Opinion
Civil No. 03-2490 (DWF/JSM).
August 13, 2004
Albert T. Goins, Sr., Esq., Goins Wood, PC, Minneapolis, Minnesota, on behalf of Plaintiff.
Daniel G. Wilczek, Esq., and Karla C. Robertson, Esq., Faegre Benson, Minneapolis, Minnesota, on behalf of Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Introduction
The above-entitled matter came on for hearing before the undersigned United States District Judge on July 2, 2004, pursuant to Defendants the Northwest Area Foundation's ("NWAF"), Karl Stauber's, Ellery July's, and Lisa Hinickle's (collectively the "Defendants") Motion for Summary Judgment. For the reasons stated below, the Court grants the Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment.
Background
NWAF is a nonprofit foundation devoted to reducing poverty. NWAF runs three programs called Ventures, Connections, and Horizons. The Ventures program is made up of small teams, each targeting a specific community or group to assist in creating long-term poverty reduction strategies. Each team is led by a Community Liaison. One team in the Ventures program is the "Yakima" team. In 2001 and 2002, the Yakima team focused its efforts on communities in Yakima, Washington.Plaintiff Mario Santos Vargas, a Hispanic-Latino male, was an Associate Community Liaison for NWAF from June 2000 until June 19, 2002. Vargas was responsible for facilitating the organizing efforts of NWAF in the communities to which he was assigned. Vargas worked primarily on two teams in the Ventures program, the North Minneapolis team and the Yakima team. Beginning in 2001, NWAF assigned Vargas to the Yakima team. The Yakima team was Vargas's primary assignment until his employment with NWAF was terminated.
Vargas had several supervisors during his employment at NWAF. Vargas was supervised by Frank Schweigert (June 2000 to August 2001), Patricia Deinhart (June 2000 to July 2001), and Howard Valandra (July 2001 to January 2002). During Vargas's entire term of employment with NWAF, Lisa Hinickle, the head of the Ventures program, oversaw Vargas's work. In January 2002, Vargas began to report directly to Hinickle when Hinickle assumed direct supervision of the Yakima team.
Hinickle assumed direct supervisory responsibility over the Yakima team after Howard Valandra, the Community Liaison for the Yakima team from August 2001 to January 2002, resigned from his position. As supervisor of the Yakima team, Hinickle was responsible for preparing year-end evaluations for several Associate Community Liaisons, including Vargas and Viki Kimsal. Prior to leaving NWAF, Valandra had prepared partial-year reviews for Vargas and Kimsal. Valandra rated both Vargas and Kimsal at the highest rating. After preparing his partial-year reviews, Valandra passed along the reviews to Hinickle, Vargas, and Kimsal.
Based on her own observations and supervision, Hinickle did not believe that either Vargas or Kimsal warranted the ratings given by Valandra in his partial-year reviews. However, Hinickle gave both Vargas and Kimsal the second-highest rating in their end of the year evaluations. Once the evaluations had been completed, Hinickle attached an addendum to the evaluation outlining the areas in which she felt the employees' performances could be improved. On April 8, 2002, Hinickle discussed Vargas's review with him. In discussing Vargas's review, Hinickle pointed out that she felt that Vargas could improve his performance by coming to meetings more prepared, treating other team members with respect, completing more of his assignments, and responding in a more positive fashion to constructive criticism.
On April 9, 2002, Vargas complained of a hostile work environment to Jim Sisson, NWAF's Human Resources Lead. Specifically, Vargas complained that he was being discriminated against on the basis of his race and national origin. The two individuals cited as being responsible for the hostile work environment in Vargas's complaint were Hinickle and Ellery July, NWAF's Director of Community Activities and Learning.
On April 16, 2002, July sent Vargas an e-mail in which July requested a meeting with Vargas. July asserts that he wanted to discuss his expectations of Vargas at the meeting and to discuss July's concerns regarding Vargas's performance. The e-mail informed Vargas that Hinickle and Sisson would be present at the meeting.
