Opinion
16cv2080 (GBD) (DF)
08-21-2018
BLAS VAN HOVEN, Plaintiff, v. THE CITY OF NEW YORK, et al., Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
TO THE HONORABLE GEORGE B. DANIELS, U.S.D.J.:
In this action, pro se plaintiff Blas Van Hoven "(Plaintiff") asserts claims against defendants The City of New York (the "City") and the Anna M. Kross Center (the "AMKC"), a facility on Rikers Island (collectively, "Defendants") under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, based on alleged deprivations of Plaintiff's constitutional due-process rights during his detention at the AMKC in November of 2015. Specifically, Plaintiff's Amended Complaint, liberally construed, alleges that Defendants acted with deliberate indifference to his health and safety by subjecting him to unsanitary conditions of confinement and denying him adequate medical care.
Although Defendants do not argue this in their motion, this Court notes that the AMKC is not a suable entity, see N.Y. City Charter ch. 17 § 396 ("All actions and proceedings for the recovery of penalties for the violation of any law shall be brought in the name of the city of New York and not in that of any agency, except where otherwise provided by law."); see also, e.g., Calderon v. AMKC-95, No. 14-cv-6872 (JG), 2015 WL 1886981, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 24, 2015) ("As a part of the New York City Department of Corrections, an agency of the City of New York, the AMKC cannot be sued independently."), and I therefore recommend that the Court construe Plaintiff's claims against the AMKC as having been asserted against the City, and sua sponte terminate the AMKC as a defendant in this action.
Currently before this Court for a report and recommendation is a motion by Defendants to dismiss the Amended Complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, on the ground that, despite having been afforded an opportunity to remedy the defects in his initial pleading, Plaintiff has still failed to plead facts adequate to state a constitutional claim. For the reasons discussed herein, I recommend that Defendants' motion (Dkt. 14) be granted in part, and denied in part.
BACKGROUND
The facts summarized herein are taken from the allegations of Plaintiff's Amended Complaint, filed December 16, 2016 ("Am. Compl.") (Dkt. 7), as supplemented and clarified by Plaintiff's filings and statements on the record in opposition to Defendants' motion (see undated Letter, docketed Oct 17, 2017 ("Pl. Opp. Ltr.") (Dkt. 20); see also "Notice of Motion," dated Oct. 27, 2017 (Dkt. 24), containing a Declaration by Plaintiff, and construed by this Court as a Declaration in opposition to Defendants' motion to dismiss ("Pl. Opp. Decl."); Transcript of conference before the Court held on Jan. 25, 2018 ("1/25/18 Tr.") (Dkt. 31); Transcript of conference before the Court held on May 23, 2018 ("5/23/18 Tr.") (Dkt. 38)). (See Discussion, infra, at Section I (regarding propriety of court's considering, on a motion to dismiss, allegations made by a pro se plaintiff in opposition to the motion).)
1. Alleged Unsanitary Conditions
Plaintiff alleges that, from November 1 to November 4, 2015, a period of four days, he was held for processing in an intake cell at the AMKC that he essentially describes as so unsanitary and overcrowded that it caused a serious risk to his health and safety. (Am. Compl., at 4.) In particular, Plaintiff complains that, as a pretrial detainee, he was subjected to the following conditions:
While, in his Amended Complaint, Plaintiff describes this period as "4 1/2 days" (see Am. Compl., at 4), he states three times in the same pleading that the period at issue spanned the dates from November 1 to 4, 2015, which is a period of four days. This Court also notes that, in the Department of Correction grievance form that he attached to his initial Complaint in this action, Plaintiff claimed that he "was left in intake pens for . . . a total of about 4 days." (Inmate Grievance and Request Program Statement Form, dated Nov. 5, 2015 (attached to Complaint, dated Nov. 28, 2015 ("Compl.") (Dkt. 2), at 8).)
a. Unusable Toilets , with Feces and Urine on the Floor
According to Plaintiff, there were no working toilets in the intake cell for the duration of his detention there. (Id.; see also Pl. Opp. Ltr., at 3 (describing "no working toilets with urine and feces unable to flush").) In statements made to this Court on the record in opposition to Defendants' motion, Plaintiff not only reiterated this allegation (see 1/25/18 Tr., at 11 (stating that there was "feces left in the toilet without being flushed because it couldn't be flushed")), but added that the detainees in the cell "would have to take our shoe off and shove it in to see if it flushes again" (id., at 10).
In circumstances where the pages of Plaintiff's filed submissions are unnumbered, this Court, for ease of reference, will cite herein to the page numbers affixed to those submissions by this Court's Electronic Case Filing system.
Moreover, while it is unclear from Plaintiff's allegations whether any of the non-working toilets overflowed onto the floor (see Pl. Opp. Decl., at 3 (describing toilets as "back[ed] up"); 1/25/18 Tr., at 10 (same)), or if some detainees actually defecated or urinated on the floor as a result of the lack of working toilets, his Amended Complaint pleads more than non-functional toilets - he pleads that the floor of the cell itself "was covered with feces and urine" (Am. Compl., at 4), causing him to experience "non-stop vomiting" (id., at 5).
b. Old Food on the Floor and Cockroach Infestation
In describing the floor of the intake cell, Plaintiff also alleges that it was "spread" with "old food" (id., at 4; see also Pl. Opp. Ltr., at 4 (describing floor as having "garbage and food left for days)), and that there was an "infestation of roaches" in the cell (Am. Compl., at 5; see also Pl. Opp. Ltr., at 4). In his opposition papers, Plaintiff further states that "food [was] pushed in through the cell door [in] disposable trays [and] left for the roaches." (Pl. Opp. Decl., at 3.)
c. Cell Overcrowding , Resulting in the Need To Sit or Sleep on the Contaminated Floor
Plaintiff alleges that the AMKC intake cell was "standing room only," with "no seats available," due to the number of detainees placed in the same area, at the same time. (Am. Compl., at 4.) In his opposition letter, Plaintiff describes this cell as approximately 15 feet by 15 feet, and asserts that about 40 people had been placed in the cell. (Pl. Opp. Ltr., at 3-4; see also Am. Compl., at 4 (suggesting that about 40 to 50 detainees were held there).) He also alleges that he "was so weak" that he "was not able to stand at times" (id., at 5), and that, despite the feces, urine, old food, and roaches on the floor, his only option besides standing was to "sit and sleep on the floor" (id., at 4). In his opposition to Defendants' motion, Plaintiff clarifies that, "because [he] could not stand anymore," and because there was "no room in the overpopulated small intake cell," he had to take a "position . . . crouched on [his] knees." (Pl. Opp. Decl., at 3.)
This Court notes that a cell measuring 15 by 15 feet would have a total area of 225 square feet. If such an area were shared equally by 40 detainees, without beds, then each detainee would have 5.625 square feet (or an area with a footprint of approximately 2.4 by 2.4 feet) in which to stand, crouch, sit, or sleep. If the area were shared by 50 detainees, then the detainees would have only 4.5 square feet apiece (or an area of approximately 2.1 by 2.1 feet) in which to stand, crouch, sit, or sleep.
d. No Running Water , Inadequate Drinking Water, and No Shower Facilities
Plaintiff also alleges a lack of water in the intake cell for drinking or washing. He alleges that the sink in the cell did not function, such that there was no running water in the cell. (Am. Compl., at 4; Pl. Opp. Ltr., at 3 (stating that there was "no working [s]ink for water"); 1/25/18 Tr., at 10 (stating that water "didn't come out of the sink" and that "[t]he sink was filled with food").) Although his allegations do suggest that detainees were provided with some water to drink, he alleges that they were only given "one drinking cup to share ([among] 40-50 inmates)" (Am. Compl., at 4; see also Pl. Opp. Ltr., at 3 (stating that "about 40 inmates" had "to share one cup")), that he was not able to drink from that cup, as it was not sanitary (Am. Compl., at 5), and that he became dehydrated (id., at 4, 5). Plaintiff further alleges that he was not provided access to a shower for the duration of his detention. (Id., at 4; Pl. Opp. Decl., at 3; see also 1/25/18 Tr., at 11 ("I asked to use the shower at least so I could get some water and still they denied me a shower")).
