Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Orange County, No. 06CC12661 H. Warren Siegel and David R. Chaffee, Judges.
Deepak Vohra, in pro. per., for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Harrington, Foxx, Dubrow & Canter, Dale B. Goldfarb and Daniel E. Kenney for Defendants and Respondents.
OPINION
SILLS, P. J.
Deepak Vohra, a recipient of governmental housing benefits, was evicted from the apartment complex owned by Cadigan Arbor Park (CAP). He sued CAP and its general partner, Patrick Cadigan (Cadigan), claiming discrimination and retaliation, among other things. Most of his causes of action were disposed of before the case went to the jury. On the remaining causes of action; the jury found that CAP had wrongfully withheld Vohra’s security deposit but it had not retaliated against him by bringing an unlawful detainer action.
Vohra appeals, claiming trial court error at every juncture. After a careful review of the record, we find no error that undermines the judgment and we affirm.
FACTS
Vohra filed his first amended complaint against CAP, the owner of a residential apartment building in Anaheim, and Cadigan in March 2007. The complaint alleged that Vohra was the recipient of housing assistance under section eight of the United States Housing Act of 1937 (42 U.S.C. § 1437(f)) (Section 8). On October 30, 2004, after being told by CAP employees that it accepted Section 8 recipients as renters, Vohra gave a deposit of $100 to hold an apartment until the Anaheim Housing Authority (AHA) “inspected the apartment and approved the rent amount.” AHA informed Vohra of its approval on November 8 for a move-in date of November 9. The “contract rent” for the apartment was $930 per month; Vohra’s portion was $206, and AHA was to pay the balance.
On November 9, Vohra and CAP entered into an agreement to rent apartment No. 429 on a month-to-month basis. CAP demanded that Vohra pay the full month’s rent of $930 plus $930 as a security deposit. Although he protested that he should not have to pay the AHA portion of the rent, he complied with CAP’s demands.
On December 6, CAP served a three-day notice to pay rent or quit on Vohra, demanding $930.00 for the period from December 1 to December 31, 2004 and $102 for the period from November 1 to November 31, 2004. Vohra complained in writing, pointing out that he had already paid more than his portion of the rent and the balance should be paid by AHA. The next day, CAP served Vohra a Notice of Termination of Tenancy effective January 31, 2005.
When Vohra refused to vacate, CAP instituted an unlawful detainer action against him. (Cadigan v. Vohra (Super. Ct. Orange County, 2005, No. 05NL015978).) Judgment was in Vohra’s favor, finding that CAP “failed to set forth, in writing, the grounds for termination of the defendant’s tenancy at or before the beginning of this action, and thus, failed to comply with the eviction procedures set forth in the [Section 8] Tenancy Addendum.” Six days later, CAP served Vohra with a 90-day notice of termination of tenancy, stating, “The reason for this notice is disruptive conduct that is disturbing to other residents as well as [CAP] staff.” When Vohra agaIn refused to vacate, CAP filed a second unlawful detainer action. (Cadigan v. Vohra (Super. Ct. Orange County, 2005, No. 05NL020785).) Judgment was entered in favor of CAP, and Vohra vacated the premises.
Shortly after the judgment in its favor, CAP wrote to AHA urging it to drop Vohra from housing assistance and notifying it that CAP would no longer accept “applicants from housing.” AHA subsequently terminated Vohra from rental assistance. Vohra then appealed the unlawful detainer judgment to the appellate department of the Orange County Superior Court. On June 1, 2006, the judgment was reversed because “the action was improperly filed prior to the expiration of the 90-day notice period,... the notice of the grounds for eviction was insufficient, and... the evidence at trial was insufficient to establish good cause for the eviction.” After the reversal, AHA reinstated Vohra’s Section 8 rental assistance.
Vohra claimed he incurred more than $9,000.00 for rent and storage charges as a result of CAP’s actions and that CAP refused to return his security deposit. He alleged causes of action for wrongful eviction, retaliatory eviction, “Discrimination based on Source of Income and Marital Status,” misrepresentation, and restitution of security deposit; he also prayed for punitive damages. Both CAP and Cadigan answered the complaint, pleading general denials and various affirmative defenses.
