Opinion
Civil Action No. 00-3419, Section "L" (5)
January 17, 2001
ORDER AND REASONS
Before the Court is defendant's motion to dismiss complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1), (5), and (6). For the following reasons, defendant's motion is GRANTED.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff William R. Vanderwall, appearing pro se, raises a civil rights claim against defendant Lane Carson, Assistant District Attorney for St. Tammany Parish Civil Division, pursuant to title 42, United States Code, section 1981. Vanderwall explains that Carson "knowingly, willingly, and under the color of law initiated, influenced, pressured, or condoned, unconstitutional and/or illegal actions" concerning property claims brought by Vanderwall in state court. Specifically, Vanderwall alleges that Carson illegally influenced and conspired with public officials, jurors, and employees of St. Tammany Parish to have Vanderwall's state claims dismissed. Carson responds that Vanderwall fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, fails to adhere to service requirements, and fails to overcome the qualified immunity defense.
II. ANALYSIS
The standard of review for motions to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) is the same as the standard for reviewing dismissals for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). See Benton v. United States, 960 F.2d 19, 21 (5th Cir. 1992). The moving party bears the burden of showing that "plaintiff can prove no set of facts consistent with the allegations in the complaint which would entitle it to relief." Baton Rouge Bldg. Constr. Trades Council AFL-CIO v. Jacobs Constructors, Inc., 804 F.2d 879, 881 (5th Cir. 1986). The reviewing court "must accept all well-pleaded factual allegations in the light most favorable to the non-moving party." American Waste Pollution Control Co. v. Browning Ferris, Inc., 949 F.2d 1384, 1386 (5th Cir. 1991). Conclusory allegations or legal conclusions however will not suffice to defeat a motion to dismiss. See Fernandez-Montes v. Allied Pilots Ass'n, 987 F.2d 278, 284 (5th Cir. 1993).
Dismissal of plaintiffs complaint is proper because plaintiff fails to satisfy his legal burden. Plaintiff mistakenly brings his claim under 21 U.S.C. § 1981. A well-plead action pursuant to section 1981 demonstrates that (1) the plaintiff is a member of a racial minority; (2) the defendant's intent to discriminate on the basis of race; and (3) discrimination concerning one of the activities stated in section 1981 such as making and enforcing contracts. See Riley v. Transamerica Ins. Group Premier Ins. Co., 923 F. Supp. 882 (E.D. La. 1996), aff'd 117 F.3d 1416. Because plaintiff fails to allege any racial discrimination in his complaint, he does not satisfy the required elements of a claim pursuant to section 1981. Therefore, dismissal is appropriate because plaintiff asserts no set of facts in his complaint capable of supporting a claim under section 1981.
The Court, however, should construe pro se pleadings liberally in civil rights cases. See Johnson v. Host Enterprise, Inc., 470 F. Supp. 381 (D. Pa. 1979). Plaintiff appears to plead a cause of action under section 1983 rather than section 1981. Defendant even responds to plaintiffs claims as if they were raised pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Accordingly, the Court will further examine plaintiffs claims under the lens of section 1983 jurisprudence.
The claims raised by plaintiff present conclusory allegations rather than specific facts upon which a section 1983 action may be brought. Plaintiff concludes that defendant violated his civil rights because the state court dismissed his claim for trespass. Even though defendant acted to dismiss plaintiffs claims by filing of an ex parte motion to dismiss, plaintiff is not entitled to relief under section 1983. He seeks $9,000.00 and injunctive relief for defendant's allegedly improper conduct as an assistant district attorney. It is established precedent that prosecutors enjoy immunity from personal liability for damages under section 1983 for actions representing the state in a judicial proceeding. See Esteves v. Brock, 106 F.3d 674 (5th Cir. 1997). Although Carson represents the state in a civil rather than criminal capacity, the scope of immunity depends on "the functional nature of the activities" of which the plaintiff complains. Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 431 (1976). Carson is therefore immune from damages for actions taken in his capacity as a judicial officer representing the state in Vanderwall's cause of action. Finally, the Court may not grant the injunctive relief requested by plaintiff.
III CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, defendant's motion to dismiss complaint is GRANTED, and plaintiffs complaint is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.