Although not directly related to the unsanitary conditions described above, Plaintiff also complains that he was denied access to a telephone during the four days that he was held in the intake cell, and that, as a result, he "was not able to make any important phone calls." (Am. Compl., at 5.)
2. Alleged Complaints About the Conditions in the Cell
In his Amended Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that he "verbally" brought the unsanitary and unsafe conditions of the intake cell to the attention of whatever officers "were available or present" in the facility, but, despite his "many repeated" complaints, "nothing was done" and no "substitute[e] arrangements were made" for his detention. (Id., at 4.) On the record before this Court, Plaintiff explained that he "wasn't ever able to get the[] name[s]" of the officers because their "name tags [were] covered." (See 1/25/18 tr., at 9 (stating that officers were "hiding their name tag[s]"); id. ("When I asked, What is your name so I could write it down, they just kept walking and ignoring me").) Nonetheless, without being able to provide the officers' names, Plaintiff told this Court:
I would ask them please just look at my complaints about the toilet[] not working, about me being dehydrated, not having to shower for three or four days from November 1st to November 4th, telling them I take psych[] medication[,] and they just completely ignored me.(id., at 9; see also id., at 11 (stating that his complaints "fell on deaf ears").)
Plaintiff informed the Court that he "asked for help from every person that passed by" (5/23/18 Tr., at 5), including captains on different shifts (see id., at 4). He also indicated that the other detainees in the cell also "plead[ed]" to reduce their time in the sordid conditions. (See 1/25/18 Tr., at 10-11 ("We would plead with them and tell each officer or captain that passed by, Can you please speed up the process. Please, speed up the process."); Pl. Opp. Ltr., at 3 (Plaintiff stating that he was held in the cell "for a period of days[,] with all staff ignoring [the detainees'] plea[]s to speed up the process")).
In his Amended Complaint, Plaintiff also alleges that he had endured "in[]humane terrible conditions" when he had been detained at the AMKC "in the past," as a result of "prior arrests" (Am. Compl., at 4), but he does not allege that he had previously made complaints regarding the conditions of his earlier detention, or even that conditions to which he had previously been exposed were in the same intake cell, and were of the same type as those to which he was exposed in November 2015.
3. Alleged Injury From the Claimed Conditions
Plaintiff alleges that, as a result of having been held in the conditions described above, he developed a number of physical symptoms. In addition to the vomiting, weakness, and dehydration noted above, he alleges that he "lost a lot of weight" and suffered from body aches, stomach pain, physical fatigue, and "severe heada[ch]e pain." (Am. Compl., at 4.)
In addition, Plaintiff alleges that the conditions in which he was held caused him mental harm - giving him "awful memories," making him feel threatened and "paranoid" to have people around him in an "enclosed area," and either impacting on existing psychiatric disorders or resulting in the development of new psychiatric conditions. (See id. (Plaintiff alleging that he "ha[s] P.T.S.D." (without clarity as to when he developed the condition), and that the experience in the AMKC cell "added to [his] severe depression").) Plaintiff also alleges that he has been issued psychiatric medications "due to these situations." (Id., at 5; see also 1/25/18 Tr., at 10 ("During that time I didn't see medical and I did let them know that I was taking medication for a previous diagnosis. After this incident, symptoms were added. I had to change medication.").
B. Procedural History
Plaintiff filed his original pro se Complaint in this action on November 28, 2015, naming as defendants the City and Maxsolaine Mingo ("Mingo"), as Warden of the AMKC. (See Compl.) On December 1, 2016, the Honorable George B. Daniels, U.S.D.J., ordered Plaintiff to amend the Complaint to correct certain deficiencies. (See Order To Amend, dated Dec. 1, 2016 ("Order to Amend") (Dkt. 6).) Specifically, with respect to any claims that Plaintiff wished to maintain against the City, that Order granted Plaintiff leave to amend the Complaint to "allege . . . facts showing that a City of New York policy, custom, or practice . . . caused violations of his constitutional rights, or that the City of New York has been deliberately indifferent to such violations." (Id., at 4.) With respect to any claims that Plaintiff wished to assert against any individuals, the Order granted Plaintiff leave to amend to "name as defendants those individual AMKC officials who were personally involved in the alleged violations of his federally protected rights and to allege facts showing their personal involvement." (Id., at 5.) Finally, with respect to any claims regarding inadequate medical care, the Order granted Plaintiff leave to amend to "allege any facts showing that he was denied adequate medical care by AMKC officials in that those officials were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs." (Id., at 6.) In addition, the Order To Amend made clear to Plaintiff that, should he choose to amend his Complaint, his original Complaint would no longer be the operative pleading, and that he would thus need to include, in his Amended Complaint, all allegations that he wished to plead in support of his claims. (See id., at 8 ("Because Plaintiff's amended complaint will completely replace, not supplement, the original complaint, any facts or claims that Plaintiff wishes to maintain must be included in the amended complaint.").)
Under the so-called "prison mailbox rule," a pro se prisoner's papers are deemed filed when they are handed over to prison officials for forwarding to the Court. See Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 270, 108 S. Ct. 2379, 101 L. Ed. 2d 245 (1988). Therefore, although Plaintiff's Complaint was not entered on the Court's docket until March 18, 2016, the Court will consider it to have been filed as of November 28, 2015, the date on which Plaintiff declared that he delivered the Complaint to prison officials for mailing. (See Compl., at 7.)
Plaintiff filed his Amended Complaint on December 16, 2016. (Dkt. 7.) In the Amended Complaint, Plaintiff named the City and the AMKC as defendants, asserting no claims against Mingo or any other individuals, either by name or as "John" or "Jane Does." (See Am. Compl., at 3.) On April 17, 2017, Judge Daniels referred the case to this Court for general pretrial supervision, and to report and recommend on any dispositive motions. (Dkt. 8.)
As Plaintiff apparently delivered the Amended Complaint to prison officials for mailing on December 16, 2016 (see Am. Compl., at 6), this Court will consider it to have been filed as of that date (see supra, at n.8).
On October 2, 2017, the City filed its motion to dismiss the Amended Complaint (Notice of Motion To Dismiss the Amended Complaint, dated Oct. 2, 2017 (Dkt. 14)), together with a memorandum of law in support (Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendants' Motion To Dismiss the Amended Complaint, dated Oct. 2, 2017 ("Def. Mem.") (Dkt 15)). The Docket reflects that, on or before October 17, 2017, Plaintiff filed a letter in which he expressed concern that his opposition papers might not be delivered to the Court in a timely fashion, requested an extension of time if necessary, and generally reiterated the basic allegations of his Amended Complaint. (Pl. Opp. Ltr. (Dkt. 20).) Treating Plaintiff's letter as an opposition to the motion, Defendants filed a letter in reply, on October 20, 2017. (Letter to the Court from Ian William Forster, Esq., dated Oct. 20, 2017 (Dkt. 21).) The Court then received Plaintiff's October 27, 2017 Declaration in opposition, to which Plaintiff attached certain medical records. (Pl. Opp. Decl. (Dkt. 24).) In response, Defendants filed another letter, urging the Court to strike or disregard Plaintiff's Declaration as it was purportedly "filed improperly as a surreply, without leave of Court," and further arguing that, "[s]hould the Court choose to consider Plaintiff's submission," it should be found to contain no additional support for the arguments made by Plaintiff in his earlier letter. (Letter to the Court from Ian William Forster, Esq., dated Dec. 8, 2018 (Dkt. 26)).
Pursuant to Local Civil Rule 12.1, Defendants also filed the required Notice to Plaintiff that the Court could convert the motion to one for summary judgment. (Notice to Pro Se Litigant who Opposes a Rule 12 Motion Supported by Matters Outside the Pleadings, dated Oct. 2, 2017 (Dkt. 16).)
Subsequent to the submission of Defendants' motion to dismiss, this Court held two telephone conferences with the parties, during which Defendants summarized the bases of their motion, and Plaintiff explained his position in opposition, expanding, to some extent (as set out above) on the factual allegations in his pleading. (See generally 1/25/18 Tr.; 5/23/18 Tr.)