In July 2007, Vohra filed a motion to compel responses to interrogatories and other discovery requests, claiming the responses were invalid because the verification of the answers predated the date of the answers themselves. CAP amended the verification and responses, but Vohra refused to take his motion off calendar, claiming the amended responses were untimely and invalid. The trial court denied the motion, stating that CAP “should produce amended verification referenced in [its response to the motion] – and if this is done, this motion is moot and no sanction is required. A simple phone call could have resolved this problem.”
A few days later, Vohra filed a motion to compel further answers to interrogatories; CAP objected to the motion. After oral argument, the trial court denied the motion. Less than three weeks later, Vohra filed another discovery motion, this time seeking orders that his requests for admission be deemed admitted, for further answers to special interrogatories, to compel the production of documents and for sanctions. CAP opposed; following oral argument, the trial court denied the motion.
Trial began in January 2007. Vohra made a motion in limine to exclude evidence of his “tenancies prior to the tenancy at [CAP] and any documents generated by previous landlords,” decisions after AHA hearings, and “[w]rit of mandate hearings and decisions and documents generated by [AHA] to support their Informal and Formal Hearing Decisions and to oppose Writ of Mandate filed by [Vohra].” After argument, the trial court denied the motion.
Vohra testified he was a single person of Indian ancestry. During 2004, his only source of income was social security, and he received a Section 8 housing benefit. He explained he went to CAP on October 30, 2004, verified that CAP was in the Section 8 housing program, and gave the employee a deposit to hold an apartment. He also gave the employee the approval packet for CAP to fill out and submit to AHA. On November 8, 2004, AHA approved the apartment and calculated Vohra’s portion of the $930.00 monthly rent to be $206.00. For November, Vohra’s portion was prorated at $150.00.
The next day, Vohra took the AHA approval form and a money order for $150.00 to the CAP rental office. CAP’s manager, Cathy Bau, gave him a lease for the apartment but refused to sign it until he paid the full month’s rent of $930.00 plus a security deposit of $930.00. Vohra told Bau CAP was not allowed to require that of a Section 8 housing recipient, but she told him that CAP’s corporate policy was to make a Section 8 tenant pay the full amount of the initial month’s rent, notwithstanding AHA’s rules and regulations. Vohra reluctantly paid CAP $1,760 and received the keys to the apartment.
In the middle of November, Vohra discovered that CAP had not completely filled out the declaration of ownership required by AHA, thus the payment of his Section 8 benefits were being delayed. Bau filled out the form, and Vohra picked it up from her and delivered it to AHA around November 19. On December 1, Vohra went to the CAP rental office to “clarify the situation that my rent is not due till February 2005, because I paid in excess to them.” After some conversation, “they agreed in a very reluctant way.”
On December 6, Vohra was served with a three-day notice to pay rent or quit, stating he owed $1032 in unpaid rent. Vohra went to the office. “I spoke with them, there must be an error here because I already paid excessive amount of my rent.... You had already told me on December 1st. The matter between you and Anaheim Housing Authority has been cleared up. So there must be an error in this three-day notice to pay rent or quit.” Bau told Vohra “that you are a single male resident, here you are receiving Section 8. You should not be receiving section 8 benefits. Your section 8 benefits should stop.” That same day, Vohra faxed and mailed a “very courteous letter” explaining “that I’m not responsible for the rent to be paid by Housing Authority.”
The next day, December 7, Vohra received a notice to terminate his tenancy as of January 31, 2005. He received another three-day notice to pay rent or quit on January 20, 2005, demanding unpaid rent of $709. Vohra did not move out, and CAP filed an unlawful detainer action against him in February. The action was tried in April 2005, and judgment was entered for Vohra because CAP failed to follow the eviction procedures required by the Section 8 housing program.
A few days after the judgment was rendered, CAP served Vohra with another three-day notice to pay rent in the amount of $397.00 for the period from March 1 through April 30, 2005, or quit the premises. Vohra did not vacate, and CAP served him with a 90-day notice to quit on May 2, 2005. The notice stated, “The reason for this notice is disruptive conduct that is disturbing to other residents as well as Arbor Park staff.” Vohra testified he was not aware of any conduct that disturbed other residents or CAP staff.
A second unlawful detainer action was filed by CAP against Vohra on August 1, 2005, and this time CAP prevailed. Vohra vacated his apartment and moved into a motel because his Section 8 benefits were terminated. From September 2005 to August 2006, Vohra lived in two motels in Stanton and stored his belongings in Anaheim. He made trips between the two places several times a week, which was inconvenient for him.
