Opinion
CIVIL ACTION NO. 03-1526
September 16, 2003
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
AND NOW, this ___ day of September, 2003, upon consideration of the Motion for Preliminary Injunction and Petition for Order to Show Cause filed on August 15, 2003 by Lauren W., James W., and Jean W. ("Plaintiff") (Docket Entry No. 22), the Response in Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for Preliminary Injunction filed on August 29, 2003 by Dr. John A. Deflaminis, et al. ("District") (Docket Entry No. 26), the Motion to Dismiss Count I of Amended Counterclaim filed on July 23, 2003 by Plaintiff (Docket Entry No. 14), the Response to Motion to Dismiss Count I of Amended Counterclaim filed on August 6, 2003 by District (Docket Entry No. 19), and the oral argument presented at the September 2, 2003 hearing, it is hereby ORDERED that the Motion for Preliminary Injunction is GRANTED in part, the Petition for Order to Show Cause is DENIED, and the Motion to Dismiss is DENIED for the reasons that follow.
I. STANDARD OF REVIEW
A. Civil Contempt
To establish civil contempt, a plaintiff must prove the following elements by clear and convincing evidence: (1) that a valid order of the court existed; (2) that the defendants had knowledge of the order; and (3) that the defendants disobeyed the order.Calvin Klein Co. v. Fashion Industries, Inc., 1982 WL 123, *2 (D.N.J., Jan 28, 1982). A person is liable for civil contempt if he violates a court order with actual notice that the order has been issued. Ouinter v. Volkswagen of America 676 F.2d 969, 973 (3rd Cir. 1982). It is not necessary, however, that the person be formally served with the order or that the violation be willful or intentional. Id. Civil contempt is remedial in nature, and serves the purpose of the parties to the action.McComb v. Jacksonville Paper Co., 336 U.S. 187, 191 (1949). It is intended to coerce "compliance with an order of the court or to compensate for losses or damages sustained by reason of noncompliance."Calvin Klein Co. v. Fashion Industries, Inc., 1982 WL 123, *2 (D.N.J., Jan 28, 1982) citing McComb v. Jacksonville Paper Co., 336 U.S. at 191.
B.Preliminary Injunction
Generally, in addressing a request for a preliminary injunction, a court assesses whether there is a reasonable probability the movant will succeed on the merits; whether denial of relief will result in irreparable harm to the movant; whether granting relief will result in greater harm to the non-movant; and, whether granting relief would be in the public interest. See ACLU v. Reno, 217 F.3d 162, 172 (3d Cir. 2000). The movant bears the burden of demonstrating each of these elements. See Adams v. Freedom Forge Corp., 204 F.3d 475, 486 (3d Cir. 2000). All four factors should favor a preliminary injunction before such exceptional relief is granted. See Nutrasweet Co. v. Vit-Mar Enterprises, Inc., 176 F.3d 151, 153 (3d Cir. 1999). As this Court previously noted, the usual requirements for an injunction to issue do not apply to the present case because § 1415(j) of the IDEA functions as an automatic preliminary injunction. Lauren W. v. Bd. of Educ. of the Radnor Twp. Sch. Dist, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18303 (E.D.Pa. Sept. 12, 2002) citing Drinker v. Colonial School District, 78 F.3d 859, 864 (3d. Cir. 1996). There is no dispute that Lauren is covered under the IDEA. As a result, she is entitled to the injunctive protection of § 1415(j).
B. Motion To Dismiss, Rule 12(b)(6)
Dismissal for failure to state a claim is appropriate when it clearly appears that plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of the claim which would entitle him to relief. See Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957); Robb v. City of Philadelphia, 733 F.2d 286, 290 (3d Cir. 1984). Such a motion tests the legal sufficiency of a claim while accepting the veracity of the claimant's allegations. See Markowitz v. Northeast Land Co., 906 F.2d 100, 103 (3d Cir. 1990); Sturm v. Clark, 835 F.2d 1009, 1011 (3d Cir. 1987); Winterberg v. CNA Ins. Co., 868 F. Supp. 713, 718 (E.D. Pa. 1994), aff'd, 72 F.3d 318 (3d Cir. 1995). A court, however, need not credit conclusory allegations or legal conclusions in deciding a motion to dismiss. See General Motors Corp. v. New A.C. Chevrolet, Inc., 263 F.3d 296, 333 (3d Cir. 2001); Morse v. Lower Merion School Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997): L.S.T., Inc. v. Crow. 49 F.3d 679. 683-84 11th Cir. 1995). A claim may be dismissed when the facts alleged and the reasonable inferences therefrom are legally insufficient to support the relief sought. See Pennsylvania ex rel. Zimmerman v. PepsiCo., Inc., 836 F.2d 173, 179 (3d Cir. 1988). If upon an ultimate determination of the proposed IEP, it is deemed appropriate, the legal sufficiency of the District's claim of unjust enrichment may entitle it to relief. II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
This Court previously articulated the following findings of fact and conclusions of law to which the parties stipulated. Lauren W. v. Bd. of Educ. of the Radnor Twp. Sch. Dist., 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18303 (E.D.Pa., Sept. 12, 2002.) The plaintiff, Lauren W., who resides within the Radnor Township School District ("the District") has been diagnosed as suffering from a variety of conditions including autism, Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder ("ADHD"), mood disorder, depression, non-convulsive seizure disorder, as well as visual-perceptual and temporal lobe impairment. Her condition results in difficulties in the behavioral, social, and academic spheres of her life. (Transcript of Hearing on August, 29, 2002, p. 26-27; Stipulation Ex. D.) Lauren is entitled to a free and appropriate education ("FAPE") pursuant to the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act ("IDEA"), 20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq., and the District is the local education agency responsible for providing a FAPE to Lauren.
