Summary
In Landregan v. Peppin, 86 Cal. 122, the owner of the land was William Minto and the assessment was to William Minto Co., and it was held that the assessment was binding upon the property and the tax deed made under it was valid.
Summary of this case from Escondido High School District of San Diego County v. Escondido Seminary of University of Southern CaliforniaOpinion
JUDGES: WORKS, J. We concur: THORNTON, J.; FOX, J.; SHARPSTEIN, J. BEATTY, C.J. (dissenting). McFARLAND, J. (dissenting).
OPINION
WORKS, Judge
On petition for rehearing. For former opinion see ante, 649.
A rehearing is denied. The petition in this case is discourteous and disrespectful in some of it language. However the individual members of the court may regard such conduct on the part of attorneys as affecting them, personally, it is an offense against the court that cannot be allowed to pass without rebuke. An attorney who has a sufficient understanding of his high calling, and the respect due to the court, as well as the respect due to his profession, should not so far forget himself as to use such language. Because of the important question presented we have carefully considered the points made, notwithstanding the manner in which they were presented in the petition. But, having done this, out of consideration for the better feelings of counsel who filed it, as well as to prevent a recurrence of a like offense, the objectionable language should not be perpetuated as a part of the records of the court. It is therefore ordered that the petition for rehearing be and the same is hereby stricken from the files.
We concur: THORNTON, J.; FOX, J.; SHARPSTEIN, J.
DISSENT:
BEATTY; McFARLAND
BEATTY, C.J. (dissenting.) I did not participate in the decision of this case, owing to want of opportunity to examine it within the time allowed for a decision. Since the petition for rehearing, I have considered it carefully, and I am able to concur in the judgment or the order refusing a rehearing. I think that section 94, of the Civil Code defines extreme cruelty, and that by such definition it consists of either -- First, the infliction of grievous bodily harm; or second, the infliction of grievous mental suffering. This definition was, I think, intended by the legislature to be complete, and this conclusion is not invalidated by what must be conceded to be true, viz.: that the acts or words causing the mental suffering or bodily injury must be not only intended but unjustifiable. These qualities of the acts of cruelty are sufficiently implied by the word "infliction." In this view the finding of the superior court comes up to the law, and nothing more can be required. The testimony, in my opinion, is sufficient to support the finding. It is possible that the application of the epithets testified to by a man to his wife in the presence of third parties might not cause her grievous mental suffering, but, on the other hand they probably would; and in this case the superior court has found that they did, in fact cause such suffering, unless this conclusion is negatived by the other fact found that her bodily health was not affected. But this, in my opinion was not essential as a test of degree of suffering contemplated by the statute. While dissenting from the judgment of the court and the order refusing a rehearing upon the grounds thus briefly indicated, I concur in the view that some of the language employed by counsel in their petition for rehearing was intemperate, and improper to go upon the records of the court.
McFARLAND, J. I dissent from the order denying a rehearing, and adhere to the views expressed in my former dissenting opinion. I concur in the views of the majority of the court as to the objectionable language used in the petition for rehearing.