DISCUSSION
I. RULE 12(b)(6) STANDARDS
A complaint may be dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure where it fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Fed. R. Civ. P. (12)(b)(6). In deciding a motion to dismiss, the Court must "accept as true all factual statements alleged in the complaint and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party." McCarthy v. Dun & Bradstreet Corp., 482 F.3d 184, 191 (2d Cir. 2007); accord Jaghory v. New York State Dep't of Ed., 131 F.3d 326, 329 (2d Cir. 1997). The issue is not whether the plaintiff will ultimately prevail, but whether his claim, as pleaded, is sufficient to afford him the opportunity to proceed on the evidence. See Chance v. Armstrong, 143 F.3d 698, 701 (2d Cir. 1998).
The Court's function on a motion to dismiss is thus "'not to weigh the evidence that might be presented at a trial but merely to determine whether the complaint itself is legally sufficient.'" Velez v. Levy, 401 F.3d 75, 80 (2d Cir. 2005) (quoting Goldman v. Belden, 754 F.2d 1059, 1067 (2d Cir. 1985)); Kopec v. Coughlin, 922 F.2d 152, 155 (2d Cir. 1991). At the same time, "conclusory allegations or legal conclusions masquerading as factual conclusions will not suffice to defeat a motion to dismiss." Achtman v. Kirby, McInerney, & Squire, LLP, 464 F.3d 328, 337 (2d Cir. 2006) (citation omitted). To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint "must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Starr v. Sony BMG Music Entm't, 592 F.3d 314, 321 (2d Cir. 2010) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 666), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 901 (2011). A pro se plaintiff is not excused from complying with procedural and substantive rules, and, to survive a motion to dismiss, a pro se complaint, like any other complaint, must contain allegations that meet the "plausibility" standard discussed in Twombly and Iqbal. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; see also, e.g., Nielsen v. Rabin, 746 F.3d 58, 63 (2d Cir. 2014).
It is also well established, though, that "the submissions of a pro se litigant must be construed liberally and interpreted 'to raise the strongest arguments that they suggest.'" Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (collecting cases); see also Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 9-10 (1980) (noting that a pro se party's pleadings must be liberally construed in his favor and are held to a less stringent standard than the pleadings drafted by lawyers); Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009) ("Even after Twombly, . . . we remain obligated to construe a pro se complaint liberally."); Lerman v. Bd. Of Educ., 232 F.3d 135, 139-40 (2d Cir. 2000) ("Since most pro se plaintiffs lack familiarity with the formalities of pleading requirements, [a court] must construe pro se complaints liberally, applying a more flexible standard to evaluate their sufficiency."). This is especially true in the context of civil rights complaints. See Weinstein v. Albright, 261 F.3d 127, 132 (2d Cir. 2001); see also Gregory v. Daly, 243 F.3d 687, 691 (2d Cir. 2001) (noting that a court must be "mindful of the care exercised in this Circuit to avoid hastily dismissing complaints of civil rights violations").
On a motion to dismiss a complaint, a court is generally constrained to look only to the pleadings. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b); Calcutti v. SBU, Inc., 273 F. Supp. 2d 488, 492 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). The mandate that a pro se plaintiff's complaint be construed liberally makes it appropriate, however, for the court to consider the factual allegations in a pro se plaintiff's opposition materials to supplement the allegations in the complaint. See Johnson v. Wright, 234 F. Supp. 2d 352, 356 (S.D.N.Y. 2002); see also, e.g., Samuels v. Fischer, 168 F. Supp. 3d 625, 645 n.11 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (finding that, in resolving motion to dismiss, it was "appropriate to consider allegations contained in [p]laintiff's [o]pposition"); Goldson v. Kral, Clerkin, Redmond, Ryan, Perry & Van Etten, LLP, No. 13cv2737 (GBD) (FM), 2014 WL 4061157, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. July 11, 2014) (amended report and recommendation) ("When a plaintiff is proceeding pro se, the Court also may rely on any opposition papers in assessing the legal sufficiency of the plaintiff's claims"), adopted, 2014 WL 3974584 (Aug. 13, 2014); Sommersett v. City of New York, No. 09cv5916, 2011 WL 2565301, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. June 28, 2011) ("[W]here a pro se plaintiff has submitted other papers to the [c]ourt, such as legal memoranda, the [c]ourt may consider statements in such papers to supplement or clarify the plaintiff's pleaded allegations."). "By the same logic, the Court may consider factual allegations asserted orally by a pro se plaintiff, in opposition to a dismissal motion." Keitt v. City of New York, No. 09cv5663 (PKC) (DF), 2010 WL 3466175, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 9, 2010), report and recommendation adopted, 2010 WL 3466079 (Sept. 2, 2010).
Although courts have not followed this approach in every case, see, e.g., Brunson v. Duffy, No. 12cv9465 (KBF), 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29015, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 6, 2015) (citing pro se cases where courts declined to consider new facts included in opposition), it is certainly true that the papers submitted by a pro se plaintiff in opposition to a Rule 12(b)(6) motion may offer clarification or context that can aid the Court in understanding the plaintiff's pleading and in affording it a liberal construction, see id., at n.4 (noting that "a district court needs to assess each case on an individual basis"). Especially in the civil rights context, where courts should act with particular care before dismissing a plaintiff's complaint, taking the step of examining a pro se plaintiff's opposition to see if it sheds light on his initial allegations "is consistent with the principle that a court may not dismiss a pro se complaint unless it is beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief," Johnson, 234 F. Supp. 2d at 356 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
"[T]he court should not dismiss [a pro se pleading] without granting leave to amend at least once when a liberal reading of the complaint gives any indication that a valid claim might be stated." Gomez v. USAA Federal Savings Bank, 171 F.3d 794, 795 (2d Cir. 1999) (stating that district court must afford a pro se plaintiff the opportunity to amend the complaint before dismissal where that amendment could result in successful pleading of claim (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).
II. DEFNDANTS' CHALLENGES TO THE SUFFICIENCY OF THE AMENDED COMPLAINT
A. Plaintiff's Conditions-of-Confinement Claim
With respect to Plaintiff's conditions-of-confinement claim, Defendants generally argue in their motion that the Amended Complaint fails to allege a constitutional violation or to identify a municipal policy or custom that caused any constitutional deprivation. (See generally Def. Mem.) As their first and principal argument, though, Defendants contend that Plaintiff cannot prevail on his conditions-of-confinement claim because he has failed to identify or name as defendants any individual officials who deprived him of his constitutional rights. (See id., at 6 (arguing that "Plaintiff has failed to meet the elements necessary . . . to sustain . . . a Section 1983 claim" because he "has not alleged the personal involvement of any individually named defendant" and, [i]n fact, . . . has failed to even name any individual defendants"); see also id., at 7-8.) Thus, it appears from Defendants' briefing that they are taking the position that, absent the assertion of a claim against an individual defendant, no claim for municipal liability can lie. If this is actually Defendants' position, then they misapprehend the relevant standards for municipal liability. As Plaintiff's Amended Complaint, liberally construed, adequately pleads a 14th Amendment conditions-of-confinement claim against the City (based on Plaintiff's allegations regarding the severity of the unsanitary and overcrowded conditions under which he was held as a pretrial detainee, the length of time he was held there, and his repeated complaints about the conditions that were disregarded), I recommend that Defendants' motion to dismiss this claim be denied.
1. Standards Applicable to a Conditions-of-Confinement Claim
a. Deliberate Indifference Under the 14th Amendment
Pursuant to Section 1983, civil claims for damages may be asserted against any person who acts "under color of any [state] statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage" to deprive another person of "any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws [of the United States]." 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Where a convicted prisoner asserts a Section 1983 claim based on unsafe "conditions of confinement," the claim is cognizable under the Eighth Amendment's prohibition of "cruel and unusual punishment." See, e.g., Johnson v. Tucker, No. 17cv2739 (KMK), 2018 WL 2976022, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. June 12, 2018). Where, however, a pretrial detainee asserts this type of claim, the claim is instead governed by the Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment, as "pretrial detainees have not been convicted of a crime and thus may not be punished in any manner - neither cruelly and unusually nor otherwise." Darnell v. Pineiro, 849 F.3d 17, 29 (2d Cir. 2017) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). In both instances, challenges to the conditions of confinement are analyzed under the framework of so-called "deliberate indifference" claims, see id., although, as discussed below, the analysis under the different constitutional amendments is not identical.
