Opinion
No. 3-034 / 02-1161
Filed April 4, 2003
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Linn County, David S. Good, Judge.
Van Meter Industrial appeals, and Jane Sires cross-appeals, from the district court's ruling on judicial review affirming the Mason City Human Rights Commission's award of damages to Sires on her sex discrimination claim. AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED.
Mark Zaiger and Jennifer Rinden of Shuttleworth Ingersoll, P.L.C., Cedar Rapids, for appellant/cross-appellee.
David O'Brien of Willey, O'Brien, Beyer Hanrahan, P.L.C., Cedar Rapids, for appellee/cross-appellant Sires.
Victoria Herring, Des Moines, for appellee Mason City Human Rights Commission.
Heard by Huitink, P.J., and Miller and Eisenhauer, JJ.
Van Meter Industrial (VMI) appeals from the district court's ruling on judicial review affirming the Mason City Human Rights Commission's award of damages to Jane Sires on her sex discrimination claim. VMI contends the district court erred in failing to reduce the award of back pay and failing to reverse the award of front pay in light of its conclusion Sires was not constructively discharged. It also contends substantial evidence does not support the award of emotional distress damages, and that the commission's remedial order is contrary to the law and not supported by substantial evidence. Sires cross-appeals, contending she was constructively discharged and that the damage award is insufficient. We affirm the district court as modified.
Although VMI denies it subjected Sires to intentional discrimination, it concedes there is substantial evidence in the record to support the finding of discrimination.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings. The Mason City Human Rights Commission (Commission) is empowered to hear evidence and make findings of fact. See Schmitz v. Iowa Dep't. of Human Servs., 461 N.W.2d 603, 605 (Iowa Ct.App. 1990). We are bound by its fact findings if those findings are supported by substantial evidence. See id. We conclude substantial evidence supports the following fact findings made by the Commission.
VMI is a wholesale distributor of electrical products. It employs over two hundred and fifty people at fifteen locations across the state. The company does approximately $100,000,000 in sales annually.
Jane Sires began working for VMI in 1988 as a part-time receptionist in the Waterloo branch. When VMI opened a new location in Mason City in 1991, Sires was promoted to office coordinator. In 1995 she was promoted to operations manager of the Mason City branch.
During her tenure at VMI, Sires received favorable performance reviews. Sires made it known she was interested in becoming a branch manager. Sires recognized that sales experience was necessary to enter upper management. At her request, her position was enlarged to assume inside sales responsibilities.
Employees of the Mason City branch office viewed Sires as second in command to branch manager Pat Freilinger. It was well known within the office that Sires was involved in sales, and employees felt they could approach Sires with questions about selling.
In 1997, VMI determined it needed to restructure its organization. It divided its offices into three regional branch units. Each unit was assigned a business unit leader, or a local leader who was to be responsible for sales at the branch. The new local leader position was not clearly defined, and VMI provided no job description. However, it appears the local leader position is similar to the branch manager position in that at least part of the duties held by the branch manager were reassigned to the local leader.
As a result of the restructuring, Freilinger was to be moved from the Mason City branch. Sires expressed to Freilinger that she was interested in his job when it became available. Freilinger informed Sires his replacement would be chosen by Mark Schon, Western Region Business Unit Manager.
Sires's interest in the branch manager position is also well documented in her performance reviews.
In January 1998, Schon held a meeting in Mason City to describe the company's restructuring plan. At this meeting, Schon announced that the new local leader position would be filled in two or three months. Although Schon indicated anyone interested in the position should talk to him, it is undisputed nobody approached Schon about the local leader position. The position was never advertised or posted.
Sires did not attend the meeting, but had attended a similar meeting in Des Moines a month earlier.
On February 6, 1998, Schon announced that Bill Meyers would become the local leader. Meyers was hired by VMI in February of 1997. He performed outside sales in a non-supervisory capacity. Meyers was not familiar with VMI's forms, procedures, or operations. However, Schon approached Meyers in January 1998 to see if he was interested in the local leader position. Employees of the Mason City office were surprised that Meyers was chosen for the position.
