Opinion
3:23-cv-01518-SB
03-05-2024
JULIE WAGGONER, Plaintiff, v. AMERICAN MEDICAL RESPONSE NORTHWEST, INC., Defendant.
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION
HON. STACIE F. BECKERMAN UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Plaintiff Julie Waggoner (“Waggoner”) alleges claims for religious discrimination against her former employer, American Medical Response Northwest, Inc. (“AMR”), under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”) and Oregon Revised Statute § 659A.030. Now before the Court is AMR's motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. (ECF No. 6.)
The Court has jurisdiction over Waggoner's claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1367, but the parties have not consented to the jurisdiction of a magistrate judge under 28 U.S.C. § 636. For the reasons that follow, the Court recommends that the district judge grant AMR's motion to dismiss.
Waggoner pleads these facts in her complaint and the Court assumes they are true for the purpose of deciding this motion. See Daniels-Hall v. Nat'l Educ. Ass'n, 629 F.3d 992, 998 (9th Cir. 2010) (noting that when reviewing a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, a court must “accept as true all well-pleaded allegations of material fact, and construe them in the light most favorable to the non-moving party”) (citation omitted).
Waggoner worked for AMR for many years. (Compl. ¶ 5, ECF No. 1.) For the first eighteen months of the COVID-19 (“COVID”) pandemic, Waggoner “scrupulously followed all rules and regulations to protect against infection, which included the wearing of personal protective equipment (PPE), hand-washing and other hygiene protocols, social distancing when possible, and quarantining when necessary.” (Id. ¶ 10.) In the summer of 2021 and in response to COVID, AMR implemented a vaccine mandate with a corresponding process for individuals to apply for a religious exemption. (Id. ¶ 12.)
Waggoner alleges that she is a devout Christian and accordingly “had serious objections to taking the vaccine because it would constitute violating her bodily integrity and tainting the purity of her body per her interpretation of her faith” and because she “believes that life begins at conception and because the COVID-19 vaccines were either tested on, or manufactured with aborted fetal cells[.]” (Id. ¶¶ 6, 12.) On September 19, 2021, Waggoner applied for a religious exemption. (Id. ¶ 12.) AMR granted her request for a religious exemption with the condition that she “wear an N95 mask (rather than a cloth or surgical mask), . . . undergo unreimbursed COVID-19 testing once weekly, and . . . eat and drink outside of the AMR facilities.” (Id. ¶ 13.) Waggoner considered the accommodation to be “unacceptable.” (Id.) Thereafter, AMR placed Waggoner on unpaid leave and subsequently terminated her employment. (Id.)
Waggoner asserts claims for religious discrimination under Title VII and under Oregon Revised Statute § 659A.030 and seeks $400,000 in economic and non-economic damages, in addition to punitive damages and attorney's fees. (Id. at 5-8.)
LEGAL STANDARDS
To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a plaintiff's “complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “The plausibility standard is not akin to a probability requirement, but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. (simplified).
DISCUSSION
AMR moves for dismissal of all claims pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). (Def.'s Mot. Dismiss (“Def.'s Mot.”) at 2, ECF No. 6.) Waggoner argues that she has alleged sufficient facts to state a claim. (Pl.'s Resp. Def.'s Mot. Dismiss (“Pl.'s Resp.”) at 5, ECF No. 7.)
I. APPLICABLE LAW
Waggoner asserts claims for religious discrimination under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., and under Oregon Revised Statute § 659A.030. (Compl. at 5-7.) The parties agree that the same legal requirements apply to both Title VII and Oregon Revised Statute § 659A.030. (See Def.'s Mot. at 4 n.2; Pl.'s Resp. at 4 n.1); see also Heller v. EBB Auto Co., 8 F.3d 1433, 1437 n.2 (9th Cir. 1993) (“Courts construe Oregon's statutory counterpart, [Oregon Revised Statute] § 659.030 (1992), as identical to Title VII. Accordingly, [the plaintiff]'s state statutory claim succeeds or fails with [the plaintiff's] Title VII claim.”) (citations omitted); El v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., No. 3:19-cv-333-SI, 2020 WL 2616397, at *3 (D. Or. May 22, 2020) (“Claims brought under this statute [Oregon Revised Statute § 659A.030] are analyzed under the same framework as claims brought under Title VII[.]”) (citations omitted).
