Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County. No. BC427334 Michael C. Solner, Judge.
Kelly Lytton & Williams and Richard D. Williams for Plaintiffs and Appellants.
Dhillon & Smith, Harmeet K. Dhillon, Harold P. Smith and Krista L. Shoquist for Defendants and Respondents.
CHANEY, J.
Plaintiffs appeal from the trial court’s orders granting defendants’ anti-SLAPP motion and awarding attorney fees and costs under Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16. Plaintiffs filed this lawsuit seeking to enjoin defendants from “[h]olding themselves out as, and representing themselves to be, the valid and legitimate Chairman and Executive Committee of RPLAC [the Republican Party of Los Angeles County].” Plaintiffs claimed they were “the validly elected officers of RPLAC, ” but defendants “planned, implemented and executed an illegitimate and wrongful coup.”
Further statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure.
Plaintiffs contend the trial court erred in granting defendants’ anti-SLAPP motion because (1) defendants’ “illegal” conduct and speech is not protected under section 425.16 and (2) plaintiffs have shown a probability of prevailing on a common law cause of action for fair procedure. We conclude defendants’ alleged conduct and speech arises from protected activity within the meaning of section 425.16, and plaintiffs have not shown a probability of prevailing on the merits of their claim because the common law right to fair procedure does not apply under the circumstances alleged. Accordingly, we affirm the order granting the anti-SLAPP motion. We also affirm the order of attorney fees and costs, rejecting plaintiffs’ challenge to the reasonableness of the award.
BACKGROUND
On December 4, 2009, plaintiffs Robert W.Vaughn, Ted Hayes, Manny Aldana, Roger L. Eshelman, Nancy Comaford, Constance S. Ruffley and Sandra Needs (collectively, plaintiffs) filed this action against defendants Jane Barnett, Gary A. Aminoff, John D. Cozza, Leonard M. Lanzi, Alex A. Burrola and Davina M. Keiser (collectively, defendants).
The complaint also lists RPLAC as a plaintiff, but RPLAC is not an appellant.
Parties
As alleged in the complaint, plaintiff Vaughn was elected Second Vice Chairman, plaintiff Eshelman was elected Secretary, and plaintiff Ruffley was elected Assistant Secretary at an RPLAC meeting held December 6, 2008. The parties agree that these plaintiffs validly held these RPLAC Executive Committee positions between December 6, 2008 and May 14, 2009. The parties disagree, however, about who the Executive Committee members were after the May 14, 2009 RPLAC meeting.
Plaintiff Vaughn maintains that he became the Chairman of RPLAC “after the former Chairman and First Vice Chairman of RPLAC resigned their offices during the course of the coup events which occurred on May 14, 2009.” Eshelman and Ruffley maintain that they retained their positions of Secretary and Assistant Secretary, respectively. Defendants, on the other hand, claim that all Executive Committee positions were vacated, either voluntarily or by membership vote on a motion to vacate, and that defendants thereafter were elected to the Executive Committee at the May 14, 2009 meeting.
On or about June 26, 2009, plaintiff Vaughn, continuing to hold himself out as Chairman, called a purported RPLAC meeting at which plaintiff Hayes was elected First Vice Chairman, plaintiff Aldana was elected Second Vice Chairman, plaintiff Comaford was elected Treasurer, and plaintiff Needs was elected Assistant Treasurer.
Alleged Wrongful Conduct by Defendants
The complaint alleges that defendants did not become members of the RPLAC Executive Committee by virtue of their “surprise coup event carried out on May 14, 2009.” Plaintiffs assert that the motion to vacate the chair made at the meeting “violated both the letter and spirit of the Bylaws; was carried out without compliance with the notice requirements for an election; and had no valid or legitimate effect.” They similarly assert that the elections for the other Executive Committee positions were “invalid” because “no notice of vacancies and elections was included in the call to the May 14, 2009 meeting.”
This is not an exhaustive list of the procedural vagaries plaintiffs allege regarding the May 14, 2009 meeting and defendants’ elections. The parties have debated whether the elections complied with Robert’s Rules of Order and RPLAC’s bylaws. We need not chronicle all of the events which occurred on May 14. As discussed below, our resolution of this appeal does not require a decision on the merits regarding the fairness of the elections.
