Opinion
E079967
05-10-2024
MARICELA VELDHUIZEN, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. CITY OF MURRIETA, et al., Defendants and Respondents
Essayli & Brown, Bilal A. Essayli, and D. Andrew Brown; Kimura London & White, Darrell P. White, and Michelle E. Soon, for Plaintiff and Appellant. Dean Gazzo Roistacher, Lee H. Roistacher, Mitchell D. Dean, and Kimberly R. Ophaso for Defendants and Respondents.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. No. CVSW2000434 Angel M. Bermudez, Judge. Affirmed.
Essayli & Brown, Bilal A. Essayli, and D. Andrew Brown; Kimura London & White, Darrell P. White, and Michelle E. Soon, for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Dean Gazzo Roistacher, Lee H. Roistacher, Mitchell D. Dean, and Kimberly R. Ophaso for Defendants and Respondents.
OPINION
RAPHAEL, J.
In November 2019, a City of Murrieta police officer arrested plaintiff and appellant Maricela Veldhuizen for spousal battery (Pen. Code, § 243, subd. (e)(1)) against her husband Christopher Veldhuizen. In this civil case, plaintiff asserts several causes of action against the officer, defendant and respondent Aaron Drootin, as well as defendants and respondents City of Murrieta and Murrieta Police Department, all resting on the premise she was arrested without probable cause. The trial court granted summary judgment to defendants, finding undisputed facts established Drootin had probable cause to arrest plaintiff. We affirm the judgment.
FACTS
On November 17, 2019, plaintiff's husband called the Murrieta Police Department and reported plaintiff had slapped him in the face and thrown "stuff," including a coffee mug, at him. Drootin responded to the call, together with another officer, who is not a party to this lawsuit.
Twice before, in March and April 2019, Drootin had personally responded to calls involving plaintiff and her husband. In March 2019, plaintiff's husband called police and complained that plaintiff had an emergency protective order against him, but she had been calling the place he was staying, which was on a military base, "to confirm if he was staying there." Drootin "advised" plaintiff's husband of the emergency protective order's status, and told him to contact military police if plaintiff "arrives and/or violates" it. In April 2019, plaintiff's husband called police to ask how to retrieve his belongings when there was a temporary domestic violence restraining order against him. Drootin responded and "advised" plaintiff's husband of the terms of the temporary restraining order, which included a no contact order, and also the "TRO modification process." Plaintiff's husband said he would "attempt to coordinate recovery of his property through a mutual friend." According to Drootin, however, he did not remember these previous calls, to other locations but involving the same parties, during the events on November 17, 2019.
The November 17, 2019 call for service informed Drootin there had been a "PRIOR DV CALL," dated November 12, 2017, but no further details. Before contacting plaintiff or her husband, Drootin also accessed a law enforcement database that showed two active restraining orders against plaintiff's husband: a domestic violence restraining order, issued in March 2019, requiring plaintiff's husband to have no contact with plaintiff or her children; and a criminal protective order, issued in May 2019, requiring him to have no negative contact with plaintiff. Nevertheless, during the call, Drootin was under the mistaken impression that the restraining orders were mutual, applying to both plaintiff and her husband.
Drootin contacted plaintiff's husband first, outside the family home. Plaintiff's husband told Drootin that plaintiff had slapped him in the face, and thrown various items at him, including a coffee mug with coffee in it (only the coffee hit him, not the mug). The slap did not leave any mark, and he had no other injuries. Plaintiff's husband told Drootin that their most recent restraining order-"the one we're going by"-required no negative contact "toward anyone."
After speaking with plaintiff's husband, Drootin spoke to plaintiff at the door to the house (she declined to allow Drootin in). Plaintiff described a verbal altercation between her and her husband, but denied throwing anything at him or slapping him. According to plaintiff, her husband had initiated a verbal altercation, she had asked him to leave (not for the first time), and he had refused. She said a coffee mug was broken because she had dropped it on the floor, but that it was not thrown. She told Drootin she "had restraining orders on" her husband from previous incidents, and she disagreed with Drootin's mistaken comment that she, too, was subject to a restraining order.
