Opinion
C/A 8:22-cv-01503-BHH-JDA
04-06-2023
Sayvion Vanover, Plaintiff, v. Curtis McCray; Corey Scott; John Doe; Jane Doe, Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Jacquelyn D. Austin United States Magistrate Judge
This matter is before the Court on a motion for summary judgment filed by Defendant Corey Scott. [Doc. 22.] Plaintiff, represented by counsel, brings this action alleging violations of his constitutional rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. [Doc. 1.] Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2), D.S.C., this magistrate judge is authorized to review all pretrial matters in cases filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and to submit findings and recommendations to the District Court.
Plaintiff filed this action on May 11, 2022. [Doc. 1.] Defendant Scott filed a motion for summary judgment on September 23, 2022. [Doc. 22.] Plaintiff filed a response in opposition to the motion on October 21, 2022, and Defendant Scott filed a reply on November 4, 2022. [Docs. 26; 31.] The motion is ripe for review.
The facts in this Background Section are from the pleadings as relevant to the allegations against Defendant Scott.
At all times relevant to the allegations in the Complaint, Plaintiff was an inmate in the custody of the South Carolina Department of Juvenile Justice (“DJJ”). [Docs. 1 ¶ 7; 20 ¶ 7.] Defendant Scott was a juvenile corrections officer with DJJ. [Doc. 1 ¶ 35.] The Complaint alleges that Defendant Scott showed pornography to Plaintiff and other DJJ inmates on or about December 31, 2015, when Plaintiff was 13 years old. [Id.] Defendant Scott also threw Plaintiff against a wall and choked him. [Id. ¶ 36.] Defendant Scott was subsequently charged with and pleaded guilty to a charge of assault and battery third degree. [Id. ¶¶ 37-38.]
Thereafter, Plaintiff commenced this action and, as to Defendant Scott, alleges causes of action under § 1983 for violations of his rights to substantive due process, to be free from the use of excessive force, and to be free from cruel and unusual punishment. [Id. ¶¶ 42-59, 90-94.] He seeks money damages, attorney's fees, and costs. [Id. at 11.]
APPLICABLE LAW
Summary Judgment Standard
Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure states, as to a party who has moved for summary judgment:
The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A fact is “material” if proof of its existence or non-existence would affect disposition of the case under applicable law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). An issue of material fact is “genuine” if the evidence offered is such that a reasonable jury might return a verdict for the non-movant. Id. at 257. When determining whether a genuine issue has been raised, the court must construe all inferences and ambiguities against the movant and in favor of the non-moving party. United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655 (1962).
The party seeking summary judgment shoulders the initial burden of demonstrating to the court that there is no genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). Once the movant has made this threshold demonstration, the non-moving party, to survive the motion for summary judgment, may not rest on the allegations averred in his pleadings. Id. at 324. Rather, the non-moving party must demonstrate specific, material facts exist that give rise to a genuine issue. Id. Under this standard, the existence of a mere scintilla of evidence in support of the non-movant's position is insufficient to withstand the summary judgment motion. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252. Likewise, conclusory allegations or denials, without more, are insufficient to preclude granting the summary judgment motion. Id. at 248. “Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment. Factual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary will not be counted.” Id. Further, Rule 56 provides in pertinent part:
A party asserting that a fact cannot be or is genuinely disputed must support the assertion by:
(A) citing to particular parts of materials in the record, including depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations (including those made for purposes of the motion only), admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials; or
(B) showing that the materials cited do not establish the absence or presence of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact.Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1). Accordingly, when Rule 56(c) has shifted the burden of proof to the non-movant, he must produce existence of a factual dispute on every element essential to his action that he bears the burden of adducing at a trial on the merits.
DISCUSSION
Defendant Scott moves for summary judgment, arguing that Plaintiff's claims against him are barred by the statute of limitations. [Doc. 22.] Defendant Scott correctly recognizes that South Carolina's three-year statute of limitations applies to Plaintiff's claims and that, because Plaintiff was under the age of 18 when Defendant Scott purportedly threw him against a wall and choked him, the limitations period would have been tolled until one year after Plaintiff turned 18. [Id. at 2-6]; see Hamilton v. Middleton, No. 4:02-1952-23, 2003 WL 23851098, at *4 (D.S.C. June 20, 2003) (“The statute of limitations for section 1983 causes of action arising in South Carolina is three years.”), aff'd, 81 Fed.Appx. 770 (4th Cir. 2003); see also S.C. Code. § 15-3-40 (“If a person entitled to bring an action . . . is at the time the cause of action accrued either: (1) within the age of eighteen years; or (2) insane; the time of the disability is not a part of the time limited for the commencement of the action, except that the period within which the action must be brought cannot be extended: (a) more than five years by any such disability, except infancy; nor (b) in any case longer than one year after the disability ceases.”); Anderson v. Dorchester Cnty., No. 2:20-cv-2084-DCN-MGB, 2021 WL 1186637, at *6-7 (D.S.C. Mar. 30, 2021) (“[W]here a person entitled to bring an action is a minor, the limitations period applicable to his action is tolled until he reaches the age of eighteen but cannot be extended more than one year thereafter.”). Accordingly, Defendant Scott argues that because the statute of limitations with respect to the claims against him expired before Plaintiff turned 18 in December 2019, Plaintiff had to file his action within one year of turning 18, or by December 2020. [Doc. 22 at 6.] Because Plaintiff did not file this action until May 11, 2022, Defendant Scott contends the claims against him are barred by the statute of limitations. [Id.]