As plaintiffs allege, defendants “held themselves out” and conducted business “as if they were the valid and legitimate Chairman and Executive Committee of RPLAC.” Indeed, evidence submitted by the parties below demonstrates that, by and large, the Republican community treated defendants and not plaintiffs as the valid and legitimate Chairman and Executive Committee of RPLAC.
Plaintiffs’ complaint asserts a first cause of action against defendants “for an injunction.” Plaintiffs sought a court order restraining defendants from “[h]olding themselves out as, and representing themselves to be, the valid and legitimate Chairman and Executive Committee of RPLAC; [¶] [m]aintaining a website identified as lagop.org which falsely and misleadingly purports to be the official web site of RPLAC; [¶] [c]onducting meetings of members, issuing announcements and bulletins, issuing public commentary, and otherwise communicating with RPLAC members and the general public in a confusing and misleading manner by asserting and falsely representing that they are the valid and legitimate Chairman and Executive Board [sic] of RPLAC; [¶] [m]aintaining one or more bank accounts in the name of RPLAC; [¶] [c]ollecting money in the form of donations and in the name of, and under the auspices of RPLAC, on the basis of false representations that they are the valid and legitimate Chairman and Executive Committee of RPLAC; [¶] [i]ssuing false and misleading statements, announcements and commentary to RPLAC members and the general public that Robert W.Vaughn and the other plaintiffs herein are not the valid and legitimate Chairman and Executive Committee of RPLAC.”
This is the title of the cause of action.
Plaintiffs also asserted a second cause of action for an accounting and a third cause of action for unjust enrichment, imposition of constructive trust and disgorgement. Plaintiffs sought an order requiring defendants to turn over to plaintiffs “all monies collected by defendants in the name and under the auspices of RPLAC.”
In opposition to the anti-SLAPP motion below, and also on appeal, plaintiffs argue that the claim they are asserting in this lawsuit is a violation of the common law right to fair procedure, although no cause of action is labeled as such in the complaint.
In support of their allegations, plaintiffs attached to their complaint 21 exhibits, totaling more than 100 pages. The exhibits include RPLAC’s 2007-2008 bylaws, two “parliamentary opinions” by plaintiffs’ expert, and correspondence and articles discussing the merits of the May 14, 2009 election.
Anti-SLAPP Motion
On or about February 10, 2010, defendants filed their anti-SLAPP motion. On April 30, 2010, plaintiffs filed a motion for preliminary injunction, which they noticed for hearing on the same day as the anti-SLAPP motion. Thereafter, on May 11, 2010, plaintiffs filed their opposition to the anti-SLAPP motion.
On May 26, 2010, after both motions were fully briefed, the trial court heard oral argument on the anti-SLAPP motion and granted it. Based on its comments at the hearing, the court essentially found that defendants demonstrated that they were validly elected to the Executive Committee on May 14, 2009, and their conduct at the meeting was not wrongful. The court issued a written order, striking the complaint and providing for an award of attorney fees and costs under section 425.16. On July 16, 2010, plaintiffs filed their notice of appeal from the order on the anti-SLAPP motion.
Motion for Attorney Fees and Costs
On July 26, 2010, defendants moved for attorney fees and costs under section 425.16, subdivision (c). They sought an award of $115,601.38 ($105,237.42 in attorney fees, $3,660 in expert witness fees and $6,703.96 in other costs). Plaintiffs filed an opposition, challenging the reasonableness of defendants’ request. The trial court awarded defendants $96,404.70 ($90,000 in attorney fees and $6,404.70 in costs).
Plaintiffs did not file a notice of appeal from this order. We may review their challenge to the reasonableness of the award because the order plaintiffs did appeal from awarded attorney fees and costs. The prior order on the anti-SLAPP motion “subsumes” the subsequent order determining the amount of fees and costs. (See R.P. Richards, Inc. v. Chartered Const. Corp. (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 146, 158 [“when the judgment awards attorney fees but does not determine the amount, the judgment is deemed to subsume the postjudgment order determining the amount awarded, and an appeal from the judgment encompasses the postjudgment order”].)
Plaintiffs acknowledge that their request for injunctive relief-the whole basis for this lawsuit-is moot. Both plaintiffs and defendants have represented that elections for RPLAC Executive Committee positions were due to be held in December 2010. We may not dismiss the appeal, however, because we still must determine whether the $96,404.70 award of attorney fees and costs can stand. To do so, we must first decide whether the trial court properly granted the anti-SLAPP motion.