Upon learning Meyers was being promoted over her, Sires was shocked and hurt. At home, she cried and became despondent. Sires was frustrated and sought to find out why she did not receive the promotion. On February 9th, Sires told Freilinger she was confused and upset because she was not considered for the position. Freilinger told Sires "we want our guys to focus on sales." Sires was told by the Director of Human Resources, Mary Beth Standerski, to call Schon with her concerns. When Sires called Schon, he told her she was more qualified for the position than Meyers, but that he did not take qualifications into consideration. He viewed Meyers as someone who could be molded into the position, and he saw Sires going into operations, not sales. However, he wanted Sires to help "mold" Meyers.
On February 23rd, Sires informed Freilinger she was leaving VMI. Freilinger told Sires he would talk with Schon the next day. On February 26th, Standerski called Sires and told her to "hang in there" and things would work out. On March 3rd, Sires told Standerski she was resigning. Standerski told her she would not accept the resignation and would make a phone call. Schon then called Sires and asked her to give him another week or so, but affirmed that if he had to do it again, he would make the same decision. Sires resigned on March 5th by letter, stating she was resigning because she was not offered or even considered for the local leader position.
On May 21, 1998, Sires filed a complaint with the Mason City Human Rights Commission alleging discrimination in employment on the basis of sex. Following a May 17, 2000 hearing, an administrative law judge issued a proposed decision and order, finding VMI had engaged in sex discrimination and that Sires was constructively discharged. Sires was awarded $43,959.77 in back pay, $9202 in front pay, and $7500 in emotional distress damages. Sires was also awarded attorney fees. Finally, VMI was ordered to establish a written policy for supervisory/management personnel transfers, promotions, demotions, wage increases/decreases, and reporting procedures. VMI was also ordered to develop job descriptions for each job, with the policy and job descriptions subject to the review and approval of the commission. On December 15, 2000, the Commission adopted the administrative law judge's proposed decision and order.
VMI filed a petition for judicial review, and Sires filed a cross-petition. A hearing was held on October 18, 2001, and in its February 15, 2002 ruling, the district court reversed the Commission's finding of constructive discharge, but affirmed the decision in all other matters.
II. Scope of Review. Our review is limited to corrections of errors at law. Dubuque County Assessor's Office v. Dubuque Human Rights Comm'n, 484 N.W.2d 200, 202 (Iowa Ct.App. 1992). A district court decision rendered in an appellate capacity is reviewed to determine whether the district court correctly applied the law. Id. To make that determination this court applies the standards of Iowa Code section 17A.19(10) (1999) to the agency action to determine whether our conclusions are the same as the district court's. Id. The scope of review encompasses a review of the entire record and is not limited to the agency's findings. Id. III. Constructive Discharge. VMI first contends the district court erred in failing to reduce the back pay award and eliminate the front pay award upon concluding Sires was not constructively discharged. Sires contends the district court erred in reversing the Commission's finding that she was constructively discharged.
A. Whether Sires was constructively discharged. Constructive discharge occurs "when the employer deliberately makes an employee's working conditions so intolerable that the employee is forced into an involuntary resignation." Balmer v. Hawkeye Steel, 604 N.W.2d 639, 642 (Iowa 2000) (quoting First Judicial Dist. Dep't of Corr. Servs. v. Iowa Civil Rights Comm'n, 315 N.W.2d 83, 87 (Iowa 1982)). To succeed on her constructive discharge claim, Sires was required to prove her working conditions were so difficult or unpleasant that a reasonable person in her position would have been compelled to resign. See id.
We conclude the district court properly reversed the Commission's finding that Sires had been constructively discharged. The loss of a single promotional opportunity alone is not sufficient to create intolerable working conditions. See Wensel v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 218 F. Supp.2d 1047, 1064-65 (N.D.Iowa 2002); accord Breeding v. Arthur J. Gallagher Co., 164 F.3d 1151, 1160 (8th Cir. 1999) ("[L]osing a single promotional opportunity is not a sufficient reason to quit or to constitute constructive discharge."); Lindale v. Tokheim Corp., 145 F.3d 953, 956 (7th Cir. 1998) ("[A] reasonable employee would not have considered a failure to be promoted an event that made her working conditions intolerable.").
B. Whether Sires's back pay and front pay damages should be limited. Because Sires was not constructively discharged, VMI argues the district court erred in failing to set aside her award of front pay and reduce her back pay awards.