Under Title VII, a plaintiff alleging religious discrimination based on a failure to accommodate “must first set forth a prima facie case that (1) [the plaintiff] had a bona fide religious belief, the practice of which conflicts with an employment duty; (2) [the plaintiff] informed [the] employer of the belief and conflict; and (3) the employer discharged, threatened, or otherwise subjected [the plaintiff] to an adverse employment action because of [the plaintiff's] inability to fulfill the job requirement.” Berry v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 447 F.3d 642, 655 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Peterson v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 358 F.3d 599, 606 (9th Cir. 2004)). If a plaintiff makes out a prima facie failure-to-accommodate case, “the burden shifts to the [employer] to show that ‘it initiated good faith efforts to accommodate reasonably the employee's religious practices or that it could not reasonably accommodate the employee without undue hardship.'” Id. (citing Peterson, 358 F.3d at 606).
Title VII “requires an employer to accommodate the religious beliefs of an employee in a manner which will reasonably preserve that employee's employment status, i.e., compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment.” Am. Postal Workers Union, S.F. Loc. v. Postmaster Gen., 781 F.2d 772, 776 (9th Cir. 1986). “Accordingly, where a certain aspect of an employment situation creates a religious conflict for a particular employee, the employer must take some initial step to reasonably accommodate the religious belief of that employee.” Id.(citing Burns v. S. Pac. Transp. Co., 589 F.2d 403, 405 (9th Cir. 1978)). “If the accommodation proposed by the employer fails to eliminate the employee's religious conflict, the employer must implement an alternate accommodation proposed by the employee, unless implementation of that accommodation would cause ‘undue hardship' to the employer.” Id. (citing Burns, 589 F.2d at 405).
The Supreme Court recently clarified Title VII's standard for “undue hardship.” See Groff v. DeJoy, 600 U.S. 447 (2023). Plaintiff argues that Groff's analysis applies here (Pl.'s Resp. at 4-8), but the “undue hardship” standard applies only if the employer's proposed accommodation fails to eliminate the employee's religious conflict. As discussed further herein, AMR's accommodation eliminated Waggoner's religious conflict and thus Groff does not apply.
“Where an employer proposes an accommodation which effectively eliminates the religious conflict faced by a particular employee, however, the inquiry under Title VII reduces to whether the accommodation reasonably preserves the affected employee's employment status.” Id. at 776-77. “If a proposed accommodation eliminates the employee's religious conflict and the employee rejects the accommodation ‘solely on secular grounds,' Title VII does not require the employer to accept an alternative proposed accommodation.” Mathisen v. Or. Health & Sci. Univ., No. 3:22-cv-1250-SI, 2023 WL 6147099, at *5 (D. Or. Sept. 20, 2023) (citing Am. Postal Workers Union, 781 F.2d at 776); see also Ansonia Bd. of Educ. v. Philbrook, 479 U.S. 68 (1986) (“We find no basis in either the [Title VII] statute or its legislative history for requiring an employer to choose any particular reasonable accommodation. By its very terms the statute directs that any reasonable accommodation by the employer is sufficient to meet its accommodation obligation.... Thus, where the employer has already reasonably accommodated the employee's religious needs, the statutory inquiry is at an end.”).
II. ANALYSIS
Waggoner alleges that her religious beliefs prevent her from getting the COVID vaccine. (Compl. ¶¶ 6, 12.) However, Waggoner acknowledges that AMR offered to accommodate her religious objection by not requiring her to receive the COVID vaccine, so long as she wore an N95 mask at work, participated in regular testing, and ate meals outside the AMR facility. (See id. ¶ 13.) The accommodation AMR offered Waggoner allowed her to refuse the COVID vaccine, which “effectively eliminated the religious conflict[.]” Am. Postal Workers Union, 781 F.2d at 776.
Waggoner alleges that she rejected AMR's proposed accommodations because they were “unacceptable” and because she was being treated differently than the vaccinated staff, not because the accommodation failed to eliminate her religious objection. (Compl. ¶ 13.) Waggoner does not allege that she has a religious objection to masking or testing. (See id. ¶¶ 10, 21, 27, noting that she wore personal protective equipment, underwent regular testing, and followed all COVID-related rules and regulations for eighteen months.) Thus, Waggoner has not alleged that AMR's accommodation failed to eliminate Waggoner's religious conflict. See Mathisen, 2023 WL 6147099, at *5 (“Plaintiff's assertion that masking would not promote safety is a secular objection, not a religious one. That objection, therefore, does not establish that the offered accommodation to her religious objection was not reasonable for purposes of her claim of religious discrimination.”).
