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explaining that a "rehashing of the same arguments set forth in the original petition will not suffice to invoke de novo review of the magistrate's recommendations."
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No. 97 Civ. 3775 (LTS)(JCF)
September 30, 2002
WILLIAM VEGA, 91-A-9063, Green Haven Correctional Facility, Stormville, NY, Petitioner Pro Se.
ROBERT M. MORGENTHAU, ESQ., DISTRICT ATTORNEY, NEW YORK COUNTY, By: Morrie K. Kleinbart, Esq., New York, NY, Attorney for Respondent.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Pro se petitioner William Vega Jr. ("Petitioner" or "Vega") moves pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(6) to vacate the judgment rendered by this Court in a Memorandum and Order dated February 20, 2002. Rule 60(b)(6) provides that a court may, on motion from a party or party's counsel, relieve that party from final judgment for any reason justifying relief from operation of the judgment. Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b)(6).
The February 20th Order rejected Petitioner's objections to Magistrate Judge Francis' Report and Recommendation ("Report") submitted to this Court on October 19, 2001. The basis for such rejection was that Petitioner's objections were general, conclusory and constituted reiterations of the arguments set forth in his original petition. Petitioner contends that the Court wrongly denied him a de novo review of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus after he had filed timely objections to Judge Francis' Report. See Petitioner's Notice of Motion to Vacate Judgment. For reasons set forth below, Petitioner's Motion to Vacate Judgment is denied.
In order to vacate a judgment, the petitioner must, on a Rule 60(b)(6) motion, show extraordinary circumstances, Rodriguez v. Mitchell, 252 F.3d 191, 201 (2d Cir. 2001), or that the judgment would "work an extreme and undue hardship." DeWeerth v. Baldinger, 38 F.3d 1266, 1272 (2d Cir. 1994). Motions for relief under Rule 60(b)(6) are generally not favored and the burden rests on the person seeking the relief. United States v. Int'l Broth. Of Teamsters, 247 F.3d 370, 391 (2d Cir. 2001); see also Paddington Partners v. Bouchard, 34 F.3d 1132, 1142 (2d Cir. 1994).
Before determining whether Petitioner has carried his burden, the Court turns to its purported error in applying a clear error standard rather than conducting a de novo review. Under section 636(b)(1) when written objections to a magistrate's report and recommendation are timely filed, the district court judge will make a de novo review "of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made." 28 U.S.C.A. § 636(b)(1) (West 2002). However, objections that are merely perfunctory responses argued in an attempt to engage the district court in a rehashing of the same arguments set forth in the original petition will not suffice to invoke de novo review of the magistrate's recommendations. See Vargas v. Keane, No. 93-CV-7852 (MBM), 1994 WL 693885 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 12, 1994); Klawitter v. Chater, No. 93-CV-0054E, 1995 WL 643367 at *1 (W.D.N.Y. Oct. 18, 1995); Murphy v. Grabo, No. 94-CV-1684 (RSP), 1998 WL 166840 at *1 (N.D.N.Y. Apr. 9, 1998). Objections of this sort are frivolous, general and conclusory and would reduce the magistrate's work to something akin to a "meaningless dress rehearsal." See Dennard v. Kelly, No. 90-CV-0203E, 1997 WL 9785 at *1 (W.D.N.Y. 1997); Murphy, 1998 WL 166840 at *1. The purpose of the Federal Magistrates Act was to promote efficiency of the judiciary, not undermine it by allowing parties to "relitigate every argument which it presented to the Magistrate Judge." Camardo v. General Motors, 806 F. Supp. 380, 382 (W.D.N.Y. 1992).
In his objections, Petitioner has simply rearranged many portion of his original brief. In fact, throughout his objections, Petitioner cites back to his original brief in support of his renewed objections. When objecting to Magistrate Judge Francis' proposed findings of fact, Petitioner objects to the Report "in its entirety on pages nine through twelve . . . thirteen through twenty . . . twenty-one through twenty-seven." See Petitioner's Objections to Magistrate Judge's Proposed Findings of Fact and Recommendation, dated January 2, 2002. It is neither in the spirit nor the letter of the Federal Magistrate's Act for the district court to duplicate every effort made by the Magistrate Judge, when the Petitioner does not specify or pinpoint his objections to the Report.
Although the nature of Petitioner's objections merits only a clear error review, in the interest of fairness the court has conducted a de novo review and finds Judge Francis' Report embodies a characteristically well-reasoned and sound analysis of Petitioner's claims.
Petitioner has not carried his burden for vacating the original adoption of Judge Francis' Report. He has neither shown the extraordinary circumstances necessary, nor has Petitioner established the extreme and undue hardship necessary to vacate the Court's order. Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED that Petitioner s Motion to Vacate Judgment is denied.
The Petitioner may not appeal this order unless "a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability." 28 U.S.C.A. § 2253(c)(1) (West 2002). A certificate will be granted "if the applicant has made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right." 28 U.S.C.A. § 2253(c)(2) (West 2002); see generally United States v. Perez, 129 F.3d 255, 259-60 (2nd Cir. 1997) (discussing the standard for issuing a certificate of appealability). The Court finds that Petitioner will not be able to sustain this burden. Thus, the Court declines to issue a certificate of appeal. The Court certifies pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that any appeal from this order would not be taken in good faith. See Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 444 (1962).
SO ORDERED.