Opinion
CA No. 3:99-CV-1468-R
August 7, 2000
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Nick C. Ventura ("Plaintiff') filed suit against Defendants Linda Hardge ("Hardge") and Dallas Independent School District ("DISD") on June 28, 1999. Plaintiff raises claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ("§ 1983") alleging violations of Plaintiffs' Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Plaintiff raises additional state law claims including malicious prosecution and false imprisonment/false arrest. Now before the Court is Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (filed March 23, 2000). For the reasons stated below, Defendants' Motion is GRANTED as to both Defendants.
I. BACKGROUND FACTS
Everything that can go wrong, will go wrong — so says Murphy's law. Sometimes, Murphy's law even works its way into cases before federal court. This is one such case. On May 02, 1997, Hardge, a school clerk at DISD, noted that Jose Ventura, a student at the School Community Guidance Center ("SCGC"), a school in DISD, was in violation of the Compulsory School Attendance Law of the State of Texas, Vernon's Texas Education Code Annotated § 25.085, et. seq. ("CSAL") due to excessive truancy. Hardge then initiated proceedings against Plaintiff on May 7, 1997 by filling out an arrest warrant affidavit, apparently believing Plaintiff to be in violation of § 25.093 of the CSAL, which makes it a Class C Misdemeanor for any parent to fail to require his or her child to attend school.
Hardge then sent Plaintiff a Notice of Trial, which listed Plaintiffs' correct mailing address but which Plaintiff nonetheless claims never to have received. Regardless, Plaintiff failed to appear for his August 25, 1997 trial date. Justice of the Peace Cleophus Steele then issued a warrant for Plaintiffs' arrest on August 25, 1997. Significantly, Justice of the Peace Steele did not issue an arrest warrant on the basis of Plaintiff's failure to appear, but rather on the basis of the affidavit filled out by Hardge.
Plaintiff was duly arrested on September 8, 1997 and secured his release after spending five hours in jail. Upon his release, Plaintiff contacted Sue Price ("Price"), an attendance liaison with DISD. It was at this moment that the following bit of irony became all too apparent: Plaintiff and Jose Ventura, while sharing the same last name, have absolutely no relationship to one another! It seems that Hardge mistakenly believed Plaintiff to be Jose Ventura's father. As a result of this unfortunate series of events, Plaintiff filed the present lawsuit on June 28, 1999. For now, the Court must adjudicate the Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment.
In fact, Jose Ventura's father is Jose H. Ventura. Plaintiff has a son named Christopher Ventura who also attended SCGC. Incidentally, Christopher Ventura was also in violation of the CSAL due to excessive truancy.
II. ANALYSIS
A. Summary Judgment Standard
Summary judgment is proper "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitle to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). "[T]he substantive law will identify which facts are material." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). The moving party through the motion for summary judgment and evidence on file show the court that there is no genuine material fact issues. Once the movant makes this showing, the nonmoving party must then direct the court's attention to evidence in the record sufficient to establish that there is a genuine issue of material fact for trial. The court must view the evidence in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party. If the nonmoving party does not show sufficient evidence to establish the existence of an element essential to her case then the moving party is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986)
B. Section 1983
Section 1983 imposes civil liability upon any person "who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws." 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994). "The first inquiry in any § 1983 suit is whether the plaintiff has been deprived of a right `secured by the Constitution and laws.'" Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 139 (1979). The deprivation of a right must be caused by the conduct of a person acting under the color of state law. There is no dispute that Defendants acted pursuant to Texas state law. The threshold question for this inquiry is whether either Defendant is shielded from liability. Plaintiff alleges that two actions of the Defendants deprived Plaintiff of his rights: (1) the erroneous listing of Plaintiff in the arrest warrant affidavit due to a case of mistaken identity, and (2) the submission of an arrest warrant application which allegedly lacked probable cause. The Court will analyze each of these alleged instances of wrongdoing.
I. Mistaken Identity
There is no dispute as to the fact that Hardge mistook Plaintiff for the father of Jose Ventura and thereby affectuated Plaintiff's arrest. Therefore, the Court is faced simply with an issue of law, i.e., whether a § 1983 defendant can be held liable for listing the wrong person to be arrested in an arrest warrant affidavit.
