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affirming dismissal of plaintiff's state and federal disability discrimination claims where the plaintiff did not “adduce evidence raising a material issue of fact regarding defendant's knowledge of her disability”
Summary of this case from Chiari v. N.Y. Racing Ass'n Inc.Opinion
No. 09-4336-cv.
October 12, 2010.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York (Joanna Seybert, Judge).
UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the judgment entered on September 16, 2009, is AFFIRMED.
Myrlande Volmar, pro se, Queens Village, New York.
Elana Ben-Dov, Peckar Abramson, P.C., River Edge, New Jersey, for Appellee.
PRESENT: ROBERT D. SACK, B.D. PARKER, REENA RAGGI, Circuit Judges.
Pro se plaintiff Myrlande Volmar, who sued defendant Cold Spring Hills Center for Nursing and Rehabilitation under federal and state law for disability discrimination in employment, appeals that part of a summary judgment award that dismissed her New York State Human Rights Law ("NYSHRL") disability discrimination claims. See N.Y. Exec. Law § 296. Specifically, Volmar argues that the district court should have declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction and dismissed her NYSHRL claims without prejudice. We review the district court's award of summary judgment de novo, and we will affirm only if the record, viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, reveals no genuine issue of material fact. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48,106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); Redd v. Wright, 597 F.3d 532, 535-36 (2d Cir. 2010). We review a district court's decision to exercise supplemental jurisdiction for abuse of discretion. See Spiegel v. Schul-mann, 604 F.3d 72, 78 (2d Cir. 2010). We assume the parties' familiarity with the facts and record of prior proceedings, which we reference only as necessary to explain our decision to affirm.
As Volmar does not appeal the district court's grant of summary judgment on her Title VII and Americans with Disabilities Act claims, we deem all arguments with respect to these causes of action waived. See, e.g., Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Mortensen, 606 F.3d 22, 28-29 (2d Cir. 2010).
Volmar contends that the district court erred by granting summary judgment on her NYSHRL claims without comment. The district court thoroughly analyzed Volmar's Title VII and Americans with Dis abilities Act ("ADA") claims without discussing those raised under the NYSHRL. No matter. On appeal, we may "affirm the district court's judgment on any ground appearing in the record." ACEquip Ltd v. Am. Eng'g Corp., 315 F.3d 151, 155 (2d Cir. 2003). Here, Volmar concedes that the district court correctly determined that her ADA claims fail because she did not adduce evidence raising a material issue of fact regarding defendant's knowledge of her disability. Her NYSHRL claims necessarily fail for the same reason. See Kinneary v. City of New York, 601 F.3d 151, 158 (2d Cir. 2010) (noting that "same elements" must be proved to establish ADA or NYSHRL disability claims); see also Raytheon Co. v. Hernandez, 540 U.S. 44, 54 n. 7, 124 S.Ct. 513, 157 L.Ed.2d 357 (2003) (noting the impossibility of an employer basing an adverse employment decision on disability if it were "truly unaware that [] a disability existed"); Brown v. Pension Bds., 488 F.Supp.2d 395, 406 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (granting summary judgment on NYSHRL and ADA claims when defendant was unaware of plaintiffs disability). Accordingly, we identify no error in the district court's decision to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the NYSHRL claims and to enter summary judgment in favor of defendant.
Volmar's assertions regarding the timeliness of her NYSHRL claims are misplaced as the district court did not base its decision on statute of limitations grounds.
We have considered Volmar's other arguments on appeal and conclude that they are without merit. Accordingly, the September 16, 2009 judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.