Where an employment decision is based on unlawful discrimination, the disfavored person is entitled to some form of compensation. See Davis v. City of Waterloo, 551 N.W.2d 876, 885 (Iowa 1996). If it is shown that the disfavored employee would have been the person hired or promoted if an unlawful factor had not been considered, the disfavored party is entitled to be placed, as nearly as practicable, in the position that he or she would have held but for the discrimination. See id. Back pay is the difference between actual earnings for the relevant time period and those that would have been earned absent the unlawful discrimination. Paxton v. Union Nat'l Bank, 688 F.2d 552, 574 (8th Cir. 1982). Front pay is a form of relief that assumes the plaintiff would have continued in his or her position absent unlawful actions by the defendant. Channon v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 629 N.W.2d 835, 848 (Iowa 2001).
Iowa courts have not addressed the issue of whether a finding of no constructive discharge operates to limit the amount of back pay or front pay available to a victim of discrimination. Because the Iowa Civil Rights Act was modeled after Title VII, Iowa courts traditionally turn to federal law for guidance. Vivian v. Madison, 601 N.W.2d 872, 873 (Iowa 1999). While federal law is not controlling in evaluating the Iowa Civil Rights Act, Iowa courts are to give much deference to the federal courts' interpretation of federal statutes. Id.
A party harmed by a discriminatory employment decision has an affirmative duty to reasonably mitigate his damages by reasonably seeking and accepting other substantially equivalent employment. Hartley v. Dillard's, Inc., 310 F.3d 1054, 1061 (8th Cir. 2002). Accordingly, the Eighth Circuit has held that as a general rule, employees are entitled to awards of back pay only if they were actually or constructively discharged. Major v. Rosenberg, 877 F.2d 694, 695 (8th Cir. 1989). But see Di Salvo v. Chamber of Commerce, 568 F.2d 593, 597 (8th Cir. 1978) (ignoring fact that plaintiff voluntarily terminated her employment and instead analyzing damage award in terms of whether she made an effort to mitigate her damages). Indeed, the majority of the federal circuit courts of appeals apply this "constructive discharge doctrine." See Marrero v. Goya, 304 F.3d 7, 28 (1st Cir. 2002); Mallinson-Montague v. Pocrnick, 224 F.3d 1224, 1236 (10th Cir. 2000); Durham Life Ins. Co. v. Evans, 166 F.3d 139, 155 (3d Cir. 1999); Jurgens v. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n, 903 F.2d 386, 389 (5th Cir. 1990); Clark v. Marsh, 665 F.2d 1168, 1172 (D.C. Cir. 1981). But see Dennis v. Columbia Colleton Med. Ctr. Inc., 290 F.3d 639, 651 (4th Cir. 2002) (holding the constructive discharge doctrine does not apply, and instead applying the general Title VII duty to mitigate damages). However, after careful consideration we decline to extend this doctrine to encompass the relief afforded by the Iowa Civil Rights Act.
The rationale behind the constructive discharge doctrine is analyzed in depth in Ezold v. Wolf, Block, Schorr Solis-Cohen, 758 F. Supp. 303 (E.D.Pa. 1991). The most often cited rationale behind application of the doctrine has been that "society and the policies underlying Title VII will be best served if, wherever possible, unlawful discrimination is attacked within the context of existing employment relationships. . . ." Id. (citing Bourque v. Powell Elec. Mfg. Co., 617 F.2d 61, 66 (5th Cir. 1980)). In Thorne v. City of El Segundo, 802 F.2d 1131, 1134 (1986), the Ninth Circuit recognized a valid policy for restricting back pay awards in promotion cases. The Thorne court found limiting back pay "encourages the employee to work with supervisors within the existing job setting and employment relationship in an effort to overcome resistance within the workplace and to eradicate discrimination." Thorne, 802 F.2d at 1134.
The Ezold court had previously decided the issue of Title VII liability and constructive discharge in Ezold v. Wolf, Block, Schorr Solis-Cohen, 751 F. Supp. 1175 (E.D.Pa. 1990). The parties agreed to bifurcate the issues of liability and damages, and therefore the issue of damages was before the court in Ezold, 758 F. Supp. at 304. In Ezold v. Wolf, Block, Schorr Solis-Cohen, 983 F.2d 509 (3d Cir. 1992), the Third Circuit reversed the initial finding of liability, and therefore did not address the district court's conclusion regarding the constructive discharge doctrine.
