Opinion
No. 1:15-cv-00987-DAD-BAM (PC)
12-07-2020
JARED M. VILLERY, Plaintiff, v. CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, et al., Defendants.
ORDER ADOPTING FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS AND DENYING PLAINTFF'S MOTION TO MODIFY PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
(Doc. Nos. 128, 142)
Plaintiff Jared M. Villery is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis in this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This matter was referred to a United States Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Rule 302.
On May 14, 2019, plaintiff filed a motion to modify the preliminary injunction that the court issued on March 25, 2019. (Doc. No. 128.) On February 25, 2020, the assigned magistrate judge issued findings and recommendations recommending that plaintiff's motion be denied. (Doc. No. 142.) In particular, the magistrate judge found that defendant had "complied with the March 25, 2019 order requiring placement of the McCall Report in Plaintiff's health record and an immediate review to determine whether Plaintiff's condition requires that he be designated for ///// single-cell status in light of the McCall Report." (Doc. No. 142 at 5.) The magistrate judge reasoned that
On February 2, 2018, plaintiff had filed an emergency motion for a preliminary injunction, requesting that the court order defendants to house him in single-cell housing. (Doc. No. 62.) Plaintiff alleged that, as a result of a violent attack he suffered while in prison, he developed PTSD that manifests itself in the form of "intense anxiety; hypervigilance; a severely oversensitive startle response; paranoia about being assaulted; aggressive, angry verbal and physical outbursts; and an inability to sleep in the presence of others." (Id. at 8.) Although plaintiff had been able to endure these symptoms while living in single-cell housing despite receiving little other treatment for his condition, defendants later transferred him to shared housing, which caused plaintiff to rapidly decompensate and develop severe, chronic sleep deprivation. (Id. at 9-10.) On March 25, 2019, the court adopted the magistrate judge's findings and recommendations in part, granted plaintiff's motion for preliminary injunctive relief in part, and ordered defendants to convene a review "to determine whether plaintiff's condition requires that he be designated for single-cell status in light of the McCall Report," an expert report prepared by Dr. Mariposa McCall that assessed plaintiff's mental health history and condition. (Doc. No. 123 at 6.) On April 19, 2019, defendants notified the court that it had convened a Unit Classification Committee ("UCC") to determine whether plaintiff's condition required him to be designated for single-cell status in light of the McCall Report. (Doc. No. 126.) But defendants did not disclose to the court what decision the UCC had reached or what action the UCC had taken. The court first learned of the UCC's decision to reject plaintiff's request to be designated for single-cell status upon review of plaintiff's pending motion, which plaintiff filed on May 14, 2019. (Doc. No. 128.)
[t]he fact that the review did not reach the conclusion Plaintiff desires does not constitute evidence that CDCR flouted the Court's order—in letter or in spirit—nor did the Court's order purport to guarantee that such review would result in Plaintiff being designated for single-cell status. Rather, the Court ordered only that the additional preliminary injunctive relief of an immediate review, with the benefit of the McCall Report in Plaintiff's health record, was warranted under the circumstances. That the outcome of the UCC was not to Plaintiff's liking does not constitute changed circumstances or new facts warranting modification of the preliminary injunctive relief already granted.(Id.) Those findings and recommendations were served on the parties and contained notice that any objections thereto were to be filed within fourteen (14) days of service. (Id. at 7.) Following the granting of multiple extensions of time, plaintiff timely filed objections on June 18, 2020. (Doc. No. 149.) Defendants filed responses on June 26, 2020 and July 29, 2020. (Doc. Nos. 151, 152.)
In accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C), the court has conducted a de novo review of this case. Having carefully reviewed the entire file, including plaintiff's objections and defendants' responses, the court concludes that the findings and recommendations are supported by the record and by proper analysis.
In his objections, plaintiff first argues that the magistrate judge incorrectly concluded that defendants were entitled to complete deference in their decision not to designate him for single-cell housing because they did not consider the McCall Report in good faith, they did not have legitimate security concerns, and they ignored plaintiff's extensive sleep deprivation. (Doc. No. 149 at 11-17.) In response, defendants contend that the UCC did consider the McCall Report and other evidence, including:
[1] a mental health chrono indicating that the Interdisciplinary Treatment Team had found on March 14, 2019, that a single-cell chrono was unwarranted, [2] the lack of documented significant in-cell/predatory/assaultive behavior towards inmates or in-cell violence, [3] the conclusions of prior Institutional Classification Committees clearing Plaintiff for double cell and dorm housing status, [4] a chrono signed by Plaintiff on April 11, 2019 confirming that he had no enemy concerns at VSP, and [5] active programming by Plaintiff at VSP involving interaction and communication with other inmates.(Doc. No. 152 at 6.) Based on the UCC's consideration of that evidence and need to "balanc[e] Plaintiff's mental health status with other factors implicating the safety and security of Plaintiff, other inmates, staff, and the institution," defendants maintain that the UCC's April 11, 2019 decision should be afforded deference by the court. (Id. at 7-8) (citing Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3269.1 and CDCR Dep't Ops. Manual § 54046.4.) In addition, defendants argue that even if the court were to find that plaintiffs' claim of deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs—i.e., a housing accommodation in light of his PTSD and mental health conditions—"plaintiff raises a mere disagreement as to the course of his medical treatment," which is insufficient to establish such a claim. (Id. at 8.)