To prevail on a conditions-of-confinement claim, a plaintiff must first establish that the conditions under which he was held were "objectively" serious enough to rise to the level of a constitutional violation. See id. To satisfy this "objective" prong under either the Eighth or 14th Amendment, the plaintiff must plead facts suggesting that he was made to endure conditions that, "either alone or in combination, pose[d] an unreasonable risk of serious damage to his health . . ., which includes the risk of serious damage to physical and mental soundness." Darnell, 849 F.3d at 30 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). "There is no static test to determine whether a deprivation is sufficiently serious; instead, the conditions themselves must be evaluated in light of contemporary standards of decency." Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). When a plaintiff alleges multiple unconstitutional conditions of confinement, the court may aggregate the effect of all of the conditions, "but only when they have a mutually enforcing effect that produces the deprivation of a single, identifiable human need such as food, warmth, or exercise." Walker v. Schult, 717 F.3d 119, 125 (2d Cir. 2013) (quoting Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 304 (1991)); see also id. at 127 (identifying sleep as another basic need "critical to human existence," and finding that "conditions that prevent sleep" can give rise to a constitutional violation). Each condition "must be measured by its severity and duration, not the resulting injury," and the conditions are not subject to "a bright-line durational or severity threshold." Darnell, 849 F.3d at 32.
In addition, the plaintiff must establish that the violation of his protected rights resulted from the defendant's "deliberate indifference" to the constitutional deprivation. See Darnell, 849 F.3d at 29. It is on this second prong of a conditions-of-confinement claim (the "subjective" prong of the claim) that the analysis diverges for plaintiffs who are convicted prisoners and those who are pretrial detainees. In cases brought under the Eighth Amendment, this subjective prong, relating to the "mens rea" of the actor, see id., is itself defined subjectively, in terms of what the actor "actually knew, and disregarded," id.; see also id. at 35 (relying on Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994)). In cases brought by pretrial detainees under the 14th Amendment, however, the subjective prong is defined objectively, in terms of "what a reasonable person knew, or should have known." Id. at 29, 35 (relying on Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 135 S. Ct. 2466 (2015)).
As noted by the Second Circuit, "Kingsley held that an officer's appreciation of the officer's application of excessive force against a pretrial detainee in violation of the detainee's due process rights should be viewed objectively." Darnell, 849 F.3d at 35. Although Darnell did not involve an excessive-force claim, but rather a claim alleging unconstitutional conditions of confinement, the Second Circuit still relied on Kingsley to elucidate the standard that should be applied to a 14th Amendment conditions-of-confinement claim. See id. (reasoning that "[t]he same objective analysis should apply to an officer's appreciation of the risks associated with an unlawful condition of confinement in a claim for deliberate indifference under the Fourteenth Amendment).
In other words, to satisfy the subjective prong of a 14th Amendment conditions-of-confinement claim, a pretrial detainee must only show that the defendant "acted intentionally to impose the alleged condition, or recklessly failed to act with reasonable care to mitigate the risk that the condition posed . . . even though the defendant[] knew, or should have known, that the condition posed an excessive risk to health or safety." Id. at 35. A pleading may thus be sufficient to plead this prong where the plaintiff alleges that the unconstitutional conditions in which he was held were actually known to the defendant or, for some plausibly stated reason, should have been known to the defendant, and that, despite this, the defendant intentionally or recklessly forced the plaintiff to endure those conditions or failed to take reasonable steps to ameliorate them. See id.; see also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 666.
To survive a motion to dismiss a conditions-of-confinement claim, the plaintiff must plead facts from which it can be reasonably inferred that both the "objective" and "subjective" prongs of the deliberate-indifference test can be satisfied, under the governing standard. See Sanders v. City of New York, No. 16cv7426 (PGG), 2018 WL 3117508, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. June 25, 2018) ("To state a deliberate indifference claim under Section 1983, a plaintiff must plead both objective and subjective elements." (citing Darnell, 849 F.3d at 29)).
b. Municipal Liability
As set out above, Section 1983 permits a plaintiff whose federal constitutional rights have been violated to sue any "person" who acted to deprive him of those rights, under color of state law. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Under Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978), a municipality may, in certain circumstances, qualify as a "person" under Section 1983, such that it may be subject to suit. See Monell, 436 U.S. at 690-91. To bring a municipality within the reach of Section 1983, a plaintiff must show "(1) the existence of an officially-adopted 'policy, custom, or practice' and (2) a direct and deliberate causal connection between that 'policy, custom, or practice' and the violation of plaintiff's federally-protected rights." Santos v. New York City, 847 F. Supp. 2d 573, 576 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (citing Board of Cnty. Comm'rs of Bryan County v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 403-04 (1997); Monell, 436 U.S. at 694). A municipality may only be held liable where the entity itself commits a wrong; it "cannot be held liable under § 1983 on a respondeat superior theory." Monell, 436 U.S. at 691.
Monell carries with it no prerequisite that individual liability be established before the municipality can be held responsible for a Section 1983 violation; indeed, a plaintiff may proceed on a Monell claim without even naming any individual actors as defendants. Askins v. Doe, 727 F.3d 248, 253 (2d Cir. 2013) (holding that, while, to prevail on a Monell claim, a plaintiff must demonstrate that he has suffered the infliction of a federal-law tort by municipal actors as the result of a municipal custom or policy, the plaintiff "need not sue the individual tortfeasors at all, but may proceed solely against the municipality"); see Barrett v. Orange Cty. Human Rights Comm'n, 194 F.3d 341, 350 (2d Cir. 1999) (holding that district court erred, as a matter of law, in instructing jury that the liability of the municipal defendants was contingent upon the liability of the individual defendants, and finding that County Human Rights Commission as a whole could have violated the plaintiff's constitutional rights, even if individual Commission members did not).
In order to plead an adequate Monell claim based on a municipality's deliberate indifference to unconstitutional conditions of confinement, a plaintiff also need not allege that his rights were violated by a formal policy. See White v. City of New York, No. 13cv 7421 (KPF), 2015 WL 4601121, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. July 31, 2015) (noting that "local governing bodies 'may be sued for constitutional deprivations visited pursuant to governmental "custom" even though such custom has not received formal approval through the government's official decision-making channels'" (quoting Monell, 436 U.S. at 659)). Where a pretrial detainee claims that, as the result of a municipal "custom" or "practice" of deliberate indifference, he was subjected to conditions of confinement that violated his due-process rights, he must allege facts capable of demonstrating that the municipality knew or should have known of the conditions, but, despite this, intentionally or recklessly failed to act with reasonable care to address those conditions.
A municipality's "actual knowledge" may be pleaded by allegations that it was on notice of the unconstitutional conditions because it had received complaints regarding those conditions, whether from the plaintiff or others. See Outlaw v. City of Hartford, 884 F.3d 351, 380 (2d Cir. 2018) (noting that "a municipal policy of deliberate indifference . . . may be shown by evidence that the municipality had notice of complaints[,] . . . but repeatedly failed to make any meaningful investigation into such charges"). In addition, or in the alternative, a plaintiff may point to investigative reports and/or press coverage to support an allegation that the municipality was on actual notice of the constitutional deprivation. See, e.g., Rodriguez v. City of New York, No. 15cv07945 (ALC), 2018 WL 1276826, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 9, 2018) (noting that publicly reported information suggesting that City "was aware of . . . unconstitutional conditions but failed to remedy them" would "support[] municipal liability"). A plaintiff may also plead facts from which it can reasonably be inferred that the challenged conditions were so obvious, persistent, or pervasive that the municipality's policy makers had to have been aware of the situation. See White, 2015 WL 4601121, at *6 (where plaintiff "adequately alleged use of excessive force against inmates at Rikers Island that was sufficiently pervasive that supervisors must have been aware of it, and yet failed to take the necessary actions to curb it," pleading was sufficient to permit Monell claim to proceed); see also Mahase v. City of New York, No. 96cv6105, 2000 WL 263742, at *7 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 5, 2000) (denying motion to dismiss Monell claim, where plaintiffs pleaded "that the 'unspeakably inhumane' conditions were 'known to and condoned by the City of New York," and noting that "[a] municipality's failure to correct a persistent pattern of behavior of which it has notice may constitute a policy or custom for purposes of § 1983 liability" (citation omitted)).
