Summary
In Vazquez v. Combs, No. 04 Civ. 4189, 2004 WL 2404224 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 22, 2004), District Judge Lynch (as he then was) considered a § 1983 claim against an entertainer and his company alleging that "they falsely reported [plaintiff] to the police for harassing Combs and stealing his Grammy, and asked that Vazquez be investigated or questioned about these alleged crimes."
Summary of this case from Ortolaza ex rel. E. v. City of HartfordOpinion
No. 04 Civ. 4189 (GEL).
October 22, 2004
Robert K. Erlanger, New York, New York, for plaintiff Damien Vazquez.
Jonathan D. Davis, New York, New York, for defendants Sean Combs and Bad Boy Entertainment, Inc.
OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Damien Vazquez claims that he was falsely arrested and held against his will by New York City police detective Gloria Frazier, allegedly acting at the direction of defendants Sean Combs and his company, Bad Boy Entertainment, Inc. ("Bad Boy"), with whom plaintiff claims he had a previous employment relationship. Vazquez sued Frazier and the City for violating his federal civil rights, and Combs and Bad Boy for conspiracy to do so, also bringing a number of state law claims against both the government and private defendants. Combs and Bad Boy now move to the dismiss the claims against them for failure to state a claim on which relief can be granted and for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. For the reasons that follow, the motion will be granted.
BACKGROUND
The facts set forth in this section are drawn from the Complaint, and must be accepted as true for purposes of a motion to dismiss. Bad Boy is an entertainment production and marketing company, of which Combs, also known as P. Diddy, is Chairman and Chief Executive Officer. Vazquez worked for Bad Boy from approximately January 2000 until May 2002, and then again from January 2003 until shortly after Christmas 2003. (Compl. ¶¶ 12, 14, 18.)In February 2002, a Bad Boy employee told Vazquez that he could no longer work in Bad Boy's main offices and gave him an envelope with several "contact sheets" with information on other music industry figures to whom Vazquez could send his resume. (Id. ¶ 13.) Vazquez left the unopened envelope in his car, where it remained until he was in a serious traffic accident approximately one month later. A relative gathered and boxed up Vazquez's personal effects from the vehicle after the accident, and the box sat in Vazquez's parents' garage for more than a year before being rediscovered by Vazquez in late 2003. (Id. ¶¶ 13, 15.) When Vazquez finally opened the envelope, he saw that the contact sheets included some of Combs's personal information, and so Vazquez emailed Combs to return the contact sheets. By return email, Combs asked for Vazquez's phone number, which Vazquez provided. (Id. ¶ 15.)
Plaintiff does not explain the discrepancy between the February conversation and his May departure date from the company.
Several days after the email exchange, Vashta Dunlop, the head of Human Resources at Bad Boy, asked Vazquez to meet with her. (Id. ¶ 17.) At the meeting, Vazquez gave Dunlop the contact sheets, and she questioned him for about twenty minutes about how he had acquired them. (Id.) In late January 2004, about a month after Vazquez's second period at Bad Boy had ended, Vazquez heard from "sources" at Bad Boy that Combs was missing one of his Grammy awards and was spending "a good deal of money" on private investigators to find it. (Id. ¶ 19.) Vazquez sent Combs an email stating that, several years earlier, another Bad Boy employee had told Vazquez that he had access to Combs's Grammy awards. Combs replied that he was "not good at riddles," and asked for the other employee's name, which Vazquez supplied by return email. Combs thanked him, and that was apparently the last time the two men communicated. (Id. ¶ 20.)
On January 29, 2004, Vazquez received a call from a person who identified herself only as "Frazier," inviting him to come to 357 W. 35th Street in Manhattan the next day for an interview. (Id. ¶ 22.) Although Vazquez believed that Frazier was referring to a job interview, he claims that he mentioned during the call that he was ill and a diabetic. (Id. ¶ 22.) Around 2:30 p.m. the next day, Vazquez arrived at the address provided by Frazier and was surprised to find himself at the New York Police Department's Midtown South Precinct. Vazquez nonetheless went into the precinct house and asked for Frazier; he was directed upstairs, where he met Frazier, and noticed an 8½ by 11" photograph of Combs hanging near her desk. (Id. ¶¶ 23-25.) Frazier told Vazquez that she just wanted to speak with him for a couple of minutes, because she was trying to catch a three o'clock train and she knew he was ill. Vazquez again told Frazier that he was diabetic and "took a needle" (presumably a reference to his need for insulin shots). (Id. ¶ 24.)
