Opinion
No. 1:01-cv-147
January 26, 2004
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Defendant Brunswick Corporation moves to strike the plaintiffs' demand for jury trial in this admiralty case. [Court File No. 65]. After reviewing the record, the Court concludes the motion is well taken and it will be GRANTED. Plaintiffs are not entitled to a jury trial on any of their causes of action brought against the defendants.
In the complaint [Court File No. 1], plaintiffs assert that this Court has subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 133 land 1333. The Court has reviewed the complaint and it does state any claims that authorize or support the exercise of federal question jurisdiction under § 1331. Although the complaint asserts common law tort claims and products liability claims under Tennessee law, there is no diversity jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332. The sole basis for the Court's subject matter jurisdiction is 28 U.S.C. § 1333(1). Section 1333(1) provides that the federal district courts shall have original jurisdiction, exclusive of the courts of the States, of "[a]ny civil case of admiralty or maritime jurisdiction, saving to suitors in all cases all other remedies to which they are otherwise entitled."
When claims which can be characterized as either admiralty or common law claims are raised, a party's right to a jury trial becomes a complex question. Concordia Co., Inc. v. Panek, 115 F.3d 67, 70-71 (1st Cir. 1997). The Seventh Amendment to the United States Constitution provides there is a right to trial by jury in suits at common law where the value in controversy exceeds twenty dollars. FED. R. Civ. P. 38(a) provides: "The right of trial by jury as declared by the Seventh Amendment to the Constitution or as given by a statute of the United States shall be preserved to the parties inviolate."
Generally, there is no right under the United States Constitution to a jury trial in admiralty cases. The Seventh Amendment right to trial by jury for common law claims does not extend to and govern civil actions which are predicated solely upon admiralty jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1333(1). The Seventh Amendment preserves the right to jury trial as it existed at common law when the United States Constitution was adopted. There was no common law right to jury trial in admiralty cases. Fitzgerald v. United States Lines, Co., 374 U.S. 16, 19 (1963); Waring v. Clarke, 46 U.S. 441 460 (1847); Concordia, 115 F.3d at 70; Ghotra v. Bandila Shipping, Inc., 113 F.3d 1050, 1056 (9th Cir. 1997); Vodusek v. BaylinerMarine Corp., 71 F.3d 148, 152-53 (4th Cir. 1995); Craig v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 19 F.3d 472, 475 (9th Cir. 1994); Wilmington Trust v. United States District Court, 934 F.2d 1026, 1029 (9th Cir. 1991); 9 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT AND ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CIVIL 2D § 2315 (1995). This is reflected in FED. R. Civ. P. 38(e) which provides that the FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE "shall not be construed to create a right to trial by jury of the issues in an admiralty or maritime claim within the meaning of Rule 9(h)."
In the instant case, the Court concludes that the plaintiffs do not have a constitutional right under the Seventh Amendment to a jury trial on their admiralty claims which have been brought invoking this Court's admiralty jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1333(1). Plaintiffs correctly concede that they do not have a constitutional right to a jury trial in this case. [Court File No. 90].
The United States Congress has created statutory rights to jury trials for certain admiralty claims. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1873, Great Lakes Act; 46 U.S.C. App. § 688, Jones Act; see also Concordia, 115 F.3d at 70; Craig, 19 F.3d at 475-76 (Jones Act). However, there are no federal statutes applicable to the plaintiffs' claims in the present case which create a right to jury trial. Plaintiffs do not have a right under any federal statute to a jury trial on their claims brought pursuant to this Court's admiralty jurisdiction.
Plaintiffs argue that the absence of a constitutional right to a jury trial does not mean that trial by jury is forbidden in admiralty cases. Although the Supreme Court has held that the United States Constitution does not require trial by jury in admiralty cases, the Constitution does not forbid it. Fitzgerald, 374 U.S. at 20; Wilmington Trust, 934 F.2d at 1029. Plaintiffs contend that Brunswick Corporation's motion to strike jury demand is untimely and the defendants have waived any objection to the plaintiffs' demand for jury trial. Plaintiffs rely on United States v. 79.36 Acres of Land, More or Less, In The County of Pima, State of Arizona, 951 F.2d 364 (Table, text in 1991 WL 275355 (9th Cir. Dec. 20, 1991)), an eminent domain case.
The plaintiffs' argument fails. The Court is not persuaded that the defendants have waived the right to object to the plaintiffs' demand for a jury trial. FED. R. CIV. P. 39(a) provides in relevant part that when a trial has been demanded as provided in FED. R. CIV. P. 38, the trial of all issues shall be by trial unless "the court upon motion or of its own initiative finds that a right of trial by jury of some or all of those issues dose not exist under the Constitution or statutes of the United States." Rule 39(a) does not impose a time limit for a party to make a motion to strike another party's demand for jury trial. Jones-Hailey v. Corporation of TV A, 660 F. Supp. 551, 553 (E.D.Tenn. 1987).
The motion by defendant Brunswick Corporation to strike the plaintiffs' demand for jury trial is timely. The motion was filed sufficiently in advance of trial so that it does not cause substantial prejudice to any party in preparing for trial. The trial has been rescheduled to June 10, 2004. In sum, because the plaintiffs do not have a constitutional or statutory right to a jury trial, the Court may order that their jury demand be stricken prior to trial. Cf. Gragg v. City of Omaha, 20 F.3d 357, 358 (8th Cir. 1994); United States v. Schoenborn, 860 F.2d 1448, 1455 (8th Cir. 1988); Hartford Fire Ins. v. First Nat. Bank of Atmore, 198 F. Supp.2d 1308, 1309 (S.D. Ala. 2002). This Court cannot impose a right to trial by jury where none exists even though Brunswick Corporation waited until several months prior to trial to make the motion to strike jury demand. Jones-Hailey, 660 F. Supp. at 553.
Assuming arguendo that the motion by Brunswick Corporation is untimely and that the defendants have waived their right to object to the plaintiffs' demand for a jury trial at this stage of the litigation, the alleged lack of a timely objection or motion to strike by the defendants does not mean that the Court must conduct a jury trial. The Court has the authority under Rule 39(a) on its own initiative to determine that the plaintiffs are not entitled to a trial by jury. The Court may sua sponte order that there will not be a jury trial. Consequently, even if the Court were inclined to deny the motion to strike jury demand as being untimely, the Court would exercise its authority under Rule 39(a) to order that there will be a bench trial rather than a jury trial.
Accordingly, the motion by defendant Brunswick Corporation to strike the plaintiffs' demand for a jury trial [Court File No. 65] is GRANTED. The Court will conduct a bench trial with an advisory jury pursuant to FED. R. Civ. P. 39(c). Rule 39(c) provides that in all actions not triable of right by a jury, the Court on its own initiative may try any issue with an advisory jury. The Court will try the issues of liability and damages with an advisory jury under Rule 39(c).
The trial is hereby BIFURCATED into two phases: liability and damages. The Court will try the liability phase of the case first. If one or more of the defendants are found liable on the plaintiffs' claims, then the Court will proceed to the damages phase of the trial.
SO ORDERED.