Although Outlaw involved claims of excessive force, the Second Circuit's explanation, in that case, as to how a municipal policy of deliberate indifference may be shown is equally applicable here, for the same reason that Kingsley has been held applicable to the standards governing 14th Amendment deliberate-indifference claims. (See supra, at n.12.)
In the 14th Amendment context, however, as discussed above, a plaintiff need only plead that the municipality "shown have known" of the constitutional deprivation, and then intentionally or recklessly failed to act with reasonable care to mitigate the risk caused by those conditions. See Darnell, 849 F.3d at 35. In this regard, while the concept does not seem to have previously found its way into conditions-of-confinement cases (possibly because, pre-Darnell, "actual knowledge" was understood to be required to satisfy the mens rea component in both Eighth Amendment and 14th Amendment cases), this Court notes that it is a familiar concept in the law that, even without actual notice, a defendant can be on constructive notice of a dangerous condition, if the condition is obvious and has persisted for a significant period of time. See, e.g., Nussbaum v. Metro-North Commuter Railroad, 994 F. Supp. 2d 483, 494 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (noting, in negligence context, that defendant railroad could be found to have been on constructive notice of dangerous condition, if it was "visible and apparent and it . . . exist[ed] for a sufficient length of time prior to the accident to permit defendant's employees to discover and remedy it."), aff'd, 603 Fed. Appx. 10, 12 (2d Cir. Mar. 2, 2015) (Summary Order). As, under Darnell, a pretrial detainee need not prove the defendant's actual knowledge to make out a deliberate-indifference claim, Darnell, 849 F.3d at 35, this Court understands that, to satisfy the law's "knew or should have known" requirement for a Monell claim based on unconstitutional conditions of confinement, a pretrial detainee need only allege facts from which the municipality's "constructive" notice of unconstitutional conditions could be reasonably inferred, cf. Zhang v. City of New York, No. 17cv5415 (JFK), 2018 WL 3187343, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. June 28, 2018) (in deliberate-indifference case involving the denial of medical care, finding that plaintiffs had sufficiently allege[d] a 'practice so persistent and widespread that it constitute[d] a custom of which constructive knowledge c[ould] be implied on the part of the policymaking officials" (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)).
2. Adequacy of Plaintiff's Allegations
a. Objective Severity of Claimed Conditions
In two recent opinions, Willey v. Kirkpatrick, 801 F.3d 51 (2d Cir. 2015), and Darnell (cited supra), the Second Circuit has addressed the standards for determining when conditions of confinement can be so unsafe as to constitute an objective constitutional deprivation.
In Willey, the plaintiff, a convicted prisoner asserting his claim under the Eighth Amendment, alleged that certain corrections officers had subjected him to "a cruel campaign of harassment . . . in retaliation for his refusal to provide false information against another inmate." Willey, 801 F.3d at 55, see also id. at 68. This harassment allegedly included, inter alia, "plac[ing] [the plaintiff] in solitary confinement with a Plexiglas shield restricting the airflow to his small cell and then incapacitat[ing] his toilet, so that he was reduced to breathing a miasma of his own accumulating waste," id. at 55, and then later placing him "in an observation cell whose walls and mattress were smeared with feces and stained with urine," id., where he "remained naked . . . for 14 days," id., at 58. Focusing on the first of these periods of confinement, the district court dismissed the plaintiff's conditions-of-confinement claim on the grounds that (1) his allegations were overly vague and conflicted as to the dates and duration of the water shut-off for the toilet, (2) the plaintiff had not claimed that waste from the toilet overflowed into his cell, and (3) the plaintiff did not claim "that he suffered sickness or other ill effects as a result of the malodorous atmosphere caused by the water shut-off." Id. at 66 (internal quotation marks and record citation omitted). The Second Circuit reversed, finding these stated grounds for dismissal to represent a "constrained conception of the Eighth Amendment's protections against unsanitary conditions of confinement." Id.
In allowing the plaintiff's claim to proceed, the Second Circuit noted that, "[c]ausing a man to live, eat and perhaps sleep in close confines with his own human waste is too debasing and degrading to be permitted," and that such "indecent conditions" in a cell could "seriously threaten[] the physical and mental soundness of its unfortunate occupant." Id. at 67 (quoting LaReau v. MacDougall, 473 F.2d 974, 978 (2d Cir. 1972) (internal quotation marks omitted)). The court emphasized that there is no "bright-line durational requirement for a viable unsanitary-conditions claim." Id. at 68. Rather, it held that district courts should weigh the severity and duration of the exposure when evaluating an unsanitary conditions-of-confinement claim, to determine whether the conditions may rise to the level of a constitutional deprivation. Id.
The Second Circuit's holdings in Darnell, a case brought by pretrial detainees under the 14th Amendment, see Darnell, 849 F.3d at 20, were similar. There, the plaintiffs alleged that they had been subjected to unconstitutional conditions of confinement in a temporary holding facility where they had been placed, at various times over an approximately two-year period, while awaiting arraignment. Id. None of the plaintiffs had been held in the facility for more than 24 hours, id., but they challenged a number of conditions of their short-term confinement, including, inter alia, (1) overcrowding (with the plaintiffs alleging that they "ha[d] no room to even stand" because the cell was so overcrowded that it was "stuffed like a can of sardines"), id. at 23; (2) a lack of toilets or unusable toilets (with the plaintiffs alleging that some holding cells did not have toilets, and for those that did, "the toilet rim and bowl, along with the surrounding floor and walls, were covered with some combination of feces, maggots, urine, vomit, and rotten milk. The toilets were frequently clogged and would overflow, spilling their contents. The smell was horrific, with one plaintiff describing the odor in the cells as 'overbearing'"), id. at 23-24; (3) garbage and inadequate sanitation (with the plaintiffs alleging that the holding cells were filthy, and "had feces and dried urine caked to the floors. The stench from the toilets drifted through the holding cells, and caused one plaintiff to 'dry heav[e] . . . yellow bile'") id. at 24; and (4) infestation (with the plaintiffs "consistently testif[ying] that the holding cells were infested with rats, mice, cockroaches, flies, and other insects and vermin"), id.
The district court granted summary judgment to the defendants, concluding, in relevant part, that, in light of the brevity of the plaintiffs' exposure to the claimed conditions and the fact that they could not "link any condition of confinement to any actual serious injury," the plaintiffs could not establish an objective constitutional deprivation. Id. at 27. The Second Circuit vacated that portion of the district court's decision, and reaffirmed its holding in Willey "that unsanitary conditions of confinement must be assessed according to two components, severity and duration, on a case-by-case basis." Id. at 30. Although none of the plaintiffs in Darnell had been subjected to the alleged unsanitary conditions for more than a single day, the Second Circuit found that "the plaintiffs ha[d] adduced substantial evidence, much of it uncontroverted, that they were subjected to appalling conditions of confinement to varying degrees and for various time periods" and that "the plaintiffs' claims should not have been dismissed on the grounds that the conditions in this case did not exceed ten to twenty-four hours, or result in serious injury." Id. at 37.