The judgment in the second unlawful detainer action was reversed by the appellate division of the Superior Court on June 1, 2006. The court stated the unlawful detainer complaint was improperly filed one day before the 90-day notice expired, the notice of termination did not provide enough detail about the alleged disruptive conduct, and the evidence at trial was insufficient to establish that Vohra had a “‘history of disturbance of neighbors.’” After the appellate decision, AHA reinstated Vohra’s Section 8 benefits.
Vohra testified he believed CAP discriminated against him because he was a recipient of Section 8 benefits. “[T]hey deliberately delayed in providing all the information [to AHA], so that’s discrimination. [¶] For 20 days they’re not even providing even the declaration of ownership to housing authority. Other side started demanding housing authority portion of the rent from me. There are series of acts here. Then they – on November 9th, they are forcing me to pay the full amount of rent while on the other side they are refusing to provide even the declaration of ownership information to housing authority.” Vohra also cited the “notice to terminate tenancy on [December] 7, one day after I complain to them. I’m not responsible for housing authority portion of the rent.... [F]irst eviction lawsuit, within four or five days after that they immediately serve me with another fraudulent notice to terminate my tenancy. All of these things are leading me to believe this discrimination and retaliation is all about.”
Another incident that led Vohra to believe CAP was discriminating against him because he was a Section 8 benefits recipient was its failure to repair the ceiling in front of his apartment. Shortly after he moved in, plaster chunks began falling on him as he went in and out of the apartment. Vohra asked CAP to fix the ceiling, but it was not repaired until after the second unlawful detainer was decided against him. “After they served me the writ of execution, the next day, three, four workers come and start fixing the roof immediately,... so before I moved, they had fixed... the ceiling....”
Vohra believed he was discriminated against because of his gender. As evidence, he cited Bau’s statements on December 6, 2004 that he should not be receiving Section 8 benefits because he was a single male. He also referred to a letter written to AHA by Jill Cantrell, the property supervisor of Greenwood & Son, apparently on behalf of CAP. After complaining vehemently about Vohra’s conduct at the apartment complex where he previously lived and at CAP, Cantrell railed against AHA for allowing him to receive Section 8 housing benefits. “There are many individuals who are desperately in need of assistance from Anaheim Housing and they do not have a prayer of being accepted. One individual at Arbor Park is forced to work part time with an air pipe in her throat and Anaheim Housing ignores her. Mr. Vohra lives off housing, does not work, and spends his time peering into windows, turning in residents for pet abuse, sitting in his car in the middle of the night, roaming the halls and standing around watching women and children and incredibly he qualifies for housing.”
Vohra also testified after the start of the first unlawful detainer proceeding, he noticed a woman sitting on her balcony who shouted out “a four letter word... starting with ‘F’” each time he walked by. Also, as he walked by other apartments to go to his apartment, another person “would open the door and shut it loudly. It happened two or three times.” Vohra also claimed “[t]hey slashed my tires after... they started the unlawful detainer proceedings.”
The parties stipulated that CAP is a limited liability partnership and that Patrick Cadigan is the general partner of that partnership. Vohra then rested.
At the close of Vohra’s case-in-chief, Patrick Cadigan moved for nonsuit on the ground that under the Corporations Code, a partner in a registered limited liability partnership is not liable for liability chargeable to the partnership. The trial court granted the motion. CAP moved for nonsuit on the causes of action for discrimination and misrepresentation, claiming Vohra failed to make a prima facie case on either cause of action. The trial court granted both motions. The trial court also granted CAP’s motion to strike the allegations of punitive damages on the ground that there was insufficient evidence of fraud, oppression, or malice.
CAP called two persons who lived at the CAP apartments. Adela Contreras had lived there for 12 years. She testified she witnessed an argument between Vohra and another neighbor. After that, every time she saw Vohra, he spit on the ground as he passed by her. She reported this behavior to Bau, “[b]ecause I was feeling uncomfortable and scared why he do that to me. To me it’s no reason to do that to somebody, you know, to see with that hate and spit it that way, making that noise and then spit on the floor. What that mean, I don’t know. He scared me.” When Contreras went to her car to go to work at 3:00 a.m., Vohra “would be there.” Her tires were damaged twice while Vohra lived there; she never had any trouble before or after he lived there.