Waggoner also does not “plausibly allege[] that the offered accommodation was discriminatory (e.g., that masking was offered as an accommodation to employees who objected to receiving a vaccination on religious grounds but was not offered to those who objected on other grounds).” Id. (citing Ansonia, 479 U.S. at 70-71); see also Penna v. N. Clackamas Sch. Dist., No. 3:22-cv-01417-YY, 2023 WL 6003834, at *2 (D. Or. Aug. 11, 2023) (“[T]o the extent plaintiff argues that he was subject to discriminatory treatment because he was required to wear a mask, distance himself from others during lunchtime, and test for COVID-19, these policies do not support a Title VII violation.”) (citations omitted), findings and recommendation adopted as modified, 2023 WL 6850268 (D. Or. Oct. 17, 2023). Waggoner also has not alleged that wearing an N95 mask at work, participating in regular testing, and eating meals outside the AMR facility “would not have ‘reasonably preserved' her employment status.” Mathisen, 2023 WL 6147099, at *5 (citing Am. Postal Workers Union, 781 F.2d at 776-77).
As such, Waggoner's allegations do not support her claim that AMR subjected her to an adverse employment action (i.e., unpaid leave and eventual termination) because of her religious beliefs, but rather because of her refusal to wear an N95 mask, test, and eat outside. See id.; see also Bartholomew v. Washington, No. 3:23-cv-05209-DGE, 2023 WL 6471627, at *4 (W.D. Wash. Sept. 21, 2023) (“[T]he Court finds that Plaintiff was offered a reasonable accommodation for his religious beliefs, which he refused, and therefore fails to state a claim for failure to accommodate under . . . Title VII[.]”); Burcham v. City of L.A., 562 F.Supp.3d 694, 708 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 7, 2022) (dismissing Title VII claim and holding that the plaintiffs failed to establish a prima facie case of religious discrimination because although they “allege that they have submitted requests for religious exemptions, at no point in the [complaint] do they state that those requests have been denied” and therefore the “[p]laintiffs do not plausibly allege that [the d]efendants have discriminated, or threatened to discriminate, against them”); cf. George v. Grossmont Cuyamaca Cmty. Coll. Dist. Bd. of Governors, No. 22-cv-0424-BAS-DDL, 2022 WL 16722357, at *18-19 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 4, 2022) (denying motion for preliminary injunction and holding that the plaintiffs could not identify an adverse employment action under Title VII where they “all ha[d] received religious exemptions” to a COVID vaccine mandate and therefore the plaintiffs “fail[ed] to raise even serious questions going to the merits of their Title VII claim”).
Waggoner appears to suggest that any accommodation would have been unreasonable, and that AMR should have permitted her to continue to work without a COVID vaccine and without any other conditions. (Compl. ¶ 15.) However, where Waggoner acknowledges in her pleading that AMR offered her an accommodation that eliminated the conflict between the vaccine requirement and Waggoner's religious beliefs and does not allege that the accommodation failed reasonably to preserve her employment status, the Court finds that AMR's accommodation was reasonable as a matter of law. See Ansonia, 479 U.S. at 70; Mathisen, 2023 WL 6147099, at *5 (dismissing the plaintiff's Title VII claim where the plaintiff's objection to masking “does not establish that the offered accommodation to [the plaintiff's] religious objection was not reasonable for purposes of her claim of religious discrimination” (citing Am. Postal Workers Union, 781 F.2d at 776-77 and Ansonia, 479 U.S. at 68); Breshears v. Or. Dep't of Transp., No. 2:22-cv-01015-SB, 2023 WL 136550, at *4 (D. Or. Jan. 9, 2023) (“Here, [the defendant] offered [the plaintiff] an accommodation-masking-that eliminated the conflict between [the defendant's] vaccine requirement and [the plaintiff's] religious beliefs, and [the defendant's] accommodation for [the plaintiff's] religious beliefs was reasonable as a matter of law.” (citing, inter alia, Ansonia, 479 U.S. at 70)).
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, the Court recommends that the district judge GRANT AMR's motion to dismiss (ECF No. 6), and allow Waggoner to file an amended complaint if she can cure the deficiencies identified herein.
SCHEDULING ORDER
The Court will refer its Findings and Recommendation to a district judge. Objections, if any, are due within fourteen (14) days. If no objections are filed, the Findings and Recommendation will go under advisement on that date. If objections are filed, a response is due within fourteen (14) days. When the response is due or filed, whichever date is earlier, the Findings and Recommendation will go under advisement.