Lauren attended the Radnor Middle School during the 1998-1999 school year pursuant to an Individual Education Program ("IEP") providing learning support within the regular education environment ("1998 IEP"). Prior to Lauren's 8th grade year, the District proposed an IEP recommending that Lauren be placed in the Learning Support Program at Radnor Middle School for the 1999-2000 school year ("1999 IEP").
In August of 1999, Plaintiff disagreed with the proposed 1999 IEP and unilaterally placed Lauren at the Hill Top Preparatory School ("Hill Top"), a private school in Rosemont, PA. At that time, they also requested a special education administrative due process hearing to determine the appropriateness of the 1999 IEP and to address whether the District should be required to pay for Lauren's Hill Top tuition and for compensatory education for Lauren for the 1999-2000 school year. After the administrative hearing process began, the parties executed a Settlement Agreement ("the Agreement") limited to the 1999-2000 school year and the administrative process was discontinued. The District agreed to continue to place Lauren at Hill Top at its expense for the 2000-2001 school year. Lauren continued to attend Hill Top during the 2000-2001 and 2001-2002 school years. Her parents paid the tuition for these two years and sought reimbursement from the District. Responsibility for these tuition costs is a subject of the recently concluded administrative due process proceeding.
The District did not prepare an IEP for Lauren for either the 2000-2001 or 2001-2002 school years. The last effective IEP was the 1998 IEP, which applied to the 1998-1999 school year when Lauren was in seventh grade. Lauren is now beginning the twelfth grade. On May 28, 2002, the District proposed an IEP for Lauren for the 2002-2003 school year ("the 2002 IEP") which provided that Lauren would enroll in an emotional support class at Radnor High School. On July 18 2002, Lauren's parents filed an action in this Court on behalf of Lauren petitioning for a declaratory judgment that Hill Top is Lauren's "pendent placement" pursuant to § 1415(j), and seeking injunctive relief requiring the District to fund Lauren's educational placement at Hill Top until the dispute over the 2002 Academic Placement is resolved.
This Court held that Hill Top is Lauren's "current educational placement" for purposes of § 1415(j) of the IDEA. Lauren W. 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18303 at *14. This Court further ordered the District to pay Lauren's tuition to attend Hill Top during the pendency of the administrative due process proceeding to determine appropriateness of the IEP offered to Lauren for the 2002-2003 school year. On August 21, 2003, the record of the completed administrative proceeding was submitted to this Court for review. (Docket No. 24). For the reasons that follow, we now clarify that Lauren's "current educational placement" is the Hill Top School for the duration of the administrative and judicial proceedings to determine appropriateness of the IEP offered to Lauren for the 2002-2003 school year. The District's responsibility to pay Lauren's tuition extends to the 2003-2004 school year pending a final judicial review of the administrative decision and a determination of the appropriateness of the IEP. At that point, should the IEP be found appropriate, the District may seek reimbursement.
III. DISCUSSION
In this order, the Court disposes of both the Motion to Dismiss Count I of Amended Counterclaim (Docket Entry No. 14) and the Petition for Order to Show Cause (Docket Entry No. 22). But, the Court now decides only the first issue presented for consideration in the Motion for Preliminary Injunction (Docket Entry No. 22), whether the District is obligated to pay for Lauren W.'s 2003-2004 school year tuition. In so doing, the Court reserves for later review all outstanding issues including the obligation to provide Lauren W. with related services and payment of attorneys fees.
