Opinion
No. CV 02 0513581 S
March 11, 2004
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
I. FACTS
This declaratory action stems from an automobile accident in which a Plymouth Neon (the car) driven by decedent Kevin Vos collided with defendant Alfred Caswell. The car was owned by plaintiffs, Arthur and Donna Vine, the named insureds on the policies issued by plaintiffs, First National Insurance Company of America (First National) and SAFECO Insurance Company of America (SAFECO). On August 26, 2001, Durenda Moss-Vine, granddaughter of Arthur and Donna Vine, gave Vos permission to drive the car to her place of work, Foxwoods Casino, in order to drop her off in time for her scheduled shift, which began at 4:00 p.m. She then directed him to pick her up after work at 8:00 p.m. After dropping Moss-Vine off at work, Vos continued to drive the car until the accident occurred on Route 214 in Ledyard, Connecticut. The plaintiffs sought an order from this court that the relevant insurance policies cover neither Vos, nor Moss-Vine, at the time of the accident. Following a two-day trial occurring on December 16-17, 2003, the jury returned special interrogatories resulting in this court entering judgment declaring that Vos was an insured under both relevant insurance policies. The remaining issue for this court's determination is whether Moss-Vine meets the definition of an "insured" under the First National policy, or the SAFECO personal umbrella policy issued to the Vines.
II. DISCUSSION
In order for Moss-Vine to be covered under the policies that are the subject of this declaratory judgment action, she must meet the definition of an "insured" under one or both insurance policies.
The First National policy defines "insured" as follows:
"Insured" as used in this part means: CT Page 8308
"You" and "your" refer to the named insured as shown in the declarations and the spouse of the named insured if a resident of the same household. (See Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, Exhibit H, p. 1.)
1. You or any family member for the ownership, maintenance or use of any auto or trailer.
2. Any person using your covered auto. (Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, Exhibit H, pp. 1-2.)
The SAFECO personal umbrella policy provides in relevant part:
"`[Y]ou' and `your' refer to the `named insured' shown in the [d]eclarations and the spouse if a resident of the same household . . ." (Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, Exhibit I, p. 1.)
a. [A]ny member of your household. But with respect to motor vehicles to which this policy applies, a member of your household is covered only as follows:
(1) while using a motor vehicle owned by you or any member of your household;
(2) while using a motor vehicle not owned by you or any member of your household provided such use is with the reasonable belief that the person using it is entitled to do so;
b. [A]ny person while using a motor vehicle not owned by you or any member of your household provided such use is with the reasonable belief that the person using is entitled to do so.
(Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, Exhibit I, p. 1.)
The defendant asserts that Moss-Vine meets the definition of insured under the First National policy because she is a "family member for the ownership . . . or use of any auto" and she is "any person using the covered auto." (Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, Exhibit H, p. 1.) The defendant also argues that Moss-Vine meets the definition of insured under the SAFECO policy because it defines insured to include "any member of [the named insured's] household . . . while using a motor vehicle owned by [the insured] or any member of [the insured's] household." (Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, Exhibit I, p. 1.) Therefore, the defendants assert that because Moss-Vine either owned the car or because she was using the car at the time of the accident, she meets the definition of insured under both policies. The plaintiffs disagree with both assertions arguing that the Vines were the legal owners of the car and that Moss-Vine was several miles away from the car at the time of the accident and therefore was not using the car. In order to meet each policy's definition of insured, the court must determine whether Moss-Vine was an owner or user of the car at the time of the accident.
Moss-Vine as an Owner of the Car
Connecticut courts have had numerous occasions to construe the word "owner" as related to cases involving motor vehicles. Our courts have "defined `owner' as any person holding title to a motor vehicle . . . In the case of a privately owned car, this definition has been applied through the certificate of registration. The certificate, in a particular person's name and identifying a particular vehicle, warrants [although it does not compel] a finding of ownership of that vehicle by the person in whose name the car is registered." (Citation omitted.) Cook v. Nye, 9 Conn. App. 221, 226, 518 A.2d 77 (1986). Registration of a car constitutes "`a public declaration of ownership' . . . [H]owever . . . this declaration is [not] conclusive as to title. It is merely evidence of ownership, to be considered in connection with other evidence in the case upon that issue." (Citations omitted.) Burakowski v. Grustas, 134 Conn. 205, 208-09, 56 A.2d 461 (1947). In Hope v. Cavallo, 163 Conn. 576, 580-81, 316 A.2d 407 (1972), our Supreme Court stated that "[t]he word owner is one of flexible meaning, and it varies from an absolute proprietary interest to a mere possessory right." Therefore, "[t]he word `owner' . . . has no commonly approved usage or fixed meaning, but must be interpreted in its context and according to the circumstances in which it is used." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 580.
The defendant relies on Hope v. Cavallo, supra, 163 Conn. 576, arguing that Moss-Vine is an owner of the car because she had exclusive possession and control over the car at the time of the accident. In distinguishing Hope, the appellate court held that " Hope represents a unique and unusual case in which the federal government issued a vehicle to the state of Connecticut, which then insured the automobile as its own." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Budris v. Allstate Ins. Co., 44 Conn. App. 53, 59-60, 686 A.2d 583 (1996). "The Connecticut Supreme Court concluded that as there was no indication that the federal government intended to retain possession or control of the vehicle and, as the state had insured the issued vehicle and thus bore the risk of loss or damage to the vehicle, in common parlance and legal acceptation, the state owned the car." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 60. This case is clearly distinguishable from Hope in that there were a number of indications that the Vines intended to retain control over the car.