Over the next several hours, Frazier questioned Vazquez in a number of locations in the precinct house about some alleged crank calls to a co-worker, about the contact sheets, and about Combs's missing Grammy award. (Id. ¶¶ 26, 28, 30.) During the questioning, Frazier called Bad Boy a number of times, "asking for guidance and advice" based on the answers Vazquez was giving. (Id. ¶ 29.) She asked for Vazquez's driver's license, cellphone and two-way pager, which Frazier later listed as "arrest evidence" on a property voucher, although Vazquez was never told he was under arrest and never advised of his rights or given Miranda warnings. (Id. ¶¶ 28, 33.) Vazquez asked Frazier if he needed a lawyer and she told him that he did not — an opinion she repeated to Vazquez's mother when she called later that afternoon. (Id. ¶¶ 27, 35.) Both Vazquez and his mother repeatedly told Frazier that Vazquez was ill and needed food to control his diabetes; Frazier ignored or downplayed these requests. (Id. ¶¶ 34-35.)
Vazquez was eventually placed in a holding cell at the precinct house and fell unconscious. (Id. ¶ 38.) He awoke in an ambulance, handcuffed to a stretcher; he was treated at St. Clare's Hospital with intravenous insulin and returned to the precinct house. (Id.) Upon his return, Vazquez was interrogated further about Combs's Grammy award by Frazier and several other detectives, then eventually fingerprinted and photographed, although he maintains he was never advised that he was under arrest. (Id. ¶¶ 40, 42.) Around eight in the morning of the following day, Frazier took Vazquez to Bellevue Hospital to receive his next dose of insulin; Vazquez was again handcuffed to the stretcher. (Id. ¶ 43.) Vazquez was arraigned approximately eighteen hours after the trip to Bellevue, and charged with aggravated harassment, petit larceny, and criminal possession of stolen property; Frazier also obtained restraining orders against Vazquez as to Combs. (Id. ¶¶ 45-47.) All charges against Vazquez were dismissed on May 5, 2004. (Id. ¶ 48.)
DISCUSSION
I. Standard on a Motion to DismissOn a motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), the Court must accept as true all well-pleaded factual allegations in the complaint and view them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, drawing all reasonable inferences in his favor. Leeds v. Meltz, 85 F.3d 51, 53 (2d Cir. 1996). The Court will not dismiss a complaint for failure to state a claim "unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim that would entitle him to relief." Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957). To be deemed adequate at the pleading stage, a complaint need not use particular words nor demonstrate that plaintiff will prevail on the merits, but need only provide "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 512-13 (2002) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)). However, "[w]hile the pleading standard is a liberal one, bald assertions and conclusions of law will not suffice." Leeds, 85 F.3d at 53;see also De Jesus v. Sears, Roebuck Co., 87 F.3d 65, 70 (2d Cir. 1996) ("A complaint which consists of conclusory allegations unsupported by factual assertions fails even the liberal standard of Rule 12(b)(6).") (internal quotation marks omitted.)
II. Conspiracy under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
Plaintiff's sole claim against Combs and Bad Boy under federal law is the Second Claim for Relief: conspiracy to falsely arrest plaintiff, thereby denying him his federal civil rights. In addition to the factual allegations described above, plaintiff avers that "Combs, Bad Boy employees, and Frazier reached an agreement to have plaintiff arrested without probable cause on unrelated charges if he did not falsely confess to taking the Grammy" and that "Combs, Bad Boy [ sic] employees, and Frazier engaged in the wrongful, overt acts previously described in furtherance of their conspiracy to deny plaintiff his constitutional rights." (Compl. ¶¶ 58-59.)
Notwithstanding the sarcasm and hyperbole in both parties' briefs on this motion, the legal rules are fairly straightforward. Section 1983 creates a federal cause of action for a person who has been deprived of any federal "right, privilege, or immunit[y]" by a person acting "under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage of any State." 42 U.S.C. § 1983; see also West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988) ("To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and must show that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law."). Because a section 1983 action requires that the defendant act under color of state law, private persons, such as Combs and Bad Boy, can only be subject to section 1983 liability if they were "jointly engaged with state officials in the challenged action." Scotto v. Almenas, 143 F.3d 105, 114 (2d Cir. 1998) (quoting Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24, 27-28 (1980)). To adequately plead that the private parties were acting under color of state law, a plaintiff must make sufficient factual allegations that tend to show a conspiracy between the private party and the police to deny plaintiff a federal right. Id.;Ciambriello v. County of Nassau, 292 F.3d 307, 324 (2d Cir. 2002) ("To state a claim against a private entity on a section 1983 conspiracy theory, the complaint must allege facts demonstrating that the private entity acted in concert with the state actor to commit an unconstitutional act.") (internal quotation marks omitted). However, generalized or conclusory allegations of joint actions or conspiracies are insufficient to sustain a section 1983 claim, and complaints that lack further factual specificity or "specific instances of misconduct" are subject to dismissal. Id.; see also Ostrer v. Aronwald, 567 F.2d 551, 553 (2d Cir. 1977).