Defendant Scott also asserts that “[d]ocument production in this case shows that the date of the alleged incidents is not correct” in the Complaint but that “this should not affect the application of the statute of limitations to bar this action against Defendant Scott.” [Doc. 22 at 3.] Defendant Scott contends that the incidents occurred on December 31, 2014, and January 1, 2015, rather than December 31, 2015, as alleged in the Complaint. [Id. at 3-4.] The Court agrees that this discrepancy between the dates does not affect the application of the statute of limitations in this case.
In response, Plaintiff does not contest that the three-year statute of limitations applies or that it expired based on Plaintiff's infancy at the time of the alleged conduct. [Doc. 26.] Instead, Plaintiff contends that summary judgment is premature because the record has not been fully developed with respect to “whether Plaintiff had the mental capacity to understand that what happened to him could give rise to a lawsuit” and that Plaintiff's “competency remains questionable today.” [Id. at 2.]
Plaintiff appears to argue that he is entitled to tolling of the statute of limitations under both the infancy and insanity provisions of S.C. Code. § 15-3-40. The Supreme Court of South Carolina has defined the term “insane” for purposes of tolling the statute of limitations:
Insanity or mental incompetency that tolls the statute of limitations consists of a mental condition which precludes understanding the nature or effects of one's acts, an incapacity to manage one's affairs, an inability to understand or protect one's rights, because of an over-all inability to function in society, or the mental condition is such as to require care in a hospital.Wiggins v. Edwards, 442 S.E.2d 169, 170 (S.C. 1994) (internal quotation marks omitted). Although Defendant Scott contends that “[t]he evidence and materials cited by Plaintiff do not establish that the statute of limitations is tolled by Plaintiff's incompetence” [Doc. 31 at 1], Plaintiff does not argue that he has established that the statute of limitations should be tolled. Instead, Plaintiff argues that because his “competency at the time of the choking by Defendant Corey Scott is questionable and his competency remains questionable today,” “it cannot be said that the statute of limitations has run.” [Doc. 26 at 2.] Accordingly, Plaintiff contends that summary judgment regarding the statute of limitations issue is premature. [Id. at 3.]
If Plaintiff has been insane since the claims accrued, the statute was tolled for the maximum five years that insanity can toll the statute. In that case, after the five years of tolling, the statute began to run and Plaintiff had three years to bring his action. See Harrison v. Bevilacqua, 580 S.E.2d 109, 115 n.5 (S.C. 2003).
Generally speaking, “summary judgment [must] be refused where the nonmoving party has not had the opportunity to discover information that is essential to [its] opposition.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250 n.5. At the same time, the party opposing summary judgment “cannot complain that summary judgment was granted without discovery unless that party had made an attempt to oppose the motion on the grounds that more time was needed for discovery.” Evans v. Techs. Applications & Serv. Co., 80 F.3d 954, 961 (4th Cir. 1996). If a party believes that more discovery is necessary for it to demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact, the proper course is to file an affidavit pursuant to Rule 56(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure stating “that it could not properly oppose a motion for summary judgment without a chance to conduct discovery.” Id.
Rule 56(d) was formerly found at subsection (f) of the same Rule; however, the 2010 Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure re-organized Rule 56. The amendments did “not affect continuing development of the decisional law construing and applying” the applicable phrases. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(d) advisory committee's note to the 2010 Amendment.
Here, Plaintiff's response in opposition to Defendant Scott's motion for summary judgment is accompanied by a Rule 56(d) affidavit, in which his counsel avers that discovery is not complete in this matter and that discovery, particularly in the form of an expert report and testimony, could shed light on “whether Plaintiff is and was competent such that the tolling of the statute of limitations has ceased.” [Doc. 26-4.] Under the Consent Amended Scheduling Order in place when Defendant Scott filed his motion, the discovery deadline was January 20, 2023, and the dispositive motions deadline was March 23, 2023. [Doc. 18 ¶¶ 5, 6.] Defendant Scott filed his motion for summary judgment on September 23, 2022, only two months after the Court entered the Consent Amended Scheduling Order and six and one-half weeks after Defendant Scott filed his Answer. Subsequently, the Scheduling Order has been amended, with the current discovery deadline extended to February 20, 2023, and the dispositive motions deadline extended to April 24, 2023. [Doc. 28 ¶¶ 4, 5.] Plaintiff's response in opposition to the motion for summary judgment and his Rule 56(d) affidavit outline the need for additional discovery at that time, including the need for an expert report and testimony regarding whether Plaintiff meets the definition of insane for purposes of tolling the statute of limitations under S.C. Code Ann. § 15-3-40. [Docs. 26; 26-4.] Based on the Scheduling Orders and record in this case as well as Plaintiff's response in opposition and Rule 56(d) affidavit describing the need for additional discovery, the Court recommends that Defendant Scott's motion for summary judgment be denied without prejudice and with leave to refile because it is premature.
As stated, the dispositive motions deadline in this case is April 24, 2023. [Doc. 28 ¶ 5.] Thus, Defendant Scott may refile his motion for summary judgment.
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION
In light of the foregoing, the undersigned recommends that Defendant Scott's motion for summary judgment [Doc. 22] be DENIED without prejudice and with leave to refile.
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.