Summary
In Vandenburg, the Second Department held that the plaintiff, who purchased the beer consumed by the minor driver of the vehicle in which he was a passenger at the time of the accident, had no cognizable cause of action under the Dram Shop Act because he "procured the alcoholic beverage for the person whose intoxication allegedly caused the accident" (id. at 794).
Summary of this case from Oursler v. BrennanOpinion
April 27, 1987
Appeal from the Supreme Court, Richmond County (Sangiorgio, J.).
Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.
This action arises out of a one-car accident during which the plaintiff sustained serious injuries while a passenger in an automobile driven by the minor defendant Anthony Fazio after both parties had consumed beer which the plaintiff allegedly bought from the corporate defendant.
Given the fact that the plaintiff procured the alcoholic beverage for the person whose intoxication allegedly caused the accident, he has no cognizable cause of action predicated upon a violation of the Dram Shop Act (see, General Obligations Law § 11-101; Alcoholic Beverage Control Law § 65; see, Harris v Hurlburt, 83 Misc.2d 626, 629; cf., Mitchell v The Shoals, Inc., 19 N.Y.2d 338).
We also find that the plaintiff has no viable cause of action against the corporate defendant predicated upon common-law negligence. Our courts have generally declined to impose liability upon dispensers of alcoholic beverages for the injuries of voluntarily intoxicated customers on the ground that the dispenser owes no duty to protect the consumer from the results of the latter's voluntary intoxication (see, Reuter v Flobo Enters., 120 A.D.2d 722; Allen v County of Westchester, 109 A.D.2d 475, appeal dismissed 66 N.Y.2d 915; Vadasy v Feigel's Tavern, 88 Misc.2d 614, affd 55 A.D.2d 1011, lv denied 42 N.Y.2d 805; cf., Wilkins v Weresiuk, 64 Misc.2d 736). Thus, there appears to be no rational basis for holding a dispenser of alcoholic beverages liable where the customer's injuries result from his own voluntary act of furnishing such beverages to a third person who thereby becomes intoxicated. Whatever wrong may have been committed by the dispenser of alcohol, its relation to the ultimate injury in this case is even more attenuated than in the case where the customer's own consumption of alcohol results in his injuries.
Thus, we find no reason to impose liability upon the corporate defendant dispenser of alcoholic beverages under the facts at bar, especially since the person whose actions were the direct cause of the plaintiff's injuries did not receive the intoxicant from the corporate defendant, but rather from the plaintiff (see generally, Barker v Kallash, 63 N.Y.2d 19).
Accordingly, Special Term properly granted the corporate defendant's motion for summary judgment. Brown, J.P., Niehoff, Sullivan and Harwood, JJ., concur.