Opinion
07-23-00007-CR
10-30-2023
JONATHAN VILLAMARES, APPELLANT v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, APPELLEE
Do not publish
On Appeal from the 364th District Court Lubbock County, Texas Trial Court No. 2021-422,178, Honorable William R. Eichman II, Presiding
Before QUINN, C.J. and PARKER and YARBROUGH, JJ.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Alex Yarbrough, Justice.
Following a plea of not guilty, Appellant, Jonathan Villamares, was convicted by a jury of possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver in an amount of four grams or more but less than 200 and was sentenced to ten years' confinement. By two issues, he maintains the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress because of a prolonged detention and an illegal search. We affirm.
Background
Appellant was a passenger in his own vehicle when it was stopped for traffic violations. The deputy approached the driver's side and asked the female driver for her license. She did not have it on her person. The deputy observed Appellant seated in an "unnatural" position as if hiding something in the passenger side door compartment. He also was without his driver's license but provided a bank card with his name on it.
The stop, which is not contested, occurred on a cold December evening. When the deputy asked them where they were coming from, the driver responded she had dropped friends off nearby. The deputy, however, knew her to be lying because he had observed the vehicle leave the parking lot of a game room in a high crime area. He asked the driver to exit the vehicle and then asked Appellant to exit. When Appellant got out, he closed the front passenger door. The deputy searched both occupants for weapons. He did not find any weapons or contraband on them.
The deputy directed Appellant to stand in front of his patrol vehicle while he questioned the driver. He escorted the driver to the passenger's side of the vehicle and, without consent, opened the front passenger door and shined his flashlight inside. He then directed Appellant to remove his hands from his pants pockets. Appellant explained he was cold and asked the deputy if he could get his jacket from the vehicle. The deputy offered to retrieve it for him, and Appellant told him it was in the back seat. The deputy retrieved the jacket, searched it, and provided it to Appellant.
Unbeknownst to Appellant and the driver, when the deputy retrieved the jacket, he observed a liquor bottle labeled "tequila" on the floorboard in between the rear captain's seats. Without disclosing the discovery, the deputy returned to the driver, searched her again, and continued questioning her. He then approached Appellant and asked him what other contraband was in the vehicle other than the open container of which Appellant denied having any knowledge. The driver claimed ownership of the open tequila bottle.
Section 49.031 of the Texas Penal Code criminalizes possession of an open bottle of alcohol with a broken seal in an area of a vehicle designed for seating. Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 49.031(a).
The trial court ordered certain statements redacted from Defendant's Exhibit 2, body camera footage of the stop. Thus, there is no audio of the deputy questioning the driver.
On finding the open container, the deputy advised Appellant he had probable cause to search the vehicle once backup deputies arrived. After they arrived, the deputy instructed a backup deputy to guard the driver and Appellant while he conducted a search of the vehicle. He immediately approached the open front passenger door, shined his flashlight on the door compartment, and removed a small, crocheted bag with part of a plastic bag protruding from the top. He uttered "wow" and placed the contraband on the hood of his patrol vehicle. The plastic bag contained a crystal-like substance later determined by a field test to be approximately 119 grams of methamphetamine. The deputy announced to other deputies "plain view, bro."
As other deputies continued to search the vehicle, the deputy who made the stop informed Appellant he was being detained based on the methamphetamine found and read him his Miranda rights. After he was charged with possession with intent to deliver, Appellant filed a written pretrial motion to suppress evidence alleging his detention and arrest violated his constitutional rights.
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 441, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966).
The trial court conducted a hearing on the motion. The only witness was the deputy who detained Appellant. At the conclusion of the testimony and arguments, the trial court announced, "it's a close call" but denied the motion to suppress the methamphetamine and found the stop was not "unduly lengthy." No written findings of fact or conclusions of law were made.
Before commencement of voir dire and trial on the merits, Appellant re-urged his motion to suppress. He argued the deputy had plain view of the methamphetamine prior to retrieving his jacket and finding the open container and thus, conducted an illegal search when he opened the front passenger door and shined his flashlight inside. The trial court agreed opening the door was a search but recalled from the suppression hearing the deputy "testified clearly that he did not see anything, though, when he flashed his flashlight in there." The trial court expressed concerns, however, about the sequence of events which resulted in discovery of the methamphetamine and sought clarification. After examining relevant portions of the deputy's body camera footage, the trial court asked for the deputy to be recalled to determine the following: "When he flashed that light, you're telling me you didn't see that?" The court indicated if the deputy did see the methamphetamine the first time he looked inside the front passenger door compartment, "it gets suppressed, and I do change my ruling."
