Summary
indicating that, if a settlor's intent cannot be determined from a trust instrument's plain language, the court must examine the facts to determine the settlor's intent
Summary of this case from Opinion No. GA-0186Opinion
No. B-2393.
December 31, 1970.
Appeal from the 116th District Court, Dallas County, McCarthy, J.
Shank, Irwin, Conant Williamson, A. B. Conant, Jr., and Ralph B. Shank, Leslie Shults, Dallas, for petitioners.
Thompson, Knight, Simmons Bullion, J. P. Jones, Jackson, Walker, Winstead, Cantwell Miller, Orrin Miller, Dallas, Z. T. Fortescue, Asst. Atty. Gen., Austin, Burford, Ryburn Ford, Roy Cole, Dallas, for respondents.
The court of civil appeals has said ( 458 S.W.2d 523) that the question in the appeal is 'whether Gary William Vaughn, the adopted child of G. H. Vaughn, Jr., is entitled to share in the remainder-class gift to 'children' within the meaning of that term as used in the trust instruments.' We approve the holding of the court of civil appeals that under the 1951 amendment of Section 9 of Article 46a, Vernon's Ann.Tex.Civ.St., in the absence of words indicating a contrary intention the unqualified words 'children' and 'child' include an adopted child. The application for writ of error was refused, no reversible error; the motion for rehearing is overruled.