The undersigned views defendants' claim that plaintiff lacks a history of in-cell violence with considerable skepticism. Though defendants' statements may accurately reflect internal, bureaucratic determinations, the magistrate judge in this case had previously found that:
Plaintiff had at least twenty-eight cellmates between March 6, 2008 and December 15, 2015. He also frequently lived alone for days, weeks, or months at a time due to problems with cellmates, despite not being on single-cell status, from July 15, 2013 through November 28, 2015. At these times, housing staff prevent[ed] other inmates from being housed with Plaintiff as much as possible. The total period of being house[d] alone during this time was 359 days.
The court recognizes that "'[i]n deciding whether there has been deliberate indifference to an inmate's serious medical needs, [it] need not defer to the judgment of prison doctors or administrators'" but that, nonetheless, prison officials are entitled to deference in those "outlier case . . . when there is evidence that the challenged medical decision was made pursuant to" a "policy or practice [that] addresses bona fide safety and security concerns[.]" Chess v. Dovey, 790 F.3d 961, 974 (9th Cir. 2015) (quoting Colwell v. Bannister, 763 F.3d 1060, 1066 (9th Cir. 2014)). Here, the court agrees with plaintiff that defendants have not identified any safety or security concerns that would actually conflict with plaintiff's medically based request for single-cell housing. Mendiola-Martinez v. Arpaio, 836 F.3d 1239, 1254-55 (9th Cir. 2016) (explaining that prison officials are entitled to deference in such situations only when "medical care and security concerns genuinely clash") (emphasis added). Nonetheless, plaintiff's focus on defendant's lack of demonstrated legitimate security concerns is misplaced here because the UCC did not base its decision solely on purported security concerns. Rather, the UCC considered the McCall Report, as well as "clinician input" from "the mental health team" in the form of a recommendation from plaintiff's Interdisciplinary Treatment Team, which determined that single- cell housing in his case was "unwarranted." (See Doc. No. 128 at 32.) The undersigned agrees with the magistrate judge's assessment that plaintiff's "motion to modify is fundamentally based on the argument that the UCC's determination that he should remain in double cell housing indicates CDCR's unwillingness and inability to make a reasoned decision in light of all the evidence available in his central and health file." (Doc. No. 142 at 6.) The undersigned also agrees with the magistrate judge's conclusion that plaintiff's disagreement with the UCC's determination in this regard "does not constitute changed circumstances or new facts warranting modification of the preliminary injunctive relief already granted." (Id. at 5.)
Plaintiff also argues that defendants' decision not to designate him for single-cell housing is based on an administrative policy to not provide inmates with the housing of their choice and not accommodate "an inmate's needs if it could conceivably lead other prisoners to seek similar relief." (Doc. No. 14 at 20-21.) However, the purported administrative policy that plaintiff describes was not mentioned in the UCC's action summary or comments, which outlines the several bases on which the UCC based its determination that plaintiff "was appropriate for double cell housing." (Doc. No. 128 at 32.) --------
Next, plaintiff argues that without the requested modification, the preliminary injunction issued by this court has "failed to maintain the status quo ante litem, the maintenance of which would have required [defendant] Diaz to reimpose [plaintiff's] single cell status classification, and house him in a single occupancy cell." (Doc. No. 149 at 18.) But the preliminary injunction that plaintiff now purportedly seeks to modify did not require defendants to designate plaintiff for single-cell housing—even though that was the relief that plaintiff had requested. If the court had intended to maintain the status quo as plaintiff now characterizes it, then the injunction would have reflected that intent and ordered that relief accordingly. It did not. The court instead concluded that only limited injunctive relief was warranted, even under the "extraordinary" facts of this case. (See Doc. No. 123 at 6.) Specifically, the court ordered "defendant Diaz to ensure that an immediate review is undertaken to determine whether plaintiff's condition requires that he be designated for single-cell status in light of the McCall Report." (Id.) As the magistrate judge correctly found, defendant complied with that order by convening the UCC on April 11, 2019 to conduct that review and make a determination. (Doc. No. 142 at 5.)
Plaintiff is certainly not alone in his dissatisfaction with the result of that review by the UCC. The undersigned remains very troubled by defendants' decision and continues to have serious concerns regarding the safety and care of plaintiff, as well as that of any other prisoner he is celled with under these circumstances. Defendants have clearly been made aware of the court's serious concerns in this regard. Nevertheless, plaintiff's dissatisfaction with the result reached by prison officials as a result of the review ordered by the court—even coupled with the undersigned's concern about the correctness the UCC's ultimate determination—does not constitute changed circumstances or new facts warranting modification of the preliminary injunctive relief that the court granted in this case.
Accordingly,
1. The findings and recommendations issued on February 25, 2020 (Doc. No. 142), are adopted in full;IT IS SO ORDERED.
2. Plaintiff's motion to modify the preliminary injunction that the court issued on March 25, 2019 (Doc. No. 128) is denied; and
3. This action is referred back to the assigned magistrate judge for further proceedings.
Dated: December 7 , 2020
/s/_________
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
(Doc. No. 111 at 20) (citations omitted). A review of the declarations submitted by ten of those cellmates indicate that relations between themselves and plaintiff veered dangerously close to serious conflict, with all of them attesting to having experienced repeated, potentially dangerous, incidents with plaintiff. (Id. at 20-25.) One cellmate declared that his time living with plaintiff was "the worst time I've spent since getting locked up"; another wrote that he had "never lived in the cell with someone so paranoid"; a third "felt too threatened to live with plaintiff any longer"; a fourth called plaintiff "a ticking time-bomb ready to blow up"; a fifth described plaintiff as "very angry, paranoid, and mumbling to himself about a conspiracy"; and so on. (Id.) Another declaration from plaintiff's bunkmate as of April 14, 2019 was also submitted with the pending motion and details behavior by plaintiff that is consistent with those earlier characterizations. (See Doc. No. 128, Ex. 14 at 123-27.)