In this case, taking Plaintiff's allegations as true for purposes of the motion, he was forced to remain in an overcrowded holding cell for four days, with no working toilet or sink, and with nowhere to sit or lie down for the duration of his detention in the cell, except on a floor that was contaminated with human excrement and urine, and infested with cockroaches. (See Background, supra, at Section A(1).) If the evidentiary record bears out these allegations, this Court would be hard-pressed to conclude that these conditions were less unsanitary than those described in Darnell. See also Rodriguez, 2018 WL 1276826, at *4 (finding plaintiff's allegations that he had been held for three days in overcrowded and unsanitary cells at the AMKC, with inoperable sinks and toilets "leading to detainees relieving themselves on the floor of the cells," to be sufficient to state an objective deprivation). While the conditions described in Willey were, in some respects, more extreme (as the plaintiff in that case contended that officers intentionally placed a Plexiglas cell shield over the bars of his cell, and then knowing that the cell would then have no ventilation, deliberately prevented his toilet from flushing, Willey, 801 F.3d at 57, and that the plaintiff was later left naked for two weeks in other unsanitary conditions, see id. at 58), "the gradation between the conditions of confinement at issue" in this case and in Willey "may speak to damages, not the absence of an objective constitutional deprivation." Darnell, 849 F.3d at 37-38.
Using some of the same arguments that the Second Circuit rejected in Darnell, Defendants maintain that the relatively short duration of Plaintiff's confinement should be viewed as a bar to his suit. Defendants contend, for example, that "overcrowding" is generally only actionable if a pretrial detainee is subject to such a condition over "an extended period of time." (Def. Mem., at 9 (quoting Hallett v. Davis, No. 11cv4646 (WHP), 2012 WL 4378020, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 25, 2012)).) Defendants add that lack of access to a shower "for as much as 14-days is too brief a period to constitute an objectively serious deprivation of an inmate's constitutional rights" (id., at 10 (citing McCoy v. Goord, 255 F. Supp. 2d 233, 260 (S.D.N.Y. 2003)), and further argue that "temporary denial of access to a mattress" (which is how Defendants construe Plaintiff's claim that he was only able to sit and sleep on the floor) "does not rise to the level of a sufficiently serious deprivation necessary to state a claim of deliberate indifference" (id., at 11 (citing Rahman v. AMKC Warden, No. 10cv4402 (BMC), 2010 WL 4025614, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 13, 2010))).
Tellingly, Defendants never directly address the most serious of the conditions about which Plaintiff complains - i.e., his allegation that the floor "was covered with feces and urine," as well as old food and cockroaches, and that his only option for sitting or sleeping over a four-day period was in a tightly cramped space on that very floor. (Am. Compl., at 4; see also supra, at n.5.) Rather, Defendants blandly characterize Plaintiff's allegations regarding non-functional toilets as asserting a denial of "access to personal hygiene needs" (id., at 10), and - without mentioning the feces or urine that Plaintiff claims was on the floor - describe his allegations regarding the lack of cleanliness of the cell as "non-specific" and "conclusory" (id., at 11). Defendants also quote Burns v. Witterstein, No. 13cv6835, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 115207, at *15 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 18, 2014), for the proposition that "the '[p]resence of, and exposure to, vermin in a prisoner's housing area does not constitute punishment under the Eight[h] Amendment'" (Def. Mem., at 11), which side-steps the issue here. Even accepting that Eighth Amendment standards should be considered equivalent to 14th Amendment standards with respect to the objective severity of the claimed conditions of confinement, see Darnell, 849 F.3d at 30; see also Figueroa v. Cty. of Rockland, No. 16cv6519 (NSR), 2018 WL 3315735, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. July 5, 2018), the threshold issue presented for the Court is whether the entirety of the conditions alleged by Plaintiff, "analyzed in combination, not in isolation," could rise to the level of an objective constitutional deprivation, Darnell, 849 F.3d at 32.
Not only may "unsanitary conditions lasting for mere days" be objectively serious, Walker, 717 F.3d at 127, but, as expressly noted in Darnell, "[a]n overcrowded cell . . . may exacerbate the effect of unsanitary conditions," Darnell, 849 F.3d at 32; see also Rodriguez, 2018 WL 1276826, at *3 (plaintiff's allegation that he was prevented from sleeping due to a combination of the overcrowded and unsanitary conditions of holding cells was sufficient to plead an objectively serious deprivation). That is exactly what Plaintiff is claiming here, when he alleges that the "floor of the intake standing cell was covered with feces and urine also old food spread as roaches," and that, as a result of extreme overcrowding, the detainees in the cell "were only able to sit and sleep on the floor with these type[s] of conditions." (Am. Compl., at 4.) Viewing Plaintiff's allegations collectively and evaluating them "in light of contemporary standards of decency," Darnell, 849 F.3d at 30, this Court cannot find that four days was objectively too short a period of time for Plaintiff to have endured the claimed conditions before they could be found to have risen to the level of a constitutional violation. Indeed, in Darnell, the Second Circuit noted that
the defendants' theory appears to be that state officials are free to set a system in place whereby they can subject pretrial detainees awaiting arraignment to absolutely atrocious conditions for twenty-four hour periods (and perhaps more) without violating the Constitution so long as nothing actually catastrophic happens during those periods. That is not the law. . . [O]ur Constitution and societal standards require more, even for incarcerated individuals, and especially for pretrial detainees who cannot be punished by the state.Darnell, 849 F.3d at 37 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). In accordance with this reasoning, this Court finds that Plaintiff's factual allegations regarding the severity of the unsanitary conditions to which he was exposed, together with the duration of his exposure, are sufficient to plead that the conditions constituted an objective constitutional deprivation.
b. Subjective Knowledge or Recklessness
It is on the subjective prong of the deliberate-indifference standard that Defendants, in their motion, focus on the supposed need for Plaintiff to name an individual defendant in the action. Defendants' apparent assertion that Plaintiff simply cannot proceed in this case against the City, absent the pleading of a claim against an individual defendant (see Def. Mem., at 6) ignores the fact that a Monell claim need not be dependent on claims against individual officers, see Askins, 727 F.3d at 253; Barrett, 194 F.3d at 350. As set out above, a plaintiff asserting a 14th Amendment claim based on unconstitutional conditions of confinement may establish that the municipality acted with the requisite mens rea by showing that it had actual or constructive notice of the challenged conditions, but unreasonably failed to address them. (See Discussion, supra, at Section II(A)(1)(b).)
Here, Plaintiff alleges in his Amended Complaint that he made "many repeated" oral complaints regarding the conditions of his confinement to the officers who were present at the time, but that, despite those complaints, the unsanitary and unsafe conditions were not remedied. (Am. Compl., at 4 (describing the condition of the floor and the lack of any other place to sit or sleep, and then alleging, "It was br[ought] to the attention verbally [of] whomever - John or Jane Doe that were (sic) available or present in the City of New York Correctional Facility AMKC/C-95, many repeated times [from] 11/1/15 [to] 11/4/15 [and] nothing was done"). Allegations by a plaintiff that he spoke directly with facility officers about unsafe conditions in his cell, but that, despite such complaints, the conditions remained unchanged, have been held sufficient to plead the subjective prong of a deliberate-indifference claim, at least as against those officers. See Walker, 717 F.3d at 119. In this instance, Plaintiff has not only alleged that he made complaints to every officer who patrolled the area of the intake cell, over a period of four days, but he has also clarified, in opposition to Defendants' motion, that these officers included captains on different shifts. (See 5/23/18 Tr., at 4.)
Even apart from his complaints, though, if the conditions in the intake cell were as foul as Plaintiff alleges, and if as many detainees were placed in that cell as Plaintiff describes, then it would be difficult to believe that officials in charge of overseeing the intake area would have lacked awareness of those conditions. See Farmer, 511 U.S. 842 (noting that "actual knowledge" is a question of fact, and that evidence that a substantial risk was "obvious" could lead a finder of fact to conclude that officers had knowledge of that risk); see also Walker, 717 F.3d 119, 125 ("Evidence that a risk was obvious or must have otherwise been known to a defendant may be sufficient for a fact finder to conclude that the defendant was actually aware of the risk" (international quotation marks and citation omitted)); Gaston v Coughlin, 249 F.3d 156, 166 (2d Cir. 2001) (finding, on summary judgment, that plaintiff's "statement that [officers] had actual knowledge of the inhumane conditions to which he was subjected" was sufficient to allow claim against those officers to proceed, and that the statement was "not . . . conclusory because it was premised on the assertion that those men 'made daily rounds' [of the area where the plaintiff was confined]" (record citation omitted)). While Plaintiff's allegations lack specificity regarding the identities of the officers to whom he complained and the exact contents and timing of his various complaints, Plaintiff's allegations do spell out a number of details regarding the unsanitary and overcrowded conditions of the cell, and those allegations, taken as true, suggest that the conditions - including the floor's being covered with feces and urine, and the lack of room for detainees to sit or sleep, except on the floor - would have been evident to anyone responsible for the facility. At a minimum, Plaintiff's allegations regarding the extent of the contamination of the intake cell at the AMKC, and its persistence over a period of at least several days, permit the reasonable inference that the City "should have known" of the claimed constitutional deprivation.
In deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a court must, as set out above, construe pro se allegations liberally, accept them as true for purposes of the motion, and draw every reasonable inference in the plaintiff's favor. See McCarthy, 482 F.3d at 191; Triestman, 470 F.3d at 474. Furthermore, "[d]etermining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief [is] . . . a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. In this instance, Plaintiff has plausibly alleged that the unsanitary conditions of the intake cell, as exacerbated by overcrowding, were objectively serious enough to give rise to a constitutional violation. Further, applying common sense to Plaintiff's allegations, this Court finds that, even apart from his assertions that he made repeated complaints to multiple officers, Plaintiff's pleaded description of the severity and duration of the claimed conditions give rise to a reasonable inference that the City knew or should have known about them. Finally, this Court finds that Plaintiff has plausibly alleged that, despite being on actual or constructive notice, the City, over the course of Plaintiff's confinement, intentionally or recklessly failed to act with reasonable care to ameliorate the risks that the conditions posed to Plaintiff's health and safety. Accordingly, this Court finds that Plaintiff's allegations are sufficient to plead a municipal policy, custom, or practice of deliberate indifference to an unconstitutional deprivation, for purposes of Monell liability. See Outlaw, 884 F.3d at 380; Mahase, 2000 WL 263742, at *7.
While the evidentiary record, once developed, may or may not support Plaintiff's apparent assertion that the City was on actual or constructive notice of the unsanitary and overcrowded conditions in the intake cell, but failed to act (see 5/23/18 Tr., at 7 (Plaintiff stating that, if discovery were to proceed, he would seek production of "grievances, work orders and complaints [about] the conditions")), it is not the Court's role, at this juncture, to make any judgments about the ultimate strength of the claim, see Velez, 401 F.3d at 80; Kopec, 922 F.2d at 155, but only to determine whether the allegations are sufficient to permit the claim to proceed.
I therefore recommend that Defendants' motion to dismiss be denied, to the extent Defendants seek dismissal of Plaintiff's conditions-of-confinement claim against the City.
B. Claim for Denial of Medical Care
In his original Complaint, Plaintiff specifically alleged that he was "denied medical treatment in a timely mann[e]r." (Compl., at 3.) Although he does not expressly make the same allegation in his Amended Complaint, Defendants state in their motion papers that, "[c]onstrued liberally, and read in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the Amended Complaint alleges that Defendants acted with deliberate indifference in failing to provide him with adequate medical treatment." (Def. Mem., at 13.) This Court agrees that, affording the Amended Complaint its most liberal construction, and reading it in light of Plaintiff's statements in opposition to the motion, Plaintiff may be trying to assert such a claim. Even drawing all reasonable inferences in Plaintiff's favor, though, this Court finds that he has not stated a facially plausible claim, see Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, that the City deliberately denied him treatment for an objectively serious medical condition.
To plead such a claim sufficiently under Section 1983 and the 14th Amendment, Plaintiff must again plead facts capable of satisfying the objective and subjective prongs of the applicable test for deliberate indifference. With respect to the first prong, Plaintiff must plausibly allege that he was deprived of treatment for a medical condition that, viewed objectively in the circumstances, was sufficiently serious to trigger constitutional protection. Lloyd v. City of New York, 246 F. Supp. 3d 704, 717 (S.D.N.Y. 2017). In other words, the objective prong, in this context, requires both "an actual deprivation of adequate medical care," Figueroa, 2018 WL 3315735, at *4 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Salahuddin v. Goord, 467 F.3d 263, 279 (2d Cir. 2006); Farmer, 511 U.S. at 844-47)), and a "sufficiently serious" deprivation, id. For the deprivation to be sufficiently serious, there must have been "'a condition of urgency, one that may produce death, degeneration, or extreme pain.'" Id. (quoting Hill v. Curcione, 657 F.3d 116, 122 (2d Cir. 2011)). As for the second prong, Plaintiff must plead facts from which it may be reasonably inferred that, despite the fact that the City knew or should have known of the deprivation, he was denied medical treatment as the result of the intentional or reckless application of an actual or de facto municipal policy or custom of deliberate indifference. See Darnell, 849 F.3d at 35; cf. Lloyd, 246 F. Supp. 3d at 719 (finding that City was "entitled to summary judgment on [p]laintiff's claim of deliberate indifference to her serious medical needs, because [p]laintiff [could] not show that [City defendants] knew or should have known that their acts or omissions posed an excessive risk to her health or safety"); Monell, 436 U.S. at 694.
1. Lack of Objective Severity of Medical Condition
In this instance, Plaintiff has not pleaded factual allegations sufficient to satisfy the "objective prong" of a deliberate-indifference claim for the denial of medical care. In the Amended Complaint, Plaintiff describes himself at the time of the alleged events as vomiting (as a reaction to the presence of feces and urine), dehydrated, and weak (Am. Compl., at 5), and, although this is not entirely clear, his allegations also suggest that he may have been suffering from severe depression at that time (see id., at 4 (describing various physical and mental injuries he allegedly sustained from exposure to the claimed conditions, and asserting that these "added to [his] severe depression"). In opposition to Defendants' motion, Plaintiff additionally informed this Court that he told officers that he was dehydrated and that he "[took] psych[] medication" (1/25/18 Tr., at 9), but that, during the four-day period of his detention in the intake cell, he "didn't see medical" (id., at 10).
Nowhere in either the Amended Complaint or his statements in opposition to Defendants' motion, however, has Plaintiff alleged that, absent immediate medical care, his life was placed at risk, or his health was placed at risk of serious degeneration, or he was placed at risk of extreme pain. While perhaps debilitating, the types of generalized conditions of physical weakness that Plaintiff describes in his pleading do not, in themselves, suggest a sufficiently serious medical condition. Compare, e.g., Cruz v. Medical Department Staff, No. 14-4078 (MAS), 2014 WL 6884246, at *3 (D.N.J. Dec. 4, 2014) (finding plaintiff's "vague allegation [of] headache pain and dizziness" to be insufficient to plead a serious medical need), with Zhang, 2018 WL 3187343, at *3, 8 (where detainee with known hypertension and cardiovascular disease was allegedly denied emergency care even when he showed extreme symptoms of cardiac distress - including "waking up during the night screaming and yelling about his shoulder and chest pain loudly enough to wake fellow inmates," pleading was sufficient to satisfy requirement of "sufficiently serious" condition). Similarly, Plaintiff's suggestion in his pleading that he had a psychiatric condition at the time of his detention does not, without more, suggest that he had a "condition of urgency." Hill, 657 F.3d at 122; see also Toliver v. Dep't of Corr., No. 10cv6298 (LAP) (JCF), 2012 WL 4510635, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 10, 2012) (recommending dismissal of plaintiff's claim that defendants had "violated his rights by denying him adequate medical and mental health care," where plaintiff had "failed to allege with any particularity that his medical needs . . . would pose an excessive risk to his health if he were denied services"), report and recommendation adopted, 2012 WL 4513435 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2012).