DISCUSSION
I. Anti-SLAPP Motion
A. Standard of Review
“Review of an order granting or denying a motion to strike under section 425.16 is de novo.” (Soukup v. Law Offices of Herbert Hafif (2006) 39 Cal.4th 260, 269, fn. 3 (Soukup).) “We consider ‘the pleadings, and supporting and opposing affidavits upon which the liability or defense is based.’ (§ 425.16, subd. (b)(2).) However, we neither ‘weigh credibility [nor] compare the weight of the evidence. Rather, [we] accept as true the evidence favorable to the plaintiff [citation] and evaluate the defendant’s evidence only to determine if it has defeated that submitted by the plaintiff as a matter of law.’” (Soukup, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 269, fn. 3.)
B. Section 425.16
Under section 425.16, a party may move to dismiss “certain unmeritorious claims that are brought to thwart constitutionally protected speech or petitioning activity.” (Robinzine v. Vicory (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 1416, 1420-1421.) Section 425.16 provides: “A cause of action against a person arising from any act of that person in furtherance of the person’s right of petition or free speech under the United States Constitution or the California Constitution in connection with a public issue shall be subject to a special motion to strike, unless the court determines that the plaintiff has established that there is a probability that the plaintiff will prevail on the claim.” (§ 425.16, subd. (b)(1).)
In evaluating an anti-SLAPP motion, we conduct a two-step analysis. First, we must decide whether the defendant “has made a threshold showing that the challenged cause of action arises from protected activity.” (Taheri Law Group v. Evans (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 482, 488.) For these purposes, protected activity “includes: (1) any written or oral statement or writing made before a legislative, executive, or judicial proceeding, or any other official proceeding authorized by law, (2) any written or oral statement or writing made in connection with an issue under consideration or review by a legislative, executive, or judicial body, or any other official proceeding authorized by law, (3) any written or oral statement or writing made in a place open to the public or a public forum in connection with an issue of public interest, or (4) any other conduct in furtherance of the exercise of the constitutional right of petition or the constitutional right of free speech in connection with a public issue or an issue of public interest.” (§ 425.16, subd. (e).)
Second, if the defendant makes this threshold showing, we decide whether the plaintiff “has demonstrated a probability of prevailing on the claim.” (Taheri Law Group v. Evans, supra, 160 Cal.App.4th at p. 488.)
C. Step 1: Arising from protected activity
As plaintiffs explained in their opposition to defendants’ anti-SLAPP motion, “the conduct complained of [in the complaint] is defendants’ wrongful act of holding themselves out as valid and legitimate officers of RPLAC, when in fact they are not.” In this lawsuit, plaintiffs sought to enjoin defendants from stating that they were members of RPLAC’s Executive Committee, from holding RPLAC meetings, and from maintaining a website for RPLAC, among other things. In opposition to the anti-SLAPP motion, and also on appeal, plaintiffs have stated that the claim they are alleging is a violation of the common law right to fair procedure.
Clearly, plaintiffs’ causes of action arise from protected activity within the meaning of section 425.16, subdivisions (e)(3) and (e)(4). Plaintiffs sought to restrain defendants from making written or oral statements in a public forum. Plaintiffs concede that the speech, and conduct arising from the speech, that they sought to enjoin was made in connection with an issue of public interest.
Plaintiffs argue: “The cause of action for common law fair procedure asserted in the present action arises from [defendants]’ conduct and actions in violating fair procedure rights, and any Constitutional speech rights are at best peripheral to the gravamen and principle thrust of the claim.” Plaintiffs’ assertion of this argument is disingenuous given that the main thrust of the injunction they sought was to prevent defendants from making oral and written statements claiming to be RPLAC’s Executive Committee.