After a brief return to his car to consult with his supervisor, Drootin sent plaintiff outside with the second officer. Drootin then entered the house and again spoke to plaintiff's husband, who repeated that plaintiff had slapped him and thrown things at him. Drootin observed the remains of a broken coffee mug on the kitchen floor, and plaintiff's husband showed him a pair of shorts that "were also stained with coffee." Plaintiff's husband acknowledged to Drootin that he had been arrested several times for conduct involving domestic violence, for pushing his wife, for vandalizing the house, and for harassing plaintiff by telephone.
While Drootin was inside talking to plaintiff's husband again, plaintiff spoke to the other officer in the driveway. She again denied slapping her husband or throwing anything at him.
Drootin arrested plaintiff for misdemeanor domestic battery (Pen. Code, § 243, subd. (e)(1)) based on her husband's statements that she slapped him. Drootin transported plaintiff to the police station and later booked her into jail.
Plaintiff filed this lawsuit in December 2020 and filed the operative third amended complaint in July 2021. She alleged four causes of action: (1) false imprisonment/false arrest, against all defendants; (2) intentional infliction of emotional distress, against Drootin; (3) negligent infliction of emotional distress, against Drootin, and (4) interference with constitutional rights, in violation of Civil Code, section 52.1 ("Bane Act Violation"), against all defendants.
In March 2022, defendants sought summary judgment on the ground that the existence of probable cause for plaintiff's arrest rendered all of her causes of action meritless. After an August 2022 hearing, the trial court granted the motion. Plaintiff filed her notice of appeal in September 2022. In October 2022, the trial court entered judgment in defendants' favor.
In the alternative, defendants also sought summary adjudication on plaintiff's Bane Act claim and claim for punitive damages.
DISCUSSION
Plaintiff contests the trial court's finding that undisputed evidence showed probable cause for her arrest. She has not argued that any of her causes of action might be viable even if the arrest were supported by probable cause, nor does any basis for such an argument appear in the record.
Along with disputing plaintiff's arguments on the merits, defendants ask us to deny her relief on several procedural grounds. Specifically, plaintiff filed her notice of appeal prematurely, after the trial court announced its decision but before entry of judgment, and defendants ask that we exercise our discretion to dismiss the appeal on that basis. Defendants also request we treat certain errors and omissions in plaintiff's appellate briefing as grounds for waiver or forfeiture.
We decline to discuss defendants' procedural arguments further except to note that they are unpersuasive, so we would in any case consider plaintiff's appeal on the merits. (See Elkins v. Superior Court (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1337, 1365 [California has a "strong public policy in favor of deciding cases on the merits when possible"].) We turn, then, to whether undisputed record evidence in fact shows plaintiff's arrest was supported by probable cause.
A. Applicable Law
"Probable cause to arrest exists where facts known to the arresting officer would be sufficient to persuade a person of 'reasonable caution' that the individual arrested committed a crime." (People v. Spencer (2018) 5 Cal.5th 642, 664 (Spencer).) "[S]ufficient probability, not certainty, is the touchstone of reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment ...." (Hill v. California (1971) 401 U.S. 797, 804; see People v. Thompson (2006) 38 Cal.4th 811, 820 [same].) "'Probable cause is a fluid concept- turning on the assessment of probabilities in particular factual contexts.'" (People v. Celis (2004) 33 Cal.4th 667, 673.) "It is incapable of precise definition," but the "'"substance of all the definitions of probable cause is a reasonable ground for belief of guilt,"' and that belief must be 'particularized with respect to the person to be . . . seized.'" (Ibid.) "Probable cause is measured by an objective standard based on the information known to the arresting officer, rather than a subjective standard that would take into account the arresting officer's actual motivations or beliefs." (Gillan v. City of San Marino (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 1033, 1045 (Gillan), disapproved on other grounds by Leon v. County of Riverside (2023) 14 Cal.5th 910.)