Qutub Ahmed lived at CAP from 2000 to 2005. He testified Vohra repeatedly accused him of failing to take proper care of the birds he kept on his balcony. They exchanged hostile words about it, and subsequently Vohra displayed behavior that made Ahmed feel the security of his apartment was threatened. Vohra also frightened Ahmed’s wife with his strange behavior. Ahmed complained about Vohra to CAP’s management. He and his wife moved out of the CAP complex to get away from Vohra’s harassing behaviors.
Cathy Bau testified she was the manager at CAP when Vohra lived there. She described him as loud, abrasive and rude. “He started yelling before he got the explanation of why things were done the way they were done.” Shortly after Vohra moved into the apartment complex, the staff began receiving complaints about him. Bau told him to deal with her if he had any problems with the other tenants.
When Vohra first came to rent an apartment, he told Bau he was a Section 8 recipient and gave her the paperwork to fill out. Bau called AHA and confirmed that he was eligible for benefits. She also called his former landlord and was told there was no problem with Vohra. “So we felt at that point we would rent to him under the same stipulations that we rent to anyone that was on housing, is that they pay their first month rent, and they pay the security deposit up front. [¶] And then when housing kicks in, about six weeks later, the rent that housing pays is applied to their rent and they end up with a credit balance. And they don’t pay again until that credit balance has been used up.” Bau later found out the previous landlord did have problems with Vohra, “but... she just wanted to get rid of him.” Bau would probably not have rented to Vohra if she had known he had just been evicted from his previous apartment.
Bau testified she filed both unlawful detainer actions against Vohra “[b]ecause of his conduct.” She cited “the repeated complaints from residents who lived in the area where Mr. Vohra’s apartment was. And I spoke with him and nothing changed. Actually it escalated. We were really left with no alternative.” She claimed neither she nor any of the CAP staff ever harassed, stalked, followed, or conducted surveillance of Vohra.
Rachel Henry, who is employed by AHA and was the hearing officer at the hearing regarding the termination of Vohra’s housing assistance benefits, testified for CAP. Vohra’s housing benefits were terminated because he had been evicted twice from apartment complexes that had accepted him as a Section 8 tenant. In the hearing, the complaints about Vohra were discussed. “[T]hose complaints were basically his... difficulty or his inability to get along with residents at the complex, as well as the management company there, his interaction, the fact that he... appeared to consistently have difficulty being a tenant and not depriving the other residents of what HUD refers to as their right to peaceful enjoyment of their premises.” Henry explained AHA considered terminating Vohra’s housing benefits after he was evicted from his previous apartment complex, but “he was given some counseling, and he was warned that if we received other like complaints, that he would lose his housing assistance, so they basically gave him an opportunity to go somewhere else, find another landlord, and live there.”
Henry testified that AHA cannot pay the Section 8 portion of a tenant’s rent to the landlord until the Housing Authority Payment (HAP) contract is signed by both the landlord and AHA. She testified it is “appropriate” for a landlord to ask a Section 8 tenant to pay the rent until the housing assistance payments start. “Most tenants know that when they go out to search for a unit, some landlords don’t want to wait for that very first payment....” Henry explained that the lease, which incorporated the HUD tenancy addendum, was a contract between the landlord and the tenant; while the HAP is a contract between the landlord and AHA.
David Redford, a real estate consultant, testified as an expert in the field of property management for CAP. He opined CAP acted appropriately by requiring Vohra to pay the full rent when he moved in because the HAP agreement had not yet been signed by AHA. Vohra wanted to move in before the HAP agreement was finalized, and CAP accommodated him by letting him defer part of his security deposit but requiring the first month’s full rent. Redford testified the unlawful detainer actions against Vohra by CAP were initiated because of his “[d]isruptive behavior; yelling, screaming, demanding attention ahead of others” and “various encounters with the fellow residents at the property.” Redford testified CAP acted appropriately towards Vohra until he moved out. Redford testified he saw no evidence that CAP retaliated against Vohra for exercising his rights as a Section 8 housing recipient. The only reason for the eviction was Vohra’s conduct.
After the close of evidence, the trial court granted a directed verdict on the cause of action for wrongful eviction. The cause of action for wrongful withholding of the security deposit and retaliatory eviction went to the jury. The jury found in favor of Vohra on the security deposit and against him on retaliatory eviction.
DISCUSSION
Vohra contends the trial court erred in denying his motion in limine to exclude evidence of his previous tenancies, his hearings before AHA, and the writ of mandate proceedings he brought against AHA to compel the reinstatement of his housing benefits. He claims because the motion in limine was erroneously denied, the trial court erroneously allowed Rachel Henry to testify on these subjects, which were irrelevant to the issues raised in his complaint and more prejudicial than probative.