In Ezold, the court rejected the reasoning behind the constructive discharge doctrine as applied to all promotion cases. Ezold, 758 F. Supp. at 308.
Where a plaintiff resigns after having been discriminatorily denied the one significant promotion available within the arena of his or her employment however, a more appropriate standard for determining the entitlement to relief past the date of resignation is one of reasonableness. In denial of promotion settings, the application of the constructive discharge rule is almost illogical because the employer is acting discriminatorily with the effect of keeping the plaintiff in his or her current position. Over and above the humiliation inflicted upon plaintiffs like Goss, a plaintiff who is discriminatorily denied a significant promotion, such as a partnership in a professional firm, is burdened by the knowledge that she has been denied the job title and compensation commensurate with the success she has achieved in the performance of her work over the course of several years; were it not for her gender she would have been promoted to the significantly superior employment position she deserves.
Strict application of the constructive discharge rule in denial of promotion cases would mean no matter how severe an employer's discrimination is with respect to the denial of a promotion, an employee would be forced to remain in the inferior employment position so long as the employer does not permit the working conditions of the inferior position to become intolerable. If the employee instead resigns the inferior position, her entitlement to a remedy for the discriminatory denial of the superior position would cease at the date of resignation. Such a rule flouts the Supreme Court's instruction that a complete Title VII remedy "should only be denied for reasons which, if applied generally, would not frustrate the central statutory purposes of eradicating discrimination throughout the economy and making persons whole for the injuries suffered through past discrimination."
Id. (quoting Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 421, 95 S.Ct. 2362, 2373, 45 L.Ed.2d 280, 299 (1975)) (emphasis in original). The Ezold court found the wholesale application of the constructive discharge rule prevents fulfillment of the court's duty to "render a decree which will so far as possible eliminate the discriminatory effects of the past as well as bar like discrimination in the future." Id. at 310 (quoting Ford Motor Co. V. E.E.O.C., 458 U.S. 219, 233, n. 20, 102 S.Ct. 3057, 3066, n. 20, 73 L.Ed.2d 721, 733 n. 20 (1982)). The constructive discharge rule neither compensates a plaintiff for his or her injury, nor deters a defendant from further discrimination. Id. Rather, the restriction operates to discourage a plaintiff from mitigating damages by accepting a position at another employer where he or she would be permitted to advance without discrimination. Id.
The Ezold court further noted Title VII and the constructive discharge theory, which developed under the National Labor Relations Act, were born of a different necessity and hold defendants to a different standard for the purpose of determining liability. Id. at 312.
As constructive discharge doctrine addresses only the "tolerability" of the conditions in which an employee must work, be they motivated by lawful or unlawful considerations, Title VII's scrutiny includes the lawfulness of the bases upon which an employer sets those conditions. Such a distinction suggests that constructive discharge doctrine is not a perfect measure of the severity of a Title VII claim for purposes of determining the appropriate scope of relief, just as the application of a different standard of liability for each doctrine suggests that one is not a perfect barometer of the legal merit of the other.
Id. The court concluded, "The constructive discharge inquiry may be informative for the purposes of determining whether [a plaintiff] properly mitigated her damages, but it is not appropriately applied as a strict limitation on the scope of Title VII relief available to her here." Id.
The Ninth Circuit has also declined to apply the constructive discharge doctrine to all cases in which a plaintiff was discriminatorily denied a promotion. See Odima v. Westin Tucson Hotel, 53 F.3d 1484, 1495 (9th Cir. 1994). The court does not apply the doctrine in cases where an employee "was preparing to enter an entirely different career" with the same employer. Id. (quoting Thorne, 802 F.2d at 1134). Thus, the Ninth Circuit did not apply the constructive discharge theory to a plaintiff who worked as a clerk-typist for the police department and was discriminatorily denied a position as a police officer, Thorne, 802 F.2d at 1134, or to a plaintiff who was discriminatorily denied a transfer from the laundry to the accounting department. Odima, 802 F.2d at 1496. The Ninth Circuit has found these cases to be more akin to a refusal to hire, noting that where an employee does not have an opportunity to overcome resistance in the workplace and eradicate discrimination there, those incentives have no relevance and back pay restrictions are inapplicable. Thorne, 758 F. Supp. at 311.