When the deputy was recalled, he testified he did not see the plastic bag of methamphetamine in the crocheted bag the first time he shined his flashlight inside the front passenger door compartment. He replied, "[d]idn't notice it" when asked if he had seen the plastic bag protruding from the crocheted bag. Later, however, the following exchange occurred during questioning by defense counsel:
Q. You will agree that that [sic] crochet bag was open, right?
A. Yes.
Q. And the plastic bag was sticking out?
A. Uh-huh.
Q. And it's a large plastic bag, right?
A. It is.
Q. It was in plain view, correct?
A. It was in plain view of me, yes.
Although the deputy claimed he did not notice the large plastic bag to be "dope" the first time he looked inside the front passenger door compartment, he later testified "[i]t wasn't concealed very cleverly in a hidden compartment or anything. It was just sitting there."
The trial court again denied the motion to suppress and found the deputy "unequivocally testified he did not see what was in the side compartment after the door was opened. When he did go to that door, he did have probable cause to search based on finding the alcohol bottle . . . ." The trial court acknowledged opening the passenger door was a search but "nothing was discovered at that time." Trial proceedings continued and Appellant was convicted as charged.
Standard of Review
We review a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress for abuse of discretion under a bifurcated standard of review. State v. Torres, 666 S.W.3d 735, 740 (Tex. Crim. App. 2023). We afford almost total deference to the trial court's determinations based on an assessment of credibility and demeanor. Id. (citations omitted). We review pure questions of law, as well as mixed questions of law and fact which do not turn on an assessment of credibility and demeanor, on a de novo basis. Id. (citations omitted). In other words, de novo review applies when the facts are undisputed. Guzman v. State, 995 S.W.2d 85, 89 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). The evidence and all reasonable inferences are viewed in the light most favorable to the trial court's ruling, and the trial court's ruling must be upheld if it is reasonably supported by the record and is correct under a theory of law applicable to the case. State v. Espinosa, 666 S.W.3d 659, 667 (Tex. Crim. App. 2023). When, as here, the trial court does not make explicit findings of fact, we assume the trial court made implicit findings of fact supported by the record. Lerma v. State, 543 S.W.3d 184, 190 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018).
Prolonged Detention
A traffic stop may last no longer than necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop. Id. at 193 (citing Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. 348, 354, 135 S.Ct. 1609, 191 L.Ed.2d 492 (2015)). In Rodriguez, the Supreme Court held a seizure justified only by a police-observed traffic violation becomes unlawful if it is prolonged beyond the time reasonably required to complete the mission of issuing a ticket. Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at 349. An investigative detention must be temporary and last no longer than is reasonably necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop. Kothe v. State, 152 S.W.3d 54, 63 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004). An investigation includes ordinary inquiries incident to the traffic stop such as checking the driver's license, determining whether there are any outstanding warrants, and inspecting for registration and proof of insurance. Lerma, 543 S.W.3d at 193.
To prolong a traffic stop, the officer must be able to point to specific articulable facts which, based on his experience and personal knowledge coupled with logical inferences drawn therefrom, warrant the additional intrusion. Davis v. State, 947 S.W.2d 240, 244 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). The officer may rely on information gathered during contact with the motorist in developing articulable facts justifying the prolonged detention. McNabb v. State, No. 07-19-00225-CR, 2020 Tex.App. LEXIS 6354, at *7 (Tex. App.- Amarillo Aug. 12, 2020, pet. ref'd) (mem. op., not designated for publication).
Search and Seizure
The Fourth Amendment prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures by government officials. U.S. Const. amend IV; Wiede v. State, 214 S.W.3d 17, 24 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). To suppress evidence for an alleged violation of the Fourth Amendment, a defendant has the initial burden to produce evidence rebutting the presumption of proper police conduct and can do so by showing the search occurred without a warrant. Amador v. State, 221 S.W.3d 666, 672 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). If the defendant meets that burden by establishing the search occurred without a warrant, the burden shifts to the State to prove the search was reasonable under the totality of the circumstances. Id. at 672-73.
The touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness. State v. Villarreal, 475 S.W.3d 784, 795 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) (citation omitted). To determine whether a detention was reasonable, a reviewing court considers whether the officer's action was justified at its inception and whether it was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the detention in the first place. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). In the case of a traffic stop, once the reason for the stop is resolved, the stop may not then be used as a "fishing expedition for unrelated criminal activity." Davis, 947 S.W.2d at 244; McNabb, 2020 Tex.App. LEXIS 6354, at *6.
"There is no per se rule that an officer must immediately conduct a computer check on the driver's information before questioning the occupants of the vehicle." Lerma, 543 S.W.3d at 190-91. Once the officer has verified a driver's license and other ordinary inquiries related to the stop, the traffic stop has been fully resolved. Id. at 191. If, however, the officer develops reasonable suspicion the driver or occupant is involved in criminal activity, the officer may continue questioning the person regardless of whether the official tasks of a traffic stop have ended. Id. Reasonable suspicion to detain a person exists when a police officer has specific, articulable facts that, when combined with rational inferences from those facts, would lead the officer to reasonably conclude the person detained is, has been, or soon will be engaged in criminal activity. Ramirez-Tamayo v. State, 537 S.W.3d 29, 36 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017).