"Information provided by a crime victim or chance witness alone can establish probable cause if the information is sufficiently specific to cause a reasonable person to believe that a crime was committed and that the named suspect was the perpetrator." (Gillan, supra, 147 Cal.App.4th at p. 1045; see also People v. Ramey (1976) 16 Cal.3d 263, 269 ["It may . . . be stated as a general proposition that private citizens who are witnesses to or victims of a criminal act, absent some circumstance that would cast doubt upon their information, should be considered reliable"].) "[N]either a previous demonstration of reliability nor subsequent corroboration is ordinarily necessary when witnesses to or victims of criminal activities report their observations in detail to the authorities." (Ramey, at p. 269.)
Under Code of Civil Procedure section 437c, subdivision (c), a motion for summary judgment shall be granted if all the papers submitted show there is no triable issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. A defendant meets its burden on summary judgment by showing that the plaintiff cannot prove its causes of action, or by establishing a complete defense to the plaintiff's causes of action. (Id., subd. (p)(2).) The burden then shifts to the plaintiff to show a triable issue of fact material to the causes of action or defense. (Ibid.) Claims and theories not supported by admissible evidence do not raise a triable issue. (Id., subd. (b)(3).)
We evaluate a summary judgment ruling de novo, independently reviewing the record to determine whether there are any triable issues of material fact. (Saelzler v. Advanced Group 400 (2001) 25 Cal.4th 763, 767.) "In practical effect, we assume the role of a trial court and apply the same rules and standards that govern a trial court's determination of a motion for summary judgment." (Distefano v. Forester (2001) 85 Cal.App.4th 1249, 1258.) In general, we give no deference to the trial court's ruling or reasoning, and only decide whether the right result was reached. (Carnes v. Superior Court (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 688, 694.) B. Analysis
Plaintiff does not dispute that her husband told Drootin she slapped him and threw things, including a full coffee mug, at him. She also does not dispute that such evidence, taken in isolation, is sufficient to give rise to suspicion that she committed spousal battery. She argues, however, that context required Drootin to discount her husband's uncorroborated statements, given the active restraining orders against him, his criminal history, and her own account of events denying any physical violence occurred. We disagree.
There is nothing inherently improbable about a couple switching roles between perpetrator and victim of domestic violence. California law regulating the issuance of mutual restraining orders reflects legislative and judicial determinations that sometimes both parties to domestic violence act as primary aggressors and not primarily in selfdefense. (See, e.g., Fam. Code, § 6305 [procedural requirements for mutual restraining orders under the Domestic Violence Prevention Act]; Melissa G. v. Raymond M. (2018) 27 Cal.App.5th 360, 372 [holding requirements of Fam. Code, § 6305 apply even when "each party's allegations of abuse arise from a different incident"].)
Here, plaintiff's husband's prior arrests and the restraining orders against him do not make it unreasonable to suspect plaintiff slapped him on November 17, 2019. As best can be determined from our record, plaintiff's husband was arrested, but never charged, for allegedly pushing plaintiff once. His other domestic violence arrests did not involve physical violence against plaintiff's person, and had not, as of November 2019, resulted in any conviction. No doubt, there are cases where an alleged victim's history of violence is so substantial that his or her uncorroborated statements could not, without more, reasonably give rise to suspicion a crime had been committed against him or her by the former victim, now alleged perpetrator. We do not find this to be such a case.
Also, plaintiff's husband's version of events was partially corroborated, even though he had no visible injuries from the alleged slap. Plaintiff confirmed she had argued with her husband. Drootin observed the remains of a broken coffee mug on the kitchen floor and found shorts plaintiff's husband wore during the argument (he had since changed) were wet with coffee. It is irrelevant to our issue that these corroborated aspects of plaintiff's husband's story are not enough to convict plaintiff of spousal battery. (See Illinois v. Gates (1983) 462 U.S. 213, 235 [probable cause "'means less than evidence which would justify condemnation'"].) Plaintiff's alternative version of what occurred, while also plausible, does not cancel out her husband's version. (See In re J.G. (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 1501, 1504 ["'[T]he possibility of an innocent explanation does not vitiate probable cause and does not render an arrest unlawful'"].)