Vazquez's section 1983 conspiracy claim against Combs and Bad Boy fails because he does not adequately allege that Combs and Bad Boy conspired with Frazier or acted in concert with her to deprive Vazquez of his civil rights. Although the Complaint alleges that Combs and Bad Boy "reached an agreement" with Frazier to falsely arrest plaintiff, and that Combs and Bad Boy engaged in the "wrongful acts" described elsewhere in the Complaint, the Complaint fails to provide "supporting operative facts tending to show agreement and concerted action between the private party and the state actors." Studifin v. New York City Police Dep't, 728 F. Supp. 990, 993 (S.D.N.Y. 1990). The Complaint contains no specific factual allegations that suggest any agreement or joint action between Frazier and the private defendants to violate Vazquez's rights.
Rather, the core of plaintiff's allegations against Combs and Bad Boy, read in the light most favorable to him, is that they falsely reported him to the police for harassing Combs and stealing his Grammy, and asked that Vazquez be investigated or questioned about these alleged crimes. But merely filing a complaint with the police, reporting a crime, requesting criminal investigation of a person, or seeking a restraining order, even if the complaint or report is deliberately false, does not give rise to a claim against the complainant for a civil rights violation. See Jones v. Maples/Trump, 98 Civ. 7132 (SHS), 2002 WL 287752, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 26, 2002) ("providing false information to an arresting officer is not, by itself, sufficient to state a claim against [a] private party under § 1983."); see also Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 939 n. 21 (1982) (merely pursuing legal process against another private person does not constitute a conspiracy or joint action with state officials so as to satisfy the 1983 requirement that the action be "under color of state law").
The other actions that plaintiff points to in his brief as suggesting a conspiracy or joint action are likewise insufficient. (P. Mem. 3-5.) Actions taken by Bad Boy or Combs alone, without any involvement of the police and or effect on plaintiff's civil rights, such as Dunlop's questioning of Vazquez about the contact sheets or Combs's request that Vazquez supply the name of the co-worker whom he suspected of stealing Combs's Grammy award, do not permit or suggest the inference of any agreement to act in concert. The allegations involving discussions or interactions with Combs and other Bad Boy employees do not even mirror Vazquez's conversations or interactions with Frazier, so as to suggest some sort of coordination. (Compare Compl. ¶¶ 17, 20-21 with ¶¶ 26, 30-31.)
The only allegation in the Complaint that warrants even a moment's discussion is the claim that Frazier repeatedly called someone at Bad Boy seeking "guidance and advice" during Vazquez's interrogation. (Id. ¶ 29.) But even that allegation falls far short of evidencing a conspiracy or joint action. Other than the conclusory reference to "guidance and advice," Vazquez gives no hint, either in the Complaint, in his brief, or in the accompanying affidavit, of the content of these conversations. It is perfectly reasonable that an investigating officer would call a witness or complainant to verify information or ask further questions in the course of interrogating a suspect. Moreover, plaintiff does not even allege that any Bad Boy employee initiated these calls — he clearly states that they were initiated by Frazier. Answering the phone when it rings at a place of business, and then speaking with a police officer about a pending. . investigation of a criminal complaint made by that business, hardly tends to show that the person on the other end of the line was engaged in a conspiracy to violate the suspect's civil rights.
Plaintiff's claim that his Complaint is sufficient because it follows "the guidelines of this Court's prior decision" in Lucas v. Novogratz, No. 01 Civ. 5445, 2002 WL 31844913 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 18, 2002), is unavailing. (P. Mem. 1, 3.) In Lucas, the plaintiff "presented supporting operative facts tending to show agreement and concerted action between the private party and the state actors" and "alleged particular concrete facts" to support an inference of a conspiracy. Id. at *4-5 (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted). Indeed, the plaintiff in Lucas alleged six specific statements or acts of the defendants that, "if proved, might support an inference of joint action or agreement between [the private defendants] and [defendant police officer]." Id. at *5. In contrast, plaintiff here points to no relationship between the private defendants and Frazier, no statements made by the private defendants that they had special connections with the police or that they could use the police to pursue their private ends (through means other than simply reporting an alleged crime to the police, which does not constitute inappropriate use of law enforcement by a private party), no statements or acts by Frazier that indicate that she was doing anything other than investigating a complaint of possible criminal activity. Plaintiff's conclusory statements of his own opinion, such as "it became apparent that . . . Frazier was now going to be Combs [ sic] personal detective to squeeze out of plaintiff the whereabouts of the missing Grammy," cannot correct these deficiencies in the factual allegations of the Complaint.