Although the Ezold court found the constructive discharge doctrine should not be applied to a plaintiff who was denied a promotion from an associate position to a partner in her law firm, Ezold, 758 F. Supp. at 312, the Ninth Circuit has specifically noted that an associate in a law firm seeking partnership status would not meet the benchmark of embarking upon "an entirely different career." Odima, 53 F.3d at 1496, n. 5.
The California Court of Appeals has recently rejected the rote application of the constructive discharge doctrine to its Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA). Cloud v. Casey, 90 Cal.Rptr.2d 757, 765 (Cal.Ct.App. 1999). The court reasoned that where resolution of discrimination from within the working relationship is not a viable option, there is no reason to require an employee to stay on the job or forfeit a right to post-resignation damages. Id.
Limiting Ms. Cloud's damages to the pay differential up to the date she terminated her employment ignores the continuing harm that may flow from the denial of promotion where prompt placement in the denied position is not available. The rationale for cutting off damages at the point of resignation — encouraging an employee to stay on the job and resolve the discriminatory job action from within the workplace — does not apply where there can be no successful placement into the position wrongfully denied. Utilizing the date of resignation damages limitation in such a case is not compatible with the statutory objective of FEHA, which is to make the victim of discrimination whole.
Id. at 766. In reaching this conclusion, the court reviewed Nobler v. Beth Israel Medical Ctr., 715 F. Supp. 570, 572-73 (S.D.N.Y. 1989), in which the court determined back pay should not be limited in situations where a plaintiff proves they were discriminatorily denied a promotion and there is no possibility of a promotion to an equivalent position. The Nobler court concluded,
[T]he remedy of back pay may be available to Nobler if he is able to sustain his discrimination claim, especially given the fact that Nobler left as a result of the alleged discrimination, and not for some non-related reason (although the resignation did not amount to a constructive discharge).
Nobler, 715 F. Supp. at 572-73.
The purpose behind an Iowa Civil Rights Act (ICRA) award is to make a person whole for an injury suffered as a result of unlawful employment discrimination. Allison-Bristow Cmty. Sch. Dist. v. Iowa Civil Rights Comm'n, 461 N.W.2d 456, 459 (Iowa 1990). The legislature has directed the courts to broadly construe the ICRA to effectuate this purpose. See Iowa Code § 216.18 (1997). We determine the purpose of the ICRA is not effectuated by limiting the amount of back pay or front pay available to a victim of discrimination in promotion who voluntarily resigns.
Sires resigned from VMI after seeking redress within the company. She brought her concerns to the Director of Human Resources, her supervisor, and the person who denied her promotion. Schon told her that if he had to make the promotion decision again, he would hire Meyers. Although Schon admitted Sires was more qualified for the position, instead of being promoted to local leader she was told she had to "mold" the man who was discriminatorily promoted over her.
The local leader position within VMI represented more than merely a promotion for Sires. It was the first step in a career path that appears to be wholly unavailable to women at VMI. In fact, the women employed by VMI are treated differently from the men beginning with their initial placement. While men start their careers working in the warehouse and then ascend to sales positions, women are started in administrative and clerical positions. Because sales experience is essential to advancement to the higher ranks of the company, women are systematically excluded from attaining upper management positions. Although Sires had sought and received inside sales experience as an operations manager, VMI did not count this experience in its decision-making in regard to its decision to hire a local leader.
It is obvious Sires was unable to work from within the company to eradicate discrimination. She attempted to do so and her attempts were thwarted. To reward VMI for Sires's inability to continue working for a company that refused to allow her to advance her career in the same manner in which the men in its company were allowed advancement, or to penalize Sires for attempting to continue her career in an environment free from such discrimination is fundamentally unfair and flouts the very purpose of the ICRA, to eradicate discrimination in employment. Accordingly, we reject VMI's invitation to extend the constructive discharge doctrine to this case.