"The Fourth Amendment is not violated by an arrest based on probable cause, even if the wrong person is arrested, if the arresting officer had a reasonable, good faith belief that he was arresting the correct person." Blackwell v. Barton, 34 F.3d 298, 303 (5th Cir. 1994). "`The Constitution does not guarantee that only the guilty will be arrested,' for `if it did,' . . . `§ 1983 would provide a cause of action for every defendant acquitted — indeed, for every suspect released.'" Sanchez v. Swyden, 139 F.3d 464, 468 (5th Cir. 1998) (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 145 (1979)). In Sanchez, the defendant law enforcement officials mistook the plaintiff for a fugitive for whom an arrest warrant had been issued. As a result of this mistake, plaintiff was held by the defendants for approximately 26 hours. The plaintiff in Sanchez argued that because defendants were in possession of the actual suspect's photographs, fingerprints, and information that the suspect had a rose tattoo on his left shoulder within two hours after [plaintiffs'] initial detention, the defendants had "conclusive proof that he was not the person wanted on the outstanding arrest warrant." Id. (emphasis added). The Fifth Circuit found in favor of the defendants despite the exculpating information in defendants' possession, stating that "we have required proof that the official's [sic] actions went beyond mere negligence before that tort takes on constitutional dimensions." Id. at 469.
Normally, the foregoing analysis would dispose of this case in favor of the Defendants. However, in both Blackwell and Sanchez, the plaintiffs were arrested pursuant to valid arrest warrants. See Blackwell, 34 F.3d at 303 ("Barton arrested Blackwell pursuant to a facially valid [arrest] warrant. . . ."); Sanchez, 139 F.3d at 468 ("Notably, Sanchez does not attack the validity of the [arrest] warrant."). In other words, as the holding in Blackwell states, the "Fourth Amendment is not violated by an arrest based on probable cause, even if the wrong person is arrested . . ." Blackwell, 34 F.3d at 303 (emphasis added). In his summary judgment briefs, Plaintiff argues that the arrest warrant affidavit filled out by Hardge lacked probable cause. The Court will now address this argument.
II Probable Cause
The Court's probable cause analysis will proceed in two parts. The first part will address Hardge's potential liability, and the second part will address DISD's potential liability.
1. HARDGE
The Supreme Court of the United States has held that "government officials preforming discretionary functions generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). In filling out and signing the affidavit to an arrest warrant, Hardge was performing a function normally performed by police officers. Thus, much of the case law regarding individual liability for illegal arrest is framed in the context of police officers.
"When an individual asserts a claim for wrongful arrest, qualified immunity will shield the defendant officers from suit if `a reasonable officer' could have believed [the arrest at issue] to be lawful in light of clearly established law and the information the [arresting] officers possessed. Even law enforcement officials who `reasonably but mistakenly conclude that probable cause is present `are entitled to immunity.'" Mendenhall v. Riser, 213 F.3d 226, 230 (5th Cir. 2000),
The Supreme Court has recognized that those who submit arrest warrant affidavits are not always trained in law. See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 235-36 (1983). The Gates Court noted that "search and arrest warrants have long been issued by persons who are neither lawyers nor judges, and who certainly do not remain abreast of each judicial refinement of the nature of `probable cause.'" Id. at 235. Further, "many warrants are — quite properly . . . — issued on the basis of nontechnical, common-sense judgments of laymen applying a standard less demanding than those used in more formal legal proceedings." Id. at 235-36.
Extrapolating from the foregoing case law, the Court finds that Hardge was reasonable in her belief that probable cause existed to arrest Plaintiff. There is no dispute that Jose Ventura was in violation of the CSAL. Therefore, Hardge had probable cause to believe that Jose Ventura's parents had committed an offense under § 25.093 of the CSAL. Thus, Hardge's decision to seek an arrest warrant against the father of Jose Ventura was not lacking in probable cause. The only problem arises in Hardge's mistake in identifying Plaintiff as the father of Jose Ventura. However, the Court has already demonstrated that no liability attaches to Hardge as a result of this mistake. The Court must, therefore, GRANT summary judgment as to Plaintiffs' § 1983 claims against Hardge. Now, the Court will address the liability of DISD.
2. DISD
"A municipality may be held liable under section 1983 for a deprivation of rights protected by the Constitution or federal law only if that deprivation is inflicted pursuant to an official, municipal policy." Campbell v. City of San Antonio, 43 F.3d 973, 977 (5th Cir. 1995). "Such a policy may include `a persistent, widespread practice of city officials or employees, which, although not authorized by officially adopted and promulgated policy, is so common and well settled as to constitute a custom that fairly represents municipal policy.'" Id. (quoting Webster v. City of Houston, 735 F.2d 838, 841 (5th Cir. 1984)). Plaintiff argues that because of an allegedly faulty affidavit, the arrest warrant which effectuated Plaintiff's arrest was also allegedly invalid, thereby depriving Plaintiff of rights secured by the Constitution. Further, Plaintiff argues that DISD maintains a policy or custom of submitting allegedly faulty affidavits. This argument addresses a different issue than that addressed by the Court in the section dealing with Hardge's potential liability. In that section, the Court found that Hardge had a reasonable basis in probable cause so to justify her decision to seek Plaintiff's arrest. In his claims against DISD, Plaintiff argues that regardless of whether probable cause existed to arrest Plaintiff, the affidavit used to effectuate that arrest was in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution.
