Summary
In Vargas, this court found the defendants were entitled to attorney's fees incurred against plaintiffs' frivolous, unreasonable, and groundless Title VII claims when plaintiffs "filed no response at all" to the defendants' motion for summary judgment, thus failing to make any showing whatsoever that plaintiffs had any reasonable basis for asserting or pursuing any claims against the defendants.
Summary of this case from Grubbs v. Grote Indus.Opinion
CAUSE NO. IP 98-726-C H/G
February 26, 2002
ENTRY ON BILLS OF COSTS AND PETITION FOR ATTORNEY FEES
The court granted summary judgment for defendants, and plaintiff Vargas then pursued an appeal pro se. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the judgment against Vargas and dismissed the appeals that Vargas had purported to file on behalf of the other plaintiffs.
Defendants filed timely bills of costs, and the union defendants filed a petition for an award of attorney fees. This court elected not to act on those matters until the Seventh Circuit acted on the merits appeal.
I. Bills of Costs
Under Rule 54(d)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a prevailing party is entitled to an award of costs other than attorney fees "as of course." The Seventh Circuit has described the effect of Rule 54(d)(1) as creating a presumption in favor of costs, and a presumption that is "difficult to overcome." Congregation of the Passion, Holy Cross Province v. Touche, Ross Co., 854 F.2d 219, 221-22 (7th Cir. 1988); accord, Contreras v. City of Chicago, 119 F.3d 1286, 1295 (7th Cir. 1997). A losing party's good faith in pursuing a claim or defense does not defeat the presumption, see Muslin v. Frelinghuysen Livestock Managers, 777 F.2d 1230, 1236 (7th Cir. 1985), although a showing of bad faith could certainly weigh in favor of awarding costs.
The presumption in favor of awarding costs may be overcome if the losing party is unable to pay the costs or if the prevailing party engaged in some "misconduct" worthy of a penalty. Congregation of the Passion, 854 F.2d at 222. There is no evidence of such misconduct in this case, and plaintiffs have not attempted to make any showing that they are unable to pay costs. All apparently remain employed with defendant and earn union-level wages.
Plaintiffs' only response to the petition for costs was Vargas' pro se submission, which reads in its entirety:
Maybe the court doesn't feel there was discrimination. Looking at the briefs we can understand why. It's bad when we know we were discriminated against and talked to any kind of way. Then in return the attorneys want us to pay for fees and to add insult to the injury. We want the court to know that the decision was already made before the judge made his decision, it was talked about within the plant about 2 months prior to the court's decision and jokes were made about it. We are willing to take a lie detector test. Shouldn't the company and its employees receive some type of warning that this type of conduct will not continue? We ask in fairness that the bill of cost and attorney fees be denied.
Docket No. 160. This obscure response does not address any relevant consideration and offers no basis for denying costs to prevailing defendants.
Defendants Borg-Warner and Dr. Larry Cole have requested costs totaling $7,668.87, most of which consists of court reporter fees for depositions in this multi-plaintiff case. Such costs are properly taxable, and the court allows the bill of costs in its entirety. Costs are hereby taxed in favor of Borg-Warner Automotive Diversified Transmission Products Corporation and Dr. Larry Cole and against plaintiffs Yolanda Vargas, Samuel Miles, Rochelle Perkins, Gloria Scott, and Tony Henry, jointly and severally, in the sum of $7,668.87.
The union defendants have requested costs totaling $3,381.82, most of which also consists of court reporter fees for depositions. The requested costs are properly taxable. Costs are hereby taxed in favor of defendants UAW Local 287 and union president Jon Hines and against plaintiffs Yolanda Vargas, Samuel Miles, Rochelle Perkins, and Tony Henry, jointly and severally, in the sum of $3,381.82. The court is not assessing costs for the union defendants against plaintiff Gloria Scott because she did not assert any claim for relief against the union defendants in this action.
II. The Union Defendants' Petition for Attorney Fees
Defendants Local 287 and Jon Hines seek an award of attorney fees under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) and 42 U.S.C. § 1988. Local 287 and Hines were prevailing parties. For their joint representation, the union seeks a fee award of $15,000. Plaintiffs have not raised any specific objection to the reasonableness of the fee, and the court finds that the hours and requested hourly rates were reasonable for the case.
Attorney fees may be awarded to a defendant who is the prevailing party in a case under Title VII if the district court finds that the plaintiff's action was "frivolous, unreasonable or groundless, or that the plaintiff continued to litigate after it clearly became so." Christianburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 422 (1978); see also Monroe v. Children's Home Ass'n, 128 F.3d 591, 594 (7th Cir. 1997) (defendants in Title VII action can recover attorney's fees if plaintiff's claim is frivolous). In awarding such fees the district court need not find that the plaintiff brought the action in bad faith. Christianburg Garment, 434 U.S. at 421.
The union defendants have shown that plaintiffs' pursuit of claims against them was frivolous, unreasonable, and groundless. The union defendants moved for summary judgment on the basis of evidence and arguments that plaintiffs had known about from the earliest stages of the case. Plaintiffs chose not to dismiss voluntarily their claims against the union defendants, so the union defendants moved for summary judgment. Plaintiffs sought and obtained extensions totaling about six months to respond to the motion. Plaintiffs then filed no response at all to the union defendants' motion for summary judgment, which the court granted.
Thus, plaintiffs have not shown that they had any reasonable basis for asserting or pursuing any claims against the union defendants. See Turner v. Sungard Business Systems, Inc., 91 F.3d 1418, 1423 (11th Cir. 1996) (affirming award of attorney fees to defendant under Rule 11 in Title VII case where plaintiff failed to respond to defendant's summary judgment motion) On this record, therefore, the court finds sufficient grounds for a fee award under Christiansburg Garment in favor of the prevailing union defendants. Plaintiffs have not attempted to show that they are unable to pay the requested fee. "When a court determines that a plaintiff can afford to pay the award, the congressional goal of discouraging frivolous litigation demands that the full fees be levied." Munson v. Friske, 754 F.2d 683, 697 (7th Cir. 1985). Plaintiffs' response offers no relevant reason to deny a fee award to the prevailing union defendants.
Accordingly, the court grants the petition of Local 287 and Jon Hines for an attorney fee award in the sum of $15,000, and assesses that sum against plaintiffs Yolanda Vargas, Samuel Miles, Rochelle Perkins, and Tony Henry, jointly and severally, in the sum of $15,000. The court is not assessing fees against plaintiff Gloria Scott because she did not assert any claim for relief against the union defendants in this action.
A separate judgment shall issue pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(d)(2)(C).
So ordered.