Opinion
No. 04-02-00234-CV.
Delivered and Filed: January 15, 2003.
Appeal from the 57th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas, Trial Court No. 2000-CI-12554, Honorable Janet Littlejohn, Judge Presiding.
The Honorable Janet Littlejohn presided over a hearing regarding the issue of damages and attorney's fees and signed the final judgment. The Honorable David Berchelmann, Jr. presided over the summary judgment hearing and granted the partial summary judgment.
AFFIRMED.
Sitting: Alma L. LOPEZ, Chief Justice, Catherine STONE, Justice, Paul W. GREEN, Justice.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Isabel Vela ("Vela"), as Next Friend of Chris Isaac Coy, appeals the trial court's judgment determining that the default judgment obtained against Pedro Gonzales, Jr. ("Gonzales") in a suit to establish paternity was barred as a matter of law. Vela contends that her suit was not barred because: (1) a direct attack on an earlier paternity finding was pending; (2) the Texas Supreme Court decision relied on by Gonzales is "bad law" or unconstitutional; and (3) Vela could properly bring the lawsuit against Gonzales as next friend. We overrule Vela's contentions and affirm the trial court's judgment
Background
Raquel Coy and Guadalupe Coy were divorced in December of 1995. The final decree of divorce named Raquel and Guadalupe as the parents of Chris Isaac Coy.
In 1996, Guadalupe filed a bill of review seeking to set aside the trial court's finding that he is Chris's father. Raquel filed an answer generally denying Guadalupe's allegations.
In December of 1997, Vela, Chris's grandmother, filed a lawsuit claiming that Gonzales is Chris's father, and the trial court entered an order in February of 1998 finding that Gonzales is Chris's biological father. The order required Gonzales to pay child support.
In July of 1999, the trial court dismissed Guadalupe's bill of review of want of prosecution. In August of 2000, Gonzales filed the underlying bill of review, asserting that he was not served in Vela's lawsuit and that Vela's lawsuit was barred as a matter of law because the final divorce decree adjudicated Guadalupe to be Chris's father. Gonzales filed a motion for summary judgment on the basis that Vela's lawsuit was barred as a matter of law. Vela responded that her lawsuit was not barred because a direct attack on the final divorce decree was pending when she filed the lawsuit and obtained the default judgment. The trial court granted a partial summary judgment in December of 2000, concluding that the lawsuit was barred but reserving the issue of damages and attorney's fees for a later hearing. In December of 2001, the trial court entered a final judgment after resolving the damages and attorney's fees issue and after denying Vela's third motion to reconsider the partial summary judgment.
Standard of Review
The standard for reviewing a summary judgment is whether the moving party carried its burden of showing that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that judgment should be granted as a matter of law. Shah v. Moss, 67 S.W.3d 836, 842 (Tex. 2001). In reviewing a trial court's summary judgment, we resolve all doubts against the movant, and we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmovant. Id.
Discussion
Section 160.007 of the Texas Family Code provides as follows:
SUIT BARRED. (a) Except as otherwise provided by Subsection (b), a suit under this chapter with respect to a child is barred if final judgment has been rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction:
(1) adjudicating a named individual to be the biological father of the child; or
(2) terminating the parent-child relationship between the child and each living parent of the child; or
(3) granting a petition for the adoption of the child.
(b) During the pendency of an appeal or direct attack on a judgment described by Subsection (a), a suit under this chapter may be filed but shall, on motion of a party, be stayed pending the final disposition of the appeal or direct attack on the judgment.
Act of April 20, 1995, 74th Leg., R.S., ch. 20, § 1, 1995 Tex. Gen. Laws 209, amended by Act of June 14, 2001, Tex. H.B. 920, 77th Leg., R.S. (2001) (section 160.007 continues in effect and governs proceedings commenced before June 14, 2001). In Dreyer v. Greene, 871 S.W.2d 697 (Tex. 1993), the Texas Supreme Court held that a finding in a divorce decree that the husband and wife are parents of certain children bars a later action by the children to establish that someone else is their biological father because the divorce decree constitutes an adjudication for purposes of section 160.007.
In her first issue, Vela contends that her lawsuit was not barred because section 160.007(b) allowed her to file the lawsuit while Guadalupe's bill of review was pending. Accepting Vela's argument that section 160.007(b) permitted her to file her lawsuit, the statute does not permit a trial court in a later action to render a judgment that is contrary to a final judgment adjudicating a named individual to be the biological father of the child. At the time the trial court rendered judgment in the underlying bill of review proceeding, Vela's lawsuit was barred by section 160.007(a). See id. Therefore, the trial court did not err in granting the partial summary judgment in favor of Gonzales.
In her second issue, Vela contends that the Texas Supreme Court's decision in Dreyer is "bad law" or unconstitutional. We are bound by the authority of Dreyer unless the Texas Supreme Court overrules or vitiates it. See Penrod Drilling Corp. v. Williams, 868 S.W.2d 294, 296 (Tex. 1993); In re K.S., 76 S.W.3d 36, 49 (Tex.App.-Amarillo 2002, no pet.).
In her third issue, Vela attempts to distinguish Dreyer because no evidence was introduced to show that Raquel swore to allegations in the divorce proceeding that she and Guadalupe were the parents of Chris. The Texas Supreme Court's holding in Dreyer did not rest on the sworn pleadings alone. Instead, the court reasoned:
The court found that Kathleen and Thorne were the "parents" of their children. It is implausible that the court would have chosen this single word to refer, without qualification or explanation, to both the biological relationship between Kathleen and the children and some other relationship involving Thorne. It is even more implausible when the finding was clearly based on Kathleen's sworn allegation that the children were "of the marriage."
Id. at 698. Although the sworn pleading bolstered the Texas Supreme Court's reasoning, the pleading was not the sole basis for the Texas Supreme Court's conclusion that the trial court's finding was an adjudication that Thorne was the biological father of the children.
Vela also seeks to distinguish Dreyer on the basis that she was not a party to the divorce proceeding. However, in Dreyer, as in this case, the subsequent lawsuit was brought on behalf of the children. Because the children's rights were represented in the divorce proceeding, the identity of the person bringing the lawsuit on their behalf does not alter the finality of the prior adjudication or the applicability of the holding in Dreyer. See In re A.L.J., 929 S.W.2d 467, 471 (Tex.App.-Tyler 1996, writ denied) (holding interests of children in divorce proceeding adequately represented by the mother).
Conclusion
The trial court's judgment is affirmed.