A. Plaintiffs Request for an Order to Show Cause Why the District Should Not be Held in Contempt
The District will not be held in contempt of this Court's order holding that Hill Top is Lauren's current educational placement. To establish civil contempt, a plaintiff must prove the following elements by clear and convincing evidence: (1) that a valid order of the court existed; (2) that the defendants had knowledge of the order; and (3) that the defendants disobeyed the order. Calvin Klein Co. v. Fashion Industries, Inc., 1982 WL 123, *2 (D.N.J., Jan 28, 1982). In Lauren W., 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18303 (E.D.Pa., Sept. 12, 2002.), this Court held that Hill Top was Lauren W.'s "current educational placement" and required the District to pay tuition for the pendency of the administrative proceeding. Lauren W., 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18303 at *14. All parties had knowledge of this order and this Court finds that the District complied with its explicit requirements.
The Court finds that the District took reasonable steps to comply with the order. There is general support for the proposition that a defendant may not be held in contempt as long as it took all reasonable steps to comply. Harris v. City of Philadelphia, 47 F.3d 1311, *1324 (3d Cir. 1995) citing Securities and Exch. Comm'n. v. AMX. Int'l. Inc., 7 F.3d 71, 73 (5th Cir. 1993); New York State Nat'1 Ore, for Women v. Terry, 886 F.2d 1339, 1351 (2d Cir. 1989) (contempt maybe found only if party did not diligently attempt to comply in reasonable manner), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 947 (1990); National Advertising Co. v. City of Orange, 861 F.2d 246, 250 (9th Cir. 1988). Plaintiffs argument that the District's behavior rises to the level of "steadfast refusal" to comply is unpersuasive. (Docket Entry No. 22 at 9) Rule 65(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C.A. (1970), provides that orders granting injunctions "shall be specific in terms; shall describe in reasonable detail, and not by reference to the complaint or other document, the act or acts sought to be restrained." This language strongly suggests that conduct will not be implied from such orders; that they are binding only to the extent they contain sufficient description of the prohibited or mandated acts. Ford v. Kammerer, 450 F.2d 279 at 280 (3d Cir. 1971). The long-standing, salutary rule in contempt cases is that ambiguities and omissions in orders redound to the benefit of the person charged with contempt. Id. The order in question dealt specifically with the obligation to pay Lauren's tuition throughout the administrative proceeding. As such, the District can not be found to have disobeyed that specifically mandated act.
B. The Obligation to Pay Plaintiffs 2003-2004 School Year Tuition
The fundamental goal of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act ("IDEA") ( 20 U.S.C.A. §§ 1400 et seq.) is to ensure that children with disabilities receive a free appropriate public education ("FARE"). To protect this goal and the educational rights of individuals with disabilities and their parents, the IDEA contains numerous procedural safeguards detailed in § 1415. See 20 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(20) (purpose of IDEA). Section 1415(e)(3)(A) requires that, pending administrative and judicial review, the child remain in his or her then current educational placement unless his or her parents and the state agree otherwise. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(3)(A). Section 1415(j) articulates a similar guarantee. "During the pendency of any proceedings conducted pursuant to this section, unless the State or local educational agency and the parents otherwise agree, the child shall remain in the then-current educational placement of such child." 20 U.S.C. § 1415(j). While our previous decision dealt only with the administrative proceeding, the language of the statute is clear. Lauren's current educational placement is Hill Top for the duration of any proceeding; this includes both the administrative and judicial proceedings.
When parents are dissatisfied with the individual education program ("IEP") offered in the public school, they may opt to place the child in private school. Such placement raises the issue of financial responsibility. In Susquenita School Dist. v. Raelee S. By and Through Heidi S., the court held that the parents of a child with learning disabilities, having unilaterally placed the child in a private school, were entitled under the IDEA to prospective reimbursement of their tuition costs from the defendant school district pending the district's appeal from an administrative appellate panel's determination that the private school, rather than the IEP proposed by the district, was the appropriate placement for the child.Susquenita School Dist. v. Raelee S. By and Through Heidi S., 96 F.3d 78, 112 Ed. Law Rep. 590 (3d Cir. 1996), reh'g and suggestion for reh'g in bane denied, (Oct. 18, 1996), (discussing district court's establishment of private school as Raelee's pendent placement and noting that this decision "effectively decided the reimbursement question in favor of Raelee's parents" and, noting issue of whether such reimbursement is retroactive or prospective.) The IDEA'S purpose of ensuring that children received a free and appropriate education favored imposing financial responsibility on a local school district as soon as there has been an administrative panel or judicial decision establishing the pendent placement, rather than requiring parents to front the funds for continued private education, a burden that many families would find overwhelming.School Committee of Town of Burlington, Mass, v. Department of Educ. of Mass., 471 U.S. 359 (1985). This Court concluded that Hill Top was Lauren's "current educational placement" and accordingly imposed financial responsibility on the District throughout the administrative proceeding. Lauren W., 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18303 at *11.