Here, the defendant concedes that the car was registered under Donna Vine's name. It is also undisputed that the Vines paid for the car's down payment, monthly loan payments, insurance premiums and the registration fees and taxes. The defendant's argument that Moss-Vine had exclusive use and control of the car ignores the testimony presented at trial when Arthur Vine testified that he drove the car on several occasions. As such, there is sufficient evidence to conclude that Moss-Vine was not the owner of the car.
Moss-Vine as User of the Car
It is undisputed that at the time of the accident, Moss-Vine was neither a passenger nor a driver of the car. Consequently, the plaintiffs argue that due to her location, Moss-Vine was not using the car. The defendant argues that this court find that physical presence should not be required when considering whether Moss-Vine was using the car. Whether use requires an individual to be physically in the vehicle at the time of an accident is an issue of first impression in Connecticut.
In the present case, neither insurance policy defines "use" or "using." Connecticut courts have traditionally held that the term "use" should be afforded its ordinary meaning. Specifically, the Supreme Court "held that the `use' of an automobile by an individual involves its employment for some purpose or object of the user while its `operation' by him involves his direction and control of its mechanism as its driver for the purpose of propelling it as a vehicle. It is perfectly clear that an automobile is being used by an individual who is traveling in it regardless of whether it is being operated by him or by another." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Aetna Life Casualty Co. v. Bulaong, 218 Conn. 51, 62, 588 A.2d 138 (1991). "Use is to be given its ordinary meaning. It denotes the employment of the automobile for some purpose of the user . . . One may use an automobile without personally operating it, as the term use is broader than operation." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 63. Although the Supreme Court adopted the ordinary meaning of "use," they have not specifically addressed the issue of whether a person may be using a car without being physically in the car.
"The determination of whether an act constitutes `use' of a motor vehicle [is] . . . very fact specific. When determining the meaning of the term `use' in an automobile insurance policy, a court must examine the factual circumstances of each case, including the particular characteristics of the vehicle." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Board of Education v. St. Paul Fire Marine Ins. Co., 261 Conn. 37, 43-44, 801 A.2d 752 (2002). Many courts have adopted the general criteria set forth in Rau v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 21 Wash. App. 326, 585 P.2d 157 (1978), for determining whether a person is using a vehicle while being outside of that vehicle. The Rau court required each of the following factors:
See Roden v. General Casualty Co., 671 N.W.2d 622, 627-28 (2003); Gorham v. Guidant Mutual Ins. Co., 80 F. Sup.2d 540, 546 (D.Md. 2000); Cuevas v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co., 130 N.M. 539, 541, 28 P.3d 527 (2001); Downing v. Harelysville Ins. Co., 412 Pa.Super. 15, 21-22, 602 A.2d 871 (1992); Tata v. Nichols, 848 S.W.2d 649, 652 (Tenn. 1993).
(1) [T]here must be a causal relation or connection between the injury and the use of the insured vehicle; (2) the person asserting coverage must be in a reasonably close geographic proximity to the insured vehicle, although the person need not be actually touching it; (3) the person must be vehicle oriented rather than highway or sidewalk oriented at the time; and (4) the person must also be engaged in a transaction essential to the use of the vehicle at the time.
(Citations omitted.) Id., 162.
The defendant argues that because Vos was eventually going to pick Moss-Vine up from work that this arrangement served Moss-Vine's purpose, specifically, her timely arrival at work. The defendant argues that Moss-Vine was therefore using the car because Vos was driving the car for the purpose of her benefit. In analyzing the facts under the four-part test, the court finds that Moss-Vine was not using the car at the time of the accident.
The first Rau criterion requires a causal connection between the injury and the vehicle's use. Moss-Vine used the car for the purpose of reaching her destination at work. Upon being dropped off at work, her purpose was fulfilled for which she was utilizing the car. The second Rau factor requires a reasonable geographic proximity between the vehicle and the situs of the accident. At the time of the accident, Moss-Vine was at work at Foxwoods Casino, located in Mashantucket, Connecticut, she was not in a reasonably close geographic proximity from the car at the time of accident, which occurred miles away on Route 214 in Ledyard, Connecticut. Also, Moss-Vine was not vehicle-oriented because she did not know where the car was located and was unaware of where Vos might go after dropping her off. Finally, Moss-Vine was not engaged in a transaction essential to the use of the vehicle. She was at work and without knowledge of the car's whereabouts or of any particular route Vos drove the car. The court concluded that Moss-Vine was not using the car at the time of the accident.
Given the defendant's failure to meet the other three criteria of the Rau test, the court makes no determination regarding whether Vos' eventual return to pick Moss-Vine up after work constitutes a causal connection.
Given the factual circumstances of the present case, a reasonable interpretation of both relevant insurance policies would lead to the conclusion that Moss-Vine neither owned nor used the car at the time of the accident and therefore did not meet either policy's definition of an insured. As such, the plaintiffs' motion for declaratory judgment is granted.
Henry S. Cohn, J.