July and Hinickle met with Sisson on April 17, 2002, to discuss the next day's meeting with Vargas. Sisson contends that it was at this meeting that he first informed Hinickle and July that Vargas had registered a complaint. However, Sisson asserts that he did not provide Hinickle or July with any specific details regarding Vargas's complaint at the meeting.
During the April 18 meeting, July told Vargas of his concerns regarding Vargas's performance. Vargas responded by calling July a liar and telling July that he was being sexist. When asked to elaborate on his assertions regarding July, Vargas declined to provide any explanations. In response, July told Vargas that he wanted to meet with Vargas within the next seven working days to discuss a possible resolution of the matter.
Sisson informed Karl Stauber, NWAF's President, about Vargas's complaint on April 9, 2002. July informed Stauber about Vargas's comment that Vargas believed July to be sexist and racist following the April 18 meeting. In addition, Stauber received a letter from Vargas on April 25, 2002, in which Vargas stated that he had filed a complaint with Sisson and that he believed the recent efforts of July and Hinickle to discuss his work performance were in retaliation for his filing of the initial complaint. Stauber asserts that he considered whether to halt July's efforts to address Vargas's alleged performance issues while the investigation of Vargas's complaint was taking place, but ultimately decided that the performance issues could be discussed while NWAF investigated Vargas's complaint.
July, Hinickle, Sisson, and Vargas had a second meeting on May 14. Vargas was made aware of the meeting via an e-mail sent to him by July on May 10. In the e-mail, July stated that the meeting was meant to provide Vargas with the opportunity to state the bases for the disagreements he had with the performance concerns raised at the earlier meeting. At the meeting, Vargas again would not give any details as to why he disputed July's assessment of his performance. Instead, Vargas stated that the comments regarding his performance were untrue and that he believed he was being subjected to harassment and retaliation.
After the meeting, July asked Hinickle to prepare a plan that would assist Vargas in addressing those areas of his performance that July felt were lacking. The plan was presented to Vargas on June 10 by July and Hinickle. July and Hinickle assert that they told Vargas that the performance plan included tasks that needed to be completed within seven days. They also assert that they told Vargas that his cooperation with the performance plan would ultimately decide whether or not he remained employed at NWAF.
On June 14, 2002, Sisson completed his investigation of Vargas's complaint. Sisson specifically identified four issues that concerned Vargas: (1) the treatment Vargas alleged he received from other staff members because Vargas had received a higher starting salary; (2) the fact that Vargas had been asked to perform Spanish translation; (3) Vargas's contention that July had met with other Yakima team members to discuss the project but had not met with Vargas; and (4) Vargas's contention that Hinickle had not allowed him to actively participate in a team meeting. After interviewing current and past employees of NWAF, Sisson issued a report determining that Vargas's complaints were unfounded. On May 1, 2002, Sisson's report was sent to Stauber.
On June 17, 2002, the date set by July and Hinickle for completion of some of the tasks in Vargas's performance plan, Vargas informed NWAF staff that he was sick and would be unable to work that day. However, Vargas returned to work on June 18. Upon his return, July and Hinickle met with Vargas to determine whether he had completed the tasks set out in his performance plan. Vargas informed July and Hinickle that he had not completed the tasks required by the performance plan. As a result of Vargas's failure to complete the tasks, July and Hinickle told Vargas that he should go home for the day. July and Hinickle then informed Stauber of their belief that Vargas's employment should be terminated.
On June 19, 2002, Stauber met with Vargas. At the beginning of the meeting, Vargas displayed a tape recorder and informed Stauber and Sisson that he wanted to tape the meeting. Stauber objected to the taping of the meeting and Vargas then told Stauber that any future discussion of Vargas's employment should take place between NWAF personnel and Vargas's attorney. At that time, Stauber told Vargas that his employment with NWAF was terminated effective that day.
On September 26, 2002, Vargas filed charges with the Minnesota Department of Human Rights against NWAF, July, and Hinickle. Before the Department of Human Rights could make a determination on Vargas's charges, Vargas withdrew his charges to bring this suit. On March 18, 2003, Vargas filed this suit.