Plaintiffs also argue that the “speech involved in this case is not protected under [section] 425.16” because it “was illegal as a matter of law.” This argument might have been availing if it was apparent on the face of the complaint that defendants engaged in illegal conduct, or if defendants conceded that their conduct was illegal. (See Flatley v. Mauro (2006) 39 Cal.4th 299, 316 [“In such a narrow circumstance, where either the defendant concedes the illegality of its conduct or the illegality is conclusively shown by the evidence, the motion must be denied”]; Novartis Vaccines and Diagnostics, Inc. v. Stop Huntingdon Animal Cruelty USA, Inc. (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 1284, 1296 [“the evidence conclusively establishes that the activities described at length in the complaint, and about which there is no dispute, are illegal as a matter of law. Indeed, [defendant] has conceded that the attacks on [plaintiffs] were unlawful”].) Here, however, the parties vigorously disputed whether defendants violated the law in the manner in which they assumed their Executive Committee positions. Defendants produced evidence in support of their position that the elections were valid after the Chairman resigned his position and the other positions were vacated by vote on a motion. The trial court sided with defendants on this issue. Where “a factual dispute exists about the legitimacy of the defendant’s conduct, it cannot be resolved within the first step but must be raised by the plaintiff in connection with the plaintiff’s burden to show a probability of prevailing on the merits.” (Flatley v. Mauro, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 316.) Such a factual dispute exists here.
D. Step 2: Probability of prevailing on the claim
Because defendants have made the required threshold showing of a cause of action arising from protected activity, we consider whether plaintiffs demonstrated a probability of prevailing on their claim. To satisfy their burden, plaintiffs “‘must demonstrate that the complaint is both legally sufficient and supported by a sufficient prima facie showing of facts to sustain a favorable judgment if the evidence submitted by the plaintiff is credited.’” (Soukup, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 291.) The trial court must deny an anti-SLAPP motion if “‘“the plaintiff presents evidence establishing a prima facie case which, if believed by the trier of fact, will result in a judgment for the plaintiff. [Citation.]”’” (Robinzine v. Vicory, supra, 143 Cal.App.4th at p. 1421.) At this stage of the proceedings, the plaintiff “need only establish that his or her claim has ‘minimal merit.’” (Soukup, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 291.) Although “‘the court does not weigh the credibility or comparative probative strength of competing evidence, it should grant the motion if, as a matter of law, the defendant’s evidence supporting the motion defeats the plaintiff’s attempt to establish evidentiary support for the claim.’” (Ibid.)
As set forth above, plaintiffs maintain that the claim asserted in their complaint is a common law cause of action for fair procedure. “The common law right to fair procedure protects an individual from arbitrary exclusion or expulsion from membership in a ‘private entity affecting the public interest’ where the exclusion or expulsion has substantial adverse economic ramifications. [Citation.] ‘The purpose of the common law right to fair procedure is to protect, in certain situations, against arbitrary decisions by private organizations. [Citation.] When the right to fair procedure is found to apply, ‘the decisionmaking “must be both substantively rational and procedurally fair.”’ [Citation.]” (Kim v. Southern Sierra Council Boy Scouts of America (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 743, 746-747, quoting Potvin v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1060, 1066, 1070-1072.)
Plaintiffs cannot state a cause of action for violation of the common law right to fair procedure based on the events alleged in their complaint. They have not alleged-and indeed cannot allege-that their removal from office had any impact on their economic interests. (Potvin v. Metrtopolitan Life Ins. Co., supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 1071 [an “insurer wishing to remove a doctor from one of its preferred provider lists must comply with the common law right to fair procedure” only when the removal will affect “an important, substantial economic interest”].)
In support of their fair procedure claim, plaintiffs rely on Wilson v. San Luis Obispo County Democratic Central Committee (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 489 (Wilson). There, a former member of the San Luis Obispo County Democratic Central Committee filed a petition for writs of mandate and prohibition after she was removed from membership in the committee. She sought an order compelling the committee to reinstate her membership. (Id. at p. 492.) In addressing whether the common law right to fair procedure applies where there is no impact on the plaintiff’s economic interests, the Court of Appeal in Wilson stated: “[A]n argument may be made that the common law right to fair procedure applies where, as here, a private organization removes a member even though the removal has no economic impact. The rationale for this argument ‘is that membership in an association, with its associated privileges, once attained, is a valuable interest which cannot be arbitrarily withdrawn.’ [Citations.]” (Wilson, supra, 175 Cal.App.4th at p. 502, quoting Ezekial v. Winkley (1977) 20 Cal.3d 267, 273 (Ezekial).)