Although Sires's failure to prove constructive discharge should not end her back pay and front pay award on the date of her voluntary resignation, we conclude the constructive discharge analysis is relevant to determining the amount of damages Sires should be awarded. Although Sires should not be required to continue her employment with a company that has no intention of allowing her to ascend, she still has a duty to mitigate her damages. Had she stayed at VMI she would have earned more than she did after voluntarily terminating her employment. It is equitable to use the higher salary figure in calculating her damages. Sires's back pay and front pay damages should be measured by the difference between the amount she would have made had she stayed in her position as operations manager at VMI and the amount she would have made had she received the local leader position. C. The amount of Sires's damages. Sires was awarded $43,959.77 in back pay and $9202 in front pay. Sires contends the district court erred in failing to increase her award because the Commission erroneously computed the salary she would have earned in the local leader position. At the time she resigned, Sires's salary was $29,140. Sires estimated the local leader position would pay $50,000 per year. Meyers conceded this figure was close to the salary range for the position. Upon being hired by VMI, Meyers was offered a $25,000 per year salary plus a sales commission, with a guarantee of earning $50,000 in the first year. Upon his promotion, his salary increased $2000 per year to $52,000 plus commission.
Likewise, had Sires proved she had been constructively discharged she would be entitled to an award of damages equal to the difference between what she actually earned and what she would have earned in the local leader position during the same time period.
Based on Meyers's $2000 salary increase, the administrative law judge determined Sires's salary would have increased by $2000 per year to $31,140 if she had been promoted to local leader. The judge did not compute the sales commission because the lack of evidence regarding it made such an award too speculative. Sires contends the adoption of the $31,140 salary was in error because it is in violation of the Equal Pay Act.
The federal Equal Pay Act states in pertinent part:
No employer having employees subject to any provisions of this section shall discriminate, within any establishment in which such employees are employed, between employees on the basis of sex by paying wages to employees in such establishment at a rate less than the rate at which he pays wages to employees of the opposite sex in such establishment for equal work on jobs the performance of which requires equal skill, effort, and responsibility, and which are performed under similar working conditions. . . .29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1). Paying Sires $31,140 per year for the same work for which Meyers earned $52,000 per year is a violation of the Equal Pay Act. The court must reverse, modify, or grant other appropriate relief from agency action if it determines that substantial rights of the person seeking judicial relief have been prejudiced because the agency action is in violation of any provision of law. Iowa Code § 17A.19(10)(b). Accordingly, we modify the calculation of Sires's back pay and front pay, utilizing the $50,000 salary figure that Meyers testified was in the range for the local leader position.
In the year before her resignation from VMI, Sires earned $29,140. Had she received the local leader position, Sires would have earned $50,000 per year. The difference between the salaries is $20,860 per year, or $401.15 per week. Meyers promotion was announced on February 6, 1998, approximately five weeks into the year. Sires is entitled to the difference in pay for the remaining forty-seven weeks of the year, totaling $18,854.05. Sires should be awarded $20,860 for 1999. She should also be awarded back pay until the time of the hearing twenty-one weeks into 2000, which equals $8424.15. Sires total back pay award is $48,138.20. We also agree that Sires is entitled to front pay for the remainder of 2000 (thirty-one weeks), for a total front pay award of $12,435.65.
IV. Emotional Distress Damages. VMI next contends the district court erred in failing to reduce Sires's emotional distress damages because it is not supported by substantial evidence.
Emotional distress damages are recoverable under the ICRA. Hy-Vee Food Stores, Inc. v. Iowa Civil Rights Comm'n, 453 N.W.2d 512, 525 (Iowa 1990). A civil rights complainant may recover such damages without a showing of physical injury, severe distress, or outrageous conduct. Id. at 526.
We conclude sufficient evidence supports the Commission's award of $7500 in emotional distress damages. Sires testified that VMI's decision to promote Meyers over her was "humiliating," and that it caused her to feel "terribly hurt" and "betrayed." Her husband testified that upon learning she did not receive the promotion, Sires was "devastated" and cried all night. She cried so hard that she had difficulty breathing and her husband feared he would have to take her to the hospital if she did not calm down. Her husband further testified that the following day Sires was withdrawn and crying. She developed a bad headache. For the following month that Sires continued her employment at VMI, her husband testified "she was very frustrated" and cried often. Sires told her husband that she couldn't stay at VMI because it was "just too embarrassing." In her letter of resignation, Sires wrote, "I cannot begin to tell you how DISAPPOINTED, FRUSTRATED, HURT, EMBARRASED, and HUMILIATED, this all made me feel." Her husband testified it took Sires approximately six months before she started to show some level of recovery. Finally, Sires's husband testified VMI's actions still affect her.