Further, Plaintiff has not alleged that he suffered any serious medical consequences from a denial of treatment - an allegation that could be relevant to the question of whether any medical condition that he may have had, at the time, was objectively severe. See, e.g., Smith v. Carpenter, 316 F.3d 178, 185-87 (2d Cir. 2003) (finding evidence that prisoner suffered no adverse consequences from being deprived of HIV medication for seven days could be considered by jury in determining whether the denial of medical care satisfied objective "serious medical need" standard). While Plaintiff claims that he suffered physical and psychological harm from being exposed to unsanitary conditions, he has not claimed that he suffered any adverse consequences from any denial of medical treatment during the period of his detention in the intake cell.
Even read liberally and most favorably to Plaintiff, his allegations thus do not plausibly suggest that he was suffering from a medical condition that was objectively serious enough to support a constitutional claim for the denial of medical care.
2. Lack of Allegations of Subjective Intent or Recklessness
Additionally, although the Court need not reach the question of whether Plaintiff's allegations are sufficient to plead the "subjective prong" of his denial-of-medical-care claim, his pleading would fail on that ground, as well. As discussed above, it is reasonable to infer from Plaintiff's allegations that, given the obvious severity of the unsanitary and overcrowded conditions claimed to have existed in the intake cell and Plaintiff's "repeated" complaints about those conditions (Am. Compl., at 4), City officials should have known of those conditions, such that the persistent failure to address them could suggest the existence of a municipal policy or practice of deliberate indifference to those conditions. Plaintiff, though, has offered nothing from which this Court could similarly infer that any officers at the AMKC knew or should have known that he had a serious medical condition that required attention. Plaintiff's Amended Complaint, even if deemed supplemented by his statements in opposition to Defendants' motion to dismiss, simply does not allege that he placed anyone on notice that he was suffering from any kind of medical condition, much less a serious condition that could reasonably be viewed as giving rise to an urgent need for treatment. At most, Plaintiff has stated that he informed duty officers that he was dehydrated and that he took "psych medication." As to the dehydration, however, Plaintiff has also alleged that he refused water when provided (see Am. Compl., at 4), and, as to any psychiatric medication, he has nowhere alleged that he informed any officer that his being deprived of certain medication would place him at urgent risk of serious health consequences.
Additionally, Plaintiff has identified no "policy, custom, or practice" of the City that allegedly caused him to have been deprived of needed medical care. Plaintiff does not allege, for example, that the City ignored reports or recommendations regarding past inadequacies in medical care at Rikers Island, and that this directly resulted in the similar inadequacy of care in his particular case. See Zhang, 2018 WL 3187343, at *9 (where detainee at Rikers Island died as the alleged result of the denial of cardiac care, and where decedent's family alleged that the City had ignored, inter alia, reports of similar health care deprivations at the facility in the past, including other deaths "under similar circumstances," court found complaint sufficient to plead "an official policy or custom" of providing inadequate medical services to detainees, and a "causal link" between that policy or custom and the violation of the decedent's due-process rights). Plaintiff also does not allege anything akin to what was pleaded in Rodriguez - a Rikers Island case in which the plaintiff alleged a "de facto policy '[of] mak[ing] medical treatment available only on certain days and thus requir[ing] detainees to wait for medical treatment' for unreasonably long periods of time." Rodriquez, 2018 WL 1276826, at *7 (record citations omitted). In short, Plaintiff in this case has pleaded no facts from which any inference could be drawn that (a) any officers at the AMKC knew or shown have known that he had a medical condition of urgency that required care, and (b) that he was denied such care as a result of a municipal policy, custom, or practice. Thus, this Court finds that Plaintiff has not pleaded facts capable of satisfying either prong of a deliberate-indifference claim against the City, based on any failure to provide him with medical treatment.
As noted above, a pro se complaint should not be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) without first affording the plaintiff leave to amend, if there is any possibility that amendment could cure the pleading deficiency. See Gomez, 171 F.3d at 795. In this case, however, Plaintiff has already been granted leave to amend, by way of an Order To Amend that expressly informed him that any claim for inadequate medical care would need to allege "a 'sufficiently serious' [medical] condition that 'could result in further significant injury or the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.'" (Order To Amend, at 5 (quoting Harrison v. Barkley, 219 F.3d 132, 136 (2d Cir. 2000).) In his Amended Complaint, filed pursuant to the Order To Amend, Plaintiff did not proceed to allege such a condition, and nothing in his opposition papers or statements on the record to this Court gives any indication that he would be able to do so.
The Order To Amend in this case predated Darnell, which clarified that the subjective prong of the deliberate-indifference test should be analyzed differently under the Eighth and 14th Amendments (for convicted prisoners and pretrial detainees, respectively), and the Order To Amend therefore incorrectly set out the Eighth Amendment standard for the subjective prong of the test, even though this is a 14th Amendment case. (See Order To Amend, at 6 (stating, with respect to a claim for denial of adequate medical care, that "a plaintiff must show that a defendant 'knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety . . .'" (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837)).) Despite this error, the Order To Amend correctly informed Plaintiff as to the standard governing the objective prong of the test, yet, as discussed above, Plaintiff's Amended Complaint, even read in light of his statements in opposition to the motion, still fails to plead facts capable of satisfying that prong. Under these circumstance, the Court need not grant Plaintiff further leave to amend.
Accordingly, I recommend that Defendants' motion to dismiss be granted, to the extent the motion seeks dismissal of Plaintiff's claim that he suffered a constitutional deprivation of adequate medical care.
CONCLUSION
For all of the foregoing reasons, I respectfully recommend that Defendants' motion to dismiss the Amended Complaint (Dkt. 14) be granted to the extent Defendants seek dismissal of Plaintiff's claim for the unconstitutional deprivation of medical care, but denied to the extent Defendants' seek dismissal of Plaintiff's conditions-of-confinement claim. I further recommend that the Court sua sponte dismiss all claims asserted by Plaintiff against the AMKC, as it is not a suable entity, leaving only Plaintiff's condition-of-confinement claim against the City remaining,
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C) and Rule 72(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the parties shall have 14 days from the date of this Report and Recommendation to file written objections. See also Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a) and 6(d) (allowing three additional days where service has been made by mail). Any requests for an extension of time for filing objections must be directed to the Honorable George B. Daniels, U.S.D.J. If Plaintiff wishes to file an objection to this Report and Recommendation, or a response to any objection made by Defendants, or a request for an extension of time, Plaintiff's submission should be filed through the Court's Pro Se Office, at the United States Courthouse, 500 Pearl Street, Room 200, New York, New York 10007. FAILURE TO OBJECT WITHIN 14 DAYS WILL RESULT IN A WAIVER OF OBJECTIONS AND WILL PRECLUDE APPELLATE REVIEW. Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 106 S. Ct. 466, 88 L. Ed. 2d 435 (1985); IUE AFL-CIO Pension Fund v. Herrmann, 9 F.3d 1049, 1054 (2d Cir. 1993); Frank v. Johnson, 968 F.2d 298, 300 (2d Cir. 1992); Wesolek v. Canadair Ltd., 838 F.2d 55, 57-59 (2d Cir. 1988); McCarthy v. Manson, 714 F.2d 234, 237-38 (2d Cir. 1983).
If Petitioner does not have access to cases cited herein that are reported only on Westlaw or Lexis, he may request copies from Respondents' counsel. See Local Civ. R. 7.2 ("Upon request, counsel shall provide the pro se litigant with copies of [cases and other authorities cited therein that are unpublished or reported exclusively on computerized databases] as are cited in a decision of the Court and were not previously cited by any party."). Dated: New York, New York
August 21, 2018
Respectfully submitted,
/s/_________
DEBRA FREEMAN
United States Magistrate Judge Copies to: The Hon. George B. Daniels, U.S.D.J. Mr. Blas Van Hoven
17A4266
Sing Sing Correctional Facility
354 Hunter Street
Ossining, NY 10562 Defendants' counsel (via ECF)
Although Plaintiff informed the Court that he was scheduled to be released from custody on August 2, 2018 (see Dkt. 33), he has not yet provided the Court with a new address where he may be reached. This Court notes, however, that Plaintiff has shown reasonable diligence in the past with regard to keeping the Court informed of changes to his contact information (see Dkts. 11, 19, 23, 28), and I therefore do not recommend, at this time, that Plaintiff's Amended Complaint be dismissed for failure to prosecute.