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Volin v. Volin

Supreme Court of Alabama
Mar 30, 1961
272 Ala. 85 (Ala. 1961)

Opinion

6 Div. 668.

March 30, 1961.

Appeal from the Circuit Court, Winston County, Bob Moore, Jr., J.

Karl Harrison, Columbiana, and Jack Crenshaw, Montgomery, for appellant.

Since the amendment to Title 34, § 29, Code of 1940, there is still the jurisdictional requirement that one of the parties be domiciled in the state so as to confer upon the court jurisdiction of the res. Gee v. Gee, 252 Ala. 103, 39 So.2d 406; Jennings v. Jennings, 251 Ala. 73, 36 So.2d 236, 3 A.L.R.2d 662.

The uncorroborated testimony of the complainant that "I am a resident of the State of Alabama and have been such for the length of time required by law" is insufficient to meet this jurisdictional requirement. Levy v. Levy, 256 Ala. 629, 56 So.2d 344.

James Rutledge, Haleyville, and John Huddleston, Montgomery, for appellee.

Since the amendment of Section 29, Title 34, Code of Alabama of 1940, no particular or specific period of residence in the State of Alabama is required of the complainant in a proceeding for divorce when the court has jurisdiction of both parties to the cause of action. Gee v. Gee, 252 Ala. 103, 39 So.2d 406; McCary v. McCary, 253 Ala. 468, 45 So.2d 292.

The uncorroborated testimony of the complainant that "I am a resident of the State of Alabama and have been such for the length of time required by law" is sufficient to meet jurisdictional requirements. Piner v. Piner, 255 Ala. 104, 105, 50 So.2d 269.


This suit was brought in the Circuit Court of Winston County, in Equity, by Charlene S. Volin against her husband, Robert S. Volin.

The bill sought an absolute divorce on the ground of cruelty.

The trial court entered a decree granting the divorce and from that decree the respondent duly appealed to this court.

The bill alleged among other things that complainant "* * * is a resident of the State of Alabama and has been such for the length of time required by law." The residence of the respondent was not alleged.

Respondent filed an answer and waiver wherein he admitted the allegations of the bill as to age, residence and marriage and denied the other allegations. He made no further appearance and offered no testimony.

The only material testimony offered was that of the complainant, and that in the form of a deposition. So far as here pertinent her testimony was:

"My name is Charlene S. Volin. I am over the age of eighteen years and am a resident of the State of Alabama and have been such for the length of time required by law.

"The name of the Respondent is Robert S. Volin. He is over the age of eighteen years.

"The Respondent and I were lawfully married on May 11, 1957."

Since the amendment of § 29, Title 34, Code 1940, by the act approved July 6, 1945, General Acts 1945, p. 691, no particular or specific period of residence in this state is required of a complainant in a proceeding for divorce where the respondent is a nonresident when the court has jurisdiction of both parties to the cause of action, the only jurisdictional requirement being that the complainant be domiciled in this state so as to confer upon the court jurisdiction of the res. Levy v. Levy, 256 Ala. 629, 56 So.2d 344, and cases cited.

The mere statement of the complainant that she is a resident of the State of Alabama and has been such "for the length of time required by law" is insufficient to meet the jurisdictional requirement that the complainant be domiciled in this state, the respondent not being shown to be domiciled here. Levy v. Levy, supra.

The respondent below, the appellant here, is not estopped from asserting on this appeal that the divorce decree was void on the ground that the trial court did not have jurisdiction, as was held in Levine v. Levine, 262 Ala. 491, 80 So.2d 235. In the Levine case, supra, the respondent wife did not appeal from the divorce decree, as was done in this case, but enjoyed its benefits, financial and otherwise, and then sought to have the divorce vacated by a bill in the nature of a bill of review.

The decree of the trial court is reversed and the cause is remanded.

Reversed and remanded.

LIVINGSTON, C. J., and STAKELY and MERRILL, JJ., concur.


Summaries of

Volin v. Volin

Supreme Court of Alabama
Mar 30, 1961
272 Ala. 85 (Ala. 1961)
Case details for

Volin v. Volin

Case Details

Full title:Robert S. VOLIN v. Charlene S. VOLIN

Court:Supreme Court of Alabama

Date published: Mar 30, 1961

Citations

272 Ala. 85 (Ala. 1961)
128 So. 2d 490

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