Analysis
By his two issues, Appellant maintains the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion to suppress because the prolonged and illegal search by the deputy exceeded the mission of the traffic stop. Although the deputy's conduct was problematic, we disagree the trial court's ruling was an abuse of discretion.
During his testimony at the motion to suppress hearing, the deputy conceded he did not have probable cause to search Appellant's vehicle until after he discovered the open container of tequila, which was located on the floorboard in between the rear seats. His articulable facts to believe criminal activity was afoot based on the totality of the circumstances were that neither the driver nor Appellant produced a driver's license, they appeared nervous, the driver had lied about where she was coming from, and Appellant was sitting in an unnatural position as if to conceal something in the door compartment. In his opinion, opening the front passenger door without consent and shining his flashlight inside was innocuous because he did not see anything of evidentiary value.
During cross-examination, the deputy conceded lying is not an offense unless it involves making a false report. He agreed nervousness alone was not sufficient to justify an investigative detention. See Woodward v. State, No. 07-16-00242-CR, 2018 Tex.App. LEXIS 3573, at *18 (Tex. App.-Amarillo May 21, 2018, pet. ref'd) (mem. op., not designated for publication). Additionally, the level of criminal activity in an area may be a factor to consider in determining reasonable suspicion but is not suspicious in and of itself. Hudson v. State, 247 S.W.3d 780, 786-87 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 2008, no pet.).
Appellant contends the delay in verifying his identity unnecessarily prolonged the stop. However, his and the driver's failure to produce any identification may have justified a prolonged detention. As observed in Lerma, it is not a per se rule that a computer check must occur prior to questioning an individual during a traffic stop. Additionally, the deputy was hesitant to run a computer check with two unrestrained individuals before backup arrived. Lerma, 543 S.W.3d at 191-92.
Here, the open container was found approximately seven minutes after the stop and the methamphetamine was discovered fifteen minutes after the stop. The deputy testified he was waiting for backup units for his own safety. We find the duration of the stop was not per se unreasonable or unduly prolonged under the totality of circumstances.
Regarding the deputy's search of the vehicle presents a conundrum. It defies logic for the deputy to have testified the methamphetamine was in plain view after determining he had probable cause due to an open container violation but that it was not in plain view when he first opened the front passenger door without consent and shined his flashlight in the compartment.
The swift discovery of the methamphetamine after the open container violation is incredulous given his testimony that when he first shined his flashlight in the same area, he saw nothing of evidentiary value. After discovering the open container and informing Appellant he had probable cause to search the vehicle, the deputy beelined toward the front door compartment area and removed the open crocheted bag with the plastic bag exposed. Credulity is further strained when the deputy was recalled and testified the methamphetamine was not "concealed very cleverly."
A meticulous review of the deputy's testimony and his body camera footage reveals he spied the plastic bag containing methamphetamine when he first opened the front passenger side door without consent when questioning the driver and before finding the open container. His conduct notwithstanding, appellate courts are directed to uphold a trial court's suppression ruling on any valid legal theory. In its verbal findings, the trial court found the deputy's account that he saw nothing of evidentiary value when he first looked into the front door compartment to be credible. The court justified the subsequent search based on the probable cause provided by the open container violation.
As the State argues, assuming the initial search was illegal, the independent source doctrine removed any possible taint. That doctrine provides that "evidence actually obtained pursuant to a distinct, untainted source is not subject to suppression because, in such cases, the prior illegality does 'not contribute in any way to discovery of the evidence seized . . . .'" See Wehrenberg v. State, 416 S.W.3d 458, 470 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013). When Appellant voluntarily asked the deputy to retrieve his jacket from the back seat, the deputy observed an open container violation. That violation created an independent source for probable cause to search the vehicle. As the trial court found, the deputy's conduct in opening the passenger door constituted a search, but nothing was discovered at that time and once he found an open container, he had probable cause to search the vehicle. See Sieffert v. State, 290 S.W.3d 478, 483 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 2009, no pet.) (citing Davis, 947 S.W.2d at 244 ("If during a valid traffic stop the officer develops reasonable suspicion that the detainees are engaged in other criminal activity, prolonged or continued detention is justified.")).
The attenuation doctrine also supports the trial court's denial of the motion to suppress. Under that doctrine, evidence may be admissible if the connection between the initial illegality and the means through which the evidence was seized is so attenuated as to dissipate the taint. See Hudson, 247 S.W.3d at 787 (holding discovery of an outstanding warrant during an illegal detention broke the connection between the primary taint and subsequently discovered evidence). We find the independent source doctrine and the attenuation doctrine are valid legal theories to support the trial court's denial of the motion to suppress and conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion. Issues one and two are overruled.
Conclusion
The trial court's judgment is affirmed.