Even assuming that Plaintiff is correct and that the arrest warrant affidavit submitted by Hardge was faulty, the Court need not address this issue because Plaintiff suffered no damage as a result of the allegedly faulty arrest warrant affidavit. Had Hardge filled out an arrest warrant affidavit more in line with that envisioned by the Plaintiff, the outcome would have been no different. Plaintiff would have still been arrested due to mistaken identity. In other words, even if the fact-finder were to find liability on the part of DISD for putting in place a policy or custom of submitting faulty arrest warrant affidavits, Plaintiff would not be able to point to any damages as a result of such policy or custom in this case. Plaintiffs' damages arise solely from Hardge's honest mistake — a mistake for which neither Hardge nor DISD can be held liable. Therefore, summary judgment must be GRANTED as to Plaintiffs' § 1983 claims against DISD.
Nonetheless, the Court strongly advises DISD to review its preprinted arrest warrant affidavit form in light of Fourth ad Fourteenth Amendment case law. DISD may not get so lucky next time!
C. State Law Claims
Along with his § 1983 claims, Plaintiff has raised state law claims for both malicious prosecution and false imprisonment/false arrest. The Court will address each in turn.
In their summary judgment briefs, Defendants expressed some uncertainty as to whether Plaintiff has actually raised these claims. Further, Plaintiff did not address either of these claims in his summary judgment briefs. However, the Court will address these out of an abundance of caution.
I. Malicious Prosecution
State actors other than prosecutors may be liable for damages for malicious prosecution if their malice results in an improperly motivated prosecution without probable cause. See Hand v. Gary, 838 F.2d 1420, 1426 (5th Cir. 1988); Wheeler v. Cosden Oil Chem. Co., 744 F.2d 1131 (5th Cir. 1984). Under Texas law, to prevail on a malicious prosecution claim the plaintiff must show that (1) a criminal action was commenced against the plaintiff; (2) the prosecution was caused by the defendant or with his aid; (3) the action terminated in the plaintiffs' favor; (4) the plaintiff was innocent; (5) the defendant acted without probable cause; (6) the defendant acted with malice; and (7) the criminal proceeding damaged the plaintiff. See Hayter v. City of Mount Vernon, 154 F.3d 269, 275 (5th Cir. 1998); Taylor v. Gregg, 36 F.3d 453, 455 (5th Cir. 1994); Richey v. Brookshire Grocery Co., 952 S.W.2d 515, 517 (Tex. 1997).
In this case, Plaintiff fails to establish the fifth and sixth elements of a malicious prosecution claim. Specifically, the Court has already found that Hardge had a reasonable basis for finding probable cause. Further, Plaintiff has failed to establish malice on the part of Hardge or DISD. The Court agrees that Hardge was negligent in assuming Plaintiff was Jose Ventura's father. However. Hardge's deposition testimony indicates that Hardge could not recall why she believed Plaintiff to be Jose Ventura's father. Similarly, Plaintiff's deposition testimony alleges no reason why Hardge would purposefully have Plaintiff arrested. Because Plaintiff has not established a lack of probable cause or the existence of malice on Hardge's part, the Court must GRANT summary judgment in favor of both Defendants on Plaintiffs' malicious prosecution claim.
II. False Imprisonment/False Arrest
"To recover for false imprisonment under Texas law, a plaintiff must prove willful detention, lack of consent, and absence of authority of law." Landry v. A-Able Bonding, Inc., 75 F.3d 200, 205 (5th Cir. 1996). Under Texas law, "want of probable cause and malice are not elements of a cause of action for false imprisonment. . . ." Bossin v. Towber, 894 S.W.2d 25, 31 (Tex.App.-Houston 1994). In addition, "if facts supporting an arrest warrant are placed before an independent intermediary such as a magistrate or grand jury, the intermediary's decision breaks the chain of causation for false arrest, insulating the initiating party." Taylor v. Gregg, 36 F.3d 453, 456 (5th Cir. 1994). "Any misdirection of the magistrate or the grand jury by omission or commission perpetuates the taint of the original official behavior." Hand, 838 F.2d at 1428.
What the Court must decide now is whether Plaintiffs' arrest was procured under authority of law. The Court finds in favor of Defendants on this point, noting that Harge's affidavit in no way "misdirected" the justice of the peace when he issued the arrest warrant. In fact, it appears to this Court that Justice of the Peace Steele issued the arrest warrant in response to Plaintiffs' failure to appear at Plaintiffs' August 25, 1997 hearing. In other words, had Hardge filled out the arrest warrant affidavit differently, the same result would have occurred. Thus, there is no way the justice of the peace was misdirected by Hardge or the DISD. Therefore, summary judgment must be GRANTED as to Plaintiffs' false imprisonment claim.
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED as to both Defendants.
It is so ORDERED.