It's a constant, she constantly talks about it. She discusses it, you know. She's upset about it. She cries a lot about it. Just this Sunday night she cried about it. She'll start to get a little better about it; and, you know, then — well, before we had to come in for the fact finding she had to go through and re-live the whole thing again. And that was very upsetting, a lot of crying. She has a lot of nightmares, you know.
We affirm the $7500 emotional distress damage award.
V. Remedial Order. VMI claims the Commission's remedial order requiring company-wide written policies and procedures is contrary to the law and not supported by substantial evidence.
The administrative law judge proposed that VMI be required to [e]stablish a written policy for supervisory/management personnel transfers, promotions, demotions, wage increases/decreases and reporting procedures. Respondent shall develop job descriptions for each job for which it hires employees. This written policy and job descriptions [sic] shall be subject to the review and approval of the Commission.
VMI claims that because Sires did not request this remedial relief, it did not have an opportunity to anticipate and address the effect of such broad remedial relief. It further argues that because only the Mason City branch was at issue in this case, a remedial order targeting all VMI locations is beyond the jurisdiction of the Commission.
Iowa Code section 216.15(8) gives authority to the Commission to "take the necessary remedial action as in the judgment of the Commission will carry out the purposes of this chapter." We give considerable deference to the Commission's fashioning of a remedy. Hamer v. Iowa Civil Rights Comm'n, 472 N.W.2d 259, 265 (Iowa 1991). The express provisions of the ICRA granting the Commission the authority to fashion remedial relief gave VMI sufficient notice that such relief could be granted.
The evidence presented indicates sex discrimination at VMI is not limited to the Mason City branch, but rather is a company-wide practice. Of the thirteen individuals promoted to local leader positions in February and March 1998, all were men. Of the upper management positions at VMI, only the Director of Human Resources is a woman. In fact, VMI employees referred to upper management as "the boys' club." Schon, the person who made the discriminatory promotion decision, is Western Region Business Unit Manager and, as such, has the power to effect hiring decisions beyond the Mason City branch. Because the evidence indicates sex discrimination reaches beyond the Mason City branch, the Commission was within its power to order company-wide remedial relief.
VI. Punitive Damages. Sires contends the district court erred in not awarding her punitive damages for what she alleges was willful, wanton, and reckless discrimination. Although she concedes punitive damages are not available under the ICRA, see Chauffeurs, Teamsters Helpers, Local Union No. 238 v. Iowa Civil Rights Comm'n, 394 N.W.2d 375, 384 (Iowa 1986), she claims she is entitled to punitive damages under Title VII.
Iowa Code section 216.19 grants to local civil rights commissions the jurisdiction to enforce the ICRA. Gray v. Kinseth Corp., 636 N.W.2d 100, 103 (Iowa 2001). Section 216.19 states:
Nothing in this chapter shall be construed as indicating an intent to prohibit an agency or commission of local government having as its purpose the investigation and resolution of violations of this chapter from developing procedures and remedies necessary to insure the protection of rights secured by this chapter. All cities shall, to the extent possible, protect the rights of the citizens of this state secured by the Iowa civil rights Act. Nothing in this chapter shall be construed as limiting a city or local government from enacting any ordinance or other law which prohibits broader or different categories of unfair or discriminatory practices.
Iowa Code § 216.19. There is no statute granting local civil rights commissions the jurisdiction to enforce Title VII.
An agency cannot award punitive damages absent express statutory language allowing such an award. Chauffeurs, 394 N.W.2d at 384. The ICRA act does not allow an award of punitive damages. Id. Sires cites no authority supporting her proposition that cross-filing her complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) grants the Commission the authority to award her punitive damages and we find none. Accordingly, we affirm the district court's denial of Sires's request for a punitive damage award.
VII. Conclusion. We affirm the district court's reversal of the Commission's constructive discharge finding. However, we conclude a finding of no constructive discharge does not terminate back pay and front pay awards at the date of voluntary termination. Instead, we compute Sires's damages as the difference in the amount she would have earned had she stayed at VMI as operations manager and what she would have made had she not been discriminatorily denied the local leader promotion. Because the Commission's finding that Sires would have earned $31,140 per year violates the Equal Pay Act, we conclude Sires's salary as local leader would have been $50,000 per year. Accordingly, we modify Sires's award of back pay to $48,138.20, and her front pay to $12,435.65. We affirm Sires's $7500 emotional distress award, as well as the remedial order and the denial of punitive damages.