Because a final judicial decision on the merits of the IEP will come some time after the school term covered by the IEP has passed, Lauren W.'s parents should not be forced to go along with the IEP to Lauren's detriment if it turns out to be inappropriate or to pay for what they consider to be the appropriate placement at Hill Top. If they choose the latter course, it would be an "empty victory to have a court tell them several years later that they were right but that these expenditures could not in a proper case be reimbursed. If that were the case, the child's right to a free appropriate public education, the parents' right to participate fully in developing a proper IEP, and all of the procedural safeguards would be less than complete." Susquenita, 96 F.3d at 85 citing Burlington, 471 U.S. at 370. Ignoring Congress' clear intention to protect a child's substantive right to a FAPE and her parents' procedural rights to seek it would be inapposite to the purpose of the IDEA.
Congress did not intend to shield school districts prior to the close of litigation, but rather intended to apply full due process procedures to the issue of financial responsibility. Susquenita, 96 F.3d at 85-86 citing S.Rep. No. 94-168 p. 32 (1975), U.S. Code Cong. Admin. News 1975 pp. 1425, 1456. The requirement that the school district continue to finance the pendent placement is implicit in its maintenance until the resolution of the dispute; failure to fund a pendent placement during litigation constitutes a unilateral change in the placement by the school district and is prohibited under the IDEA. Drinker v. Colonial Sch. Dist., 78 F.3d 859 at 865 citing Monohan v. Nebraska, 491 F. Supp. 1074, 1089 (D. Neb. 1980) aff'd in part, vacated in part on other grounds, 645 F.2d 592, 597-98 (8th Cir. 1981). So long as Hill Top School functioned as the current educational placement when the stay put provision of the IDEA was invoked, the school district must bear the burden of paying for the costs of Lauren W.'s education through the date of the district court's final order. Drinker, 78 F.3d at 867. See Bayonne Board of Education v. R.S., 954 F. Supp. 933 (D.N.J. 1997) (concluding that when a school district agrees to the pendent placement for purposes of the "stay put" provision, it becomes responsible for tuition and expenses associated with the placement of the child at the school pending the conclusion of the judicial proceedings). Therefore, the District must pay the tuition at Hill Top School for the 2003-2004 term in the amount of $16,175. (Plaintiff's Ex. P-1). It must also pay the related late charges incurred as a result of the delay. (Plaintiff's Ex. P-1).
B. District's Claim of Plaintiffs Unjust Enrichment for Payment of 2002-2003 School Year Tuition
The District's counterclaim for unjust enrichment cannot be dismissed at this juncture because an ultimate determination of the appropriateness of the IEP has not yet been made. If the school district's IEP is ultimately determined by a court to have been an appropriate placement, § 1415(e)(3)(A) will bar the parents' right to reimbursement for any period they violated the statute. Burlington, 471 U.S. at 374 ("If a handicapped child has available a FAPE and the parents choose to place the child in a private school or facility the school . . . is not required . . . to pay for the child's education at the private school facility" (quoting 34 C.F.R. § 300.403)). If so, the District's claim would be legally sufficient, despite any veracity afforded to Plaintiffs allegations. See Markowitz, 906 F.2d at 103; Sturm, 835 F.2d at 1011;Winterberg, 868 F. Supp. at 718. While Burlington does not specifically address a counterclaim for unjust enrichment, the rationale extends to this case. Parents cannot enjoy the benefit of tuition payment for a period of time during which an appropriate IEP existed in public school. Upon a complete review of the administrative record, there may be adequate facts in support of the District's claim of unjust enrichment that would entitle it to reimbursement for the tuition expenses it incurred. See Conley, 355 U.S. at 45-46 (1957); Robb, 733 F.2d at 290. Should the Court ultimately reach the conclusion that the IEP offered by District was appropriate, Plaintiffs would have received tuition payment for education at a private school when one was not required. IV. CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing reasons, the Petition for Order to Show Cause (Docket Entry No. 22) is DENIED. The Motion for Preliminary Injunction (Docket Entry No. 22) is GRANTED in part in that the District is required to pay for Lauren W.'s tuition at the Hill Top School for the duration of the judicial proceedings. The Court reserves for later review all outstanding issues including the obligation to provide Lauren W. with related services and payment of attorneys fees. Should the Court deems the proposed IEP appropriate, the District may be entitled to seek reimbursement under a claim of unjust enrichment. As such, the Motion to Dismiss Count I of Amended Counterclaim (Docket Entry No. 14) is DENIED.