The appellate court in Wilson declined to decide whether the common law right to fair procedure applied to the plaintiff’s removal from the committee despite the lack of economic ramifications. Instead, the court reviewed whether the committee complied with fair procedure in removing the plaintiff, and concluded that it did. (Wilson, supra, 175 Cal.App.4th at pp. 502-503.)
We note that the language from the California Supreme Court’s opinion in Ezekial that was quoted in Wilson regarding membership as a valuable interest is dicta. In Ezekial, the plaintiff sought redress for his dismissal from a surgical residency program at a private teaching hospital, an expulsion that certainly had an impact on the plaintiff’s economic interests. (Ezekial, supra, 20 Cal.3d at pp. 269-270.) As set forth above, the California Supreme Court’s most recent pronouncement of the common law doctrine of fair procedure includes as an element an impact on a substantial economic interest. (See Potvin v. Metrtopolitan Life Ins. Co., supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 1071; see also Kim v. Southern Sierra Council Boy Scouts of America, supra, 117 Cal.App.4th at p. 746; Kurz v. Federation of Petanque U.S.A. (2006) 146 Cal.App.4th 136, 147-148.) Plaintiffs here cannot show any impact on their economic interests.
Furthermore, language from Wilson and the other cases quoted above highlights another reason that plaintiffs cannot state a valid cause of action for violation of the common law right to fair procedure: They were not excluded or expelled from membership in RPLAC. We are not aware of any case applying the doctrine of fair procedure to an organization’s decision to remove a member from a leadership role in the organization.
Plaintiffs cite Curran v. Mount Diablo Council of the Boy Scouts (1983) 147 Cal.App.3d 712 (Curran) in support of their argument that, “Full expulsion is not required– a denial of rights within the organization is sufficient to establish the cause of action.” Plaintiffs’ reliance on this case is misplaced. The plaintiff in Curran was “expelled” from membership in the Boy Scouts. (Curran v. Mount Diablo Council of the Boy Scouts, supra, 147 Cal.App.3d at pp. 721-722.) Although the appellate court stated that the plaintiff’s “rank of eagle scout, which ensure[d] routine promotion to the status of ‘Scouter, ’” was an “important benefit[] which [was] entitled to legal protection, ” the court did not hold that the loss of rank and status alone was sufficient to state the cause of action. (Id. at p. 721.) Curran is a “full expulsion” case, and not applicable to the situation here where plaintiffs remained members of RPLAC after they were removed from its Executive Committee.
Plaintiffs ask this court to expand the doctrine or fair procedure beyond its current parameters to circumstances in which plaintiffs retained their membership in the organization and suffered no adverse economic consequences. We decline to do so. Plaintiffs have not stated and cannot state a cause of action for violation of the common law doctrine of fair procedure. The trial court’s decision to grant the anti-SLAPP motion was not error.
II. Attorney Fees and Costs
Plaintiffs challenge the award of attorney fees and costs under section 425.16, subdivision (c). Under this provision, defendants prevailing on an anti-SLAPP motion are entitled to recover reasonable fees and costs. (§ 425.16, subd. (c); Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1131 (Ketchum).)
As the parties correctly agree, we review the trial court’s award of attorney fees and costs for abuse of discretion. (Ketchum, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 1130.) “The ‘“experienced trial judge is the best judge of the value of professional services rendered in his court, and while his judgment is of course subject to review, it will not be disturbed unless the appellate court is convinced that it is clearly wrong.”’” (Id. at p. 1132.) We will not substitute our judgment for that of the trial court and we will not set aside a trial court’s discretionary rulings unless they are clearly arbitrary, irrational or exceed the bounds of reason. (Maughan v. Google Technology, Inc. (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 1242, 1249-1250 (Maughan).)
As set forth above, defendants sought $115,601.38 in attorney fees and costs and the trial court awarded them $96,404.70. The record does not reveal where the court made cuts in defendants’ request, and the parties do not explain. On appeal, plaintiffs argue that the award is still too high for various reasons.