Relevant evidence is “evidence... having any tendency in reason to prove or disprove any disputed fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action.” (Evid. Code, § 210.) Henry’s testimony regarding the complaints about Vohra’s behavior that were aired in the AHA hearings was relevant to CAP’s defense to Vohra’s retaliatory eviction claim by supporting CAP’s argument that he was evicted because of his inability to coexist with other tenants. Henry’s testimony about the HAP contract supported CAP’s defense to Vohra’s claim that CAP discriminated against him by requiring him to pay the full rent up front.
Although Henry’s testimony did not help Vohra’s case, it was not unduly prejudicial. The trial court has the discretion to exclude evidence “if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the probability that its admission will... create substantial danger of undue prejudice....” (Evid. Code, § 352.) The trial court here determined the evidence should be admitted, and Vohra has not met his burden to show that the determination was an abuse of discretion. (Vorse v. Sarasy (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 998, 1008-1009.)
Vohra next contends the trial court committed multiple errors at the close of his case-in-chief by dismissing his causes of action for discrimination and misrepresentation, granting a nonsuit to Patrick Cadigan, and striking punitive damages. We disagree.
The parties stipulated at trial that CAP is a limited liability partnership and that Patrick Cadigan is the general partner. Corporations Code section 16306 provides that absent personal tort liability or a partnership agreement to the contrary, “a partner in a registered limited liability partnership is not liable or accountable, directly or indirectly, including by way of indemnification, contribution, assessment, or otherwise, for debts, obligations, or liabilities of or chargeable to the partnership or another partner in the partnership, whether arising in tort, contract, or otherwise, that are incurred, created, or assumed by the partnership while the partnership is a registered limited liability partnership, by reason of being a partner or acting in the conduct of the business or activities of the partnership.” (Corp. Code, § 16306, subd. (c).) Thus, a partner is not a proper party in an action against a limited liability partnership. (Corp. Code, § 16306, subd. (g).) There is no evidence that Cadigan had any personal involvement in CAP’s dealings with Vohra.
Vohra contends the nonsuit was error because CAP admitted in interrogatory answers that it was not a registered limited liability partnership. But Vohra never offered the interrogatory answers into evidence; thus, there was nothing in the record to contradict the parties’ stipulation.
“After the plaintiff has completed the presentation of his case, the defendant may move for nonsuit. [Citation.] The motion shall be granted if the court determines that the plaintiff’s evidence is insufficient to support a jury verdict in his favor. [Citation.].” (Barbosa v. Impco Technologies, Inc. (2009) 179 Cal.App.4th 1116, 1121.)
Vohra failed to make a prima facie case on his causes of action for misrepresentation and discrimination. He argues CAP discriminated against him on the basis of his marital status, gender, national origin, religion, and his status as a recipient of housing assistance by demanding the full amount of rent when he moved in, serving defective three-day notices to quit, refusing to repair the ceiling outside his door, and harassing him. But there is no evidence in the record that he was treated differently from any other tenant on the basis of his protected status. (Gov. Code, § 12921, subd. (b).) Likewise, there is no evidence of misrepresentation. Vohra insists that CAP did not tell him he would have to pay the full month’s rent before he moved in or that the HAP contract was ineffective until signed by AHA. The evidence shows otherwise. CAP told Vohra the first month’s rent was due in full before he signed the lease. The HAP agreement was not binding on CAP or AHA until they both signed it. No one told Vohra otherwise. He failed to show a false statement or nondisclosure of material fact. (Agosta v. Astor (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 596, 603.)
Vohra claims the trial court erred in striking his claim for punitive damages because the evidence clearly shows that CAP should be punished. Punitive damages must be based on clear and convincing evidence of “oppression, fraud or malice....” (Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (a).) “(1) ‘Malice’ means conduct which is intended by the defendant to cause injury to the plaintiff or despicable conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others. [¶] (2) ‘Oppression’ means despicable conduct that subjects a person to cruel and unjust hardship in conscious disregard of that person’s rights. [¶] (3) ‘Fraud’ means an intentional misrepresentation, deceit, or concealment of a material fact known to the defendant with the intention on the part of the defendant of thereby depriving a person of property or legal rights or otherwise causing injury.” (Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (c).) Vohra did not present evidence of despicable conduct or intent to injure him.
