Opinion
No. X02 UWY-CV-06-4012839-S
March 27, 2009
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS TO STRIKE
I. BACKGROUND
The plaintiffs bring this action in eighteen counts. Counts Two, Nine, Fourteen and Fifteen are brought under the Connecticut Environmental Protection Act, Connecticut General Statutes Sec. 22a-16, et seq. (hereinafter referred to as "CEPA"), which was adopted in 1971. The remainder of the plaintiffs' claims sound in nuisance, including public nuisance (Counts One and Ten) and private nuisance (Counts Three through Eight, Eleven through Thirteen and Sixteen through Eighteen).
The plaintiffs seek to have a reinforced pipe, that was installed more than two decades ago, removed and reinstalled. They seek to have the bottom of the ditch cleaned out and the stone liner of a channel reinstalled. The plaintiffs believe that these measures will remedy the conditions which allegedly cause flooding in their neighborhood. The plaintiffs seek damages and an injunction.
All defendants have moved to strike the case from the jury case on the same grounds. Therefore, the court will address all of the motions in one memorandum of decision which shall apply with equal force to all motions.
The matter was argued before the court on March 26, 2009. Defendants argue that the complaint essentially seeks equitable relief and, therefore, should be tried to the court. Plaintiffs argue that the private nuisance claim was triable to a jury in 1818 and, therefore, there is a constitutional right to a jury with respect to that claim. Plaintiffs concede that there is no right to a jury on either the public nuisance claim or the CEPA claim. Defendants argued that the damage claim amounted to approximately $3,000.00 based upon the answers to interrogatories and the testimony, by way of deposition, of all of the plaintiffs. Plaintiffs did not contest this representation in their argument. They did indicate that the damage aspect was a smaller part of the case compared to the injunctive relief requested. The Court reserved decision in the matter.
II. DISCUSSION
"No party has a constitutional right to a trial by jury of any action not so triable in 1818, when the constitution was adopted." U.S. Fidelity Guaranty Co. v. Spring Brook Farm Dairy, Inc., 135 Conn. 294, 297, 64 A.2d 39 (1949). Further, C.G.S. Sec. 52-215 provides, in relevant part, that "all cases . . . including . . . special statutory proceedings which, prior to January 1, 1880, were not triable by jury, shall be entered on the docket as court cases, and shall . . . be disposed of as court cases." The relief which a court may give under CEPA is exclusively equitable. Notably, the CEPA statute does not provide for a trial to a jury or money damages. Therefore, this claim, which did not exist before 1971 cannot be tried to a jury. Likewise, as plaintiffs conceded in oral argument, the public nuisance claim must be tried to the court.
The remaining claim in the complaint sounds in private nuisance. Plaintiffs argue that, since this claim existed in 1818 and was tried to a jury, it still exists as a jury case today. Defendants respond that, although private nuisance may be decided by a jury, where the nature of a claim is the abatement of the nuisance, the equity powers of the court are invoked. O'Neill v. Carolina Freight Carriers Corporation, 156 Conn. 613, 244 A.2d 372 (1968). They argue that the present case essentially asks the court to issue an injunction to abate the alleged nuisance. They further argue that the damages claim is very small, and is dominated by the equitable claim. Further, they claim that many nuisance claims, which sought equitable relief, were tried to the court before 1818.
When legal and equitable issues are combined in a single action, whether the right to a jury trial attaches depends upon the relative importance of the two types of claims. Where incidental issues of fact are presented in an action essentially equitable, the court may determine them without a jury in the exercise of equitable powers. Doris v. McFarland, 113 Conn. 594, 608, 156 A. 52 (1931). Where, however, the essential basis of the action is such that the issues presented would be properly cognizable in an action of law, either party has a right to have the legal issues tried to the jury, even though equitable relief is asked, in order to give full effect to the legal rights claimed. Berry v. Hartford National Bank Trust Co., CT Page 5764 125 Conn. 615, 618, 7 A.2d 847 (1939).
The Court, upon review of the pleadings and claims made in this action, rules that the action is predominately equitable, seeking injunctive relief. Plaintiffs stressed the importance of the injunctive relief in their argument to the Court. The CEPA Counts and the Public Nuisance counts are unquestionably equitable in nature. The Private Nuisance count seeks damages of around $3,000.00. The action is essentially equitable with incidental issues of fact which may relate to a small amount of money damages. The prevailing issue in the relief sought is the request for injunctive relief. "Equitable actions, therefore, are not within the constitutional guaranty of trial by jury." Evans v. General Motors, 277 Conn. 496, 509-10, 893 A.2d 371 (2006). An action in equity is "conspicuously inappropriate to a trial by jury." Hall v. Smedley Co., 112 Conn. 115, 117, 151 A. 321 (1930). "It is well settled that there is no right to a jury trial in an equitable action . . . the form of relief sought is not dispositive [but] it is certainly a relevant factor." Gaudio v. Gaudio, 23 Conn.App. 287, 301, 302-03, 580 A.2d 1212 (1990).
III. CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing reasons, the Defendants' Motions to Strike the case from the jury docket are granted. The case will commence on April 28, 2009, as a court-side matter.