First, plaintiffs argue that the trial court improperly awarded fees for work done on matters unrelated to the anti-SLAPP motion. Plaintiffs rely on Lafayette Morehouse, Inc. v. Chronicle Publishing Co. (1995) 39 Cal.App.4th 1379 for the proposition that, for purposes of attorney fees under section 425.16, subdivision (c), the prevailing defendant is entitled to fees and costs incurred on the motion to strike only, not on the entire suit. (Id. at p. 1383.) After Lafayette was decided, however, the Legislature amended section 425.16, mandating that the section be “construed broadly.” (§ 425.16, subd. (a); Briggs v. Eden Council for Hope and Opportunity (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1106, 1119.) Thus, Lafayette is tempered by this legislative mandate, which courts have interpreted to mean fees under subdivision (c) of that section may be awarded for work performed in connection with an anti-SLAPP motion. (See e.g., Wanland v. Law Offices of Mastagni, Holstedt & Chiurazzi (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 15, 22; Rosenaur v. Scherer (2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 260, 285-286.)
Plaintiffs fail to acknowledge that they created circumstances under which defendants were forced to incur fees and costs above and beyond the anti-SLAPP motion. After defendants filed their anti-SLAPP motion, plaintiff filed a motion for preliminary injunction, which they noticed for hearing on the same day as defendants’ motion. When plaintiffs subsequently filed their opposition to the anti-SLAPP motion, they asked the trial court to refer to their motion for preliminary injunction and supporting papers: “The preliminary injunction motion and supporting declarations specify in full and complete detail the facts, evidence and legal authorities which establish plaintiffs’ probability of prevailing on the claims herein, and plaintiffs refer to and rely upon this body of evidence as the core factual grounding for their opposition to defendants’ motion to strike. On that basis alone (probability of prevailing) defendants’ anti-SLAPP motion should be denied.” Plaintiffs will not be heard to argue that defendants are not entitled to attorney fees and costs incurred in connection with plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary injunction. Plaintiffs themselves demonstrated that the preliminary injunction motion was intertwined with defendants’ anti-SLAPP motion.
Second, plaintiffs argue the award should not include any fees and costs from Bell, McAndres & Hiltachk LLP or Flick Law Group because neither firm appeared as counsel of record in this litigation. As defendants explained below, these two firms worked on the matter because they were intimately familiar with the issues, having represented defendants prior to the litigation in communicating and negotiating with plaintiffs regarding the events alleged in the complaint. Defendants explained that they worked with these two firms to avoid duplication of effort and to keep costs down. Ironically, plaintiffs have demonstrated why it was reasonable to involve these other firms in their defense of this action. Plaintiffs attached as an exhibit to their complaint a letter from Bell, McAndres & Hiltachk, LLP setting forth legal and factual findings regarding the May 14, 2009 meeting.
Third, plaintiffs argue that the trial court should not have awarded $5,225 in attorney fees for three lawyers from San Francisco to travel to Los Angeles for the hearing on the anti-SLAPP motion. It is not clear from the record that the court awarded these fees, given that it reduced defendants’ fee request by more than $15,000. But in the event it did, we do not find that the court abused its discretion. Plaintiffs question the need for “out of town lawyering” in this case. Defendants explained in connection with their motion that one of the partners at the litigation firm they chose “was an elected member of the San Francisco Republican Central Committee with a personal knowledge of Central Committee procedure and its interplay with the Elections Code, ” and also had expertise in anti-SLAPP matters. It was not unreasonable for the three attorneys from the firm who had worked on the matter to travel to Los Angeles for the hearing given that the trial court had on calendar both the anti-SLAPP motion and plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary injunction.
Finally, plaintiffs complain about the number of hours defendants billed on the matter after the May 26, 2010 hearing on the anti-SLAPP motion. It is not clear from their brief which time entries they believe are unreasonable, or the amount of hours they believe the trial court should have shaved off of defendants’ request. As noted above, the trial court did reduce defendants’ fee request by more than $15,000. Plaintiffs’ conclusory statements about too many hours billed after May 26, 2010 are not sufficient to demonstrate an abuse of discretion.
Based on our review of the record, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding defendants $96,404.70 in fees and costs.
As defendants point out and plaintiffs do not dispute, defendants are entitled to their attorney fees and costs on appeal. (Hansen v. California Dept. of Corrections and Rehabilitation (2008) 171 Cal.App.4th 1537, 1547.)
DISPOSITION
The orders are affirmed. Defendants/respondents are entitled to recover attorney fees and costs on appeal in amounts to be determined by the trial court.
We concur: ROTHSCHILD, Acting P. J., JOHNSON, J.