Vohra contends the trial court erred in allowing expert witness Redford to testify that he saw no evidence of retaliation in his review of documents and depositions when preparing to testify at trial. Vohra argues this was impermissible because it was not helpful to the jury and it was an opinion on the ultimate issue of retaliation.
Evidence Code section 801 allows expert opinion, but it must be “[r]elated to a subject that is sufficiently beyond common experience that the opinion of an expert would assist the trier of fact....” (Evid. Code, § 801, subd. (a).) In Kotla v. Regents of the University of California (2004) 115 Cal.App.4th 283 (Kotla), the trial court allowed the expert for a plaintiff in a wrongful termination action to testify that certain actions by the employer indicated a retaliatory motive. The appellate court reversed, finding the “testimony created an unacceptable risk that the jury paid unwarranted deference to [the expert’s] purported expertise when in reality he was in no better position than they were to evaluate the evidence concerning retaliation. Absent unusual facts, it must be presumed that jurors are capable of deciding a party’s motive for themselves without being told by an expert which finding on that issue the evidence supports.” (Id. at p. 293.)
In Kotla, the jury was instructed that the expert opinion was “conclusive and binding” unless it was “not believable.” (Kotla, supra, 115 Cal.App.4th at p. 293, fn. 4 (italics omitted).) Here, however, the jury was told, “You do not have to accept an expert’s opinion. As with any other witness, it is up to you to decide whether you believe the expert’s testimony and choose to use it as a basis for your decision. You may believe all, part, or none of an expert’s testimony.” Furthermore, percipient witnesses also testified it was Vohra’s conduct that motivated the eviction proceedings, not retaliation. In this context, even if Redford’s testimony was improper expert opinion, it did not cause prejudicial error.
Vohra argues the trial court erred in granting a directed verdict on his cause of action for wrongful eviction, claiming he proved all the elements of a cause of action for breach of contract. This is a puzzling argument, because a breach of contract cause of action was not presented or argued in the trial court. After both parties rested, CAP argued there is no recognized cause of action for wrongful eviction, and the trial court and counsel had extended discussions on this question. The court ultimately decided to treat the cause of action for wrongful eviction as one for malicious prosecution; it than granted a directed verdict because it found that neither unlawful detainer action had been a favorable determination on the merits for Vohra. The wrongful eviction jury instruction proposed by Vohra, which was withdrawn, states: “It is unlawful for [CAP] to evict Vohra for the purpose of retaliating against Vohra for lawfully and peaceably exercising his rights under the law.” It appears that Vohra’s wrongful eviction cause of action was duplicative of his cause of action for retaliatory eviction.
Vohra quarrels with the jury instruction the trial court gave on his cause of action for retaliatory eviction. The instruction begins: “Deepak Vohra claims that [CAP] was not entitled to evict him because [it] filed their Unlawful Detainer actions in retaliation for [his] having engaged in legally protected activities.” The instruction continues by telling the jury that Vohra must prove that he “peaceably questioned” the policy of getting the first month’s rent in full from him, that CAP filed the unlawful detainer lawsuits because Vohra questioned its policy, and that CAP did not have a “legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason” to evict him.
Vohra argues the jury should have been told that retaliatory eviction was established as a matter of law because CAP lost the two unlawful detainer actions against him. Thus, he claims, the issue of good cause to evict him was fully litigated, or could have been fully litigated, and CAP should have been collaterally estopped from sending it to the jury in this case. Vohra is wrong. The unlawful detainer actions did not litigate the question of CAP’s motive in evicting Vohra. Lack of good cause does not equate to retaliation. CAP was entitled to a jury determination of its motive.
Vohra’s final contention is that the trial court erred in denying his motions to compel discovery and deem certain facts admitted. He argues the trial court denied all the motions without setting forth any reasons. Again, Vohra is wrong. The first set of motions was denied on August 27, the second on September 24, and the third on November 5, 2007. The minute orders reflect that a reporter was present and oral argument was held at all three hearings, but no reporter’s transcripts are in the record. Vohra cannot claim error without providing an adequate record. (Wagner v. Wagner (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 249, 259; In re Angel L. (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 1127, 1136-1137; Nelson v. Anderson (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 111, 136-137.)
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. CAP is entitled to costs on appeal.
WE CONCUR: O’LEARY, J.MOORE, J.