While pursuing his discrimination action, Vargas also pursued a claim for unemployment compensation benefits. A hearing officer and the Commissioner's Representative found that Vargas had been discharged for disqualifying conduct. On January 24, 2004, the Minnesota Court of Appeals affirmed the decision denying Vargas benefits.
Discussion
I. Standard of ReviewSummary judgment is proper if there are no disputed issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). The court must view the evidence and the inferences that may be reasonably drawn from the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See Enter. Bank v. Magna Bank of Missouri, 92 F.3d 743, 747 (8th Cir. 1996). However, as the Supreme Court has stated, "[s]ummary judgment procedure is properly regarded not as a disfavored procedural shortcut, but rather as an integral part of the Federal Rules as a whole, which are designed 'to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action.'" Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 327 (1986) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 1).
The moving party bears the burden of showing that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Enter. Bank, 92 F.3d at 747. The nonmoving party must demonstrate the existence of specific facts in the record which create a genuine issue for trial. See Krenik v. County of Le Sueur, 47 F.3d 953, 957 (8th Cir. 1995). A party opposing a properly supported motion for summary judgment may not rest upon mere allegations or denials, but must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 256 (1986); Krenik, 47 F.3d at 957.
II. Collateral Estoppel
Defendants assert that the doctrine of collateral estoppel precludes this Court from making a finding contrary to the decision of the Minnesota Court of Appeals regarding Vargas's claim for unemployment benefits. In contrast, Vargas asserts that the standard of review used by the Minnesota Court of Appeals in considering the decision of the Commissioner's Representative is limited and that statute and public policy bar the Minnesota Court of Appeals' decision from having preclusive effect.
The Court finds that the doctrine of collateral estoppel does not bar it from considering the issues present in this suit. The Court notes that the Minnesota Court of Appeals applies a highly deferential standard when reviewing the decisions of the Commissioner's Representative. The Court further finds that public policy requires the courts to consider claims of racial discrimination when alleged rather than relying on determinations that were not entirely focused on the issue.
III. Race and National Origin Discrimination
Vargas asserts that he was discriminated against on the basis of his race and national origin in violation of Title VII, the Minnesota Human Rights Act ("MHRA"), and 42 U.S.C. § 1981. In order to establish a prima facie case of discrimination based on race or national origin, Vargas must demonstrate that (1) he was a member of a protected group; (2) he was meeting the legitimate expectations of his employer; (3) he suffered an adverse employment action; and (4) similarly situated employees who are not members of the protected group were treated differently. See Clark v. Runyon, 218 F.3d 915, 918 (8th Cir. 2000).
If Vargas is able to establish a prima facie case, the burden shifts to NWAF to produce a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the adverse employment action. See id. (citing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973)). If NWAF is able to articulate such a reason, the burden shifts back to Vargas to show that the proffered reason is merely a pretext for discrimination. See id. The elements and analysis of a discrimination claim under each of the statutes is the same. See Saulsberry v. St. Mary's Univ. of Minnesota, 318 F.3d 862, 866 (8th Cir. 2003).
Vargas sets out several instances that he asserts form the basis of his claims for race and national origin discrimination. Specifically, Vargas asserts that the modification of his performance evaluation, the decision not to promote him to the Community Liaison position he sought in March 2002, the general treatment of him in the workplace, the decision to place him on a performance plan, and the decision to terminate his employment are all evidence of NWAF's discriminatory treatment of him.
A. Performance Evaluation
Vargas asserts that the modification of his performance review by Hinickle from a rating of "meets all expectations" to the rating of "proficient" is evidence of the discrimination he faced at NWAF. NWAF contends that the modification of the performance review was appropriate, that the modification was not an adverse employment action, and that the only similarly-situated individual, Kimsal, was treated in exactly the same manner.
The Court finds that the modification of Vargas's performance review by Hinickle is not evidence of discriminatory conduct. The "meets all expectations" rating given to Vargas by Valandra occurred as part of a partial-year review. Vargas was not entitled in any way to receive that same rating at the end of the year and Hinickle was acting within her supervisory powers when she made the determination that the performance of Vargas and Kimsal was merely "proficient." The modification of the performance evaluation was not an adverse employment action in this setting. In addition, Vargas has failed to show that the only other similarly-situated person, Kimsal, was treated in a different manner.