In particular, the plaintiff in Lucas alleged:
(a) Mr. Novogratz stated to Lucas on December 21, 1998, that he "had all his ducks in the water, and had a friend in the detective division at the First Precinct whom he was going to see"; (b) sometime in January 1999 defendant [police officer] Druin caused a clerk at the First Precinct to "abruptly terminate the taking" of a complaint from Lucas concerning the removal of equipment from the site; (c) Druin on a later occasion informed Lucas that "plaintiff would never have a complaint involving the Novogratzes accepted at his precinct, or at any other"; (d) Druin again intervened on or about January 27, 1999, when Lucas attempted to file a criminal complaint at the First Precinct relating to city permits that allegedly had been fraudulently obtained under plaintiff's name, allegedly telling Lucas "that he would not allow any criminal complaints to be made that would implicate the Novogratzes"; (e) at the February 18, 1999, [Environmental Control Board] hearing (which apparently took place in the Seventeenth Precinct), Ms. Novogratz telephoned Druin to report that Lucas was in the courtroom, and, as a result of Druin's intervention, the hearing was adjourned; and (f) the following week, Druin sent Detective Matuzak to arrest Lucas while he was hospitalized in the St. Vincent's Hospital Coronary Care Unit, notwithstanding that detectives had earlier agreed to permit Lucas to surrender voluntarily at the precinct after his discharge from the hospital.Lucas, 2002 WL 31844913, at *4 (internal citations to complaint omitted).
Although Lucas is distinguishable in any event, the Court takes due notice of the fact that the Lucas decision rested, in part, on the Court's responsibility to read pro se complaints liberally and give the benefit of the doubt to litigants who lack the assistance of counsel. No such presumption applies here, where Vazquez has been represented by an attorney at every stage of the litigation.
Finally, in both his Complaint and his brief, plaintiff repeatedly refers to Combs's celebrity status and to plaintiff's belief that the events described in the Complaint occurred because of Combs's celebrity. (E.g., Compl. ¶ 25 (referring to a picture of Combs in the police station), ¶ 51 ("star-struck NYC police officers apply the law differently for celebrities"), P. Mem. 1 (the "notorious defendant Sean Combs" and the "abuse of [his] celebrity power).) That some police officers may be eager to assist celebrities or curry favor with them or their associates does not mean that when those celebrities seek the help of the police they are any more subject to liability for civil rights violations than an ordinary citizen would be. Whatever different treatment Vazquez claims Combs received from the police, neither plaintiff nor the private defendants here will receive any different treatment in this case than that accorded any other civil litigant in this Court. Vasqies has failed to state a claim for a section 1983 conspiracy as to Combs or Bad Boy, and accordingly that claim will be dismissed. Vasquez's claims that Frazier undertook to violate his civil rights in hopes of pleasing a celebrity are properly directed at Frazier and the City, not at the private defendants.
III. The State Law Claims
The Compaint also asserts three causes of action against Combs and Bad Boy for alleged violations of state law: (i) the Fifth Claim: false arrest against both Combs and Bad Boy; (ii) the Eighth Claim: violations of New York Labor Law § 191, 198 against Bad Boy for failure to pay wages; and (iii) the Ninth Claim: a quantum meruit claim against Bad Boy for the reasonable value of the work performed by plaintiff. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3), a district court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims if it has dismissed those claims over which it has original jurisdiction. Because the sole federal claim against these defendants will be dismissed, and because, given the early stage of this litigation, the factors of judicial economy, convienience, fairness, and comity all point toward declining jurisdiction, see, e.g., Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 n. 7 (1988), the three state law claims will likewise be dismissed.See also Arum v. Miller, 304 F. Supp.2d 344, 348 (E.D.N.Y. 2003) (dismissing state claims against defendants where federal claims against them have been dismissed, even though federal and state claims against other defendants survived).
CONCLUSION
For all of the foregoing reasons, the claim against Combs and Bad Boy for conspiracy to violate 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (the Second Claim) is dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The dismissal is without prejudice to seek leave to replead, should discovery reveal facts that could justify such a claim. The remaining claims against Combs and Bad Boy (the Fifth, Eighth and Ninth Claims) are dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
SO ORDERED.