Opinion
17840.
SUBMITTED APRIL 15, 1952.
DECIDED MAY 12, 1952.
Petition for injunction, etc. Before Judge Lilly. Thomas Superior Court. January 28, 1952.
Steve M. Watkins, for plaintiffs in error.
Jesse J. Gainey and James T. Gainey, contra.
"Where no motion for a new trial is made, and a decree is attacked because contrary to law and evidence, the exception should specify wherein it is contrary to law." Groover, Stubbs Co. v. Inman, 60 Ga. 406, 407 (5). Where, under the record in a case, several assignments of error might be made on the judgment and decree of the court, such as that there were issues of fact which should have been submitted to a jury, or that the judgment was contrary to law for specified reasons, an exception to the decree as "being contrary to law," is too indefinite to present any question for decision by this court. Cates v. Duncan, 180 Ga. 289 ( 179 S.E. 121). See also Higgins v. Cherokee Railroad, 73 Ga. 149 (2); Rodgers v. Black, 99 Ga. 142 ( 25 S.E. 20); Fidelity Deposit Co. v. Anderson, 102 Ga. 551 ( 28 S.E. 382); Newberry v. Tenant, 121 Ga. 561 ( 49 S.E. 621); Greenfield v. Harvey, 191 Ga. 92, 95 ( 11 S.E.2d 776); City of Douglas v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 207 Ga. 690 (2) ( 64 S.E.2d 63); Kent v. Shannon, 209 Ga. 8 ( 70 S.E.2d 376); Ulmer v. Ulmer, 51 Ga. App. 177 ( 179 S.E. 748). The bill of exceptions in the instant case presents nothing for review.
Writ of error dismissed. All the Justices concur.
No. 17840. SUBMITTED APRIL 15, 1952 — DECIDED MAY 12, 1952.
The plaintiff alleged that it had procured a money judgment against one of the defendants; that execution had issued and been levied upon the remainder interest in certain lands as the lands of the defendant in execution; and that other named defendants were threatening to cut and remove valuable timber from the lands. It prayed that the defendants be temporarily and permanently enjoined from removing the timber, and for other substantial equitable relief.
The defendants filed an answer, in which they admitted certain allegations of the petition, and denied others. The plaintiff filed a written motion, which asserted that the answer presented no issue of fact to be passed upon by a jury, and asked that the court render a decree granting the relief prayed. The judge entered a decree, in which it was recited that one of the defendants had previously filed a petition against the plaintiff, and, considering the allegations of the former petition of the defendant, and the answer of the defendants in the present case, there was no issue of fact to be passed upon by a jury, and the court entered a decree for the substantial relief sought by the plaintiff. The bill of exceptions recites that "the defendants, W. A. Vick Sr. et al., named in plaintiff's petition, designate themselves as plaintiffs in error," and that the "decree was in effect an order sustaining the motion of the plaintiffs . . to which said judgment and decree and ruling of the court, defendants then and there excepted, here and now except, and assign the same as error, such ruling being contrary to law."