B. Hiring of a Community Liaison
Vargas asserts that NWAF's failure to hire him for the Community Liaison position that came available in March 2002 is evidence of discrimination. Vargas asserts that he applied for the position and that he was qualified to serve as a Community Liaison. NWAF asserts that it relied on the advice and recommendation of an independent, outside search firm in filling the vacant Community Liaison position. NWAF further asserts that Vargas was not qualified to serve as a Community Liaison.
The Court finds Vargas's assertion that he was qualified to serve as a Community Liaison questionable given the performance evaluations dating back to 2001 in which various supervisors state that Vargas must work to improve his communication and teamwork skills. The Court also finds that Vargas has failed to present evidence demonstrating that he was similarly-situated in terms of his qualifications with the individual hired to fill the Community Liaison position.
C. Vargas's Treatment In The Workplace
Vargas asserts that he was discriminated against in the workplace at the hands of July and Hinickle. Specifically, Vargas asserts that he was told to remain silent at a team meeting, that his recommendations were not implemented, and that his performance evaluations did not accurately reflect his true performance. In contrast, NWAF asserts that these allegations amount to nothing more than inactionable disagreements between an employee and an employer exercising its supervisory powers.
The Court finds that Vargas's allegations regarding his general treatment in the workplace are inactionable because no adverse employment action is alleged. The only arguably actionable conduct is the allegation regarding Vargas's performance evaluation. However, Vargas received a bonus on the basis of the performance evaluation. While Vargas disagrees with the actions taken by the NWAF staff, none of the instances alleged resulted in Vargas suffering a "materially significant disadvantage." Ledergerber v. Stangler, 122 F.3d 1142, 1144 (8th Cir. 1997) (quoting Harlston v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 37 F.3d 379, 382 (8th Cir. 1994) (defining the term "adverse employment action")).
D. Performance Plan
Vargas asserts that the fact that Hinickle and July created a performance program for him is evidence of racial discrimination. Specifically, Vargas asserts the performance program was designed so that he would be unable to comply with its requirements resulting in his termination. In contrast, NWAF asserts that the creation of the performance program was not an adverse employment action because the creation of the performance program was in no way adverse to Vargas's terms or conditions of employment. NWAF contends that the funds that it would have needed to spend on additional training for Vargas as part of the performance program demonstrates NWAF's commitment to Vargas. NWAF also asserts that Vargas has failed to present evidence that similarly-situated individuals were treated more favorably.
The Court finds that the creation and adoption of the performance program is not evidence of racial discrimination. The performance program was designed to address areas of Vargas's performance that had been cited by his supervisors for some time. Requiring Vargas to comply with the program was not an adverse employment action and Vargas has presented no evidence that any other employee of NWAF was treated more favorably.
E. Termination of Vargas's Employment
Vargas asserts that the termination of his employment with NWAF occurred as the result of discrimination on the basis of his race and national origin. NWAF asserts that Vargas was terminated after he failed to comply with the terms of his performance program.
The Court finds that Vargas has failed to present prima facie evidence that his termination occurred as the result of racial or national origin discrimination. Vargas was given the sole task of finding local training options that would strengthen his skills in the areas that had been cited by Hinickle and July. Vargas was told that this task was to be completed within one week. Vargas failed to do so and his employment with NWAF was terminated as a result.
Even if the Court was to find that Vargas had presented prima facie evidence of discrimination, NWAF has presented a legitimate, non-discriminatory basis for its actions and Vargas has failed to show that the reason asserted by NWAF was pretextual. NWAF contends that the firing of Vargas occurred only after he refused to comply with the performance program designed by Hinickle and July. The Court finds that NWAF's asserted bases for not promoting Vargas to the Community Liaison and for terminating Vargas's employment are legitimate and that Vargas has failed to present evidence that the decisions were the result of pretext. Accordingly, the Court grants Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment as to the race and national origin discrimination claims.