As plaintiff notes in briefing, coffee was not visible on the shorts. Drootin held the shorts, however, and agreed with plaintiff's husband when he said the wetness from the coffee could be felt on the leg of the shorts, and that they smelled of coffee. Plaintiff said that her husband "dropped [coffee] on himself."
Plaintiff's comparison of this case to the facts of Gillan, supra, 147 Cal.App.4th at p. 1033, is inapt. In that case, a teenager accused her former coach of having sexually harassed and molested her. (Gillan, supra, 147 Cal.App.4th at p. 1039.) Some of her accusations, however, were "generalized and not specific as to time, date, or other details," and "[o]ther accusations concerning more specific events either lacked sufficient detail or were inconsistent in the details provided." (Id. at p. 1045.) The accuser also expressed "strong antipathy" toward the coach "based on his treatment of her as a player on the basketball team apart from the alleged sexual harassment." (Id. at p. 1046.) Police attempts to generate evidence through surreptitiously recorded conversations between the accuser and the coach yielded only vehement denials, and no evidence of wrongdoing. (Id. at p. 1038.) A vice-principal of the school called the investigating officer and told him "she was skeptical of the accusations . . . and that the other coaches felt the same way." (Id. at p. 1047.) Police still detained the coach, but then immediately released him under Penal Code section 849, subdivision (b)(1). (Gillan, at p. 1039.) That statute allows a peace officer to release a person taken into custody without a warrant where the officer "is satisfied that there are insufficient grounds for making a criminal complaint against the person arrested." (Pen. Code, § 849, subd. (b)(1).) "The purposes of detaining [the coach] in that manner were to publicize the 'arrest' and invite any additional accusers to step forward, and to obtain his fingerprints and photograph to assist in the investigation." (Gillan, at p. 1039.) The court of appeal affirmed the trial court's finding, treating the coach's detention as an arrest and finding a lack of probable cause. The court reasoned that "the information known to the police at the time of [the coach's] detention was not sufficiently consistent, specific, or reliable to cause a reasonable person to believe the accusations . . . particularly in light of the exculpatory nature of [the coach's] statements in the recordings and the comments by the vice-principal, and the accuser's strong antipathy toward [the coach] based on his treatment of her as a player on the team." (Id. at p. 1047.)
Our facts are different than Gillan's, requiring a different result. There was nothing inconsistent or vague in plaintiff's husband's account of what had happened. Although plaintiff speculates her husband may have harbored a grudge from his prior arrests and the restraining orders she took out against him, nothing in what he said to Drootin expressed particular animus about past events. In Gillan, police had input from third parties (the vice principal and other coaches) who were skeptical of the accuser's allegations, and the surreptitiously recorded conversations between the accuser and the coach yielded only exculpatory evidence; there is nothing of the sort here. Moreover, the police in Gillan seem to have believed they did not have probable cause to arrest the coach, instead purporting only to detain him to use the ensuing publicity to advance their investigation. Again, nothing of the sort took place here.
Although the test for probable cause is an objective one, evidence the arresting officer did not in fact believe there was probable cause is some indication an objective analysis of facts known to the arresting officer would reach the same conclusion. (See People v. Miller (1972) 7 Cal.3d 219, 226 ["it would be a logical absurdity for the courts to be asked to determine the reasonableness of an officer's belief that [the] particular crime had been committed unless it were first established that the officer did entertain such a belief"].).
Plaintiff frames her opening brief around comparisons between Drootin's actions on November 17, 2019, and what a "reasonable officer" would have done during his encounter with plaintiff and her husband. Such arguments stray from the probable cause standard, which focuses on objective analysis of the facts known to the arresting officer. Thus, the narrow issue before us is not whether Drootin acted unreasonably in general, or even out of compliance with his department's policies. It is not whether his investigation of the facts was thorough or in keeping with best policing practices. Rather, it is whether "facts known to the arresting officer would be sufficient to persuade a person of 'reasonable caution' that the individual arrested committed a crime." (Spencer, supra, 5 Cal.5th at p. 664.) For the reasons above, we find those facts sufficient.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. The parties are to bear their own costs on appeal.
We concur: MILLER Acting P. J., FIELDS J.