria must be established. Shaw v. Stroud, 13 F.3d 791, 798 (4th Cir. 1994). Specifically, a plaintiff must show that the supervisory official was (1) actually or constructively aware of a risk of constitutional injury, (2) deliberately indifferent to that risk, and (3) that an affirmative causal link exists between the supervisor's inaction and the particular constitutional injury suffered by the plaintiff. Carter, 164 F.3d at 221. Here, the Complaint contains no plausible allegations against Defendants McMaster or Stirling to demonstrate that they were aware of, or deliberately indifferent to, any constitutional risk of injury to Plaintiff. As such, the Complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted against Defendants McMaster and Stirling, and they should be dismissed from this action on that basis. See London v. Maier, No. 0:10-cv-00434-RBH, 2010 WL 1428832, at *2 (D.S.C. Apr. 7, 2010); Ford v. Stirling, No. 2:17-cv-02390-MGL, 2017 WL 4803648, at *2 (D.S.C. Oct. 25, 2017).
Plaintiff's claims are subject to dismissal
Further, the Complaint as a whole is subject to summary dismissal because Plaintiff's claims are not properly before this Court based on the Younger abstention doctrine. Liberally construed, the Complaint appears to assert that Defendants have violated Plaintiff's constitutional rights in relation to his ongoing appeal of his criminal conviction in the state courts. Granting Plaintiff's requested relief would require this Court to interfere with or enjoin Plaintiff's pending state court proceedings. Indeed, Plaintiff specifically asks for injunctive relief from this Court, in which he requests an order requiring the state court to act with regard to the appointment of counsel on Plaintiff's behalf and with regard to briefs filed in the state court. As discussed below, because a federal court may not award relief that would affect pending state proceedings absent extraordinary circumstances, this Court should abstain from interfering with it.
In Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), the Supreme Court held that a federal court should not equitably interfere with state criminal proceedings "except in the most narrow and extraordinary of circumstances." Gilliam v. Foster, 75 F.3d 881, 903 (4th Cir. 1996) (en banc) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Younger Court noted that courts of equity should not act unless the moving party has no adequate remedy at law and will suffer irreparable injury if denied equitable relief. Younger, 401 U.S. at 43-44; see also Sprint Commc'ns, Inc. v. Jacobs, 571 U.S. 69, 72-73 (2013) (explaining the circumstances when Younger abstention is appropriate).
From Younger and its progeny, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has culled the following test to determine when abstention is appropriate: "[1] there are ongoing state judicial proceedings; [2] the proceedings implicate important state interests; and [3] there is an adequate opportunity to raise federal claims in the state proceedings." Martin Marietta Corp. v. Md. Comm'n on Human Relations, 38 F.3d 1392, 1396 (4th Cir. 1994) (citing Middlesex Cty. Ethics Comm'n v. Garden State Bar Ass'n, 457 U.S. 423, 432 (1982)). Here, Plaintiff is involved in ongoing state proceedings related to an appeal of his conviction, and Plaintiff asks this Court to award relief for alleged constitutional violations; thus, the first element is satisfied. The second element is satisfied for reasons the Supreme Court has explained: "[T]he States' interest in administering their criminal justice systems free from federal interference is one of the most powerful of the considerations that should influence a court considering equitable types of relief." Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 36, 49 (1986). The third element is also satisfied, as Plaintiff can raise the issue of his pro se status and counsels' continued representation of him in the state court.
A ruling in Plaintiff's favor in this case would call into question the validity of the state court proceedings involving Plaintiff's criminal appeal and would significantly interfere with those ongoing state proceedings. See Younger, 401 U.S. at 43-45; Cinema Blue of Charlotte, Inc. v. Gilchrist, 887 F.2d 49, 52 (4th Cir. 1989) ("[F]ederal courts should abstain from the decision of constitutional challenges to state action, however meritorious the complaint may be, 'whenever [the] federal claims have been or could be presented in ongoing state judicial proceedings that concern important state interests.'") (citation omitted); Washington v. Tilton, No. 2:10-cv-997-HFF-RSC, 2010 WL 2084383, at *1 (D.S.C. May 19, 2010). This Court finds that Plaintiff can raise his federal constitutional rights in the state court proceedings. Thus, this Court should abstain from hearing this action. See Nivens v. Gilchrist, 444 F.3d 237, 247 (4th Cir. 2006) (explaining that "when a district court abstains from a case based on Younger, it should typically dismiss the case with prejudice; not on the merits").
CONCLUSION
Consequently, for the reasons stated above, it is recommended that the District Court dismiss this action without issuance and service of process pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.
The undersigned finds that Plaintiff cannot cure the defects in his Complaint by mere amendment and therefore recommends that the instant action be dismissed without affording Plaintiff an opportunity to amend because amendment would be futile. See Goode v. Cent. Va. Legal Aid Soc'y, Inc., 807 F.3d 619, 624 (4th Cir. 2015); Thomas v. Drive Auto. Indus. of Am., Inc., No. 6:18-cv-169-AMQ, 2018 WL 5258811, at *2 (D.S.C. July 25, 2018) (declining to automatically give plaintiff leave to amend pursuant to Goode because plaintiff could not cure the defects in his claims against defendant by mere amendment), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2018 WL 5255183 (D.S.C. Oct. 22, 2018); Workman v. Kernell, No. 6:18-cv-00355-RBH-KFM, 2018 WL 4826535, at *2 (D.S.C. Oct. 2, 2018) (declining to give plaintiff leave to amend because it would be futile for plaintiff to amend his complaint against the defendants being dismissed), aff'd, 766 F. App'x 1 (4th Cir. 2019). Here, Plaintiff's state court appeal remains pending at this time, and he is able to raise the issues complained of herein regarding counsel's representation with the state court. Further, dismissal without leave to amend is proper because Defendants are not state actors or are immune from suite under § 1983, and Plaintiff would be unable to allege facts to show that these Defendants are proper Defendants in such an action.
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
s/ Jacquelyn D. Austin
United States Magistrate Judge September 24, 2019
Greenville, South Carolina
Plaintiff's attention is directed to the important notice on the next page.
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. "[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must 'only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'" Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
300 East Washington Street, Room 239
Greenville, South Carolina 29601
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).