IV. Retaliation Claim
Vargas asserts that he was retaliated against for complaining of Defendants' discriminatory actions in violation of Title VII and the MHRA. The tripartite analysis set forth in McDonnell Douglas is applicable to Vargas's claims of retaliation. In order to establish a prima facie case of retaliation under Title VII and the MHRA, Vargas must show that: (1) he engaged in statutorily-protected conduct; (2) he suffered an adverse action; and (3) a causal connection exists between Vargas's protected conduct and the adverse action. See Bergstrom-Ek v. Best Oil Co., 153 F.3d 851, 859 (8th Cir. 1998).
Vargas contends that the termination of his employment occurred in retaliation for the complaints he filed with Sisson. Vargas's primary evidence of the allegedly retaliatory conduct of Defendants is the temporal proximity of his filing of the initial complaint with the termination of his employment. Vargas points out that he filed his initial complaint regarding his work environment on April 9, 2002. One week later, Vargas received an e-mail from July requesting a meeting be held regarding Vargas's performance. Two days later that meeting was held and July informed Vargas of the concerns that he had regarding Vargas's performance. On June 19, 2002, Vargas's employment with NWAF was terminated.
NWAF asserts that Vargas has not presented a prima facie case of retaliation under either Title VII or the MHRA. NWAF points out that Hinickle discussed her assessment of Vargas's performance with him before he filed his initial complaint. NWAF also asserts that the initial meeting between Vargas, Hinickle, July, and Sisson was not intended to be used to discipline Vargas. NWAF asserts that it terminated Vargas's employment only after Hinickle and July designed the performance program and Vargas failed to comply with its requirements.
The Court finds that Vargas has not presented a prima facie case of retaliation. Vargas clearly engaged in protected conduct in complaining to Sisson. However, the Court finds that neither the modification of Vargas's performance evaluation by Hinickle, nor the development of the performance program by Hinickle and July are adverse employment actions. The only adverse employment action that Vargas suffered was the termination of his employment. Vargas must then link the complaint to the termination of his employment. Vargas attempts to do so by pointing to the temporal proximity between the two events. However, any link between these two events was severed when Vargas refused to comply with the performance program. The Court might be more willing to accept Vargas's assertion that the performance program was designed for him to fail, if Vargas had made any effort to comply with the performance program. Vargas's failure to present a prima facie case of retaliation, NWAF's assertion of a legitimate, non-retaliatory reason for its actions, and Vargas's failure to present evidence of pretext require that the Court dismiss Vargas's retaliation claims.
V. Hostile Work Environment
Vargas also brings a harassment claim, alleging that he faced a hostile work environment on the basis of his race and national origin. To succeed on a hostile work environment claim, Vargas must prove four elements: (1) membership in a protected group; (2) the occurrence of unwelcome harassment; (3) that the harassment was based on race or national origin; and (4) that the harassment affected a term, condition, or privilege of employment. See Elmahdi v. Marriott Hotel Services, Inc., 339 F.3d 645, 652 (8th Cir. 2003). To alter the terms and conditions of one's employment, conduct must be severe and pervasive, both objectively and subjectively. See Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21-23 (1993). When determining the severity and pervasiveness of an employer's conduct, several factors should be considered, including: the frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether the conduct is physically threatening or humiliating or merely offensive; and whether the conduct unreasonably interferes with an employee's work performance. See id.
Vargas asserts that NWAF created a hostile work environment on the basis of his race and national origin. The Court finds that the conduct complained of by Vargas does not surpass the high threshold established in Harris for a hostile work environment claim. Much of the conduct complained of is not harassment in any form and the remaining allegations do not rise to the requisite level required for hostile work environment claims. Thus, Vargas's hostile work environment claims are dismissed with prejudice.
Conclusion
For the reasons stated, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:
1. Defendants the Northwest Area Foundation's, Karl Stauber's, Ellery July's, and Lisa Hinickle's Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 14) is GRANTED.
2. Plaintiff Mario Vargas's Amended Complaint (Doc. No. 4) is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.